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Comparing societies in Conflict 
The comparison of societies is one of the staples of social 
science, yet it is one of the most problematic practices in 
the profession. The attractions of comparative studies are 
not hard to find. The most basic is probably no more than 
this; to compare is an inescapably human preoccupation - an 
intellectual reflex. Added to this, the morphology of 
societies in the last hundred years or so has displayed an 
exciting and intriguing dissonance between integration and 
the reassertion of diversity. Shaped by imperialism and the 
various transformations for which 'modernisation' is a 
convenient shorthand term, the world has shown signs of 
developing into a single political system, a global society 
and a world economy. At the same time, and often in 
deliberate reaction to these developments, the consciousness 
of national, ethnic, racial, religious and other forms of 
diversity has mocked too hasty presumptions of confidence in 
their ineluctable progress. This dissonance between the 
development of uniformity and the re-statement of 
singularity helps to fuel several of the most durable 
conflicts of our time, which appear to share pathological 
~ymptoms visible with depressing regularity to the most 
casual television viewer. These conflicts co-exist clumsily 
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with a common global discourse of democracy, self-
determination and human rights, a common political structure 
in the territorial (nominally 'nation') state, and an 
increasingly common experience of global patterns of 
production and consumption. The competitive juxtaposition of 
shared and singular elements in conflict situations is a 
powerful stimulus to comparative studies 
It is against such a background that opportunities for 
comparative study of Northern Ireland and South Africa 
present themselves. Both these societies are marked by their 
histories as colonies of settlement. The consequences of 
conquest and dispossession have made themselves felt in 
discrimination and exclusion, material and status 
inequalities and subjective identities of settler and 
native. These in turn are codified in rival claims to self-
determination which are pursued through similar discourses 
of partition, accommodation and assimilation. Endemic 
political violence in both societies has displayed 
dimensions of armed struggle, counter-insurgency and 
communal hostility. 
Not surprisingly, each similarity is diluted by differences 
of nuance or degree. Among these are the respective 
distances from and nature of the relationship to the 
metropole and metropolitan influence. The demographic make-
up and nature of economic resources available for 
exploitation are quite different in each case. There is 
sharp divergence in the degree to which each has been an 
'international issue'. Forms of identity and claims to self-
determination contradict as well as complement each other. 
Such differences prompt understandable fears that in 
comparative studies each national component may receive less 
than its due. Naturally enough, those who have established a 
degree of mastery over single cases (and perhaps who have 
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considerable intellectual and even emotional capital tied up 
in them) are sceptical of what they see as glib and self-
interested comparisons by those who probably know less at 
primary level and first hand. 1 
Similarity and singularity co-exist confusingly, emphasising 
seductive comparative possibilities at one moment and 
sizable obstructions at the next. The issue is clouded 
further by the fact that comparison is not always a 
disinterested activity. A useful strategy for an isolated 
and unpopular regime is to put itself 'in perspective' by 
comparison with other conflicts involving similar (or 
allegedly similar) elements l~ke ethnicity and rival 
nationalisms. South Africa is a case in point. Something of 
this sort was certainly going on in the rash of comparative 
concern about 'plural societies', in conferences, projects 
and publications funded by Department of Information front 
organisations in the mid-1970s, before such practices were 
revealed in the 'Muldergate' scandal. In direct lineage from 
these dubious enterprises, the South African government's 
attempts to market consociationalism in the 1980s as a 
panacea for the ills of 'divided societies' are worthy of 
mention. As a result, South African opposition movements 
have tended to be suspicious of any comparative dimension to 
the study of South African conflicts, no matter how 
disinterested or potentially fruitful. Anything which 
undermined the view of apartheid as sui generis and uniquely 
evil put at risk the gains of hard-fought political 
struggle. 
This has not prevented others claiming honorific affinity 
with South African liberation movements themselves. 
Identifying Northern Ireland Protestants as a 'labour 
aristocracy'; 
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.. allowed the Adams axis to provide an 
internationally appealing version of their 
struggle. Just as the IRA and Sinn Fein were 
presented as the equivalents of the ANC and 
the PLO, the very substantial obstacle to a 
united Ireland represented by the Protestant 
community was identified with 'privileged 
colon' reaction from Algeria to Israel and 
South Africa. 2 
Indeed the South African comparison is one that Sinn Fein 
president Gerry Adams is fond of deploying,3 although such 
unfavourable juxtapositions of Ulster Protestants and 
Afrikaners have also come from other, less predictable 
sources. For instance, a first secretary at the British 
embassy in Washington caused a furore by comparing Ulster 
Protestants to Afrikaners at a meeting of representatives of 
investment organisations in Boston: 
He said of the Ulster Protestants: "They have 
a lot in common with the - it sounds unfair 
to say this but it's true - with the 
Afrikaners in South Africa or the Zionists in 
the kibbutzes in Israel •• and they have 
embarrassed successive British governments by 
proclaiming their loyalty to the Crown and to 
the Union. n4 
In fact, such argument by analogy is a staple in ~he 
discourse of conflict in and around societies like Northern 
Ireland and South Africa. Participants in such conflicts 
habitually try to gain moral purchase by investing their own 
cause with reflected legitimacy, or an opponent's with 
second-hand opprobrium. 5 In a sense, this phenomenon is one 
of the best arguments for comparative studies of societies 
in conflict, and one of the best counter-arguments to the 
custodians of singularity. Comparison is a fact of life in 
societies like Northern Ireland and South Africa; 
politicians do it,6 journalists do it, the person in the 
street does it. 7 As a result, there is all the more reason 
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for academic social scientists to do . it systematically and 
well. 
Perspectives in the Literature 
Despite the intellectual challenges which are clearly 
signalled in surface similarities between the two societies 
and the imperative of evaluating widely held popular 
assumptions about parallels between them, n •• with notable 
exceptions, scholars have been curiously reluctant to embark 
on systematic comparisons which aim at drawing conclusions 
by viewing South Africa, Northern Ireland and Israel 
together n • 8 The literature is indeed quite sparse. Self-
consciously comparative writing on South Africa and Northern 
Ireland embraces journalistic accounts9 and articles by 
academic writers in journalistic format lO as well as longer 
more systematic treatments. The latter include overviewsl1 
and those with more specific focus. l2 Even without explicit 
comparison, the juxtaposition of case studies from Northern 
Ireland and South Africa in thematically-organised 
collections suggests affinity and comparison. 13 
The collection edited by Giliomee and Gagiano includes some 
directly comparative chapters and others which focus 
individually on Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel. 
The comparative dimension has two principal thrusts. The 
first is the conceptual framework of 'divided societies' 
which permeates many of the chapters. Indeed its influence 
extends to those contributions which express scepticism 
about its applicability across the board, giving the 
collection a useful dimension of internal debate. The second 
is provided by the notion of 'settler societies' which 
strongly influences several of the chapters. l4 
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The two most systematically developed works which deal with 
both Northern Ireland and South Africa are Donald Akenson's 
God's peoples15 and stanley Greenberg's Race and state in 
Capitalist Development. 16 These studies have three common 
characteristics which are worth noting at the outset of this 
one. The first is that both deal with the two societies as 
part of wider comparative frameworks. Akenson brackets 
Ulster PresbyteriansI7 and Afrikaners along with Zionists as 
creators and holders of 'covenantal cultures'. In 
Greenberg's work, Northern Ireland and Israel play minor 
supporting roles as 'related settings' in a much more fully 
worked-out thesis involving economic growth and racial 
domination in South Africa and Alabama. 
Secondly, in terms of an influential classification of 
comparative studies, both works lean towards the 'parallel 
demonstration of theory' in which; 
•• the reason for juxtaposing case histories 
is to persuade the reader that a given, 
explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory 
can" repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness -
its ability convincingly to order the 
evidence - when applied to a series of 
relevant historical trajectories. IS 
Thirdly, neither study focuses directly on political systems 
or political movements. Akenson at times sounds like a 
particularly zealous cultural determinist for whom systems 
of belief very largely shape social patterns and political 
structures. In Israel, Northern Ireland and South Africa, 
.... mind literally overcomes matter ... 19 His principal 
interest is in the 'covenantal grid' he claims to discern in 
the three societies, the 'cultural wiring' derived from the 
Old Testament which underpins and animates the political 
behaviour of Ulster Protestants, Afrikaners and Israelis. On 
the whole, the political movements which articulated and 
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mobilised the interests and energies .of these groups are 
accorded the attention due to second-order phenomena. 
Greenberg is not as concerned to assert the claims of one 
explanatory dimension in the way Akenson is. But he too is 
not principally concerned with governments, parties and 
political movements. His focus is on farmers, workers and 
businessmen, and the dynamics of economic growth. While the 
fact that these 'class actors' were participants in popular 
political movements is obviously not unknown to him, he 
certainly does not emphasise it, and indeed acknowledges it 
only rarely. 
As the rest of this chapter should make clear, this study 
will differ from Akenson's and Greenberg's on all three of 
these counts. Its focus will be directly on Afrikaner 
Nationalism and Ulster Unionism in their various 
institutional forms and components, to the exclusion of 
third or further contexts and examples. It will, moreover, 
be concerned as much to discuss and explain contrasting 
elements of their life cycles, as well as to bring forward 
and account for essential similarities. 
Although Greenberg's and Akenson's work will be cited and 
discussed in the text that follows, some preliminary 
discussion is necessary. 
In God's Peoples, Donald Akenson has fashioned a powerfully 
argued thesis, according to which a belief system derived 
from the Old Testament has become embodied in states created 
respectively by Afrikaners, Israelis and Ulster Protestants. 
The dominant motif in this 'cultural grid' is the Covenant 
between God and a chosen people, while others include 
particular historical and legalistic modes of thought, 
attachment to a promised land, a disposition to make sharp 
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distinctions between the sacred and ~he profane, and a 
prominent place for blood sacrifice in group mythology. An 
essential feature of this grid is how the motifs dovetail 
into a self-reinforcing cultural st!ucture. According to 
Akenson, the parts of the belief system support each other, 
bestowing great durability on this structure, but when some 
cultural point of no return is reached and one component is 
irrevocably discredited, all are compromised and the whole 
structure comes apart. 
The predominant share of the book's energies is taken up in 
establishing the hegemony of the covenantal grid in shaping 
the Afrikaner, Ulster Protestant and Zionist cultures up to 
the point where they are embodied in their own states. The 
further development of these state systems is examined in 
rather less detail, and even less attention is paid to the 
subsequently declining influence of the Ulster Protestant 
and Afrikaner covenantal cultures. It is hard to recognise 
the confident cultures whose ascendancy Akenson traces and 
plots over three centuries in his portraits of chosen people 
overcome with doubt and confusion. The reader who has 
accepted Akenson's single-minded assertion of the virility 
and durability of covenanting cultures over the millennia 
since the Hebrew scriptures were written, and in the 
centuries of their development in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa may find this recessional postscript something of an 
anti-climax or even an enigma. 
Part of the problem lies in Akenson's assumption that 
\cultures' create states. In a broad sense this is probably 
true, but more specifically it is political movements which 
capture and exercise power, fashion and develop state forms. 
The holy myths and theologised patterns of thought which 
~ominate Akenson's analysis have had to co-exist in these 
movements with a conglomeration of secular political ideas 
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and interests. This co-existence can .be competitive as well 
as harmonious and it is one of the functions of political 
movements to integrate the various elements as best they 
can. In Akenson's account, such considerations are quite 
overshadowed by the hegemony of the cultural grid, which may 
amount to mistaking the part for the whole. If this were the 
case, the breakup of what were two quite diverse coalitions 
-- Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism -- could be 
made to appear more puzzling than necessary. 
The purpose of Greenberg's "parallel demonstration of 
theory" is to establish theoretical propositions about the 
relationship between capitalism and state-sanctioned systems 
of ethnic and racial discrimination. This orientation and 
the relative weight assigned to Northern Ireland among the 
four societies discussed, rule out a full-scale comparison 
of Northern Ireland and South Africa in Greenberg's work. As 
a result, it would be unfair to complain that Race and state 
in Capitalist Deyelopment does not provide this. 
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to point to shortcomings 
within the book's own terms of reference. For instance, a 
sUbstantial portion of Greenberg's thesis20 deals with the 
development of 'bounded' working classes,21 in which white 
workers in South Africa and Alabama, and Jewish workers in 
Israel, played their parts as 'dominant class actors' in 
racially divided societies. In an extraordinary and 
inexplicable omission, Protestant workers in Northern 
Ireland are not discussed, despite the fact that, arguably, 
the Protestant working class has been (in Greenberg's terms) 
the most important 'class actor,22 in the Northern Ireland 
situation. 23 Certainly, to discuss the phenomenon of 
'bounded' working classes without considering divisions in 
Northern Ireland's working class and the relationship 
.between the Protestant working class and the Unionist 
bourgeoisie detracts greatly from the concept's authority.24 
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A related problem is that although Greenberg invokes 
"'moments,' the events, facts and 'living men' without which 
'there is no historY''',25 the dominant tenor of his thesis 
is of the unfolding logic of economic systems, rather than 
the conflicts of competing political movements. 
Specifically, his readers could be forgiven for failing to 
grasp that Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism were 
vigorous popular political movements which articulated and 
integrated a rich variety of what were sometimes 
contradictory popular political positions. Moreover, while 
his designation of 'dominant classes' in each of his 
research settings is correct j his treatments of Northern 
Ireland and South Africa underestimate the extent to which 
Afrikaners and Protestants felt themselves to be threatened 
by the competing popular forces of Irish and African 
nationalisms, and in general how insecure their dominance 
could appear in their own eyes and understandings. 26 
The Subject of this Study 
These 'dominant classes' have begun to attract an increasing 
share of comparative attention in both popular27 and 
scholarly28 works. Indeed although revolutionary nationalist 
movements probably still hold superior attractions for most 
scholars, at least some people have come to share Patrick 
Buckland's concern that: 
•• it may be that far too much attention has 
been paid to the rise of nationalist 
movements in various parts of the world and 
insufficient acknowledgement given to their 
opponents, for the pace and nature of 
historical change is determined as much by 
the upholders of the status quo as by 
advocates of change. 29 
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Buckland's own summary of the Unionists' predicament (which 
has remained valid not only for the period of Home Rule 
agitation about which he was writing, but ever since) 
helpfully points up parallels with the Afrikaners: 
Like their colonial counterparts elsewhere, 
they were faced with three broad options as 
they saw power and privilege about to be 
ripped from their grasp. They could simply 
succumb. They could try to come to terms with 
the nationalists and carve out for themselves 
a position of influence in the new order. Or 
they could resist and try to maintain the 
status quo. 30 
The similarity of Ulster Protestants' and Afrikaners' 
predicaments is attributable to characteristics which the 
two groups have in common and to parallels in the historical 
forces which have shaped them. Both display a high degree of 
self-conscious identity and a propensity to define political 
association and conflict in 'group' terms. These 
characteristics are expressed in each case in a vigorously 
expressed aspiration to self-determination. It is true that 
the Ulster Protestants' determination to control their own 
political destiny has been more ambiguous than the 
Afrikaners' full-blown nationalism and claim to statehood. 
These ambiguities are best caught in the nature of 
'loyalism' and its place in the larger phenomenon of Ulster 
Unionism. 31 But whether or not loyalist versions of Ulster 
Unionism qualify as 'quasi-nationalism', 'proto-
nationalism', or 'unsatisfied nationalism',32 Ulster 
Protestants have made it clear at least since the 
introduction of the First Home Rule Bill that they reserve 
the right to determine their own political status 
independently of any understanding between British authority 
and the forces of Irish nationalism. This claim to self-
determination is the distinguishing mark of loyalism. 
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Both Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners inhabit industrial 
societies, (although rural interests are important in each), 
yet both draw on settler origins for this sense of identity 
and aspiration to self-determination. Both are physically 
situated among larger 'native' populations, which are 
regarded as at best culturally alien, and at worst, 
primordial enemies. Neither has unambiguous title to a well 
defined territory and both are economically integrated with 
those whom they reject politically. Each has attempted to 
concoct and control a political system in which it could 
claim to be a majority.33 Each has proceeded from the 
assumption that political absorption into the 'alien' 
majority is unacceptable, in the forms respectively of a 
united Ireland, and a unitary South Africa in which all 
would enjoy equal rights. As a result, both have faced 
endemic legitimacy crises associated with ethnic domination, 
discriminatory practices, repressive, de facto, one-party 
rule. Each has faced (especially in recent years) the 
dilemma of choice between accommodation and repression. 
An important feature of all this has been the effective 
political mobilisation of both groups or communities along 
ethnic lines. Both organised in response to crises; in the 
case of Afrikaners, impoverishment, urbanisation, resistance 
to British imperialism, and the dangers of economic and 
political competition from the black majority constituted 
the elements of the crisis. For Ulster Protestants, they 
were provided by the long-drawn-out confrontation between 
Irish nationalism and British imperialism which culminated 
in partition and the creation of Northern Ireland. 
After this period of growth, both matured in the capture and 
.exercise of state power. In each case, the movement has 
partly decayed in the context of a sharply renewed and 
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heightened legitimacy crisis. This in turn has been composed 
of resistance from those excluded from political power 
(respectively, blacks and Catholics), external pressures 
(respectively, from a broadly based movement in the 
international community, and from the British government) 
and social and economic changes internal to their own 
constituents. The fault line in each case has been between 
those who have tried to carry out reform from above 
(violating some of the populist and 'democratic' premises on 
which both movements were based), emphasising power-sharing 
to broaden the basis of government and those who have 
resisted such accommodating moves on the grounds that they 
presage surrender and assimilation. 
Considerations of Methodology 
On the face of it then, Ulster Unionism, and Afrikaner 
Nationalism (the movements which are the products of this 
mobilisation) have similar life-cycles, and the communities 
which produced them seem to share numerous structural 
similarities, to the extent that comparative study should be 
a worthwhile intellectual task. If this is the case, two 
preliminary questions present themselves; what should the 
study's methodological orientation be? And given that the 
main subject of the study is the life cycles of Afrikaner 
Nationalism and Ulster Unionism, what should be its 
principal focus? 
Skocpol and Somers' threefold classification of the 'logics' 
of comparative studies is very helpful on the methodological 
issue. A two-case comparison is probably two narrow for the 
"parallel demonstration of theory" or "macro-causal 
analysis"34 procedures and given the peculiarities of 
historical experience exemplified by Ulster Protestants and 
Afrikaners, it would be difficult to assemble a broad range 
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of comparable societies. 35 In any case, the number and 
strength of singularities displayed by the two cases suggest 
that the highlighting of contrast should be an important 
element of a comparative study. Under these circumstances, 
'the contrast of contexts' logic seems appropriate. Skocpol 
and Somers describe the aim of this approach as : 
••• to bring out the unique features of each 
particular case •• and to show how these 
unique features affect the working out of 
putatively general social processes .•• 
Whereas explicit theorising is characteristic 
of the Parallel type of comparative history, 
what matters more in the contrast-oriented 
type is that the historical integrity of each 
case as a whole is carefully respected. 36 
Such an approach seems fitting to groups (or 'peoples' or 
'nations') which constitute in Skocpol and Somers' terms 
"relatively irreducible wholes, each a complex and unique 
sociohistorical configuration in its own right". Given the 
considerable volume of the literatures on each of the cases, 
it is possible to carry out such a study largely (though not 
exclusively) through a synthesis and interpretation of 
secondary sources. 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism as Coalitions 
The principal focus is provided by what is now the widely-
accepted verdict that Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners were 
organised into coalitions of identity and interest, rather 
than the monoliths of self-serving imagination and popular 
misconception. Apart from offering more convincing 
interpretations of the two individual cases, the coalition 
idea bestQws a further dimension of similarity and incentive 
for comparison. As a result, this study looks at the 
' political and wider social movements which characterised the 
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internal organisation of Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners 
in terms of the fostering of unity and the integration of 
diversity. Among the themes to emerge, is the question of 
the coalitions' internal balances of power and the tension 
between the demands of leadership and control from above by 
dominant social and political actors, and the freedom of 
action from below to define the limits of legitimate 
leadership. 
The framework of comparison is provided by parallel cycles 
of growth, maturity and decay in the organisation and 
dissolution of the coalitions. In the growth phase (Chapters 
2 and 3) two main themes are .explored. Firstly, questions of 
the social composition and degree of integration of the 
coalitions are discussed. Secondly, comparative perspectives 
on the mythology and ideology of the movements are used to 
contrast their respective purposes and trajectories, and to ' 
throw further light on how they were internally organised. 
Issues of state-building (Chapter 4) dominate the maturity 
of Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism and further 
reflect on questions of purpose and direction. All phases 
are important in these comparable cycles, but arguably that 
of decay and dissolution is most important. The spectacle of 
groups organising on ethnic or other bases to achieve and 
wield state power is not unfamiliar. The spectacle of them 
fragmenting and relinquishing power is less well-studied and 
as a result receives particular attention here. In this way, 
Chapter 5 dwells on the crises which illegitimacy and their 
own internal strains brought to Afrikaner Nationalism and 
Ulster Unionism, while Chapter 6 discusses the dilemmas of 
reform, reaction and repression which resulted from these 
crises. As Chapters 7-9 relate, these dilemmas demonstrated 
in both cases the limits of cohesion under stress and 
brought about the fragmentation of the coalitions. 
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If successfully carried out, such a comparative exercise can 
serve useful purposes in clarifying and refining (or 
discrediting) popular conceptions or misconceptions of 
parallels between cases. In addition, the 'visibility' of 
one case can be increased by contrast with another, and 
sharper definition achieved. 37 There are other 
possibilities beyond these limited objectives however. 
Comparative discussion of the cyclical transformations of 
these movements can contribute to debate about such issues 
as the nature of ethnicity and class, and the relationship 
between them. Some of these issues are briefly addressed in 
Chapter 10, the concluding chapter of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CLASS AND THE FORMATION OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST AND AFRIKANER 
NATIONALIST COALITIONS! 
PERSPECTIVES ON CLASS COALITIONS 
One of the most striking features of Afrikaner Nationalism 
and Ulster Unionism has been the ability of these movements 
to attract and hold support from all social classes. In each 
case, solidarity and the imperative of undivided political 
leadership in a single political party have been essential 
to the movement's success. In both, warnings and injunctions 
against the dangers of disunity have been important elements 
of ideology. Above all, leaders have stressed the perils of 
class division. Many movements in different contexts have 
aspired to such an all-class composition, but the situations 
of Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism are similar in 
that they were shaped by colonial settlement, 
industrialisation and imperial power. These forces created 
societies which in each case were differentiated along lines 
of race, religion, ethnicity and class. 
There are several ways to understand the phenomenon of 
solidarity across class lines in societies such as these. It 
can be understood in its own terms as the natural, organic 
self-expression of self-determining communities and be made 
to illustrate the comparatively greater strength and 
durability of ethnic over other axes of division. On the 
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other hand, it can be viewed as aberrant, a form of 'false 
consciousness' attributable to the tradi ng of privilege for 
allegiance and the manipulation of insecurities and fears. 
Lastly, the reality of ethnic, racial and religious 
identities can be recognised, but in a way which allows them 
to be 'decomposed' and their temporal and circumstantial 
nature revealed. From this perspective there is nothing 
false about an attachment to such an identity, but the 
combinations of material interests and social forces which 
give them purchase are subject to change, and the validity 
of the identities may change with them. 
The principal antagonism raised by these competing 
frameworks lies in the claim that such all-class movements 
contradict or even refute class-based theories of political 
conflict. One authority explicitly links Ulster Protestants 
and Afrikaners in a work critical of Marxist class theory: 
White South African workers and Ulster 
Protestant workers are organized in social 
and political formations that differ 
profoundly from those of their counterparts 
in England or Scandinavia. The fact that each 
of the former two sets of workers is 
identified politically and morally far more 
closely with its own bourgeoisie than with 
its co-workers in the subordinate group 
suggests that the collective social 
attributes of those who embody labour are of 
decisive importance in analysing class 
formation. 1 
other writers have discussed the individual cases in similar 
terms2 and it is probably true to say that the successful 
integration of Protestant and Afrikaner wage earners in 
Northern Ireland and South Africa, into all-class political 
movements based on collective identities, constitutes a 
particularly serious challenge to the validity of class-
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based theories of politics. As the chief custodians and 
exponents of such theories, Marxist writers have responded 
to this challenge by producing sUbstantial bodies of work on 
Northern Ireland and South Africa in the last twenty years. 3 
These works are critical of both non-Marxist interpretations 
and earlier Marxist ones. They have set out to rework 
explanations of white and Protestant working class 
allegiances in more strictly materialistic terms, avoiding 
the implausibilities of earlier Marxist accounts based on 
the conception of false consciousness. At the same time they 
have taken issue with non-Marxist versions based on concepts 
like ethnic mobilisation. 4 Among the theoretical issues 
involved in these revisionist projects have been (in the 
case of South Africa) drawing and redrawing the lines 
dividing classes and re-assessing the grounds on which 
groups of people are assigned to one class or another. 5 In 
the case of Northern Ireland, re-evaluating the phenomenon 
of Unionism in the light of the uneven development of Irish 
capitalism6 and claiming an independence of identity and 
action for working class Protestants within Unionism,7 have 
been central to revisionist accounts. 
Although the overall intention is to offer more solidly-
grounded materialist explanations for Afrikaner Nationalism 
and Ulster Unionism, these works usually allow some causal 
weight to national, ethnic, religious and racial factors. On 
the other hand, the admission tends to be perfunctory and 
reluctant, while the exact relationships between material 
and non-material factors are never discussed at length. 
Related issues centre on how to explain the persistence of 
racial and religious antagonisms and identities into urban 
and industrialised environments, which are usually thought 
to be hostile to them,S and whether discriminatory practices 
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and systems of privilege are functional or dysfunctional to 
capitalism. 
These problems are shadowed by political questions which 
underlie the intellectual debates, and sometimes break 
surface. In general terms, these concern the priorities of 
class and nation in revolutionary struggle. The issues 
however are configured rather differently in the two cases. 
In Northern Ireland, it is the status of the Protestant 
working class which is emphasised and the question whether 
alliances between it and revolutionary groups can be 
contrived. In the case of South Africa, the emphasis is on 
the possibility of splits in. the ruling coalition along 
class lines and the opportunities such divisions might 
present to opposition forces. Underlying all of this, is the 
question of the composition of the nation, and the place of 
settler working classes within it. The stubborn myth that 
working-class Protestants could be won for nationalism or 
socialism (a belief now much attenuated) has been a durable 
element in Northern Ireland's struggles. That such 
possibilities have been so much more weakly expressed in the 
theory and practice of South African opposition provides an 
eloquent contrast between the two situations. 
In pursuing these various controversies, Marxist and non-
Marxist writers alike, often refer to Ulster Unionism and 
Afrikaner Nationalism as 'class coalitions' or 'class 
alliances'. The idea of a class coalition is a useful one, 
but as with all concepts, the more precision which attends 
its use, the better. As a first stage of refinement, it is 
worth pointing out that class coalition as a descriptive 
term can have both a weak and a strong meaning. Many 
political parties in advanced industrial societies are class 
.coalitions in the sense that they draw support from more 
than one class, and claim to represent or even embody the 
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national interest in an undivided society. In a strong sense 
however, a class coalition draws the support of all or 
nearly all members of a group in a divided society. It does 
this in explicit opposition to class politics, substituting 
some other ideal-type relationship -- national, religious, 
racial, ethnic -- or some combination of these to define the 
group in terms of what are claimed to be the society's 
principal divisions. 
Several features are useful in identifying and classifying 
class coalitions in this strong sense. The first is a dual 
recognition; that an organic community does exist but within 
it there are discrete interests which have to be 
accommodated. This sense of an organic community bestows a 
degree of permanence -- beyond, say, mere arrangements 
between political forces for the duration of a parliament. 
Recognition that the community is differentiated (and may 
even become divided) along class lines formalises the idea 
of coalition. This dual recognition ensures that class 
coalitions in the strong sense have an existence in a much 
wider context than merely the formal political system. 
Economic, social, industrial, religious, cultural and even 
paramilitary groups give identity and form to sub-groups and 
special interests. They complement political parties and 
ensure a high degree of mobilisation to combat alternative 
allegiances and identities, while at they same time they can 
limit political leaders' freedom of action. Where class 
coalitions are in power, such forms of organisation also 
help in blurring the lines between the organs and functions 
of state and party, especially coercive ones. 
If these features help to identify class coalitions, others 
help to classify them. Firstly, class coalitions may differ 
in the nature and degree of incorporation of their elements. 
Two models suggest themselves, representing the opposite 
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poles of hierarchy and autonomy. A class alliance might be a 
working arrangement between forces powerful in their own 
right, in which the partners retain a noticeable capacity 
for autonomous action. It might on the other hand result 
from a process of hierarchical incorporation in which some 
elements are kept firmly under control by others. The 
capacity for autonomous identity and action within a class 
coalition can be an important factor in its dynamics of 
maintenance and decay. Such possibilities prompt questions 
such as; to what extent do working class elements show a 
sense of class identity within class coalitions? To what 
extent are they capable of autonomous action? Do they have 
alternative choices or possible allies outside the confines 
of their situation? To what extent can they influence 
directions within it by direct action? 
Secondly, if coalitions can differ in their structure, then 
it is likely that processes of formation can differ too. 
These processes might include coercion, the destruction of 
independent political power especially of working classes, 
prior to their subordinate incorporation. They might also 
include trading privilege for allegiance, and the 
elaboration and promotion of identities and ideologies. This 
feature usefully reveals the binding elements in coalitions. 
An important factor here might be whether or not coalitions 
represent the coming together of already-formed classes, or 
whether classes are formed in the process of incorporation. 
A third feature involves the dynamics of coalitions, in the 
sense of their purposes and the driving forces which move 
them. Two tendencies might usefully be observed here. Some 
coalitions are driven predominantly by an external dynamic, 
in the sense of threats to a self-perceived group's autonomy 
and self-determination, to its culture and identity, and to 
its material welfare. Others are driven less by external 
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threat than by the need for a group to define and realise 
itself in political self-determination and economic 
development. In this way it could be useful to discriminate 
between aspirant and dominant coalitions. An important 
related topic is to assess which component of the coalition 
takes upon itself the task of defining goals (indeed of 
defining the group itself) and the degree of autonomy with 
which such leadership tasks can be undertaken. These points 
are also related to whether the coalition's internal state 
subsequent to its formation remains static or reflects 
trajectories of change. 
The purpose of the remainder. of this chapter is to discuss 
the nature of class coalitions in the context of the growth 
and rise to power of Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster 
Unionism. In its formative years, Ulster Unionism brought 
together the principal classes to which Ulster Protestants 
belonged. Substantial landowners well-ensconced in the 
British aristocracy and conservative establishment were 
prominent among the leaders, as were the Anglo-Irish 
imperial and military caste with whom they substantially 
overlapped. After the collapse of the Liberal Party in rural 
Ulster in the mid-1880s, tenant farmers gave their support 
to Unionism, In the cities, a sometimes uneasy alliance 
between the Protestant working class and the business 
classes mobilised the financial 9 and electoral resources on 
which Unionism was to depend. 
Afrikaner Nationalism also brought together rural and urban 
interests. Agriculture was represented by substantial Cape · 
wine and wheat farmers, and their maize-growing counterparts 
in the north. Nationalism's resources conspicuously lacked 
Unionism's developed industrial classes, and relied on those 
whom O'Meara evocatively calls 'cultural entrepreneurs' __ 
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teachers, clerics, journalists -- for whom language was a 
resource and a weapon, to provide vanguard leadership. 
Although both movements represented alliances between rural 
and urban interests, the main focus of this chapter will be 
on the incorporation of working-class elements into the 
coalitions. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
class politics threatens to expose ethnic or national 
movements to potentially devastating flank attack. Of all 
the elements in coalitions of this sort, working classes are 
the ones most exposed to competing and subversive 
conceptions of interest and solidarity, those most likely to 
take freedom of action upon themselves. Secondly, both 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism had to reproduce 
majority support in competitive electoral systems, and so 
working-class support was crucial for the reproduction of 
both movements. Thirdly, working-class elements have the 
reputation of being the most sectarian, the most racist and 
resistant to change in the respective coalitions. This 
aspect in particular will be important in explaining the 
decay of unity in both movements. For all these reasons, the 
integration of working classes into Ulster Unionism and 
. Afrikaner Nationalism was centrally important to the growth 
of these movements. Lastly, the phenomenon of the 'bounded 
working class,lO -- working class elements of dominant 
groups who define themselves in distinction to both 'their 
own' bourgeoisie and subordinate workers -- is the aspect of 
class coalitions which most explicitly contradicts class 
explanations of political allegiance and action, and hence 
poses interesting historical and political questions. 
By reviewing the bodies of literature on class factors in 
the growth of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism 
then, it ought to be possible to compare why, how, and with 
what effect these two class coalitions came into being, and 
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how they were maintained. It ought to be possible moreover 
to compare them in terms of the relative autonomy of their 
components. Such a comparison will be a useful basis on 
which to consider their eventual break up. 
THE FORMATION OF THE AFRIKANER NATIONALIST CLASS COALITION 
Since the incorporation of white working-class elements into 
the Afrikaner Nationalist class coalition came to be viewed 
as a problem requiring explanation, rather than as part of 
the ineluctable process of national self-realisation, it has 
motivated the production of a sizable literature. As noted 
above, many of these studies. have been carried out by neo-
Marxist scholars, taking issue with 'liberal' accounts of 
the white working class, and seeking to remedy shortcomings 
in earlier Marxist versions.!! The neo-Marxist versions have 
in turn attracted criticism,!2 while some contributions are 
less easy to classify. 
A noticeable tendency in these conflicting accounts of the 
white working class and its relationship to Afrikaner 
Nationalism, is the way in which they focus on different 
periods. Broadly speaking, neo-Marxists, in their attempts 
to discredit what they see as 'whig' interpretations of an 
inevitably unfolding nationalism, and to emphasise the 
temporary and material nature of the forces which made up 
the nationalist alliance, tend to foreshorten the process of 
incorporation. Non-Marxists, or those who advocate 
synthetic explanations stressing not only material but also 
ethnic, cultural and ideological factors, tend to argue that 
it was a longer and more continuous process.!3 
Bearing this important difference in mind, there are four 
main points of emphasis in accounts of the incorporation of 
working class elements into the Afrikaner nationalist class 
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alliance. These are; the effects of the colonial origins of 
the South African state and society on class formation; the 
struggles between white labour and capital on the 
goldfields, culminating in the Rand Revolt of 1922; the 
efforts of the Pact government (1924-29) to solve the 'poor 
white' problem; the intensive incorporation specifically of 
working-class Afrikaners into the nationalist coalition, 
after the formation of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (GNP) 
in 1934. 
Colonial Origins and White Class FOrmation 
Explaining the absence of a strong socialist movement across 
colour lines, Giliomee cites the centrality of South 
Africa's 'settler origins': 
Unskilled Afrikaner workers entering the gold 
or diamond mines never forgot that they, like 
their fathers, commanded a position of 
authority and superiority over Africans in 
the pre-industrial period. That, together 
with the political power and better education 
they enjoyed, made them resist the rigid 
industrial discipline and abuse to which the 
Africans were subjected. 14 
Making the same general point, Marks and Trapido cite the 
fact that: 
"Afrikaner workers brought with them a 
heritage of racist assumptions from the 
countryside which were frequently sharpened 
rather than undermined by the competition in 
town and the deliberate attempts of both 
capital and the state to manipulate the 
'faultlines' of race in an effort to maintain 
a racially hierarchical division of labour 
and a divided working class. 1S" 
Greenberg represents industrialisation and 
proletarianisation in South Africa as an enormous upheaval, 
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throwing together African peasants, Afrikaners forced from 
the land, and immigrants from allover the British Empire, 
"stirring together a seemingly endless variety of languages, 
cultures, skills and experiences". He continues; 
•• But the upheaval and emerging production 
relations had little impact on racial 
divisions that characterised European 
settlement in southern Africa from the 
seventeenth century. Assumptions that ruled 
the Colonial Office, the Kaffir Wars and 
Afrikaner farms were reconstructed for use in 
the mines and workshops.16 
Neo-Marxists have been less forthcoming with explanations 
rooted in pre-industrial attitudes, but the overall effect 
is of confusion, rather than outright rejection. Davies for 
instance invokes "racist consciousness" as a partial 
explanation for the white workers' struggle for a colour bar 
in the early twentieth century: 
•• In the twentieth century, as in the days 
of Kruger's republic, white workers who had 
nothing else to bargain with, came to 
consider that institutional privileges over 
their black fellow workers (whom their 
background I~ught them to regard as inferior) 
were vital. (emphases added) 
It is not clear from the context whether the "racist 
consciousness" would have been as important if the workers 
had anything else to bargain with. Elsewhere, Davies asserts 
the existence and importance of "racial prejudice and 
ideology,,,18 but criticises simons and Simons19 in 
contradictory terms because although they recognise .... the 
fundamental relations of capitalist exploitation and class 
struggle", they view the white working class in terms of 
"unfolding consciousness and historical anthropology".20 
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It is clear from a wide range of accounts, that the colonial 
context of South African industrialisation and class 
formation had an important role to play in preventing the 
emergence of a socialist movement which transcended racial 
boundaries. It also helped make white working-class people 
available for incorporation into a nationalist movement 
which elaborated and codified prejudice into explicit racial 
ideology. 
Conflict Between White Labour. Capital and the State 1900-
~ 
Central to most explanations . of the incorporation of white 
wage earners into the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance, is the 
assertion that subjugation was an important element in the 
process. During the first two decades of this century 
relations between capital and white labour on the gold mines 
were sharply antagonistic. These antagonisms had their roots 
in the nature of the gold mining industry under South 
African conditions. 21 The main features were high 
capitalisation and highly concentrated ownership, while the 
colonial structure of South African society forced African 
wages down to a fraction of whites'. Since the price of gold 
was fixed by factors outside the control of the industry, 
costs, especially labour costs, determined profitability. 
This fact was essential to conflict on the goldfields. Under 
these circumstances, the ratio of high-waged white to low-
waged black labour, the job colour bar and issues like 
deskilling and fragmentation were important in industrial 
conflicts which emerged during crises of profitability. 
Strikes in 1907, 1913 and 1914 marked particularly intense 
moments in this long-term antagonism. 
Yudelman argues that in the early days of the South African 
state: 
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•• a cr~s~s of gold mining profits .•• led 
inevitably to a crisis of the state itself: 
its legitimacy and economic viability were 
dependent on white employment and on gold 
mining revenue. Capital accumulation and 
state legitimation, then, were the major 
problems facing the fledgling South African 
state. 22 
In order to resolve conflicts between accumulation and 
legitimation, the state had to intervene. The Transvaal 
government had done so sporadically and unevenly between 
1902 and 1910, and like it, the Union government resorted to 
repression or incorporation as developing situations 
demanded. But when in 1921 the gold mining industry's cost 
crisis restated itself in forceful terms, both the 
imperative and the opportunity for more dramatic 
intervention and thoroughgoing reorganisation presented 
themselves: 
Both the government and mining capital, each 
for its own reasons, wanted to subjugate the 
white workers; both were eventually prepared 
for violence if necessary. The economic 
crisis provided a compelling rationale for 
subjugation and generated popular support to 
make it feasible ••• For the government, 
however, subjugation was not an end in 
itself. It was clear that a more permanent 
solution would have to follow, in which state 
intervention of a less dramatic type would be 
institutionalised on a continuing basis. 23 
Dealing with the same period, Davies argues that within a 
general context of "offensive struggles by mining capital" 
to reorganise the industry so that white employees could be 
restricted to "supervisory and mental functions", state 
policies had by 1919: 
••• succeeded in creating the objective 
conditions for the emergence of a sizeable 
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and significant white wage earning supportive 
class. 24 
According to Davies, as the gold price fell after the war, 
the contradictions of the costs crisis in the industry were 
too great for; 
m1n1ng capital in particular to be able .to 
secure the kind of economic changes it needed 
to make at the expense of the white wage-
earning classes and at the same time to 
maintain intact the ideological apparatuses 
which had functioned to secure the support of 
white wage earners for the form of state. 25 
When the crisis reached open conflict in the Rand Revolt of 
1922, the state revealed its partisan nature in the 
subjugation of the white mining unions. In this account, it 
was left to the alliance of the Nationalist and Labour 
parties in the Pact government to re-establish this support 
by incorporating the unions into a state-sponsored, 
bureaucratic system of industrial relations, and granting a 
number of economic concessions. Yudelman's account differs 
in that he denies that the Pact government represents a 
significant break in continuity with its predecessor, 
stating that the measures it took merely gave, .... more 
comprehensive and systematic form to the new industrial 
order whose foundations had been so securely laid by the 
South African Party government. n26 He is inclined moreover 
to stress the subjugation of the unions rather than the 
importance of the concessions and privileges granted to them 
by the Pact government. 
Nonetheless, these two interpretations of the period agree 
that as a result of their subjugation, the mining unions 
were depoliticised, robbed of their potential as, .... an 
independent 'militant' social force,,27 and entered into a 
close and dependent relationship with the state. 
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The 'Poor White Problem' and the Making of the White Working 
Class 
The coincidence between mining capital's need for large 
quantities of unskilled labour and the availability of an 
ultra-cheap, rightless and controllable labour force in the 
African population, condemned many thousands of unskilled 
whites to the status and material hardships of 'poor 
whiteism'. This numerous class of whites had been forced 
into the cities by war, drought, cattle disease, and the 
development of capitalist relations in the countryside. Its 
continued existence would threaten the stability and 
legitimacy of the state, but to accommodate its members on 
the mines would stretch the cost structure of the industry 
beyond endurance. 
The 'poor whites' were in a sense up for 
grabs •• The historic possibilities ahead of 
them were several and the question of how to 
win them over and regain their loyalties in a 
class society exercised all the energies of 
competitive elites and ambitious politicians. 
They were as well a potentially untamed mob, 
a threat to the propertied. 28 
The poor white problem was a staple ingredient in South 
African politics from the beginning of the century until a 
combination of racial protective legislation, the 
development of manufacturing industry and the effects of 
World War II solved it by the late forties. The issue was 
central to successive phases of a complex historical process 
of incorporating the white working class in a capitalist 
order in South Africa. 
Before 1919, the state resorted to several strategies to 
incorporate unemployed white incomers to urban areas. These 
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included educational and training schemes to socialise 
whites into manual labour and to give them advantages over 
blacks; reservation of jobs in state employment; persuasion 
of employers in the private sector; schemes of land 
settlement. The Pact government relied on the use of state 
employment (especially on the railways) on the same pattern 
as previously, but in extended form. It also passed a 
packag.e of measures (including the Wage Act, and customs 
Tariff Act) aimed at encouraging the employment of whites in 
the private sector. The combined effect of these two arms of 
this 'civilised labour policy' was greatly to increase the 
absolute numbers of whites in working-class categories 
(especially the unskilled ones) and the proportion of white 
people thus employed. For instance, between 1924 and 1933, 
the proportion of unskilled white workers on the railways 
rose from 9.5% to 39.3% while that of Africans fell from 75% 
to 48.9%29 According to O'Meara, by 1939 nearly 40% of 
Afrikaners were clustered in four occupational categories; 
unskilled labourer, mineworker, railway worker and 
bricklayer. 30 
The measures taken by the Pact government did not solve the 
poor white problem. In fact, while there may have been 
between 150 000 and 200 000 poor whites when the Pact came 
to power in 1924,31 in 1932, one estimate put their numbers 
at 300 000. 32 Nevertheless, by co-ordinating and extending 
previous measures, they did absorb significant numbers of 
whites into the political and economic systems. They also 
provided the pattern for further incorporation which would 
be brought about by economic growth in the boom years after 
the abandonment of the gold standard and the intensive 
efforts of the National Party both before and after it came 
to power in 1948. 
The National Party and the White Working Class 
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The developments summarised thus far reflect two relatively 
continuous processes. In the first, white workers forfeited 
the capacity to confront the state or capital in return for 
a place within a bureaucratic system of industrial relations 
and a measure of privilege and protection. In the second, 
landless whites were transformed into urban workers, 
sponsored directly or indirectly by the state. These 
developments helped to underwrite white working-class 
support for the South African state, but did not reflect 
direct incorporation into a specific political movement. The 
political loyalties of white workers (including of course a 
growing number of Afrikaners) were divided among the main 
white political parties, especially the Labour Party. The 
project of securing the allegiance of the Afrikaner workers 
became an important preoccupation of Afrikaner Nationalists 
between 1934 and 1948. 
The most comprehensive treatment of this subject is that of 
O'Meara. 33 The purpose of his account is to 'demystify' 
Afrikaner Nationalism and to locate it in the material world 
of social classes and the shifting alliances of class 
'fractions', rather than as " •• either the product of culture 
itself, or as the collective psychology of a culturally pre-
defined group,'Afrikanerdom,,,.34 Central to this 
interpretation is the role played by the Broederbond as the 
representative of petty bourgeois35 interests in the 
Transvaal, which were left isolated by fusion and the 
creation of the United Party in 1934. A measure of this 
isolation is the fact that only one Transvaal member of the 
Nationalist Party joined the GNP at this juncture. 
During the 1930s, the Bond initiated two 
moveme~t~ which were to give kultuurpolitiek 
a spec1f1c class content, politicising class 
cleavages in cultural terms and finally 
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succeeding in interpellating a new subject --
the Afrikaner volk. These were the assault on 
the trade unions, and the economic movement. 
The first mobilised working class support, 
whilst the second made explicit the economic 
basis and petty-bourgeois character of 
Afrikaner Nationalism. 36 
In attempting to use trade unionism interpreted in ethnic 
and cultural terms, the Broederbond's principal objective 
was that newly-proletarianised Afrikaners would see their 
material interests in national rather than class terms, and 
thus be available to provide the mass base which would 
propel the GNP into power. The Mineworkers' Union (MWU) was 
the centrepiece of the Broederbond's effort. The mining 
industry's strategic position in the economy was one 
incentive for this choice, as was the fact that white 
miners' wages were determined by the productivity of the 
gangs of African workers they supervised: 
with a direct economic interest in the 
intensified exploitation of African workers, 
there was thus little chance that white 
miners would seek to organise or identify 
their interests with the African workers over 
whom they exerted daily supervision and 
control on behalf of mining capitalists. 37 
In addition, among white miners, Afrikaners were clustered 
at the lower levels of skill, and the union's leadership was 
both corrupt, and unusually compliant towards the employers. 
As Yudelman puts it: 
By the time of World War II, organised white 
mine labour was an insignificant force in 
South Africa, particularly in economic and 
industrial terms. Formerly the most organised 
and militant section of the white labour 
force, it was thoroughly co-opted, 
depoliticised and riven by internal dissent 
and corruption. 38 
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In the struggle to mobilise trade union members for 
nationalism, the main instrument was the Nasionale Raad van 
Trustees (NRT) , a front organisation which financed rivals 
to established trade unions, or, in the case of the miners, 
a reformers' group to wrest power from the existing 
leadership. Neither the NRT nor any other organisation 
devoted to organising Afrikaner workers on specifically 
national lines was the result of independent action by 
workers themselves; all were inspired, financed, led and 
maintained by petty-bourgeois groups. 
O'Meara's judgement is that although the Broederbond's 
assault on the trade unions was completely successful only 
in the case of the MWU, the casting of white workers' 
material interests in ethnic terms allowed the HNP to extend 
its electoral base. The six mining constituencies which the 
HNP won in the 1948 election are often cited as the decisive 
gain which allowed the Nationalists to win. The struggle to 
mobilise Afrikaner workers had been long drawn-out, was 
incompletely realised, and in it, the workers themselves had 
been objects rather than SUbjects. 
The Pattern of Incorporation of Working-Class Whites in the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Class Alliance 
The pattern of incorporation of working-class whites in the 
Afrikaner Nationalist class alliance can be summarised in 
terms of four themes. 
The first theme is the context of colonial settlement and 
the continuing imperial factor in South African politics. 
Together these helped produce conditions in which the 
,working class was not only divided, but doubly divided, 
between black and white, and Afrikaans and English speaking 
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elements. Simons and Simons note the rich variety of 
working-class identities: 
Ambitious working men could appeal to class 
interests against employers or to racial 
sentiments against Africans and Asians; 
combine with Britishers against 'the Boer' or 
with Afrikaners against 'the capitalist,.39 
In this colonial context, " .• the fundamental question of 
equal political and economic rights for blacks was never 
seriously considered or debated among the white government 
or white electorate". 40 This meant that at least until the 
1940s, relationships betwee~ the state, capital and white 
labour could take place without the threat of black 
political aspirations directly impinging to shape them. 
The continuation of the imperial factor in South African 
politics in questions like the symbols and sUbstance of 
South African sovereignty, the ultimate allegiance of its 
citizens, the connections between imperial capital and South 
African political parties, and South Africa's participation 
in the Second World War, meant that Afrikaner workers could 
easily be approached in ethnic terms. Lack of proficiency in 
English often held Afrikaners back in the economy and white 
poverty during the Depression was largely confined to 
Afrikaners. As Giliomee puts it: 
It was this context that made Afrikaner 
poverty such an emotional issue, allowing 
ethnic mobilisers to hold British imperialism 
responsible for the condition of their 
people, rather than accepting it as part of 
the generally painful process of 
industrialisation and of the breakdown of the 
Western economic order. 41 
. The Afrikaner worker, the Broederbond argued, was not 
exploited as a worker but as an Afrikaner; it was not that 
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capitalism was wrong, but in the wrong hands; the employer 
was not of the same volk as the worker; .... were Afrikaners 
in charge, exploitation would wither away in the cooperative 
organic unity of the volk ... 42 As for trade unions, in 1939, 
Albert Herzog claimed that 80% of members were Afrikaners, 
but only 10% of the ·secretaries. O'Meara43 says this is an 
exaggeration, but concedes the general point about exclusion 
and discrimination. 
The coincidence of ethnic division with discrepancies in 
status and material reward within the white working class, 
superimposed on the division between black and white, was 
influential in making Afrikaner workers available for 
mobilisation along with other major social groups in the 
Nationalist class alliance. 
The second theme is the early and far-reachin9 subjugation 
of the white labour movement which helped structure the 
conditions under which Afrikaner workers were later 
incorporated. As argued above, blacks did not pose a 
political threat to white rule in this period, but under the 
conditions of the mining industry, they posed a threat to 
the economic interests of white miners. In this situation 
there was no obvious harmony of interests between white 
employers and white labour, such as both might have 
recognised if white rule was to be imminently threatened by 
the organisation and advance of black political aspirations. 
In fact, the bitter antagonisms which marked relations 
between mining capital, white workers and the state in the 
first two decades of this century, and which were caused at 
least in part by the threat to white workers of cheap black 
labour, showed not only that the independent power of 
militant white workers had to be subjugated, but that such a 
harmony of interests then had to be created. It was not so 
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much the fear that white and black workers would combine, or 
that blacks would speedily organise to advance claims to 
equality, but that in a confrontation with militant white 
labour, the coercive powers and reserves of legitimacy of 
the fledgling South African state would be speedily 
exhausted. This might offer both demonstration effect and 
opportunity for insurrection to the hundreds of thousands of 
African migrant workers in the mine compounds, who 
outnumbered the white population of the witwatersrand. 44 
This harmony was created by the incorporation of white 
labour after 1922. It was a forced harmony, based on the 
sUbordination of one of the parties, and a recognition by 
the others (mining capital and the state) that it would be 
politically counter-productive to push advantages through to 
their logical conclusion. Because it was the forced harmony 
of incorporation, not the alliance of parties powerful in 
their own right and who retained wide freedom of action, it 
was a highly formal one. Its formality was reflected in the 
apparatus of Industrial Conciliation Acts, the legislative 
provisions of the civilised labour pol i cy and the 
instruments excluding Africans from industrial rights. 
The third theme concerns the materials out of which a 
working class component of the National ist class alliance 
was composed. Subjugated white miners occupying protected, 
deskilled, supervisory roles over African labour formed one 
component while semi-skilled operatives in the fast-growing 
manufacturing industries provided the other. The vast 
majority of workers in both groups were Afrikaners. 45 Both 
were recruited to a large extent from the ranks of 'poor 
whites'. They were not attracted away from pre-existing 
allegiances of long-standing to a larger self-conscious 
social class -- 'the working class', or 'the white working 
class' -- or from some conception of themselves 
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constituting a self-consciously organised ethnic class 
the 'Afrikaner working class'. Rather than entering the 
nationalist alliance in some such corporate form, on its own 
terms and under its own leadership, the people who were 
attracted into Christian National trade unions and who voted 
for the HNP in 1948, came in large measure from a background 
devoid of self-conscious, autonomous political organisation. 
Writing of the state's efforts to alleviate 'poor whiteism' 
before 1922, Davies says: 
It must be emphasised that in acting in this 
way the state was not principally responding 
to the economic demands of 'poor whites' 
themselves. The 'poor whites' were, at least 
initially, an extremely disorganised stratum 
with little power of their own to enforce 
even limited economic demands. 46 
Charles van Onselen takes issue with this view arguing (in a 
study which takes 1914 as its closing point) that 
marginalised urban Afrikaners (he avoids the term 'poor 
whites') were not as disorganised and powerless as Davies' 
assessment suggests. 47 Van Onselen supports his case with 
instances when unemployed Afrikaners were able through 
marches, demonstrations and confrontations with employers, 
municipal and state officials to obtain relief and relief 
work. What is more, he credits them with a 'working class 
consciousness' that enabled them to resist incorporation 
into a nationalist labour movement inspired by Het volk in 
1910. The examples he takes, however, seem more like crisis-
driven moments of resistance than the products of continuous 
organisation. Van Onselen himself comments, in discussing 
the search of the Afrikaner poor for 'political shelter' 
that, " •• perhaps it is inevitable that, under capitalism, 
the poor and unemployed should be politically homeless". 48 
His own reference to the later history of unskilled" 
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Afrikaner workers suggests the brevity and fragility of 
their "aggressive working class consciousness": 
That in the succeeding decades the same 
workers should have fallen prey to the nets 
of a narrow nationalism is one of the many 
tragedies of modern South Africa. 49 
Certainly, references to organisation and consciousness 
among poor whites in discussions of the later period are 
conspicuous by their absence. O'Meara states that Christian 
National ideologists: 
•. always claimed that they were in the 
business of 'rescuing' Afrikaner workers from 
'poor whiteism'. In practice, few or no 
attempts were made to organise 'poor whites'. 
The majority of attacks on trade unions were 
directed at those whose members could in no 
way be considered 'poor whites', but were in 
fact chosen for their relative prosperity.50 
In the accounts of the period then (especially those of 
Davies and O'Meara), the workers who came to be incorporated 
into the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition were of two 
principal types. The first was composed of supervisory wage 
earners in the mining industry and the second, semi-skilled 
workers in new manufacturing industries and state-protected 
employment in railways, iron, and steel. Large numbers of 
both types were recruited into industrial roles from 
backgrounds which reflected rural displacement and 
impoverishment. At the same time, . an emergent and aspirant 
class of 'ideological entrepreneurs' was conducting a 
vigorous campaign to proselytize on behalf of Afrikaner 
identity and install it as the primary mode of consciousness 
among these newcomers to industrial life. 
The fourth theme reflects the important role of this 
emergent class. The incorporation of Afrikaner workers did 
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represent a defensive project to some extent, since in 
colonial South Africa all whites were to some extent members 
of a dominant caste. But much more importantly, this was a 
trans formative and not merely a defensive project. The 
Afrikaner Nationalist class coalition faced the problem not 
only of preserving Afrikaner interests against black 
advance, but of advancing Afrikaner interests by creating an 
Afrikaner capitalist class from the struggling petty 
bourgeoisie, and a fully fledged working class from 
impoverished rural whites. This self-imposed task had to be 
undertaken in the teeth of English cultural hegemony and the 
dominance of the economy by 'English' capital. 
In summary then, the incorporation of working class elements 
into the Afrikaner Nationalist class alliance reflected the 
influence of a colonial context in the persistence of 
notions of racial hierarchy from the countryside to the 
industrial workplace and in the importance of the imperial 
factor which made Afrikaner workers receptive to 
interpretations of their material conditions in ethnic 
terms. Incorporation was preceded by the conclusive 
subjugation of white working-class militancy by capital and 
the state and the creation of elaborate discriminatory 
schemes of state-sponsored protection and advancement for 
white workers. These conditions made it possible for 
Afrikaner Nationalists successfully to incorporate already-
co-opted workers and those newly proletarianised by courtesy 
of state sponsorship, into a transformatory class coalition. 
THE FORMATION OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST CLASS COALITION 
In the years between 1886 when the first Home Rule Bill was 
defeated and 1920 when the Government of Ireland Act 
partitioned the country, Ulster Unionism, the coalition 
which expressed opposition to Irish nationalism, was formed. 
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It was this alliance which forced the partition of Ireland 
and underpinned the regional government in Northern Ireland 
which lasted until 1972. 
By the time the alliance was formed, the north-east of 
Ireland, and especially Belfast, had experienced widespread 
and intensive industrialisation, first in factory production 
of textiles, and from the mid-nineteenth century, in 
shipbuilding and engineering. 51 By 1901, 46% of the male 
population was employed in engineering, shipbuilding, linen 
and the textile finishing sector. At the same time, female 
employment was also very important. The ratio of women to 
men in the textile industry was 3:1, and more than 43% of 
women and girls over ten years old were in employment, 
compared to 32% in the rest of the united Kingdom. 52 
In this context of rapid industrialisation there was ample 
scope for class conflict over a wide range of issues, from 
wages to unemployment, trade union recognition and rights, 
poor housing, epidemics and industrial disease. 53 Given the 
condition of the Belfast working classes in this period, it 
is all the more remarkable that: 
Not only was Ulster Unionism distinguished 
for its vehemence, it was also distinguished 
for its cohesion. From 1886 until just 
recently, a surprising unionist front was 
maintained in the north of Ireland. It cut 
across class barriers. Landowners, tenant 
farmers, businessmen, artisans and labourers, 
all combined in this movement, and many 
commentators have remarked upon the co-
operation shown by such diverse social and 
economic groups in sustained political 
action. 54 
central to the maintenance of this front, was the 
-integration into it of Protestant members of the working 
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class. This historical development had a number of 
distinctive features which might be summarised as follows; 
the formation of the class alliance did not occur entirely 
spontaneously and purely as a reaction to the rise of Irish 
nationalism, but as part of a longer process; relations 
within and between classes during this period of 
industrialisation were affected by pre-existing patterns of 
relationship in the countryside; the Protestant working-
class elements which were integrated (or subordinated) into 
the Unionist coalition possessed traditions of independent 
electoral and direct action in both sectarian and labourist 
directions; whatever the differences between Protestant and 
Roman Catholic workers, they . were not such as to make common 
action unthinkable. 
These features in turn helped to shape the process by which 
the movement was formed, the place and role of the various 
components of the alliance, and the nature of the social, 
political and economic system over which it presided for 50 
years. 
The Chronology of Ulster Unionism 
Responding to what he sees as inadequacies in the 
historiography of Ulster Unionism, Gibbon analyses the 
movement in terms of much longer processes than mere 
reaction to the threat of Home Rule: 
Ulster Unionism did not spring perfect and 
complete, as Athena from the head of Zeus 
from the home rule crises of 1886, 1892 a~d 
1912. On the contrary, like all substantial 
social movements, it had been 'prepared for' 
historically by the development -- albeit by 
divergent paths -- of all the elements it was 
to combine. 55 
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The most important of these elements., according to Gibbon's 
account, were Unionism's regional character, sectarian 
status and all-class composition. These characteristics and 
the dualistic antagonisms into which they were locked 
(Ulster/Ireland, Protestant/Catholic, Unionist/Nationalist), 
were based on differing modes of production in Ireland. The 
north was characterised by machine production and the south 
by extensive commercial farming. These in turn were based on 
divergent experiences of settler colonialism: 
In the north-east a society of colons of 
British origin farmed holdings of more or 
less uniformly small size. In the south a few 
scattered colons grazed. or sub-let large 
estates. 56 
The crucial element in the diversification of these small 
agricultural holdings into textile production was, 
•• the relation between the low level and high 
generality of colon capitalisation which 
followed specifically from the character of 
the petty commodity-producing agriculture 
which the immigrants brought with them. 57 
(emphasis in original) 
It was on the basis of this domestic, income-supplementing 
textile production, that the skilled labour (and to some 
extent the capital) for the transition to machine production 
was found, and the trajectory of development begun that was 
to see the later growth of engineering and shipbuilding. 
Gibbon does not rest content with arguing that the facts of 
uneven development underpinned the division of Ireland by 
tying the north-east counties with capitalist bonds to the 
empire. Within this overall framework, he asserts, there 
·were complex processes of political and ideological 
struggle, in which class alliances were formed and reformed: 
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.. prior to the home rule crisis, Ulster 
possessed a structured popular politics, a 
structured system of class alliances and a 
structured set of political and crypto-
political ideologies. These comprised the raw 
material upon which the crisis acted and out 
of which a new quasi-nationalist political 
party eventually emerged. Ulster un~o~ism! 
when it appeared, represented a mod1f1cat10n 
of existing class alliances and ideologies. 58 
Among the elements shaping these early alliances, was the 
importation into the city of processes and relationships 
from the countryside. 
Relationships in the countryside and the Formation of Class 
Alliances in the City 
The effect of pre-industrial conflicts is summarised by 
Hepburn and Collins. Industrialisation and urbanisation 
according to them had, "minimal impact on the essential 
character of community conflict". Belfast, in this view 
brought a "simply new and in due course dominant element to 
a much older conflict".59 In this new environment: 
•. harsh working conditions and tight 
competition for jobs helped perpetuate and 
intensify old rural battles between Ulster 
Catholics and Protestants in a new setting. 60 
This phenomenon had a direct impact on the formation of the 
Unionist alliance. In a reinterpretation of the origins of 
Orangeism in the late eighteenth century, Gibbon61 analyses 
this most important form of sectarian organisation in 
popular Protestant politics. It remains important to the 
present day as a means of mobilising, showing solidarity, 
maintaining identity and confronting Catholic aspirations. 
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The economic circumstances hospitabl~ to the growth of 
orangeism were occasioned by the growth of demand in 
domestic linen production which opened the labour market to 
Catholics, especially in Armagh. The Orange Order was the 
Protestant weavers' vehicle for restricting the industry to 
Protestants. It was not that there was a shortage of 
employment: 
Rather, an unrestricted labour market was the 
occasion of the breaking of the economic 
barrier between Protestants and Catholics 
which appeared to underlie the entire system 
of social inequality. Faced with a threat to 
the principle of homogeneity which determined 
the character of the social relations of the 
community and its relations with the world as 
a whole, the weavers appropriated to 
themselves the powers of enforcing what they 
understood to be an integral part of the 1691 
settlement. In doing so they were reported to 
be acting under the belief that they were 
enforcing the penal laws. 62 
Feeding on traditional rural phenomena like feuding and the 
vengeance group, the Orange Order became formalised (making 
extensive use of freemason-like ritual) as an instrument for 
intimidating and evicting Catholics. It became expedient, in 
the interests both of the order itself and sections of the 
landlord class, to institutionalise and use it as a basis of 
renewed social compact. For the order, it meant the 
landlords' approval and for the landlords a means of 
establishing control over forces whose activities had the 
potential to turn against them. By 1798, orangemen were 
being admitted to the militia, in which role they were 
prominent in putting down the United Irishmen's rebellion of 
that year. In this way, popular initiatives and ruling class 
control were run together in a way that was to remain 
characteristic of Ulster Unionism, as was the blurring of 
the distinction between private and public forces of 
coercion. 
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orangeism made its way to the towns along with the 
transition to machine industry not, Gibbon argues, as a 
result of 'contagion' or 'migration', but because, " •• simply 
of the existence in towns of specific conditions making 
their populations receptive to such changes". 63 Whatever the 
case, orangeism was a powerful instrument in reproducing 
relationships of nepotism, patronage and brokerage between 
employers and workers, especially in the older textile mill 
ghetto of Sandy Row. These relationships were at their 
height during the second phase of Ulster's industrialisation 
(transition to factory production of textiles) from about 
1830-60. 
The third phase, the development of shipbuilding and 
engineering, brought with it a different set of 
relationships, structured by the very different material 
conditions of work for the 'labour aristocracy' of 
'islandmen' in the shipyards. 64 The Orange Order was 
prominent and important in the shipyards, and in the new 
areas which housed the workers, the Shankill in west 
Belfast, and Ballymacarrett in the east. But the islandmens' 
high earnings and relatively free conditions of labour 
allowed for more cosmopolitan, less deferential 
relationships between workers and owners, in which the 
binding ideology became social imperialism rather than 
confessional nepotism. If Orangeism never again as 
faithfully and consistently reproduced the patron-client 
relationships of the countryside in the town, nonetheless 
some of the qualities remained. They reasserted themselves 
as factors in the fluctuating contours of class alliances, 
especially in times of depression when the possibilities of 
working-class independence shrank. 
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sectarian and Labourist Expressions of Protestant Working-
Class Independence 
Perhaps the most singular feature of the Ulster Unionist 
class alliance has been the degree of independent identity 
and sometimes action shown by its Protestant working-class 
components. By showing themselves capable of subordination 
and deference on the one hand and militant populism on the 
other, Protestant workers have invited confusion and 
misinterpretation. Their conflicts with bourgeois leadership 
in the period when the Unionist class alliance was being 
consolidated in the anti-home rule period were of two kinds; 
firstly, sectarian-populist, . and secondly, labourist. 
Early expressions of working-class dissidence had much to do 
with the vicissitUdes of the Orange Order in the early and 
mid-19th century. Viewed with suspicion by many of the upper 
classes because of its wild and vulgar associations, and by 
the British administration in Ireland for its provocative 
role in the endemic violence which sorely tried the rulers' 
resources, it was 'often threatened by legislation against 
secret societies in the 1820s, and even endured a period of 
dissolution after 1836. 65 A particular source of Orange 
grievance was the Party Processions Act (1850), which 
forbade provocative demonstrations of the sort which were 
integral to popular politics in Ireland, especially in the 
north. This measure was the troublesome kind of law which is 
very difficult to enforce and at the same time, calculated 
to incite defiance. Throughout the 1860s, it was a focus for 
Orange discontent, not only towards the government for 
promulgating it, but also towards the Order's own Grand 
Lodge for accepting it. The discontent took on wider 
ramifications in 1868 when one of the principal agitators, 
William Johnston of Ballykillbeg Co. Down was imprisoned. 66 
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This incident crystallised the discontents of newly-
enfranchised urban artisans who formed the Protestant 
Working Mens' Association with the aim of returning Johnston 
(a small landowner and novelist, perpetually in financial 
difficulties) to parliament as 'their representative', an 
aim which was duly achieved in the same year. 
Historians agree that neither Johnston's election nor his 
subsequent career exemplified class consciousness in any 
strict or commonly accepted meaning of the term. For 
Patterson, this "dissident working class conservatism"; 
•• mobilised disparate conflicts and 
ideologies. The elements of class resentment 
were not a reflection of the labour process 
alone, but were mediated by the specific 
ideologies of Belfast's urban elite •••• (who) 
demanded a sectional expression for what they 
regarded as their crucial role in making the 
town a 'conservative citadel,.67 
For Gibbon, the Protestant Working Mens' Association " •• with 
its astonishing combination of class hatred, sectarianism 
and deference, expressed diverse and inconsistent 
intentions".68 Patterson illustrates this diversity by 
pointing out that Orangeism could function not only to 
integrate Protestants politically, but to " •• give a specific 
if limited articulation to class conflict •• " 69 and by 
stressing that the anti-bourgeois element in Johnston's 
campaign was not only a question of class antagonism, but an 
assertion of sectarian militancy in defence of Protestant 
principles, notably the right to march: "The bourgeoisie 
were attacked not only as exploiters but also because of 
their obvious distaste for urban violence and law 
breaking".70 
It was not long before Johnston was devoting himself to the 
reform of Belfast conservatism, advocating collaboration 
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rather than dissidence, and achieving an agreement under 
which one of the Belfast parliamentary seats would go to a 
member of the conservative working classes. 71 
After Johnston's death in 1902, his parliamentary seat was 
successfully contested by Thomas Sloan in the same broad 
interest of sectarian populism. Sloan was a small-scale sub-
contractor in the shipyards (he described himself as "an 
employer and a worker"), and an evangelical preacher. His 
reputation as a sectarian agitator caused anxiety in the 
ranks of respectable Orangeism and moves to isolate and 
discipline him led to a split in the Orange Order. This saw 
Sloan and his followers form . the Independent Orange Order, a 
movement as ambiguous and contradictory as the populism of 
Johnston and his followers. 
Unlike earlier manifestations of sectarian populism however, 
the Independent Orange Order attempted to come to terms with 
the most fundamental problem facing any independent 
initiatives from the Protestant working class. This attempt 
was largely the work of Lindsay Crawford, a journalist and 
editor; 
Crawford realised that any successful 
campaign for independent Protestant working 
class representation was bound to introduce 
an element of political instability in the 
north, and that in that situation the 
Catholic community simply could not be 
ignored. Protestant radicals had to accept 
that there were social demands held in common 
by Orangemen and Nationalists, and that if 
necessary they could ally to wrest basic 
reforms from the government. 72 
The document which contained this reasoning, the 
Magheramorne Manifesto,73 prepared for the Independents' 
'Twelfth of July celebrations in 1905, has a disputed 
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significance in histories of this period. In effect, the 
manifesto spoke out in favour of a secular nationalism, 
purged of mainland British and Roman Catholic influence. 
Whatever the conflicting views about the place of the 
manifesto in the Independents' ideology, the fluctuating 
fortunes of the Order highlight the difficulties of 
independent working-class initiatives within Ulster 
Unionism. In particular, Crawford's invitation to 
Protestants to reconsider the question of their identity and 
the whole range of their relationships, both within the 
Unionist class alliance, and across it to Catholics, 
illustrates the narrow limits of an identity which tries to 
be both sectarian and independent. In the face of determined 
mobilisation of the Protestant population by the forces of 
official Unionism (the main agent of this, the Ulster 
Unionist Council, was set up in 1905, the year of the 
Magheramorne Manifesto) the Independent Orange Order was 
overshadowed, and by 1908, the year of Crawford's expulsion 
from it, had been thoroughly marginalised. 
Orange populism was not the only example of independent 
working-class politics in this era. Given that Belfast was 
one of the empire's great industrial cities, it is hardly 
surprising that socialist ideas and movements made their 
appearance. The form that they took in Belfast had, of 
course, to come to terms with the specific patterns of 
ideological, class and political struggle which colonialism 
and uneven development had brought to this part of Ireland. 
These included a divided working class, a nationalist 
struggle, and collaborative relationships between working 
class Protestants and 'their' bourgeoisie. In this context, 
the labour politics which developed had a number of 
characteristics. 74 Firstly, they were reformist, stressing 
.the possibilities of local government in bringing about 
improvements in transport, housing, and public amenities. 
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Secondly, labour politics in this era were dominated by 
skilled (and hence Protestant) workers. Thirdly, all 
significant Belfast labour representatives of the time stood 
by the maintenance of the Union, and in terms of their own 
organisation and strategies, saw themselves as operating in 
a British context as part of the wider labour movement. 
It is in the third of these characteristics that the 
principal contradictions of Belfast labourism emerge. As 
Patterson points out, the strategy of integration with the 
British labour movement was problematic, given the latter's 
home rule sympathies. 75 Even more important than this, was 
the difficulty of distancing. labour politics from 
conservative unionism, once the decision to maintain the 
Union was made. These contradictions were eloquently vested 
in the person of William Walker. Walker was a carpenter by 
trade and a trade unionist by avocation, who was the leading 
figure in Belfast labour politics in the first decade of 
this century, holding high office in the Belfast Trades 
Council (the principal vehicle for labour politics) and the 
Irish Trades Union Congress. So prominent was he, that he 
gave his name to the package of ideologies and strategies 
summarised above -- 'Walkerism'. 
The basis of the Belfast labour movement which Walker 
represented, and the source of its ambiguities, lay in the 
Protestant dominance of skilled trades, especially in 
shipbuilding and engineering. In 1901,76 when the proportion 
of Catholics in the city of Belfast was 24%, they made up 
only 10,7% of the five principal skilled categories in 
machine industry77 and they were overrepresented in 
unskilled labour categories (32% of 'general labourers' were 
Catholics). The Belfast Trades Council was dominated by 
skilled workers in small and medium firms, while the skilled 
shipyard workers tended to hold themselves aloof and work 
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through the Amalgamated society of Engineers. The 
sectionalism, craft unionism and sectarianism of the 
shipyard workers were obstacles in the way of leaders (like 
Walker) of independent labour politics in Belfast. 78 
Nevertheless, Walker's defence of the union from a labour 
point of view was one put forward on behalf of all skilled 
workers. This programme and the contradictions which fatally 
undermined it, were best expressed in Walker's three 
unsuccessful attempts to win the parliamentary seat of North 
Belfast between 1905 and 1907. 79 
Walker's main point was that the Union was essential for the 
economic development on which the skilled jobs of the 
Belfast working class and the 'municipal socialism' which he 
himself aspired to lead both depended. By contrast, the 
nationalism of the underdeveloped south was reactionary, 
parochial and obscurantist. The best defence of the Union 
was to abandon reactionary unionism and embrace progressive 
social reform in parliament and local government. Unionism 
with Labour in the vanguard would be seen to be in the 
interests of all Irish people. However, the two elements at 
the heart of this position were incompatible. Walker's 
labourism stressed class and his Unionism accepted home rule 
as the central issue. But if this was the case, he could not 
easily justify introducing class, a subject which could 
split the Unionist vote, into electoral competition. 
Walker's vulnerability on this kind of issue was 
demonstrated when during the North Belfast by-election of 
1905, he was induced to answer a questionnaire put to 
candidates by an extremist Protestant group. Thus cornered, 
Walker gave uniformly sectarian answers, culminating in the 
following evasive exchange: 
Finally when asked 'Will you in all things 
place the interests of Protestantism before 
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those of the party to which you . are 
attached?' He replied, 'Protestantism means 
protesting against superstition and hence 
true Protestantism is synonymous with 
Labour,.80 
Walker's answers were widely distributed on a handbill, and 
the effect probably lost him the Catholic votes in the 
constituency, and the seat. The very choice of North Belfast 
as a seat to contest, it should be added, illuminates the 
limits of Belfast labour politics: 
In East Belfast, there had been no contest 
since 1892 and Wolff, a large employer and 
patron of local orangeism, was a formidable 
candidate. In the West, where in voting 
strength the sectarian balance was even, the 
problems for a labour candidate, who would 
inevitably be charged with splitting the 
Protestant vote, would have been severe. In 
the South the election of Sloan meant 
splitting the possible labour vote. 81 
Walkerism and the Independent Orange Order represented in 
their different ways a durable strain in Unionist politics. 
This was the attempt to find space for a wide range of 
interests, from ultra-sectarianism through populism to 
limited class-consciousness and reformist social democracy, 
within a framework which acknowledged the primacy of the 
Union, and resistance to Home Rule. Ultimately, each attempt 
had to recognise that the space afforded by the primacy of 
the national question was a narrow one indeed. This strain 
did not however die out with the completion of the Ulster 
Unionist coalition and the successful preservation of the 
union in Northern Ireland. Both sectarian populism and 
'loyal' labourism continued to seek expression, especially 
in times of political or economic crisis, but they were to 
come up against the same constricting realities as their 
predecessors. 
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The possibilities of united Working Class Action 
A notable feature of the Ulster Unionist class coalition, 
especially in comparative context, is that although it 
marked in some respects a division between settler and 
native, this separation was in no sense as absolute and as 
formal as in other colonial situations. Differential legal 
statuses, and formal prohibitions (on landholding say, or in 
employment) were no longer part of British rule by the late 
19th century. Catholics did not represent a low-wage, super-
exploited labour force held by repressive laws to a formally 
inferior status. 82 It is true that there were elements of 
racism in the divide between the populations, as Lee has 
discussed. 83 But however widespread private suspicions and 
beliefs about the inferiority of Catholics were, official 
Unionist ideology avoided the determinism they implied. It 
was not so much that Catholics were incapable of being good, 
productive, loyal citizens of the empire, it was that they 
perversely chose not to be and to follow priests and 
agitators into disloyalty instead. 
Similarly, whatever the private feelings of Catholics, and 
the pronouncements of some of the more bigoted clerics, 
Irish nationalism insisted on the wholeness of the Irish 
nation, and the importance of Ulster Protestants in 
completing it. 
In the economic sphere, none of Ulster's industries required 
the mass of rightless, controlled, cheap labourers which 
only a more numerous native population could provide, and 
which typifies colonial economies. It is true that the 
Belfast working class was divided and that Protestants 
dominated the skilled occupations. The divisions reached 
into the unskilled as well. In Belfast docks for instance, 
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work in the cross channel berths, which was more regular and 
had higher status and better conditions, was monopolised by 
Protestants. 84 In the deep-sea berths, where work was 
intermittent and harder, Catholic dockers overwhelmingly 
predominated. Despite this, the 1910 census figures quoted 
above show that although Catholics were disproportionately 
represented in the ranks of the unskilled, 68% of unskilled 
labourers were Protestants. 
Despite competing identities and mutual suspicions between 
Protestant and Catholic then, neither ideological nor 
material conditions have been such that a common class 
consciousness between workers from both sides of the 
sectarian divide has been unthinkable. Indeed socialists and 
nationalists have always been ready to applaud on the most 
meagre evidence any sign of Protestant workers acting in 
their 'true' interests, while Unionists are ready to 
denounce the same actions as betrayal to Irish nationalism. 
In the period of the Unionist coalitions's formation, the 
question of a common class consciousness between Protestant 
and Catholic was raised by the Belfast dock strike of 1907. 
The strike arose from James Larkin's efforts to organise 
Belfast dockers for the National Union of Dock Labourers. It 
began with a demand by the (mainly Protestant) cross-channel 
dockers for a closed shop, and broadened to include issues 
of pay and conditions, drawing in the (Catholic) deep-sea 
dockers and, in sympathy, the carters who distributed goods 
in the city once they were landed. Although those on strike 
never exceeded 3 500, strike meetings attracted anything up 
to 10 000, and the biggest demonstration totalled 100 000. 
Support came from the Independent Orange Order, from Walker 
and the Belfast socialists, and from Joseph Devlin, the most 
important Irish nationalist leader in Belfast. Violence 
surrounding picketing and blacklegging and a police mutiny 
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(occasioned partly by the demanding and distasteful work of 
protecting blacklegs), encouraged the civil authorities to 
call in the military, which in turn brought riots in 
nationalist areas, provoked by the sight of the occupying 
army on the streets of Belfast. During these disturbances, 
the army shot dead two people. 
The most complete account of the strike argues that the 
riots represented a crucial blow to the strike's chances of 
success: 
The riots created a new atmosphere. There had 
been no actual sectarian fighting, but 
sectarian fears and suspicions had been 
aroused •• This division, this change of 
atmosphere~ was a critical blow to the strike 
movement.8~ 
Belfast employers proved themselves quite capable of 
encouraging this sectarian atmosphere, which was ensured by 
the continued presence of the military. It was however the 
readiness of British labour leaders to make concessions 
amounting to an admission of defeat on the strikers' behalf, 
which formally ended the strike. 
In the context of Belfast politics, perhaps the 1907 strike 
was impressive enough. Protestant and Catholic unskilled 
workers acted in pursuit of the same goals. Large non-
sectarian crowds supported the strikers, and so did the 
Independent Orange Order, Walker and the BTC, even the 
nationalists. Strike leaders insisted that the orange and 
the green, home rule and the Union were not at issue in this 
struggle for workers' rights. As tension mounted in Catholic 
areas with the introduction of troops, Protestant strikers 
patrolled the interface between Protestant and Catholic 
trying to calm Protestant crowds who tried to get involved. 
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Yet there is no evidence that these things presaged or 
promised any change of consciousness on either side. Each 
part of the alliance that supported the strikers had its own 
agenda: the violence, although occasioned by protection for 
blacklegs in Catholic areas, was of a pronouncedly 
nationalist flavour: despite the efforts of strike leaders, 
hostile Protestant crowds made provocative demonstrations 
aimed at the Catholic rioters. 
Nothing, in short, gave good reason to suppose that the 
sectarian mould of Belfast politics was going to be broken 
by class politics across the religious divide. It is one of 
the enduring myths of left-wing views on Ireland that this 
was possible, that, 
•• the strike represented the possibility of a 
withdrawal of working class support for the 
two complexes of ideology which dominated 
Irish society: Protestant unionism and 
Catholic nationalism. 86 
This myth, in Patterson's view, stems from a long-standing 
misunderstanding of working class Unionism, in which even 
militant trade unionism could co-exist with a strong 
rejection of nationalism with its connotations of 
backwardness and priestly domination. These beliefs in turn 
fed on traditions which were rooted in the conditions of 
existence of the Protestant working class and were not 
merely the product of bourgeois manipulation. 
For Gray, the strike revealed the enormous potential and 
crippling limitations of independent Protestant working 
class action. 
If, then, the 1907 dispute revealed in full 
array the capacity for Protestant workers to 
provide a formidable vanguard in industrial 
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agitation, it also illustrated the 
limitations of such agitation, as the 
powerful impact of the workers' actions 
raised issues which threatened other 
compelling supremacist imperatives. In 
recoiling from this discovery, they hastened 
to their own defeat. 87 
The failure of cross-class identity and action to develop in 
Belfast during the period when the Unionist class coalition 
was completed is all the more striking given the lack of 
ambiguity about Protestant workers' status in class terms. 
Whatever privileges they enjoyed in terms of dominating the 
skilled trades, they were not a 'colonial' labour 
aristocracy, in the sense of .enjoying a different legal and 
political status from 'natives'. Nor did they occupy an 
ambiguous place in the division of labour as supervisors and 
controllers of 'native' labour, and while it was true that 
they feared Catholic competition for skilled jobs, they were 
not threatened by large scale deskilling and regrading which 
would put them at the mercy of capitalists' cheap labour 
policies. Their capacity for independent action, yet their 
unwillingness or inability to take that independence beyond 
a point which would threaten the compact with other 
Protestant classes, makes them a particularly difficult case 
to accommodate in class explanations of politics. 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FORMATION OF THE AFRIKANER 
NATIONALIST AND ULSTER UNIONIST CLASS COALITIONS 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism indeed present 
similar cases of a set of workers, "identified politically 
and morally far more closely with its own bourgeoisie than 
co-workers". In each, this was the essential feature of the 
movement. Only by drawing support from all classes under 
conditions of democracy or quasi-democracy88 could these 
movements maintain themselves in power, and in fact ensure 
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the survival of 'their' states. Their all-class nature 
allowed each to make claims to embody a people, not a 
conspiracy. This quality was essential for the claims to 
legitimacy through self-determination fashioned by each for 
external and internal consumption. Mass support was 
essential not only at the polls, but to provide the 
personnel to run the bureaucratic and coercive arms of state 
on a partial basis, quelling opposition and allowing the 
state to reproduce itself. 
In both cases, the repeated demonstration of an all-class 
appeal contributed to the 'monolith' of popular imagining, 
an image all the more powerful because it was exemplified 
not only at the polls, but also in a broad range of social, 
cultural and religious structures which supported the formal 
political parties. This popular myth of organic unity has 
had to be refined however, especially under the impact of 
neo-Marxist ideas. This in turn has made it possible to 
compare and refine the class coalition idea in the two 
cases. 
The preceding discussions of Afrikaner Nationalism and 
Ulster Unionism as class coalitions suggest a four-point 
working model for comparison. The first consideration is the 
place accorded to working class representation in the 
political parties which were the standard-bearers of these 
movements. The second is the combination of means used to 
ensure the cohesion of the movements. The third is the 
relation between the processes of forging political unity 
and those of class formation. The fourth is the respective 
explanatory weights assigned to external and internal 
factors in bringing different classes together. Threats from 
other social groups to the interests of Afrikaners and 
. Ulster Protestants represent external factors, and projects 
of social transformation -- typified by urbanisation and 
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upward mobility -- exemplify what is . meant by internal 
factors. 
Working Class Incorporation into the Ulster Unionist Party 
and the Afrikaner National Party 
Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism were similar in 
that working-class elements were incorporated into class 
coalitions in clearly subordinate roles. Neither movement 
was characterised by internal, participatory democracy; 
working-class representatives were not consistently active 
in formulating social programmes and pushing for them from 
within; working-class figures rarely, if ever achieved 
leadership positions. 
The undemocratic nature of the Ulster Unionist Party is well 
documented. 89 Although from time to time efforts were made 
to give the appearance of rank-and-file involvement by 
extending representation on the Ulster Unionist Council, the 
movement's governing body,90 these were largely cosmetic. 
By the time of partition, the council itself was largely by-
passed in favour of a caucus of leaders in the government, 
parliament and the party organisation. 
The only useful purpose it served in the 
1920s and 1930s was to provide a rally at 
which the party leader paid due tribute to 
the work of the rank and file, and whipped up 
enthusiasm for the policies of the 
government. In this way, control of the party 
was concentrated in the hands of a few of 
those who had successfully defied any 
attempts to bring about Home Rule to Ireland, 
who had organised a military machine to 
defend their cause, and who, in consequence, 
had spent a lifetime in exercising political 
power without any but the scantest reference 
to the general body of the movement. So by a 
combination of the particular circumstances 
of the leaders, and default on the part of 
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the Council, it was the caucus which 
controlled the Unionist Party: the democratic 
process was at best a facade and at worst a 
fraud. 91 
As for the National Party, an authoritative account of 
Afrikaner Nationalism describes, " •• elite politics within 
Afrikanerdom as a corporate group, with a mere veneer of 
rank and file accountability •• "92 and the National Party 
itself as: 
•• a well-disciplined party in which the 
decisions are made by a small elite, while at 
the same time allowing members the freedom to 
express opinions and dissent within the party 
structure. 93 
Gwendolen Carter, describing National Party organisation in 
the 1950s (when popular enthusiasm and participation in the 
party were at their height) notes that, liThe Afrikaner, 
especially of the platteland, still cherishes his concept of 
radical, direct democracy •• ", but makes plain the hold of 
the party organisation where, " •. the provincial congress 
seems to be less the supreme authority it is often termed, 
than a useful sounding board for party leaders, and g 
necessary outlet for party members". (emphasis added)94 
In general, while the ideology and politics of the National 
Party made it plain that it was essential for the party when 
in government to look after the interests of the white 
worker, this should be done without according white workers 
a corporate place in its organisational hierarchy. The 
paternalistic flavour of this position is conveyed well by 
the 1952 party constitution in which a section is devoted to 
"Co-operation between Employers and Employees": 
In the economic spheres the Party desires to 
knit together people of all sections and 
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levels having the right of existence so as to 
provide security and foster a spirit of 
mutual trust, solidarity and joint national 
responsibility.95 
The section makes it plain that the party and the party 
alone is fit to carry out the functions of representing 
workers, functions which elsewhere are generally the 
province of specifically working-class organisations. 
The place of working-class people in the Ulster Unionist 
Party and the National Party can be gauged by reviewing data 
on the socio-economic background of elected representatives 
in each. Newell stultz's analysis of the data for individual 
Nationalist MPs first elected between 1940 and 1970 reveals 
that only 1,3% of them were 'workers' ,96 and that the 
largest occupational group (nearly 40%) is that of 'opinion 
formers' (teachers, academics, journalists, clergymen, 
'organisers' and politicians). It is possible to make a 
similar calculation from the biographical detail on Unionist 
politicians supplied by Harbinson. 97 The near total 
exclusion of blue collar workers which stultz refers to 
among elected representatives in South Africa is mirrored in 
the Ulster data. Only seven out of 164 unionist MPs elected 
to the Stormont Parliament between 1921 and 1970 could be 
described as workers, or 4,3%.98 There were nearly as many 
housewives, twice as many landowners, twice as many doctors 
of medicine,99 five times as many lawyers (barristers and 
solicitors), and seven times as many company directors in 
the total. Of the 57 unionist members returned to the 
Westminster Parliament during this period, not one could be 
classified as a worker. This brings the percentage for the 
two elected assemblies to 3.1%.100 
Although the Ulster Unionist and Afrikaner Nationalist class 
coalitions both incorporated working-class elements in 
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subordinate ways, there were differences during the 
respective periods of growth and consolidation. For a period 
at least, Ulster Unionism made provision for the formal 
corporate representation of working-class interests at the 
political level. This was done through the medium of the 
Ulster Unionist Labour Association (UULA). 
The undemocratic nature of the Ulster Unionist Party, 
described above by Harbinson was a feature from the 
beginning. Despite its carefully cUltivated mass electoral 
base, the party was effectively run by a small, elite group. 
The movement's supreme body, the Ulster Unionist Council was 
set up in March 1905. It had . two hundred members, made up of 
one hundred from local unionist associations, and fifty each 
from the Orange Lodges and the party's peers and MPs. But as 
Buckland observes: 
•• the real control of the organisation lay in 
the hands of a few landowners and 
professional and businessmen, the day-to-day 
work being carried out by the permanent staff 
and a small, elective, standing committee. 101 
This was, " •• virtually the directing power of Ulster 
Unionism". Buckland argues that the elite nature of Ulster 
Unionism jeopardised its unity, especially in the light of 
its 'leading citizens' complacency and refusal to address 
the social problems of expanding and industrialising 
Belfast,102 and the vitality shown by populist and labour 
movements like the Belfast Protestant Association, the 
Independent Orange Order, and the Belfast Trades Council. It 
is true that after the dock strike in 1907, the 
'progressive' challenge withered away but this, according to 
Buckland was due to the inadequacies of individual 
progressive leaders and the superior financial and 
organisational resources of Unionism (especially after the 
formation of the UUC in 1905): 
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.• rather than to Ulster Unionism's ability 
to adopt a social programme which would 
mobilise working class support. The problem 
of labour was, therefore, an ever-recurring 
problem to Ulster Unionism's leaders. 103 
After the dock strike, there was a long period of industrial 
peace, but between 1918 and 1921, problems of adjustment 
from a wartime to a peacetime economy caused conflict in the 
shipyards, which spread to other industries. Apart from 
normal grievances over hours and pay, the issue of Catholic 
workers taken on by shipbuilders to replace Protestants who 
had joined the armed forces became acute when the volunteers 
were demobilised. Other factors helped stoke Protestant 
working class militancy; the increasing violence of the 
IRA's guerrilla struggle; the vocal support given by the 
British labour movement to the nationalist cause in Ireland; 
and the extension of the franchise. In this political 
climate, the unrepresentative nature of Ulster Unionism 
again became a matter of concern to at least some of its 
leaders. 
The outcome of this concern was the UULA,104 set up in 
June/July 1918 in order to combat the divisive effects of 
socialism on working-class Unionists105 and to give them a 
voice in the councils of Unionism. 106 • One of the prime 
movers of the UULA was Edward Carson, the leader of the 
Unionist Party,107 and there was about the organisation a 
strong element of incorporation from above. Although on 
social issues and working class interests, the UULA 
leadership was very deferential,108 some Belfast employers 
were suspicious and fearful of allowing such direct working-
class representation, and for these reasons, the UULA could 
not be regarded as the solution to the unity question. 
Despite this, UULA members displayed a capacity for 
70 
independent initiative and action reminiscent of the 1903-
1907 period, although this reflected plebeian sectarianism, 
rather than progressive labour politics. Examples of this 
tendency include the role of the UULA in the expulsion of 
Catholics from the shipyards in 1920 and in the formation of 
unofficial paramilitary groups of ex-servicemen and old UVF 
members for the purposes of self-defence, reprisal and 
coercion of Catholics during the intensifying conflict 
between Irish republicans and the British state. 109 
The UULA admirably captures the enduring complexities of 
Unionist class politics. The leadership of the party was 
divided on it. Carson had ambitions to secure the long term 
mass basis of the Unionist Party with a social programme and 
a permanent voice in the party's directing body for its 
working-class constituents, but the hostility of the 
businessmen in the party to this showed itself in conflict 
over allocation of seats to working men. 110 The UULA members 
who achieved elected office were criticised for their 
deference and lack of militance in strikes and related 
issues. But in the pogroms and organisation of private 
armies, they were too militant for the party leadership, and 
it is likely that one of the functions of formal 
incorporation which the UULA represented was for the 
leadership to control plebeian sectarian militance. 
The UULA enjoyed only a brief period at the centre of 
Unionist politics. Buckland attributes its eclipse to the 
post-war slump in the linen and shipbuilding industries, 
arguing that, as always, economic depression effectively 
curbed the attraction of labour politics for the Protestant 
working class and diminished the need for the leadership to 
conciliate it. Farrell notes that although the UULA had been 
.sidelined in organisational terms by the mid-1920s, the 
grassroots tendency which it represented was still able to 
71 
prevent even the 'minimal' concessions to the Catholic 
minority which 'pragmatic' Unionist leaders wanted to make 
in order to propitiate the British government. 111 
The Combination of Means Used to Ensure Cohesion in Ulster 
Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism 
The problems of unity in Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner 
Nationalism were defined in a context where industrial and 
political issues were closely intertwined with each other 
and with questions of national identity. They were addressed 
by a mixture of coercion, privilege and ideology.112 
In each case, similar sets of complex relationships were 
involved. Afrikaner and Protestant workers were in 
antagonistic relationships with blacks and Catholics over 
industrial issues which affected their material interests 
like dilution and the access of these competitors to skilled 
jobs -- and also over questions of national identity, 
political rights and the nature of the state. They were also 
in antagonistic relations with 'their own' bourgeoisie over 
normal issues of class conflict -- wages and conditions --
but also over questions of the status and treatment of 
'native' labour. Industrial issues did not stand alone but 
always had to be seen in the context of other issues of 
domination and subordination. These ranged from racial 
attitudes in the wider society, and racial antagonisms at 
the workplace, to formal disabilities and discriminations. 
On the other hand the political imperative of unity within 
the dominant bloc could be undercut by class conflict. 
Coercion played an important prefatory role to the creation 
of the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance. The suppression of 
the Rand Revolt in 1922 made clear the unacceptability of 
autonomous direct action by the white working class and 
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paved the way for the highly structured system of industrial 
relations created by the Pact government, and exploited 
later by the National Party, both before and after it gained 
power, in order to incorporate white and especially 
Afrikaner workers. 
coercion played a much smaller part in the Unionists' 
situation. The interests of skilled shipbuilding and 
engineering workers (always central to Protestant working 
class concerns) were much less vulnerable to threats from 
cheap labour, and employers in these industries did not face 
the peculiar conditions of the mine owners in South Africa, 
conditions whose logic forced them into head-on conflict 
with white workers. The imperatives which forced the Union 
government to crush the Revolt were also much weaker in the 
Irish case. Both in fiscal and coercive terms British rule 
in Ireland was much less fragile than the South African 
state, so that although the military did intervene in the 
1907 dock strike, the stakes were much lower than in the 
desperate gamble and draconian response which the Revolt 
represented for the white miners, the employers, and the 
state. Paradoxically, although the British state in Ireland 
was stronger than its South African counterpart, Ulster 
Unionists faced a much graver political threat to their 
self-determination from Irish nationalism and liberal 
governments in the successive Home Rule crises between 1886 
and 1921. As a result, Protestant workers and employers 
could not afford a conflict so destabilising as to require 
coercion on the scale of the Revolt. 
A central resource in explaining the success of Ulster 
Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism as all-class political 
movements in industrial societies, has been the argument 
that the political allegiances of Protestant and Afrikaner 
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workers respectively were bought with privilege and material 
advantage: 
Although white workers were never the 
dominant partners in the alliance, the 
attention given to securing their immediate 
interests in high wages compared with black 
workers and in job security (a combination 
necessarily requiring job reservation) served 
as the lynchpin of the class alliance which 
provided the political base for Afrikaner 
unity.113 
•• Unionist leaders ••• had mobilised the 
Protestant masses to resist Home Rule and 
inclusion in the Free state through the 
policy of discrimination and the ideology of 
Protestant supremacy •• If a lasting loyalty to 
the new state was to develop among the 
Protestant masses, they had to be given a 
privileged position within it.114 
As those benefiting from sectarianism 
perpetuate it in Northern Ireland, so is 
racism perpetuated in South Africa. And as in 
the one case the beneficiaries include 
workers as well as elites, so is it in the 
other. Northern Irish Protestants exclude 
Catholics from jobs that would compete with 
Protestant workers; South African whites 
reserve certain jobs exclusively for 
themselves. 115 
Despite the similarities summarised above, the privileges 
which helped create and maintain the two class coalitions by 
protecting and promoting the material interests of 
Protestant and Afrikaner workers differed in both extent and 
the form in which they were secured. The difference in 
extent was evident in both the political and economic 
privileges each group enjoyed. Afrikaner workers, like all 
whites, enjoyed democratic rights within racially defined 
boundaries which excluded 'non-whites' from common enjoyment 
of them. In Ireland, before partition, Protestant workers 
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existed on common terms of individual political equality 
with Catholics. After 1922, such political privilege they 
(and other Protestants) enjoyed was as a result of tactics 
like gerrymandering or ratepayers' franchise in municipal 
elections and not from formal inequalities in individual 
status. 
The difference in extent of political privilege is matched 
by differences in material inequalities between Protestant 
and Catholic on the one hand, and Afrikaner and African on 
the other. The core of working-class Protestant material 
privilege, lay in domination of skilled working-class jobs, 
and a significantly smaller chance of being unemployed. This 
still left many Protestants in unskilled positions and 
vulnerable to unemployment, in an economy which ever since 
the 1920s has experienced very much higher rates of 
unemployment than the rest of the united Kingdom. The point 
has often been made that although Protestants have been 
relatively better-off than catholics, the absolute number of 
Protestants living in poverty has always been greater than 
those of Catholics. This situation signals inequalities of a 
very much lesser scale than those between Afrikaner workers 
and Africans, especially as the Nationalist coalition 
matured in the exercise of governing power after 1948. 
There has also been a difference in the way material 
privilege was secured. The privileges of Protestant ·workers 
were much less formally underwritten and elaborated than 
those of white workers in South Africa. Although under the 
Stormont regime between 1922 and 1972, there was no shortage 
of Unionist leaders to echo the call of Prime Minister 
Brookborough on Protestants to employ only their own kind, 
and the government itself practised discrimination in the 
. public service, a large measure of employment discrimination 
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was left in the hands of the Protestant workers themselves, 
perpetuating the exclusivism of the old craft unions. 
In this sense, Protestant workers themselves ensured the 
perpetuation of privilege by control of the workplace which 
was maintained by basing Orange Lodges there, by overt 
displays of Orange and loyalist symbols and ritual, and in 
the last resort by physical expulsion. In the latter half of 
the 19th century, employers sometimes protested at this 
denial of the right to employ whom they pleased, but by the 
time of the formation of the Northern Ireland state, their 
acquiescence was secure. The point is not to shift 
responsibility for discriminatory practices and inequality 
away from either employers or the state; both were culpable 
in their own ways. The point is that as in so many other 
things, Protestant workers had a direct and autonomous hand 
in creating and maintaining their own political and economic 
conditions. For instance, exclusionary control at the work-
place was mirrored in the practice of street-fighting by 
which both Protestants and Catholics undertook the defence 
of their own residential areas. This was much less true of 
Afrikaner workers, whose privileges were secured by the 
highly elaborate programme of discriminatory legislation 
begun in the White Labour Policy by the Pact government. The 
colour bar was not simply the result of action by powerful 
trade unions, but of government action. According to Mason 
this was especially true of the colour bar in the 
manufacturing industry where .... at its inception, a large 
number of its beneficiaries were neither employed, nor union 
members": 
•• this group of white workers came to see 
their guaranteed positions, from the first, 
as the outcome of governmental measures, 
rather than as simply a response to their own 
solidaristic efforts. The need for trade 
union solidarity was never, therefore, as 
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firmly rooted here as among the . mineworkers. 
Attempts to predict future trade union 
solidarity on the basis of the early 'good 
signs' amongst the mineworkers were 
inherently misdirected. 116 
Class FOrmation and the Forging of Political Unity 
The formation of the Ulster Unionist and Afrikaner 
Nationalist class coalitions involved a similar mixture of 
pre-industrial relationships shaped by colonialism, 
settlement and resistance, and class formation under 
conditions of industrialisation. 
Despite the similarity of elements, there were clear 
differences in the processes. The making of the Protestant 
working class took longer, with domestic production of linen 
from the 18th century and machine production of textiles 
from the early 19th. This process also preceded the direct 
incorporation of working-class elements into the Unionist 
coalition. By contrast, the growth of South African 
manufacturing industry, the state-sponsored creation of an 
Afrikaner working class, and the final elaboration of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist class coalition were virtually 
contemporaneous. 
The two working classes were made from much the same 
materials, small farmers and landless labourers. But the 
move from the land represented a trauma for Afrikaners not 
duplicated in the case of Ulster Protestants. Military 
defeat and the effects of rinderpest and drought made the 
experience of the move to the city a harrowing one in both 
personal and, more importantly, national terms, with 
attendant grievances and resentments. The making of the 
Protestant working class does not evoke such individual or 
collective trauma. Belfast's riggers, riveters, fitters, 
shipwrights and joiners were made from: 
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•. fresh-faced countrymen who walked down to 
the Lagan to find work .. They came down from 
the Hollywood Hills, from the shores of 
Belfast Lough, from Castlereagh -- from the 
green townlands around Craigantlet, Comber, 
Moneyrea -- small farmers, hedge carpenters, 
landless labourers, bringing little with them 
except the clothes on their backs, their 
strength and intelligence and leaving behind 
little more than the prospect of building 
'famine walls' for the landlord. 117 
This doubtless romantic view should not be allowed to 
obscure the rigours and insecurities faced by the newly-
urbanised. But it helps to establish a background to a 
context in which Protestant workers, or at least the elite 
of shipyard and engineering men who set the tone for the 
rest, could maintain their independence and identity not 
only from Catholics, but also from 'their own' bourgeoisie. 
South African cities, where commerce and industry were 
dominated by Jews and the English, must have presented a 
more hostile and alien challenge to Afrikaners than Belfast 
presented to the newly-urbanised Protestants. Their 
reception was eased by the familiar sectarian institutions 
of Orangeism. The emerging industrial bourgeoisie of Belfast 
was composed of their co-religionists. As we have seen, 
these factors favoured a limited, but durable and sometimes 
intense expression of autonomous action in both political 
and industrial conflict. 
Internal and External Factors in the Creation of Class 
Coalitions 
In the historiographies of both Ulster Unionism and 
Afrikaner Nationalism rival accounts assign differing 
weights to internal and external factors in creating unity. 
78 
In the case of Unionism, external factors include the 
political advance of Irish Nationalism and betrayal by the 
British government. Fear of these, it can be argued, were 
powerful stimulants to Unionist unity. In opposition to 
this, the orthodox Irish nationalist account stresses 
another external factor, 'imperialism'. In this version, no 
sUbstantial material or other interest existed within the 
Protestant community to persuade them to deny their Irish 
identity, but their resistance was induced by the 
manipulations of the British ruling class, whose imperial 
interests were served by partition. In South Africa, the 
British annexations of the 1860s and 1870s, the Jameson 
Raid, the Boer War, and the entry into the First and Second 
World Wars can be cited as political events which helped to 
shape a nationalist identity among Afrikaners. 
In both cases, neo-Marxist challenges have emerged to 
accounts which allegedly over-emphasise factors like these, 
and which seek to put the burden of historical explanation 
on factors internal to the Ulster Protestant and Afrikaner 
Nationalist communities, notably the dynamics of class 
relations within them. As the remarkably similar 
historiographical critiques and manifestoes of Gibbon's and 
O'Meara's works indicate,118 the intention is to rescue 
Ulster unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism from accounts 
which falsely view them as spontaneous reactions to external 
threat, and the realisation of collective identities which 
required only conditions of crisis to make themselves 
manifest. Instead of falling into the trap of understanding 
the movements in their own terms and categories, these 
materialist accounts claim to demystify them and reveal the 
class-based interests which shaped them. 
~ibbon successfully relates the growth of Ulster Unionism to 
the emergence of a powerful industrial bourgeoisie in 
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Belfast prior to the first Home Rule. Crisis, and even 
O'Meara's critics credit him with powerful insights in his 
account of the Economic Movement, and the class interests 
which used it as a vehicle. In each case, reappraisal of the 
building of class coalitions emphasises the importance of 
material factors and the dynamics of class relations. 
Whatever the final judgment on the adequacy of these 
materialist accounts in explaining the individual cases, 
they point to important comparative issues. 
Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism are most like each 
other when viewed as movements which reflect ethnic 
solidarity in the face of external threat. Viewed (even in 
part) as the product of contending and combining class 
forces, as the product of internal tensions and aspirations 
as well as external threat, they seem less alike. The neo-
Marxist historians of Ulster Unionism have an even more 
pressing difference than that (shared by their South African 
counterparts) with liberal historians. It is with previous 
Marxist accounts of Ulster Unionism, and especially their 
treatment of working-class Protestants as dupes or pawns of 
the bourgeoisie. It is this failure of analysis, stemming 
from the work of James Connolly, the inspiration of the Left 
in Ireland, which in its uncritical acceptance of Irish 
nationalist perspectives, prevents Irish Marxists from 
taking Unionism seriously.ll9 
As a result, the work of Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson in this 
field represents a self-conscious vindication of the 
enduring vitality and robust (though limited) autonomy and 
class character of popular Protestant politics and ideology. 
In their reappraisals of the growth of the Afrikaner 
Nationalist class coalition, Davies, O'Meara, and others 
come to what is effectively the opposite conclusion about 
the Afrikaner working class. Indeed the overall thrust 
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appears to be to deny the status \working class' to 
Afrikaner wage earners (and to whites generally), or at 
least to emphasise that their stay in the true or 
\ productive , working class was a short one. The story that 
emerges from the revisionists' analysis is of defeated and 
unformed class elements which were incorporated into the 
Nationalist class alliance first by the systematic 
construction of privilege for white workers created by the 
Pact government in a stratified structure of industrial 
relations, and then by the Broederbond's assault on the 
trade unions. 
These Afrikaner wage-earners .had no real equivalent of the 
autonomous traditions of the Protestant working class; their 
sense of themselves as the most staunch of loyalists, 
consciously separate as a class from other elements in 
Unionism; their own view of themselves as an elite, \the 
industrial classes' distinct from a backward nationalist 
peasantry; their own options of ultra-sectarianism and 
labourism; their own practices of direct and exclusionary 
action from ritual marching to riot and pogrom, which did 
not always fit with the interests and policies of the 
leading elements in the Unionist coalition. 
The other side of this coin was that the organising and 
controlling classes in each coalition were different too. 
When it became clear with the rise of Sinn Fein and the 
intensification of the struggle for Irish independence over 
most of the island, that Unionism would henceforth be an 
Ulster phenomenon, the movement was led by a mature 
capitalist class, long established in shipbuilding, 
engineering and textiles, and with close links to British 
imperial capital. The Afrikaner Nationalist class coalition 
was led by the aspirant cap~talist class of Transvaal petty 
bourgeoisie whose role O'Meara emphasises, and the Cape-
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based leadership of agricultural capital which was branching 
out into insurance and banking. 120 With the benefit of 
hindsight, it might be noted that the Northern Ireland 
economy (as it became after 1921) was poised for decline, 
while that of South Africa after 1948 was poised for 
development. Afrikaner Nationalism then represented aspiring 
classes in a dynamic economy, while Ulster Unionism 
represented dominant classes in a declining economy. 
In this context, Afrikaner Nationalism represented a 
transformatory movement of aspiring classes, while Ulster 
Unionism was an essentially defensive project. As Harbinson 
puts it, the essential character of Ulster Unionism was that 
.... the Union apart, they placed no distinctive principles or 
programme before the people ... 121 By contrast, Afrikaner 
Nationalism was a movement of elaborated ideology, economic 
development and large-scale social engineering. For each of 
them, the capture of state power presaged a quite different 
project from its counterpart. 
SUMMARy 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism were both class 
coalitions, formed when external events seemed to threaten 
the interests of groups who were disposed to view themselves 
in ethnic terms, but were differentiated by class. These 
class differences were not transcended in the coalitions, 
they were reproduced, and the patterns of incorporation in 
both cases was a hierarchical one. 
Despite this similarity, there were important differences in 
the materials from which these coalitions were constructed, 
and the processes by which it was done. The substance of 
.these differences was that Protestant workers in Northern 
Ireland had a more fully elaborated working-class identity, 
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in terms of the work they performed, . and their traditions of 
independent political action. Both sets of workers were, 
broadly speaking 'settler' working classes, given the 
different places occupied by them in the occupational 
structure and political system compared to blacks and 
Catholics. But the supervisory and administrative nature of 
the work done by many Afrikaner workers, especially in the 
mining industry, meant that the settler label more truly 
fits the Afrikaner worker than the Ulster Protestant. 
There were other differences in addition to this. As we have 
seen, the role of the state in organising and guaranteeing 
the privileges which bound the coalitions together was 
greater in South Africa than it was in Northern Ireland. The 
movements which were the vanguards of the coalitions 
differed too; Afrikaner Nationalism was dynamic and 
aspirational, while Unionism was static and defensive. After 
they achieved state power, Ulster Unionism in 1921, and 
Afrikaner Nationalism in 1948, these similarities and 
differences continued to play roles in determining the 
movements' later trajectories of maturity and decay. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY OF ULSTER UNIONISM AND AFRIKANER 
NATIONALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Afrikaner Nationalism 
and Ulster Unionism both successfully integrated social 
classes which are normally considered to be antagonistic to 
each other into successful coalitions of social and 
political mobilisation. Essential to the process of 
integration in both cases was the exploitation of political 
mythology which became essential to the cohesion of the 
coalitions, and was woven into their patterns of growth, 
maturity and decay. Just as the classes were integrated into 
Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism in different ways 
and with different results, so too was political mythology 
exploited in different ways and it is to the demonstration 
and interpretation of these differences that this chapter 
now turns. What is important here is not only the content of 
the mythologies, but the ways in which they have been 
elaborated, transmitted and possessed. 
Political mythology is a well-nigh universal feature of 
political societies, forming an apparently indispensable 
part of such political processes as mobilisation, the 
construction of ideology and the manufacture of legitimacy. 
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In his analysis of political myth,1 Henry Tudor stresses 
the practical understanding offered by political myths, 
rather than disinterested knowledge, or explanation from 
general laws and principles; 
The understanding ••. (a mythical 
explanation) •• provides is a practical 
understanding: that is to say, an 
understanding in which men consider the world 
that confronts them, not as the object of 
disinterested curiosity, but as the material 
for their activity •••• men view their 
circumstances in the light of their purposes, 
and their explanations are simultaneously 
justifications and prescriptions. 2 
Typically, political myths use the past to make sense of the 
present; events and personalities are chosen, highlighted 
and cast in a dramatic narrative. A representative 
individual, a cadre, or even a whole people may be the 
protagonist. Among the functions myths fulfil are to define 
identity or to create or reinforce solidarity. Myths provide 
exemplars, look outward to other groups, classes or nations 
to distinguish friends and enemies, and inwards to 
distinguish heroes and traitors. Myths simplify choices and 
offer guidance on how they should be faced; they explain 
setbacks and celebrate victories; 
The view of the world that we find in a myth 
is always a practical view. Its aim is either 
to advocate a certain course of action or to 
justify acceptance of an existing state of 
affairs. 3 
Political mythology is a very useful concept to employ in 
trying to understand political movements, but it is not 
without its problematic aspects. For instance, is it 
necessary or even possible to distinguish mythical from 
other forms of knowledge and understanding? This problem is 
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apparent when the subject of truth claims arises 
assessing a myth either on its own, or in competition with a 
rival mythical account. Tudor stresses that it is important 
that myths have a basis in truth -- the events described 
cannot be fictional, they must be \real' and the account 
must not be falsified outright, so that the myth is 
plausible. Tudor places the historian, the philosopher and 
the scientist in opposition to the myth-maker. Theirs is the 
world of, " •• general laws and principles .• disinterested 
curiosityll. In particular, historians do not have the myth-
makers' imperatives of justifying actions, giving to people 
the confidence to act. By contrast, " •. they generally stand 
at some distance from events .and conditions on which they 
comment. This allows them to see things in a broad 
perspectivell •4 Probably enough has been written about the 
problems of ideology and objectivity in the social sciences 
to make this an inadequate basis for distinction between the 
historian and the myth-maker. Reference could be made to the 
historian's technical expertise, commitment to evaluation, 
the range of techniques he or she can use to validate 
sources and so on. Others, like du Toit, argue that 
professionalism provides no sure dividing line between 
history and myth; 
The hold of intellectual paradigms is strong; 
even competent and critically minded 
historians may find their researches giving 
credence to historical myths. Such a myth is 
that of the \Calvinist' origins of Afrikaner 
Nationalism and associated racial 
ideologies ••••• The problem is that much of 
the relevant historical research has been 
carried out in terms of intellectual 
paradigms very much conducive to the myth. 5 
Du Toit does not offer an explicit, theoretical demarcation 
between myth and history, although it is implicit in his 
argument that such a divide exists; 
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•. we may simply wonder at the fact that not 
only van Jaarsveld but other historians as 
well -- the competent and professional as 
well as the lesser brethren, Afrikaner 
nationalist as well as liberal historians --
went to such lengths to manipulate or 
selectively distort the evidence in order to 
create and sustain a historical fabrication, 
and that reputable social scientists all too 
readily accepted this concoction as the 
historical truth. 6 
L. M. Thompson takes up this issue, criticising Tudor's 
division between history and mythology.7 His final position 
seems to be that historians are myth-makers, but specialist, 
technically proficient ones; . 
One cannot understand the present without 
some awareness of the momentum it carries 
over from the past. Historians as specialists 
in knowledge of the past, have an obligation 
to communicate their knowledge to other 
people as effectively as possible. If that 
means making myths -- that is to say 
describing exemplary events powerfully --
then historians should indeed be mythmakers. 8 
Akenson takes sharp issue with both Thompson9 and du Toit10 • 
His criticism of the former revolves around the claim that 
Thompson views political myths as things to be vindicated or 
(more likely) to be disproved. As Akenson sees it, instead 
of standing outside and judging a mythology (or belief 
system) "the most important task of the scholar is to see 
how the systems work, and this has to be done in terms of 
the myths themselves".ll In the criteria he sets out for 
assessing myths12 Thompson perhaps offers some grounds for 
Akenson's charges, but in fact, despite an undertone of 
disapproval, he appears far more concerned to discuss how 
political mythology has been adapted in Afrikaner 
Nationalism than he is to discredit it. 13 
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In Akenson's judgement, du Toit's account of Afrikaner 
Nationalist political mythology has two principal 
deficiencies. The first is his (openly expressed) intention 
to discredit the mythology on the grounds that it has had, 
and continues to have, deleterious political effects. 
Certainly the question of scholarly bias is a sensitive one, 
but in this case du Toit's frankly expressed normative 
purposes should be considered along with the determination 
which pervades Akenson's own work to rehabilitate his chosen 
peoples from the effects of unfair scholarly treatment and 
the mistaken policies of metropolitan governments. 
In the second place, Akenson .accuses du Toit of academic 
snobbery and sleight of hand in adopting an "exclusive" 
definition of ideology in order to deny that " •• there is 
some common ideological core that persisted through all the 
successive transformations of the Afrikaner movement".14 For 
Akenson this amounts to denying the existence of a rich 
demotic Afrikaner culture so that du Toit can " •• force the 
analysis of Afrikaner out of the historical mode".15 This is 
a strange charge to make, considering what du Toit has to 
say about the historical development of Afrikaner 
Nationalism elsewhere in the source which Akenson uses 
against him. 
From the first stirrings of a wider group 
consciousness among the scattered rural 
population of the Cape Colony and the 
republics in the 1880s through the cultural 
and language movements of the early twentieth 
century to the collective ethos of the 
modernising Afrikaner elite that is now in 
power ( ••• Afrikaner nationalism •• ) has had a 
much more variegated career than it is 
usually credited with. Nor should this be 
surpr~!ing. The last 100 years have seen 
dynam1c transformation of South Africa from 
an agrarian society to a modern industrial 
state; based on a minority group in a complex 
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plural society the Afrikaner movement had to 
find its course amid changing patterns of new 
political and economic alignments. In the 
circumstances it is only to be expected that 
the Afrikaner's political history should not 
be a steady and unswerving progress toward 
some predefined goal, but rather constitutes 
a complex pattern of apparent demise, 
resurgent assertion, consolidation, fusion 
and faction.,,16 
Any reading of this source other than a determinedly 
adversaria1 one is likely to conclude that de Toit's 
intention is to view Afrikaner Nationalism historically and 
to understand it in context rather than in terms of some 
ahistorica1 schema. It is not clear why Akenson reacts with 
such vehemence to du Toit on the question of Afrikaner go 
112demotic culture. The charge cannot (or should not) be 
that du Toit denies the existence of this. Although he is 
much less impressed by it than Akenson -- referring to " •• a 
diffuse set of sentiments associated with common language, 
history and identity,,17 -- he certainly does not deny the 
possibility that a " •. rich popular cu1ture .• "lS existed. 
Presumably the issue is over whether this popular culture 
can usefully be called an 'ideology'. Unfortunately, Akenson 
himself is less than explicit on the nature and role of 
ideology. In fact he scarcely uses the concept at a1l. 19 His 
own arguments are developed through usages like "Afrikaner 
culture", "Afrikaner thought", "Afrikaner mythology", 
"Afrikaner belief system", "Afrikaner cosomology", without 
any great attention to how they are elaborated and mediated 
into specifically political thought and practice. The reader 
is left with no guidance as to whether he rejects du Toit's 
usage of 'ideology' per se, or whether he accepts the nature 
of ideology as du Toit's work reflects it, but claims that 
such an ideology did in fact inform 'Afrikaner Culture' at 
an earlier period than du Toit gives credit. Since he offers 
no clue as to whether 'ideology' has a special role to play 
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in 'Afrikaner culture', or what such . a role might be, his 
charges against du Toit's usage lack focus and cogency. 
Whatever the sUbstance of Akenson's charges, his criticism 
of du Toit raises interesting questions about the 
relationships between mythology and ideology and between 
popular and 'high' (in the sense of cultivated, formalised 
and elaborated) components of both. It might be argued for 
instance that mythology and ideology overlap, given their 
characteristic functions of explaining, interpreting and 
justifying the social world for individuals and classes, 
ethnic groups and nations. Perhaps a fruitful approach might 
be to regard political myths . as pre-ideological, a necessary 
precondition for the elaboration and structuring of 
programmes which offer specific guidance and inspirational 
models explicitly for political action. If this were so, it 
could be argued that all ideologies are based on political 
myths, but not all political myths have a superstructure of 
ideology. 
Societies which reflect popular participation and mass 
mobilisation in politics are particularly hospitable to 
political mythology. Like other political phenomena which 
are characteristic of modernised societies, mythologies may 
be seen firstly as part of a general class of things, 
secondly as part of more specialised categories and thirdly 
in terms of their own national context. In this way, the 
myths of the Proletarian Revolution in Russia, and the Long 
March in China may be compared in terms of all political 
myths, of revolutionary mythologies, and in terms of 
specifically Soviet and Chinese historical and ideological 
context. We ought to be able to compare political 
mythologies in the way we compare ideologies, movements and 
institutions, in order to construct or discourage general 
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propositions or law-like statements, . and to cast light on 
the nature of individual cases by reflection from others. 
Such is the pervasiveness of political mythology in advanced 
societies that there are many surface similarities between 
individual examples, in form (often narrative drama) in 
content (crisis and deliverance) and in type (foundation 
myths and diaspora myths are particularly well-dispersed). 
If we are selecting mythologies for comparison then, we 
should try to ensure that there are more than surface 
similarities. 
In Protestant Ulster and among Afrikaners, political 
mythology has been unusually pervasive and intense. It has 
been widely disseminated and deeply felt, assiduously 
cultivated and regularly celebrated. It has also been in 
both cases, unusually resistant to the secularisation (both 
literal and metaphoric) of politics, which has taken place 
in comparable advanced industrial societies. Indeed the 
popular Western view of both, is of thoroughly atavistic and 
anachronistic communities. 20 
Most political mythologies are inclusive in the sense that 
they try to mobilise support on the basis of whole 
societies. In this context themes such as the melting pot, 
resistance to the invader or imperialist, revolutionary 
citizenship, and so on ar~ prominent. By contrast, the 
political mythologies of Protestant Ulster and Afrikanerdom 
are sectarian and exclusivist, although they differ both 
internally and between each other in degrees of determinism 
over questions of identity. Following from this, each is 
basically a mythology of group relations, one which is 
unusually frank about the centrality of conflict and the 
impossibility of assimilation or even accommodation. The 
fault lines in Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism, 
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the cracks along which the movements. began to decay, were 
given definition by reformers' abandonment of the 
prohibitions on accommodation about which the respective 
mythologies were quite explicit. 
The sources of these mythologies are also apparently 
similar. Themes and events from settler and frontier history 
are picked out and highlighted, emphasising encirclement and 
siege, crisis and deliverance. Archetypal self-assigned 
attributes, especially honesty, are contrasted with the 
treachery of 'natives' and with conspiratorial metropolitan 
forces. Concerns derived from Protestant, specifically 
Calvinist theology are superimposed on these concerns. In 
this way, political issues are typically cast in religious 
contexts; relationships and identities are given 
transcendental sanction and hence a special authenticity and 
force. The idea of covenant is common, indeed central to 
both, and illustrates the force of the sacred in politics. 
Political and religious ritual overlap to an unusual degree; 
days set aside to celebrate or re-dedicate some aspect of 
political mythology are treated in effect as holy days, and 
the form of celebration may well be a religious one. 
These similarities seem to go well beyond those shared to 
some degree or another by all political mythologies, and 
warrant further comparative treatment of the mythological 
dimension of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism in 
growth, maturity and decay. The following salient aspects 
will be considered; the sources of the mythologies; their 
structure, content and purposes; the context of their 
appearance and development; the media through which they 
have been constructed, transmitted and reproduced; 
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AFRIKANER POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY 
Whatever the differences between liberal and materialist 
accounts of Afrikaner Nationalism most historians 
acknowledge the importance of mythology in creating and 
fostering the sense of identity (whether natural or 
invented) which helped mobilise Afrikaners and define 
ideologies which guided and led the mobilised group. 
Giliomee for instance, citing Nairn,21 invokes; 
•• the element of shared historical 
memories •. the collective unconscious of an 
ethnic group -- the indigenous resources on 
which cultural entrepreneurs such as Malan 
drew, appealing to Afrikaner history and 
myths about themselves in presenting the 
'purified' National Party as the only 
credible ethno-cultural representative. 22 
Du Toit23 invokes the "collective ethos" of Afrikaner 
unities, and states in this context that; 
Even political myths and collective fictions 
may become potent forces for change when they 
are adopted as the unifying symbols and 
programmes for action by important social 
groups. 24 
Moodie goes even further than these authors and writes; 
•• if the idea of theoretical consciousness 
is at all valid for social groups, 
Afrikanerdom achieved theoretical 
consciousness between August 1938 and October 
1939. This Afrikaner consciousness was based 
not on class (not even on race) but on 
culture, upon language and tradition. 25 
He views such a consciousness as a source of inspiration in 
the minds of masses, a rallying point for action, a resource 
·of symbols to be tapped in times of doubt and despondency. 
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Although he has radically different views on the nature and 
the genesis of this consciousness, O'Meara too testifies to 
powerful nature of the mythology, especially when writing of 
the centenary celebrations of the Great Trek, where he says, 
.. the Eufees did largely succeed in 
mobilising Afrikaans-speakers in terms of a 
culturally and ethnically exclusive vision. 
It united Afrikaners as Afrikaners ••• 26 
The sources and content of the mythology which helped create 
the collective "unconscious"' or "ethos", the "theoretical 
consciousness" or the " •• culturally and ethnically exclusive 
vision •• " are most comprehensively treated by Moodie27 and 
Thompson. 28 From both it is ciear that the principal source 
of mythology is a selective reading of South African history 
which begins by conceptual ising history in ethnic terms --
it gives 'Afrikanerdom' a history. This history portrays a 
pattern of relationships between settler, native, and 
imperial power, in which Afrikaners identify themselves in 
struggle with African peoples (Blood River and the Covenant) 
and the British (Slagtersnek, the two Anglo-Boer Wars). In 
the political mythology of Afrikaner Nationalism, the Great 
Trek defines Afrikaners against both, and fittingly it is 
the centre-piece of the mythology. 
In some respects, the contents of Afrikaner Nationalism's 
political mythology has many familiar elements. The Great 
Trek for instance has elements of epic journey, migration 
and civilising mission, all of them discernible in other 
epics of political mythology (the Long March, the American 
West, European imperialism). Deliverance in a climactic 
battle like Blood River is also a commonplace theme, not 
least in the centrality of the Battle of the Boyne in Ulster 
Protestant mythology. The tendency to project significance 
backwards onto events and individuals who would have been 
102 
unaware of any ethnic portent in their actions (as in the 
Slagtersnek myth) is also widespread. 
A notable feature of the mythology analysed by Moodie is the 
emphasis given to themes of martyrdom, suffering and death, 
arranged around two cycles, the Great Trek and the Anglo-
Boer War; 
The saga which began with the gallows at 
Slagtersnek ended with an execution in 
Pretoria; the flight from the British in the 
Cape and Natal was duplicated by defeat at 
the hands of the same enemy in 1902; the 
suffering and death of women and children at 
Blaaukrantz foreshadowed the agony of the 
concentration camps; and the martyrdom of 
Piet Retief was reflected in Paul Kruger's 
death in exile and the execution of Jopie 
Fourie. 29 
This emphasis on suffering, redemption, and resurrection, is 
not unusual in nationalist mythology.30 But unlike other 
nationalisms, in this instance the realisation of the 
sufferings into the hoped-for future was complicated by the 
fact that this required the subordination of others. This 
has meant that Afrikaner Nationalist mythology has had to 
bear the burden of being both the story of a suffering, 
martyred people and an ascendancy, or imperial myth in which 
themes of scientific racism, civilising mission, and the 
preparation of others for self-determination have 
successively appeared. 31 
In considering the source and content of Afrikaner 
Nationalist mythology, the aspect which has attracted the 
most scholarly attention has been the fusion of religious 
and political concerns in the production of what Moodie 
called the Afrikaner civil Religion. Within this, the most 
prominent aspect has been that of the covenant, and this has 
been subjected to the closest critical scrutiny.32 
103 
Certainly in terms of popular understanding of Afrikaner 
Nationalism, the covenant is a very influential concept, 
integrating and explaining the alleged sacred intensity, 
historical longevity and thus the rigid intransigence of an 
embattled people, apparently marked by God for special 
suffering, special favour and a divine mission. 33 
The vow allegedly taken by the trekkers before the battle of 
Blood River, to build a memorial church if God granted them 
victory, has certainly been a central point of Afrikaner 
Nationalist mythology in the twentieth century, especially 
at the centenary of the vow in 1938; 
While the Broederbond elite had long preached 
the civil theology and celebrated the rituals 
of the civil faith, the Ossewatrek (the 
'oxwagon trek') made the Afrikaner civil 
religion an integral part of the 
consciousness of thousands of ordinary 
Afrikaners. 34 
Thompson prefaces his sceptical and critical treatment of 
the myth with the following summary; 
We shall find that we cannot be sure 
precisely what actually happened concerning 
the taking of the covenant or vow in the 
commando in 1838; that once they had defeated 
the Zulu and sacked their headquarters, 
nearly all the members of the commando 
proceeded to forget all about any such vow or 
covenant; that in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century a number of clergy, 
politicians, and intellectuals in the 
Transvaal and Orange Free state republics 
began to resurrect, embellish, codify, and 
celebrate a version of the events of December 
1838 for the purpose of promoting pride and 
self-confidence among Afrikaners in the face 
of British imperial aggression; and that 
their successors have modified the story 
during the twentieth century as British 
imperialism has waned and African nationalism 
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has replaced it as the principal threat to 
Afrikaner Nationalism. 35 
As part of a wider demystifying assault on the alleged 
Calvinist origins of racial supremacy and chosen people 
myths in Afrikaner Nationalism, du Toit also refers to the 
covenant theme; 
A prime example of this relevant to our theme 
is the meaning of the covenant made by the 
Trekker-commando under Andries Pretorius 
prior to the battle of Blood River on 16 
December 1838. Blood River and the covenant 
have become so charged with political, 
historical and religious significance as 
central symbols of modern Afrikaner 
Nationalism that it is ~irtually impossible 
to conceive what meaning the covenant might 
have had at the time in the minds of the 
participants themselves. 36 
Du Toit argues that the covenant fell into no well-
established religious tradition, although he suggests that 
there may have been secular precedents among blood oaths 
taken by frontiersmen. Furthermore, he claims that until the 
nationalist period, when it would gain "dominant 
significance", the Trekker covenant was, "an isolated and 
almost forgotten episode". 
The critical comments of du Toit and Thompson reveal an 
important aspect of the mythology of Afrikaner Nationalism, 
namely the extent to which it was the self-conscious 
creation of a modernising elite. This in turn points the way 
for a discussion of the media in and through which the 
mythology was articulated and disseminated. 
Many writers have noticed the dual nature of Afrikaner 
Nationalism, the fostering of a sacred history in an urban, 
industrial context; 
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•• the preservation, salvation, or rescue of 
the volk required both the affirmation of 
traditionally rooted symbols of unity and the 
'modernisation' of the community. Thus, 
paradoxically, the unity of the community 
could only be maintained through its 
differentiation to meet the requirements of 
the modern ec'onomy which it sought, 
ultimately, to control. 37 
Du Toit makes the same kind of point; 
Contemporary Afrikaner Nationalism is quite 
simply a different kind of social and 
cultural phenomenon than the 'natural' and 
s pontaneous sense of solidarity and the 
cohesive integration of a number of central 
values that might have characterised the 
traditional Afrikaner community ••• The very 
process of mobilising Afrikaner cultural 
identity presupposes the breakdown of the 
traditional order and responds precisely to 
the needs and pressures of the urban context 
by propagating such an intensely conscious 
identification with 'Afrikaner' values and 
symbols. 38 
Perhaps the most singular aspect of Afrikaner Nationalism 
and its political mythology lies in the organisational 
network which was employed to create and foster this 
"intensely conscious identification". Giliomee discusses how 
after 1934, when the National Party in its present form came 
into existence; 
•• the party, the Afrikaner Broederbond, the 
Afrikaans press, writers, businessmen, 
schools, universities, and even the church 
all attempted to foster the consciousness 
among the Afrikaners of an exclusive 
political identity.39 
In this way, the Afrikaner population was mobilised along 
every important social dimension with the political party at 
the apex, but resting on a base of cultural, religious, 
industrial, and educational organisations. As Slabbert 
106 
points out, the bureaucratisation of . Afrikaner life was the 
key element in which a collective ethos could emerge; 
On all fronts of Afrikaner life bureaucracies 
developed. On the economic front there were 
SANLAM, SANTAM, the Reddingsdaadbond, 
Federale Volksbelegging, Blanke Werkers 
Beskermingbond, Ko-ordinerde Raad van Suid 
Afrikaanse Vakbonde, Yskor, Foskor, and 
Evkom ••• The cultural bureaucracies were the 
Akademie vir Taal, Lettere en Kuns, the 
Broederbond
6 
the FAK, the Ossewa Brandwag, 
and SABRA.4 
Although these bureaucracies were created to serve specific 
purposes that were diverse, and even contradictory; 
•• in them, elite groups could articulate the 
needs of their members as they conceived of 
them and interpret the events that the 
majority of Afrikaners were experiencing. 41 
There is broad agreement among historians and sociologists 
that Afrikaner political mythology was manufactured, 
fostered and disseminated very much by elites. Emphases vary 
greatly on the extent to which these elites had a pre-
existing degree of common identity on which to work. There 
are differences as to which of the elites were most 
important at what time,42 and the relative contribution of 
the strands they represented - neo-Fichtean, neo-Calvinist, 
National Socialist and so on. There is disagreement over the 
nature of elites, particularly the role of class factors. 43 
What appears not to be in dispute is that the sense of 
unity, and collective ethos on which Afrikaner Nationalism 
was built, was constructed by interlocking elites and 
organisations. Central to this view is the crucial role of 
an elite of petty bourgeois 'cultural entrepreneurs' which 
saw itself as economically deprived and politically 
·excluded. 
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The elitist nature of the forces which created Afrikaner 
Nationalism is usefully illustrated by the Broederbond. 44 
This organisation is not an open one and the process of 
selection and recruitment is rigorous. 45 Giliomee emphasises 
the fact that 'sound financial standing' has always been 
required of recruits, while O'Meara states that the Bond, 
" •• only ever represented bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
groups".46 The Broederbond has performed many functions 
within Afrikaner Nationalism. These have varied in their 
salience over time, but a central one has always been to 
define and redefine Afrikanerdom and Afrikaner Nationalism. 
In Thompson's estimation, the Broederbond has been 
' •. largely responsible •• ' for the success of the Afrikaner 
nationalist mythology, so that; 
Not only has it dominated the historical 
consciousness of most Afrikaners, but it has 
also been imposed on the minds of other 
sections of the South African population, 
especially since the National Party won 
control of the state machinery in 1948. 47 
We might summarise at this point by saying that the 
political mythology of Afrikaner Nationalism has been drawn 
from a selective account of a history reflecting the three-
cornered relationship between settler, native and imperial 
power, fused with concerns drawn from Protestant and more 
specifically, Calvinist theology. This fusion has produced a 
distinct and exclusive48 sense of ethnic identity. Whatever 
the pre-existing 'natural' or organic sense of collective 
identity, this political mythology has displayed a very 
marked degree of self-consciously directed effort in 
manufacture and dissemination. This has involved a very high 
degree of bureaucratisation and the creation of a network of 
·organisations which has been considered the pre-requisite 
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for the successful creation and fostering of a collective 
ethos. All of this has been the work of elites whose self-
assigned tasks have been of rescue and transformation. 
The fact that these tasks have been dynamic, not merely 
defensive and preservative, has meant that political 
mythology has not been enough to sustain Afrikaner 
Nationalism. Political mythology offers only limited 
guidance for action, while it might well provide the "ethnic 
adhesive" (in Giliomee's striking phrase) which makes 
concerted action possible. It is here that, despite 
Akenson's criticisms, du Toit's distinction between ideology 
and mythology strikes a chord. He argues that if there has 
been an underlying continuity in the collective ethos that 
has persisted in many forms since the 1880s, "it can be 
found only in a diffuse set of sentiments associated with 
common language, history and identity", adding; 
That there is some common ideological core 
that persisted through all the successive 
transformations of the Afrikaner movement and 
that provided the basis for these 
developments, or a standard against which 
they can be measured is a fiction with little 
or no historical basis. 49 
Following Carl Friedrich he points out that nationalism has 
no necessary content regarding the political and social 
order, except to realise nationhood. In the case of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, apartheid provided the ideology whose 
specific programmes would achieve the transformation and the 
tasks of rescue and modernisation. Viewed in this light, 
political mythology was a necessary pre-condition for the 
elaboration and articUlation of more specific ideological 
programmes, but can be seen as separate from them. This 
raises the possibility that as ideology is redefined in 
order to cope with changing political conditions, political 
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mythology has to change too. Thompson devotes a chapter of 
his work to this phenomenon, arguing that some components of 
mythology can be changed more easily than others. 
It is true that the Slagtersnek myth, 
formerly a particularly potent contributor to 
Afrikaner political consciousness, is being 
eased out of the lexicon, and that the myth 
of the covenant is a source of lively debate 
among Afrikaners. However, official South 
Africa remained wedded to a modified version 
of the cluster of myths concerning the vacant 
land, the unassimilable races, and the ten 
black nations. 50 
ULSTER PROTESTANT POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY 
The political mythology of Protestant Ulster is a rich and 
profuse one, so that only the central elements will be 
treated here. 51 Ulster Protestants are the heirs if not 
invariably the descendants of English and Scottish 
settlements in the north-eastern counties of Ireland in the 
seventeenth century. As such, the organising themes of their 
mythology are those of a civilised and embattled settlement, 
fortified against a dispossessed and rebellious native 
people who are numerically superior, unassimilably alien and 
implacably hostile. As with other political mythologies, 
these themes are used to give continuity and point to what 
becomes Ulster Protestants' 'own' history. In this history, 
Ulster Protestants define themselves not only in the pattern 
of relationships between settler and native, but also 
between both and the imperial power. Ulster Protestants see 
themselves as the agents and dependents of this power, but 
also sometimes the victims. The salient events thus picked 
out, are the massacres of 1641, the siege of Derry and the 
Battle of the Boyne in 1689, and Ulster's resistance to Home 
Rule for Ireland between the 1880s and 1922. 
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In some senses it is an oversimplification merely to conjure 
up an image of siege, and the enemy outside the walls. The 
plantations of Ulster were imperfectly carried out and 
separation of settler and native was far from complete or 
clear cut. As stewart points out; 
The planters were frontiersmen, and naturally 
displayed frontier attitudes where their 
lands bordered on those of native septs. But 
even more important to them was the problem 
of the enemy in their midst. From the outset 
they faced the menace of a fifth column •••• 
It is not the problem of antagonistic groups 
confronting each other in different parts of 
the province; it arises from the mosaic of 
the settlement itself. The settlers developed 
over a long time a special kind of siege 
mentality created by the necessity of having 
always to test the loyalty of those within 
the settlement itself, both the 'Irish' 
settled in pockets within the frontier and 
those whose steadfastness might have been 
undermined b~ constant day-to-day contact 
with them ••• 2 
In this way, betrayal, treachery and conspiracy figure 
largely in the settlers' mythology, notably in the 1641 
uprising, when it was the enemy within who rose and 
massacred large numbers of Protestants. 53 This rising of the 
native Irish against the settlers has to be seen in the 
larger context of the tangled affairs of king and parliament 
in England, Scotland and Ireland at that time. The actual 
death toll in the massacres has long been the subject of 
tendentious controversy, and the whole event has recently 
been the subject of fresh research and historical 
revision. 54 But it is widely accepted that the rising was a 
profoundly traumatic one for Ulster Protestants, a myth of 
infamy which lasts to this day. 
"Important as the folk memory of 1641 is, it is quite 
eclipsed by the twin legacies of the Williamite wars in 
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Ireland, the siege of Derry and the Battle of the Boyne. The 
siege especially can be regarded as the central event in the 
Protestant mythology; 
The siege of Derry in 1689 is their original 
and most powerful myth. They seem to see 
themselves in that and since then, as an 
embattled and enduring people. Their 
historical self-vision is of endless 
repetition of repelled assaults, without hope 
of absolute finality or fundamental change in 
their relationship to their surrounding and 
surrounded neighbours. 55 
The essential elements are as follows. In 1688 a Catholic 
army was poised outside the walled city of Derry 
(Londonderry) to secure the city for King James in his 
coming struggle against Prince William of Orange, causing 
consternation among the Protestants behind the walls. While 
the city's leaders disputed the validity of the army's 
warrants; 
An excited debate was taking place among 
crowds gathered in the market square. Many of 
the younger citizens were for keeping the 
regiment out, and even some of the aldermen, 
though fearful of the consequences, hoped 
that this might be done without their having 
to take the lead. The waiting soldiers on the 
opposite bank, suspecting some such design, 
now began to cross the river in considerable 
numbers and move swiftly towards the city 
walls. Suddenly when the first of them were 
within sixty yards of the Ferry Gate, a group 
of thirteen apprentices ran to the main 
guard, seized the keys, and drawing up the 
bridge, shut and locked the gate. They then 
hastened to shut the other three great gates 
of the city leaving an armed guard on each. 56 
It should be noted, as Stewart points out, that the closing 
of the gates was an act of rebellion, given that James was 
"the legitimate king in Ireland, and that the people of Derry 
took this action not out of profound identification with 
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William, but out of fear of a repeat . of 1641, fuelled by a 
forged letter which signalled just such a happening. 57 In 
this all-important myth, the young and hot-headed took 
direct action to secure a threatening situation, while wiser 
heads temporised. One of the latter, Governor Lundy, has 
been immortalised as the arch-betrayer. Genuinely unsure of 
the rights of the situation and afraid to commit the people 
in his care to a hazardous siege, Lundy was forced to flee 
the city in disguise. He is burned in effigy annually to 
this day, as a symbol of all who would compromise the 
security of the people. This 'Lundy myth' was used with 
devastating effect, notably by the Reverend Ian Paisley, to 
discredit Ulster Unionist leaders who between 1968 and 1974 
tried to deal with the legitimation crisis in the Northern 
Ireland state by means of reforms under British auspices, 
leading to institutions designed to share power with the 
Catholic minority. 
By the time the siege was lifted in July 1690, the 
Protestant cause was saved by the victory of Williamite 
forces at the Battle of the Boyne. The Boyne and the siege 
are commemorated yearly on the Twelfth of July and the 
Twelfth of August respectively. 
In modern times, it is Ulster's resistance to Home Rule 
which has provided the most fertile source of political 
mythology.58 In this, the centrepiece of resistance was the 
Ulster Solemn League and Covenant 59 which was opened for 
signature along a third of a mile of tables in the Belfast 
city hall and in smaller towns throughout Ulster on 23 
September 1912. The document attracted the signatures of 218 
206 men, and a separate declaration to the same effect was 
signed by 228 991 women. 60 It was clear that this was not 
~erely rhetoric, because Protestants had been drilling 
secretly since the previous year. In 1913 the Ulster 
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Volunteer Force (UVF) was formed out .of these contingents, 
armed with illegally imported weapons, and trained by 
British Army officers. One hundred thousand men were 
mobilised eventually, by and large reproducing the class 
structure of Protestant Ulster in the ranks of the UVF. The 
UVF was welcomed by the Protestant leaders because it 
ensured that the resistance to Home Rule would be contained 
and disciplined. The Covenant and the quasi-military nature 
of the UVF gave a very strong impression of discipline and 
even lawfulness to what were in fact highly unconstitutional 
and illegal acts. 
The myth of Ulster Protestants as a people always prepared 
to defend their rights, under their own leaders and against 
lawful authority if necessary, but in a disciplined and 
lawful, but utterly determined way has been a very powerful 
legacy in the present Northern Ireland crisis. The Covenant 
was a momentous expression of solidarity, dignified, precise 
and limited, embodying to perfection the Ulsterman's self-
image as an honest, loyal citizen, provoked beyond endurance 
by conspiracy and subversion. The myth of the Covenant lies 
long across the present Northern Ireland crisis, but it had 
its roots long precedent to the crisis over the Third Home 
Rule Bill. 
There are two principal sources for the Ulster Covenant. The 
first is the Scottish covenanting tradition in which 
relations between king and people, notably over the question 
of the upholding of the reformed faith, were pursued in a 
contractarian tradition. 61 By 1912, later advocates of 
contract and resistance had been superimposed on this 
tradition, elaborating the myth of covenanting resistance in 
Unionist rhetoric. For instance, one speaker at a meeting 
~efore the signing of the Covenant invoked to a cheering 
crowd of thousands the spirit of Charles James FOX, to 
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refute Liberals who claimed the Unionists were being 
treasonous; 
These are the words he used speaking of the 
principle of resistance --'I mean the general 
principle of resistance, the right inherent 
in free men to resist arbitrary power 
whatever shape it may assume, whether it be 
exerted by an individual, by a Senate, or by 
a King and parliament united. This I proclaim 
as my opinion; in support of this principle I 
will live and die.,62 
In general, the contractarian spirit of the Covenant could 
hardly have been made plainer. This explicit form of social 
contract was preceded by the older tradition of 'public 
banding', also Scottish, in which, "through the centuries of 
weak central government in the kingdom, the nobility and 
gentry had developed a tradition of entering into 'bands' 
for mutual protection".63 The Williamite settlement meant 
that there was no longer any need for covenanting in 
Scotland and the growth of public order meant that public 
banding too became unnecessary; 
In Ireland however, there was a continuing 
threat to public order, however exaggerated 
that threat might have been in Protestant 
minds - unlike Scotland, the country really 
was full of Catholics. In effect, public 
banding was not abandoned, but from 1688 was 
transmuted into an exercise embracing not 
only Presbyterians but those English (and 
indeed Scottish) settlers who were attached 
to the episcopal establishment as well. 
Whether under the name of the Antrim 
Associations in 1689, the militia in 1715, 
1719, 1745, 1756, and 1760, or the Volunteers 
in 1778, the Protestant tenantry were 
accustomed to being arrayed in arms under 
their landlord's leadership to maintain order 
whenever the French/Spanish/Catholic/Jacobite 
threat with the presumed native threat 
accompanying it reared its ugly head. The 
habit sustained in the Protestant community 
the sense that public order really derived 
more from their exertions than from the 
activities of the sovereign authority.64 
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The covenanting and banding traditions have political, 
military and religious aspects. In political terms there is 
a strongly contractarian dimension to the notion of covenant 
which encourages resistance to leaders who betray their 
trust and/or fail to provide strong enough leadership. In 
military terms, self-help and direct action in times of 
emergency rather than vesting a monopoly of violence in the 
state are stressed. In religious terms, the Ulster Covenant 
is decorated with providential language and there is no 
reason to doubt that the signatories attached a sacred 
significance to it, bestowed by the fact that they attested 
to it before God. But the Cov.enant myth is essentially one 
of a compact between ruler and ruled, and between the 
members of the community themselves,65 and it is not, 
certainly not directly and explicitly, one between the 
community and God, bestowing the status of chosen people. 
There is however one exception to this. MacIver has 
demonstrated how the Rev. Ian Paisley uses the writings of 
John Knox to fashion such an understanding of a covenant 
between God and the Protestants of Ulster; 
The Old Testament covenant between God and 
Israel established for Knox and other 
reformers the ultimate precedent for God's 
desired relationship with contemporary 
nations. The truly reformed nation became the 
contemporary counterpart of Old Testament 
Israel -- a chosen people with a special God-
given task. Just as Knox and the early 
Scottish Covenanters believed God had 
ordained Scotland to play a special role in 
history, so Paisley and his associates 
perceive Ulster as unique in God's sovereign 
plan for history ••• 66 
Several points should be noted in thi~ context however. 
Firstly, in the sources cited by MacIver to justify this 
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point (Paisley's writings), she finds that a national 
covenant with God is "implied, if not directly stated". 
Secondly, it can be pointed out that although Paisley is the 
single most popular political leader of Ulster Protestants, 
the small size of his church in relation to the mainstream 
Protestant denominations suggests that his theology does not 
necessarily reflect the dominant mythical conception of 
covenant. Thirdly, in any case as MacIver points out, 
Paisley is also concerned to elaborate a theory of covenant 
between ruler and ruled. Again relying on Knox, and using 
explicitly Biblical citation (in an interpretation of Romans 
13) he defines a theory of resistance to rulers who do not 
fulfil their obligations to their people, specifically to 
afford them protection; 
The duty to resist that Knox and Paisley 
glean from Romans 13, while founded 
ultimately upon the covenants of ruler and 
people with God, expresses itself concretely 
in the notion of a mutual contract between 
ruler and people elaborated by Knox. In 
Knox's view, the subject's duty .to obey 
depends wholly upon the ruler's fulfilling 
her responsibility: protecting well-doers and 
punishing wrongdoers. Resistance would surely 
follow a ruler's failure to perform these 
duties, and such resistance would be 
justified. 67 
Like all political mythologies, that of Protestant Ulster 
requires media for reproduction and dissemination. In some 
respects such formal media are strikingly lacking in this 
case. There has for instance been no intellectual class 
engaged in the elaboration and articulation of this 
mythology, in ways typical of full-blown nationalist 
movements. No substantial literature supports the mythology, 
although there is a scattering of histories, and some works 
of near-hagiography.68 Any literary figures who might be 
described as Ulster Protestants by origin, tend to be 
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sceptical, ambivalent, or downright critical of the 
mythology.69 The British connection which is an integral 
part of the Ulster Protestant's mythology is enshrined and 
reproduced in the trappings of statehood and rule, but these 
and media like broadcasting and the press tend to reproduce 
a metropolitan British culture rather than a parochial 
Ulster one. Protestant aspects of the mythology are 
proclaimed from the pulpit, and the churches are centres of 
activities carried on by social, educational and welfare 
organisations. 70 
The most important organisations involved in reproducing and 
propagating Ulster Protestant mythology however, especially 
in its exclusivist, sectarian and activist forms, are the 
fraternal organisations. The myth of the siege of Derry is 
embodied in the Apprentice Boys of Derry,71 which has seven 
parent clubs within the walls, many branches throughout 
Ulster, and some in England, Scotland and America. The order 
has no important function other than to commemorate the 
siege, mainly through the ritual of marching along the city 
walls themselves, a practice which in 1969 was the occasion 
of the scenes of public violence which above all symbolised 
the beginning of the current round of 'troubles'. 
Overshadowing the Apprentice Boys in size, though not in 
symbolic importance, is the orange Order, whose marches, 
especially commemorating the Battle of the Boyne on 12 July, 
represent the most notable regular display of Ulster 
Protestant solidarity, and adherence to its political 
mythology. 72 
The origins of the Orange Order (which was founded in 1795) 
are complex73 and even a little obscure, although in the 
.Orangemens' own mythology, the starting point is taken to be 
a sectarian affray called the 'Battle of the Diamond' near 
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the village of Loughall in County Armagh. The Order grew out 
of rural and agrarian vendettas in County Armagh in the 
eighteenth century. These did not at first have an 
exclusively sectarian character, and some of the early 
vengeance groups which participated in them had mixed 
membership. The deeper significance of the Order's origins 
can be interpreted in terms of economic and demographic 
changes which threatened status balances between Protestant 
and Catholic in rural County Armagh where the two 
denominations were approximately equal in numbers. The 
burden of explanation has shifted from that of land hunger 
to changes in the rapidly developing linen industry which 
threatened the position of Protestant journeymen weavers. 
Whatever the case, the rural struggles took on a sectarian 
character; 
The conflict in County Armagh passed on two 
traditions to the wider Orange movement of 
the nineteenth century and after. The rural 
labourers and the new urban working class 
created by Belfast's linen mills and 
shipyards inherited the Peep o'Day Boys' 
militant anti-Catholicism, and their rituals 
of confrontation. The Armagh gentry of the 
Established Church were succeeded over the 
years by the Ulster landed classes, the 
clergy and the politicians, for whom the 
Order provided a loyal vassalage, an 
electorate and ultimately a citizen army.74 
The Orange Order contributes to the reproduction ' of the 
Protestant political mythology in very direct ways. Its 
rituals, particularly marching, commemorate the principal 
events and personalities of that mythology. The lodges into 
which the Order is administratively divided (there are 1 450 
in Northern Ireland) ~re often named for these events and 
personalities, and they carry elaborately printed banners 
depicting scenes central to the mythology. In addition, 
marching is a display of territoriality and dominance, a 
119 
rite of assertiveness and refusal, "to treat politics as 
having to do with compromise and consensus rather than 
elemental confrontation".75 
The Order claims to perform welfare and educative functions 
as well and the roles it plays are aptly summarised in a 
source quoted by whyte;76 
••• a bridge between denominations; an arena 
for friendly competition between lodges; an 
opportunity for celebration and display; a 
means of instilling discipline into the 
irresponsible; a forum where the low status 
Protestant can make his views heard. 
Although the Order makes rather a point of its fraternal 
nature, and middle-class Protestants who have wished to make 
a political career have generally had to adhere to the forms 
of Orangeism, it is predominantly a lower-class 
organization. Many professional and intellectual Protestants 
associate it with bigotry and violence. Despite this, it is 
likely that the Orange Order still fulfils for many lower-
class Protestants, in the performance of its rituals and the 
sustaining of its mythology, the functions of an earlier era 
as described by Miller ; 
Orangeism sustained within this modernising 
society, however, the core of a community 
which cut across social classes, in which all 
were in some sense equal in their common 
Protestantism. Social change might place 
one's class in jeopardy -- one might cease to 
be an independent weaver or a strong farmer 
and become instead a factory operative or a 
shipyard worker -- but one could never lose 
the status which attached to being a 
Protestant, except by some unthinkable act 
like marrying a Catholic. 77 
The Order's membership was estimated at 90 000 by Rose in 
1971,78 a figure which suggested that 32% of male 
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Protestants belonged. The Order itself claimed 95-96 000 
members in 1984,79 although actual membership data, like 
initiation rituals, and the substance of what happens at 
meetings, are secret. 
An important characteristic of the Ulster Protestant 
political mythology is that it has not formed the basis for 
a full-blown ideology. The energies it mobilised were in 
defence of an established order on behalf of classes which 
saw themselves as representative of a developed and 
modernised society threatened by absorption into a polity 
which under Home Rule would be dominated by backward, 
agrarian interests and unduly influenced by an allegedly 
authoritarian and obscurantist church. 80 If this could be 
avoided by mobilising the political energies and allegiances 
of all these classes, then it would not be necessary to 
recast and reshape society. Brown argues that the 
Protestants' version of history is simpler than that of the 
Irish nationalists, and has to perform fewer functions; 
By its nature it is bound to comprehend 
imaginatively much less of the human 
condition. Northern Protestants as inheritors 
of those who have prosecuted the political 
cause of the Protestants of Ireland have in 
the last analysis only one historical 
requirement -- to uphold the settlement of 
1689 and to try to ensure that the principle 
of Protestant hegemony is recognised and 
supported. 81 
This simplicity of function has meant that there has been no 
need for the Ulster Protestant mythology to be elaborated 
into an ideology more specific and detailed about goals and 
programmes than itself. 
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COMPARING THE TWO MYTHOLOGIES 
In the light of the foregoing description and analysis, it 
might reasonably be argued that historically, the two 
mythologies are indeed strikingly similar. Settler origins 
and frontier themes, the alien and treacherous majority, 
siege and the threat of annihilation, deliverance in battle, 
are prominent in both. In both, the sacred and the secular, 
and the past and the present are made to overlay and 
interpenetrate each other in the creation of what indeed 
might be called, 'civil religions', or 'sacred histories'. 
Old Testament themes and Protestant theology, notably 
Calvinism, provide a providential language, exemplars, and 
an intellectual framework for both. Both mythologies are 
exclusivist and deterministic in the identities they 
celebrate, they conceive of politics in terms of group 
relations, and in this context they are firmly against 
assimilation. To a very strong degree the mythologies of 
Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners are the mythologies of 
minorities who wish to be majorities. 
Despite all this, a comparative perspective on the two 
reveals a number of strong differences. The most salient of 
these can be discussed in three related themes. 
It is likely that all political mythologies are a 
combination of popular and elite elements. The very purpose 
of a political mythology is to mobilise popular feelings. A 
mythology has to be grasped and accepted at a popular level, 
but rarely if ever can it be used as a mobilising device, 
purely from popular resources: it is articulated, 
elaborated, refined, disseminated, to some extent by elites. 
This of course is rather a broad generalisation, and within 
~ts limits, mythologies might differ widely in their elite 
and popular elements. Such is the case with Ulster 
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Protestants and Afrikaners. At this point it is worth 
recalling Akenson's invocation of 'demotic' mythology and 
culture. It may be assumed (since he does not elaborate) 
that this is a common sense usage describing ideas which 
were widely disseminated among the people. Another dimension 
of 'demotic' is suggested however when Akenson notes that 
Afrikaner ethnicity was fostered both by "informal, home-
based affirmations,,82 and by more formally organised 
institutions. A mythology, then, or any other system of 
ideas, may be more or less demotic in the ways that it is 
reproduced as well as in the degree of its dispersal. 
A third possibility is to stretch the idea of popular to 
'populist'. In this sense, a mythology might be more or less 
demotic in the values it professes and the events it 
celebrates. It may in one sense or another place 'the 
people' and 'the establishment' in juxtaposition and 
celebrate the virtues of the former rather than the latter. 
The Lundy myth and the institution of Orangeism have clearly 
had these effects for Ulster Protestants. orangeism and the 
establishment have never been completely at ease in each 
others' company. orangeism's potential for lower-class 
indiscipline and the rank-and-file's suspicion that Unionist 
leaders are not authentically Orange define the uneasiness 
which the Order's self-conscious attempts at fraternity do 
not dispel. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that Ulster Protestant 
mythology is highly demotic in all three of these 
dimensions. It is of course widely shared and understood. It 
is also reproduced, disseminated and held predominantly at a 
popular level. In a full and literal way, the mythology is 
'possessed' at popular level, and in a straightforwardly 
literal way, it is a 'street' mythology. It is commemorated 
and reproduced in marches and other street rituals, and the 
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streets themselves are decorated with arches and flags, 
gable ends are painted, the very kerbstones are coloured in 
party colours. Marching has a direct and practical, as well 
as a mythological significance, in that it demonstrates 
territorial 'rights', and demarcates zones of dominance. The 
border which divides Ireland does not only run between the 
Republic, and Northern Ireland, but some form of it is never 
far from the suburbs, villages and city districts where 
people live. 
Where there is a very high degree of informal residential 
separation, unsecured by legislation and social engineering, 
the ritual celebration of mythology in the street is an 
important contributor to group solidarity, and since it is 
often the occasion of violent confrontation, -the medium of 
renewal and elaboration of the mythology itself. 83 For many 
Ulster Protestants, their demotic mythology has direct, 
unbroken and unmediated links to mass action. It has 
reminded them, their leaders and their enemies that it is on 
themselves and not on the state alone that questions of 
identity, survival and dominance rest. Participation in 
living history have constantly reinforced the mythology 
without cultivation from above. 
Thirdly the dominant tenor of Ulster Protestant mythology is 
an oppositional and populist one. Miller provides the key in 
this context; 
•. the public band naturally conceives itself 
bound to the sovereign authority not by 
national identification but by a contractual 
bond. 84 
Lacking the strong sense of nationality which provides 
conclusive legitimacy to sovereign authority, all the Ulster 
-Protestant mythology's loyalties are conditional, first and 
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foremost, to British authority, but to local leaders as 
well. Northern Ireland may have been 'their' state, but it 
was an imperfect representation of their identity. Its 
autonomy was incomplete, its status ambiguous. Its elites 
might be unreliable, class tensions marked the coalition on 
which the existence of the state rested. A certain kind of 
vigilance and distrust of established authority which their 
long-established mythology, their fraternal institutions and 
cultural practices were well-suited to express remained 
characteristic of the Ulster Unionist coalition even after 
it was entrenched in its own state. Crucially for later 
developments, all three of these things - mythology, 
institutions and practices -~ were largely immune from 
manipulation from above. 
In many respects Afrikaner Nationalist mythology contrasts 
sharply with this. Its elaborate organisational 
infrastructure, and the energetic intellectual input of 
theologians, scholars and literary men simply have no real 
parallel in the Ulster case. From an early stage, Afrikaner 
political mythology was subject to cultivation and 
manipulation from above. Its genuinely demotic aspects were 
taken over by the network of cultural organisations which 
was vital for the embodiment of Afrikaner unity, and 
latterly by the state. Christian National education was 
crucial for inculcating obedience to authority as an 
essential part of Afrikaner ethnicity and loyalty to the 
state,85 rather than the populist independence of the Y2lk 
was reinforced by state control of broadcasting, and party 
control of newspapers. 
If all political mythologies have both popular and elite 
origins, then the balance would appear to be strikingly 
different in these two cases, with the Ulsterman's much more 
demotic than the Afrikaner's. The difference is highlighted 
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in the two secret societies which have played such a part in 
the affirmation and dissemination of the two mythologies; on 
the one hand, the Orange Order, with its predominantly 
lower-class mass membership, its fraternal and populist 
outlook, and its very simple range of tasks and vision; on 
the other hand, the Broederbond, self-consciously elitist 
and dynamic in its self-assigned role to assist in the 
cultural and economic transformation of Afrikaners and the 
country they would come to dominate. 
It is true of course that resistance is an important theme 
in the mythology of Afrikaner Nationalism; resistance to 
British imperialism, and the ~ncroachment of native 
populations figure largely. But it is pre-eminently a 
mythology of national identification and unity, of an 
organic volk realised and celebrated in sovereign statehood. 
As such it is quite without the explicitly conditional and 
contractarian assumptions of Protestant Ulster. 
Another point of difference lies again in a question of 
balance between elements. In discussing the genesis of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, Giliomee makes use of Rude's 
discussion of ideologies of popular protest, arguing that 
they are composed of two parts; 
•• 'inherent' beliefs, transmitted through 
oral traditions and folk memories, concerning 
matters such as the right to the land and a 
'proper' political order, and •. 'derived' or 
borrowed ideas which are of a more abstract 
political, philosophical and religious nature 
and are grafted onto the base of the 
'inherent' notions. 86 
Giliomee goes on to argue that from the 1890s onwards, the 
inherent beliefs were greatly augmented by derived thought, 
and it is generally accepted that Afrikaner Nationalism was 
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progressively developed on a base of mythology to become an 
ideology of transformation. a7 This culminated in apartheid, 
a specific blueprint of social engineering, which itself has 
proved highly subject to ideological adaptation in the face 
of changing political conditions. 
None of this can be said of the Ulster Protestant mythology 
which has remained at a 'pre-ideological' level, a popular 
mythology of resistance, rather than a structured and 
adaptable ideology of transformation. Its entire substance 
can still be conveyed by the slogans, "No Surrender!" and 
"Not an Inch!". 
These differences are highlighted in the use the two 
mythologies have made of the idea of covenant. The Ulster 
Covenant had its origins in beliefs and practices of the 
most practical sort, concerned with establishing the limits 
of political obligation, and organising mutual defence. 
Although the organisational details were drawn up by the 
elite of industrialists and landowners who led the Ulster 
Unionist coalition, the Covenant is a remarkable example of 
a people taking its history into its own hands, making and 
possessing its own mythology. It did have providential 
overtones, and it was the work of a people one of whose 
characteristics was religious observance (though not 
necessarily piety). But the significance was a compact 
between the people and their leaders, and a rejection of the 
authority of the state to which they were nominally loyal. 
No special relationship was canvassed between God and Ulster 
Protestants, no special mission or status was affirmed, 
other than as the testimony of any God-fearing people 
defending their rights. It was moreover an end in itself. It 
was a measured, limited, highly specific response to a 
crisis, not a metaphysical base on which ideological zealots 
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and cultural entrepreneurs could later elaborate. If Home 
Rule could be averted, then there was an end to it. 88 
The covenant in Afrikaner Nationalist mythology has been a 
rather different proposition. The origins of the original 
Covenant were obscure, and there was a considerable period 
in which no-one celebrated it, nor indeed. paid much 
attention to it at all. It was resurrected by strenuous 
elite efforts, placed at the centre of the Nationalist 
mythology, and given meanings which it mayor may not have 
had for the original trekkers. Although the centenary of the 
Great Trek in 1938 generated much emotional involvement 
among Afrikaners,89 there was nothing to match the urgency 
and distillation of purpose which the direct, popular, mass 
experience of the signing of the Ulster Covenant provided. 
The Trekker Covenant was not an end in itself, but became 
part of more elaborate ideologies, which themselves were 
subject to revision. 90 In 1988, the year of the 150th 
anniversary of the Covenant, there was sharp controversy 
within Afrikaner political and cultural circles as to the 
origins of the vow, who precisely subscribed to it, what 
they actually said, and its present meaning. 91 In this way, 
the Covenant can be made to serve both reformers and 
resisters, as Thompson's reports of Day of the Vow speeches 
indicate. The dominant strands of Ulster Protestant 
mythology however are too unambiguous to stand as anything 
but justification for resistance.. Reformers could not modify 
them, they had to abandon them. 
In summary, it can be argued that the political mythology of 
Protestant Ulster is much simpler than that of Afrikaner 
Nationalism, and bears a much less varied historical burden. 
Its dominant motif is that of resistance, and its covenant 
is that of a contracted people, not of a chosen YQlk. The 
Ulster Protestant mythology has a more genuine mass base. It 
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is reproduced and possessed not in the intellectual 
controversies of elites but at the popular level, in day-to-
day local struggles and confrontations over territory, with 
an enemy who is never farther away than the end of the 
street. It is less ambiguous, less subject to ideological 
elaboration and revision, and possibly as a result, more 
intractable. In this way, it can be argued that 
Ulster Protestant political mythology, in the comparative 
terms outlined above, provides a better basis for mass 
popular spontaneous resistance in forms of direct action 
than the by-now elaborated, confused, and competing 
ideologies of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
It would be overstating the case to suggest that the 
availability of a mythology to inspire, explain, and 
justify, is the sole, or even predominant determinant of 
such action. But it is likely that an authentic mythology 
in the sense of being accessible, truly popular, and 
unambiguous, is an important element in the organisation of 
any mass counter-revolutionary resistance. 
****************************** 
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STATE, SOCIETY AND PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNDER ULSTER 
UNIONIST BULE AND SOUTH AFRICA UNDER AFRIKANER NATIONALIST 
mll& 
The successful mobilisation of disparate social groups into 
political coalitions enabled . the Ulster Unionist Party and 
the Afrikaner National Party to achieve political power and 
for long periods to preside over what in each case was a ~ 
facto one party state. Unionist rule in Northern Ireland 
lasted from 1921 to 1972 and in south Africa, the National 
Party will continue to hold the governing power it acquired 
in 1948 until the formation of a Transitional Executive 
Authority, probably in late 1993. Given the similar elements 
in both situations -- colonial settlement, ethnic and racial 
divisions, industrialisation, imperial relationships -- it 
is scarcely surprising that there are similarities in the 
states and political systems that the two movements built. 
Firstly, both states were formed in such a way as to 
manufacture pseudo-democratic majorities by means of 
partition. Northern Ireland's creation in a single stroke of 
partition and South Africa's evolution towards grand 
apartheid reflected in their different ways the aspirations 
of minorities to become majorities. 
Other similar features might usefully be summarised as 
follows; both states suffered from endemic legitimacy 
crises; formal and informal discrimination in political, 
social and economic spheres was necessary for the 
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functioning and reproduction of both states; there was no 
clear distinction between state and party in both cases; 
political conflict in both systems was reduced largely (and 
sometimes completely) to issues of security and " survival of 
the state, with opposition equated to disloyalty or even 
treason; both states relied on formidable arsenals of 
repressive legislation and coercive forces for their 
continued existence. 
Before discussing the political, social and economic changes 
which produced dilemmas of reform and reaction, leading in 
turn to the fragmentation of the Ulster Unionist and 
Afrikaner Nationalist power bl~cs, it will be useful to 
discuss the Northern Ireland state and the Afrikaner 
nationalist state, each in turn and in terms of the features 
listed above. 
STATE. SOCIETY AND PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND UNDER UNIONIST 
mll£ 
Until the onset of the crisis precipitated by the campaign 
of the Northern Ireland civil Rights Association in the mid-
sixties, unionist rule in Northern Ireland was stable, 
though never fully legitimate. The principal characteristics 
of unionist rule were shaped by the disputed status of the 
territory. The partition of Ireland came about as a result 
of a violent clash of national identities; 
The truth in crude terms is that both the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland were 
created by a combination of military force 
and popular will.1 
In this sense, both the Irish Free State and Northern 
Ireland had revolutionary origins in movements of popular 
resistance to imperial authority. Although the weakness of 
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the IRA in the north-east of Ireland meant that the Anglo-
Irish War was fought largely in the south and west, communal 
rioting, shipyard pogroms, terrorist attacks and reprisals 
accounted for 455 deaths in Belfast between 1920 and 1922, 
with 1 700 wounded. 2 Aside from the local disturbances, 
Ulster Protestants were in any case all too aware of the 
embattled and insecure position of Unionists in the rest of 
Ireland. 3 
Legitimacy 
The clash of identities and the violence which surrounded 
Northern Ireland's birth betwe~n 1920 and 1922,4 meant that 
from the beginning, Unionist rule faced two challenges to 
its legitimacy. The first arose from the irredentism of the 
Irish Free state and the second from the disaffection of the 
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. In reality, Irish 
Nationalists showed varying degrees of understanding of the 
Ulster problem,5 but (writing of 1920-22 and the 
establishment of the Northern Ireland state) Lee refers to 
the "immaturity of nationalist thinking about Ulster", and 
concludes that, " •• AII nationalists, whatever their position 
on the Treaty, insisted on misinterpreting the Ulster 
situation".6 This was not an auspicious basis on which to 
deal with the reality of a neighbouring state, and the 
official position of the Irish Free state (and later 
Republic) became the claim to the whole 'national territory' 
of Ireland, that is, the full geographical extent of the 
island. The claim was embodied in the Irish Constitution of 
1937 (Articles 2 and 3).7 and although Irish governments 
were unable or unwilling to contemplate coercion, or indeed 
any other concrete move to make good the claim,8 this threat 
from the outside to the legitimacy of Northern Ireland 
coloured all aspects of politics there, to the extent that 
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one recent study concludes that Irish. nationalism was 
"Unionism's greatest support".9 
The attitudes of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland 
to the newly-founded state, l i ke those of nationalists in 
the Free state, were not homogeneous, and there is room for 
speculation on whether some sort of negotiated allegiance 
might have been secured in the early days.10 Clearly there 
was a symbiotic relationship between Unionist intransigence 
and Catholic alienation in which it is difficult to find a 
first or dominant term. Certainly however, by the late 
twenties, conscious acts of policy by the Unionist 
government like the abandonment of proportional 
representation in elections to the Northern Ireland 
parliament11 and the ruthless gerrymandering of local 
electoral boundaries, left northern Catholics thoroughly 
marginalised and alienated. 
Despite the shades of nationalist opinion north and south of 
the border, and discounting the Unionists' own contribution 
to the situation, it was neither far-fetched nor unjust for 
them to see themselves faced by an irredentist neighbour and 
a potential fifth-column among the disaffected of their own 
fellow citizens. The effect of this perception was to make 
the legitimacy of the state the central issue in politics. 
It imparted a quality of urgency to mundane matters of 
electoral choice and at times an atmosphere of crisis. 12 It 
affected the politics of the governing party by putting an 
imperative premium on unity. It affected the politics of 
government by equating loyalty to party with loyalty to the 
state. Finally it affected the politics of opposition by 
blurring the distinctions between the violent irredentism of 
the IRA, the diplomatic irredentism of the Free 
State/Republic, and the nationalism of the elected 
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representatives of the Catholic minority in the Northern 
Ireland parliament13 . 
Discrimination 
The question of discrimination is widely recognised as 
central to the history of Northern Ireland between partition 
in 1922 and the imposition of direct rule by the British 
Government in 1972. The report of the Cameron Commission14 
into the disorders of August 1969 which arose out of the 
campaign for civil rights and militant Protestant reaction 
to it, confirmed Catholic claims of unfair treatment and 
gave official recognition to them. The commission summarised 
the areas of discrimination as: housing allocation, local 
government employment, gerrymandering of local government 
boundaries and partisan law-enforcement. It would be wrong 
to state however that there is a consensus on the nature, 
extent, and significance of discrimination under Unionist 
rule. At one extreme, there is the view that discrimination 
was the cement which kept the Unionist alliance together, 
and was therefore crucially important for the reproduction 
of the state • 
•• Unionist businessmen won their mass support 
through the Orange Order and by fostering and 
exploiting differences between Protestant and 
Catholic in the North. They consolidated that 
support by discrimination against Catholics 
in the industries and local councils which 
they controlled. Once in power in the new 
state, they had ample opportunity to step up 
discrimination and strengthen their position 
by gerrymandering and wholesale political 
repression. 15 
On the other hand, Unionist publicists defend the record of 
the regime,16 and academic debate has produced sharply 
diverging estimates of the extent and importance of 
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discrimination. 17 Two recent, judicious summaries of the 
published research18 come to similar conclusions; that 
discrimination was pervasive, but neither as extreme nor as 
essential to the maintenance of the state as some writers 
suggest. Both in fact quote with approval the same third 
source, in concluding that there was, "a consistent and 
irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against 
Catholics".19 
One-partyism and the politics of security 
For Richard Rose, a political regime is formed by, " .• the 
institutions coordinating the civil administration, the 
police and the military within a state".20 Writing in 1971 
he argued that one of the central characteristics of 
Northern Ireland under the Unionists was that: 
•• the empirical distinction between the 
regime and government is difficult to 
establish, for a single party, the Unionist, 
has been exclusively and continuously in 
power since the regime was established. 21 
Patrick Buckland saw in Unionist governments, "the triumph 
of parochialism and partisanship",22 in which the cabinet 
was typically "an executive committee of Northern business 
and commerce",23 closely integrated with the local community 
and susceptible to its influence. The civil service, and as 
we shall see, the police and the higher ranks of the 
judiciary were all closely identified with the Unionist 
Party. The system of government which developed was " •• an 
informal style of administration inimical to long-term and 
overall planning",24 in which party supporters had 
privileged access ensuring 'doles' and discrimination in 
their favour. An enduring pattern was quickly set by the 
benevolence, paternalism and drift of Northern Ireland's 
first prime minister Sir James Craig. Under him, "the desire 
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to conciliate local interest groups made difficult the 
development of long term and consistent policies".25 
Although Northern Ireland was formally endowed with the 
apparatus of parliamentary democracy, its political system 
did not possess in practice the fluidity which is the mark 
of a functioning democracy. Elections were no more than 
"sectarian head counts",26 especially after the abolition of 
proportional representation in local elections (1922) and 
for the stormont parliament (1929).27 The Unionists made no 
bones about what was required; 
What I want to get in this house and what I 
believe we will get very much better in this 
house under the old fashioned plain and 
simple system, are men who are for the Union 
on the one hand, or who are against it and 
want to go into a Dublin parliament on the 
other. 28 
The referendum-like quality of Northern Ireland elections 
received powerful confirmation in the Ireland Act (1949) of 
the Westminster parliament. Passed in response to the 
declaration of the Irish Republic, the act stated: 
Northern Ireland remains part of His 
Majesty's dominions and of the United 
Kingdom, and it is hereby affirmed that in no 
event will Northern Ireland or any part 
thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's 
dominions and of the united Kingdom without 
the consent of the Parliament of Northern 
Ireland. 29 
The effect of the act was immediate: 
Sir Ba~il Brooke,showed himself an apt pupil 
of Cra1g by call1ng a snap election to rally 
dissident Unionists to him and to squelch the 
Northern Ireland Labour Party. He naturally 
won a resounding victory.30 
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The effects of sectarian polarisation in Northern .Ireland's 
politics are illustrated well in the history of the Northern 
Ireland Labour Party (NILP) which articulated ' the labourist 
concerns of the predominantly Protestant skilled working 
class. 31 Founded in 1924, modelled on the British Labour 
Party and with close links to trade unions, the NILP was 
faced from the beginning with the problem of what attitude 
to take to partition and the Northern Ireland state. 
In effect Labour in the North had decided to 
face the reality of partition and had begun 
to make a serious attempt to gain political 
power in the new parliament. It made no firm 
commitment on the national question, however, 
refusing to make any explicit declaration of 
loyalty to the new state or any intimation of 
desire to see a united Ireland brought 
about. 32 
In this situation, Unionists could brand the NILP as 
disloyal, nationalists could accuse it of being anti-
national and the Roman Catholic hierarchy could announce the 
incompatibility of socialism and Catholicism. 33 Within the 
party itself the issue of partition was very divisive. 34 The 
declaration of the Republic in the 26 counties and the 
Ireland Act forced the NILP into a decision on the issue of 
partition and at the party's conference in 1949 it adopted 
an explicitly Unionist position. This did not assist it in 
the election held that year. Its candidates were shouted 
down and driven from platforms by Protestant extremists. The 
two seats it held in the previous election were lost to the 
Unionists. 35 
With elections reduced to sectarian head counts, and all 
political differences reducible to the issue of the 
legitimacy of the state, the Unionist Party under the 
Stormont system was inescapably more than a political party. 
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It was the embodiment both of the community it represented 
and of the state which guaranteed the continued self-
determination of that community. 
Repressive legislation and the organs of coercion 
Given that legitimacy and security were such central 
preoccupations in Northern Ireland under Unionist rule it is 
scarcely surprising that policing, the legal system and 
specific repressive statutes were controversial features of 
the regime. Both the immediate context of Northern Ireland's 
creation and the longer and broader context of Irish history 
bequeathed a violent legacy to, the new state. Agrarian 
violence, sectarian urban rioting, guerrilla war, 
paramilitary mobilisation and coercive imperial rule all 
cast their shadow into the present, while the IRA's 
determination to use force to unite Ireland projected open-
endedly into the future. As a result, Northern Ireland's 
security system was quite aberrant by the standards of the 
British state, of which it was part, and of western 
democracy generally. This showed itself in three ways; the 
nature of the regular and reserve police forces: the 
association between legal officers of the state and the 
Unionist Party; the extent of repressive powers possessed by 
the government. 
The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) differed in three 
principal ways from British police forces. Firstly, it was 
(and remains) a centralised body; in the context of Northern 
Ireland it is a 'national' force. As a result, it was 
subject to close political direction by the Unionist 
minister of home affairs. Secondly it was (and remains) a 
paramilitary force with a prominent internal security 
function, armed as a matter of course, and with access to 
armoured vehicles and infantry weapons. Thirdly, the RUC 
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relied heavily on an armed reserve fo~ce of civilians to 
carry out its security functions. 
Of these features, the last is the most important. The 
Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, generally known as 'the 
'B' Specials') was the most characteristic institution of 
the Northern Ireland state. 36 The formation of the Specials 
in November 1920 served four functions; the old UVF was re-
mobilised, demonstrating to the British government and Irish 
nationalists the extent of loyalist opposition to a 
nationalist takeover; loyalist militants were brought under 
military discipline; the British government was induced to 
finance security forces in Nor~hern Ireland, but to leave 
them under local control; a force was created which could 
combat IRA guerrillas in the North and save the region from 
'anarchy.,37 Of these, the last was probably the least 
important, given the weakness of the IRA in counties where 
there was a Protestant majority. But the first three, 
.... gave institutional expression to a Protestant vigilantism 
which was both traditional and -- in its own terms --
effective". 38 
The RUC, then, followed the colonial model of the Royal 
Irish Constabulary rather than British examples. It was 
responsible directly to the state rather than the community, 
and internal security rather than crime prevention was its 
principal function. Although the initial aim was for 
Catholics to comprise one third of the regular force (the 
proportion of Catholics in the population of Northern 
Ireland), the actual figures showed steady decline from 23% 
in 1923 and 17% in 1929, to 10% in 1960. 39 The 'B' Specials 
on the other hand constituted an exclusively Protestant 
force. 40 In sum, the establishment and development of local 
security forces in Northern Ireland amounted to .... the 
subordination in practice of policing to the political 
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direction of the Unionist government", and a process that 
.... was turning the police into an armed wing of Unionism".41 
The administration of justice in Northern Ireland also 
conformed to the pattern of near-monopoly of important state 
offices for Protestants: .... supervising the administration 
of justice was an overwhelmingly Protestant judiciary, 
integrated into the Ulster Unionist Party, and often the 
Orange Ordern • 42 At the time of the Civil Rights campaign in 
the sixties: 
Of the twenty high court judges appointed 
since 1922, fifteen had been openly 
associated with the Unionist Party and 
fourteen of the county court appointments had 
similar associations. Resident magistrates 
had also been drawn from the same source. 43 
In 1970, out of the seven High Court Judges, three were 
former Unionist MPs and the fourth was the son of a Unionist 
minister. 44 The composition of juries aggravated this 
situation. According to Hillyard, property qualifications, 
and the rules for challenging jurors ensured that, " •• most 
juries, particularly in Belfast, were Protestant".45 The 
overall result of this domination by Unionists was that: 
They closed prospects for using the law as a 
mechanism for the protection of the civil 
liberties of the minority -- although there 
is little evidence that the Catholic 
nationalist minority tried to use the legal 
system for redress of their grievances. 46 
Certainly, the perception of Catholics was that the legal 
system was biased against them: 
Criminal charges are preferred much more 
forcefully against Catholics than against any 
other section of the population, both in 
selecting the number and nature of the 
charges to be brought (and) in the 
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seriousness or otherwise of the Act under 
which the charges are brought. 47 . 
The legislative centrepiece of this partisan coercive system 
was the civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (1922). The 
Special Powers Act (as it came to be known in practice) was 
in the tradition of earlier British coercion acts in 
Ireland, by whose standards, according to one authority, it 
was, ..... not immoderate ... 48 Nonetheless, by the standards of 
mainland Britain, the Act effectively suspended the rule of 
law and gave very wide discretion indeed to the Executive. 
Perhaps the Act's most damaging attack on the principle of 
the rule of law reads: 
If any person does any act of such a nature 
as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the 
preservation of the peace or maintenance of 
order in Northern Ireland and not 
specifically provided for in the regulations 
he shall be deemed guilty of an offence 
against the regulations.~9 
Indeed the only restraint on executive power was the 
expressed intention that "the ordinary course of law and 
avocations of life and the enjoyment of property shall be 
interfered with as little as may be permitted by the 
exigencies of the steps required to be taken under this 
Act ... 50 This expression of good intentions was, of course, 
entirely at the mercy of political discretion. As Edwards 
points out, even the ultimate responsibility of the 
Executive to parliament for its actions was rendered 
ineffectual by the absence of an effective opposition. 51 
The Special Powers Act came to stand for the whole system of 
coercive domination which underpinned Unionist rule in 
Northern Ireland, and it was the centrepiece of Catholic and 
nationalist protests against repression and discrimination. 
Perhaps its most objectionable feature was that although it 
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was passed into law at a time of turbulence and widespread 
political violence, it remained on the statute book even in 
times of stability as a reminder of Catholics' subordination 
as a community, and of the fusion of party, state, and legal 
system which Unionist rule represented. 52 The endemic 
legitimacy crisis of the state in Northern Ireland could 
scarcely be better symbolised. 
STATE. SOCIETY AND PARTY UNDER NATIONALIST RULE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
It is always difficult, and usually misleading, to be too 
precise about when historical ~rocesses begin and end. Most 
recent analyses of Afrikaner Nationalism treat it as a 
phenomenon created in response to certain material 
conditions, and subject to change as these social, political 
and economic conditions change. 53 It is always difficult to 
attempt a periodisation of a social movement, and assert 
that its true or essential nature was revealed at any given 
point. It can be argued however that in the period between 
the post-Sharpeville recovery in the sixties and the onset 
of the political and economic crisis of the mid-seventies, 
Afrikaner Nationalism and the political system it created 
had reached a kind of stable maturity.54 Afrikaner 
Nationalism was a movement which claimed to embody the 
interests and aspirations of a people irrespective of 
region, class, denomination or other difference. It was led 
by a political party, and rested on a base of educational, 
cultural and other social organisations. 55 The movement was 
not monolithic, but all-embracing and united. It had an 
organising ideology, which did not mean the same thing to 
all,56 but which served as a focal point, giving direction, 
justification and interpretation. The people (the YQlk) in 
question was defined in terms of its separateness from 
imperialism (metropolitan and local) and from the black 
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majority. Relatively few in number, and lacking geographic 
concentration, Afrikaner Nationalists were forced to stress 
unity at all costs in their political organisation. They set 
out to concoct a system, through partition and repression, 
in which they would be in a majority. This 'white South 
Africa' would satisfy them (if no-one else) in terms of 
self-rule, democracy, and material interest. 
Legitimacy 
This system lacked both domestic and international 
legitimacy. The obsessive concern with racial classification 
and the assignment of rights and status on the basis of race 
which the systematic application of apartheid after 1948 
represented, seemed a direct echo of the Nazi racism which 
had been punished in the Nuremberg Trials. The signing of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949 
demonstrated that there would be henceforth a standard and 
an instrument in whose name to deny legitimacy to apartheid. 
The fashioning of an anti-colonial and anti-racist consensus 
in the united Nations ensured that there would be a pressure 
group to pursue this aim. Landmarks in this process were the 
expUlsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961, the 
revocation of South Africa's UN mandate for South West 
Africa in 1966, the Lusaka Manifesto in 1968 and in 1971, 
the defeat for states in the OAU favouring dialogue with 
South Africa. 
Of course, south Africa lacked international legitimacy 
because it lacked domestic legitimacy from the majority of 
its people. After the growth and development of African 
resistance to apartheid in the fifties, culminating in the 
State of Emergency and Sharpeville Massacre in 1961, it was 
clear that peaceful political change towards a system 
regarded as legitimate by the majority was not possible. At 
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every stage in the struggle between white rule and black 
resistance, the international and domestic dimensions of the 
conflict over South Africa's illegitimacy were inseparable. 
This is made clear by the prominence given to the 
international campaign against apartheid in the ANC's 
mutually reinforcing, 'Four pillars' of the struggle against 
apartheid. 57 
Discrimination 
The lack of international and domestic legitimacy is 
attributable in large measure to the fact that the South 
African state was grounded in . racial discrimination. It is 
widely accepted that the hallmark of the apartheid system --
its uniqueness even -- lies not in the presence of racial 
discrimination which is pervasive, if not universal in world 
politics, but in the way it was given backing in the 
constitution, the institutions, and every aspect of the 
state's structures and purposes. 58 Allied to this central 
characteristic were a number of other important features. 
Firstly, the system of discrimination which apartheid 
represented covered virtually the whole range of human 
activity and interaction. Anthony Lemon59 usefully 
emphasises three principal dimensions of the system; the 
'micro-scale' of petty apartheid involving discriminatory 
access to amenities; 'meso-scale' segregation of the Group 
Areas Act and associated legislation; and 'macro-scale' 
measures through which African political aspirations were 
intended to be channelled into territories successively 
labelled, 'bantustans', 'homelands' and 'national states'. 
Similarly, John Dugard classifies the law of apartheid into 
two kinds of measure, " .• those which prescribe the personal, 
social, economic, cultural, and educational status of the 
individual in society" and " •• those laws which construct the 
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institutions of separate development and determine the 
political statu~ of the individual".60. 
Discrimination on this scale required not merely the 
perpetuation of colonial practices which the Nationalists 
inherited, but also an ambitious programme of social 
engineering. It required ruthless coercion in carrying out 
this programme and an elaborate ideological justification, 
which reflected a high sense of purpose to elevate it beyond 
mere self-interest. De Klerk describes this in terms of, " a 
most rational, most passionate, most radical will to 
restructure the world according to a vision of justice: all 
with a view to lasting peace, · progress and prosperity".61 In 
essence, the survival of the state required a universal 
system of discrimination, and discrimination on this scale 
could not be left to individual choice, custom, or informal 
centres of social and economic power. Protection of 
Afrikaners' interests (and those of whites in general) could 
not be left to self-help. Indeed the very definition of 
these interests was increasingly an elite activity practised 
in universities, research organisations and social movements 
which formed a network enveloping both party and state. 
One-partyism and the politics of security 
A state built on such foundations of discrimination and 
ethnic particularism could only exist as a de facto one-
party state, in which although other (white) parties were 
allowed to exist, there was a fusion between party and 
state. Indeed there was a fusion between people, party and 
state, woven together by religious62 and cultural 
organisations, which created an expectation of privileged 
access to state resources. 63 As one authority put it in the 
late 1980s, the National Party, " •• has virtually become 
synonymous with the South African state and white 
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domination".64 Having won a narrow victory in 1948, the 
Nationalists secured their domination of the formal 
political institutions (notably in the constitutional 
struggle over the rights of coloured voters), and 
progressively identified themselves with the main 
bureaucratic and coercive arms of the state: 
•• preference was increasing given to party 
men in appointments and promotions in the 
armed forces, the police and public service, 
the diplomatic service, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and the 
judiciary. In some areas, the Gleichschaltung 
was achieved by a slow war of attrition 
against non-Nationalists. Competent policemen 
or consular figures would find comparative 
juniors promoted over their heads, and 
resign. In other areas, notably the army, the 
Nationalist takeover had the aspect of a 
bloodless purge. 65 
This process was greatly facilitated by the ambitious 
programmes of economic nationalism and social engineering, 
which required large scale extension and ramification of the 
state apparatuses. In this way, Afrikaner economic interests 
were built up by and in the state. 
Institutions which linked agricultural 
cooperatives to financial institutions on the 
one hand and to the party on the other, 
served to give these interests cohesion. So 
too did those state corporations directly 
involved in production, like the iron and 
steel industry (Iscor) and the publicly owned 
transportation and communications networks. 66 
Also useful in building up a one-party patronage state were 
the numerous bureaucracies set up to administer and oversee 
the various manifestations of apartheid. These included 
racial classification, residential segregation and 
education, and the political and economic development of the 
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'homelands'. The scale and range of government activity grew 
enormously under the Nationalist government. By the mid-
1970s, the central bureaucracy comprised 38 state 
departments and their adjuncts (including advisory boards, 
councils and commissions), 28 public corporations, 22 
agricultural control boards and nine national research 
institutes. 67 The duplication of departments and services in 
the (then) seven 'self-governing' homelands, and in the 
administration of the coloured and Asian populations, 
greatly swelled the proliferation of the bureaucracy.68 
stadler regards the Nationalists as," not especially 
venal in respect of patronage",69 but aside from questions 
of the abuse of power, strong influences promoted a fusion 
of state and party. Firstly, apartheid was such a 
doctrinaire and ambitious programme of social engineering, 
and so absolutely identified with the National Party that 
there was simply no room for a neutral public service; self-
selection if nothing else ensured that. Secondly, so 
completely did the National Party come to dominate white 
electoral politics in the fifties, sixties and seventies, 
that a close identity between party and state was 
inevitable. Thirdly, the identification of the National 
Party with key state symbols, and most particularly with the 
achievement of republican status for South Africa, also 
brought state and party together. 
Although they were embedded in a racially exclusive context, 
the formal elements of parliamentary democracy were 
important ingredients in legitimising and reproducing the 
state under Nationalist rule. Even within this context 
however, these formally democratic elements were severely 
attenuated by security legislation, which greatly encroached 
upon civil liberties and shielded the government from public 
scrutiny and accountability. Perhaps more importantly, the 
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informal conventions of democratic systems were also 
conspicuously absent. The notion, in particular, that 
alternation in government is possible (and desirable) 
because voters make choices on past record and policy 
potential was not applicable to South African politics, 
certainly after 1948. The National Party was successful in 
making voter choice a matter of ethnic loyalty and racial 
solidarity. In effect, politics became a matter of security 
and demography.70 Electoral politics did not concern 
competing claims to managerial competence in the economy, 
social legislation and foreign policy. Elections were, 
effectively, calls for a united people to express itself in 
referenda on its destiny. Throughout the years of building 
and consolidating apartheid, the National Party equated 
opposition to it with 'alien ideologies', like communism and 
liberalism, with external forces like British imperialism or 
third-world radicalism, and above all with the threat of 
black rule, the 'swart gevaar' of so many election speeches 
and pamphlets. 
Repressive legislation and the organs of coercion 
It is not surprising that to impose this enormously 
ambitious and far-ranging system of social control and 
legally-sanctioned inequality on the majority of the South 
African population and in the face of prevailing movements 
and values in world politics, required extensive and 
stringent coercive powers and a well-developed security 
apparatus to apply them. Both aspects of repression are well 
documented, the legal framework rather more fully than the 
security forces. 71 
If the most central characteristic of apartheid was the way 
in which the distance between communities was maintained by 
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statutory differences in status, this phenomenon was taken 
to its logical conclusion by the criminalisation of 
Africans' lives through the medium of offences against race 
statutes, principally 'pass laws' controlling movement. In 
1947, 418 000 prosecutions under these laws amounted to 41% 
of all prosecutions, and in 1967 the figures were 1,043,000 
and 44%.72 Writing in 1974, Sachs calculated that " •• one 
African man in two can expect to see the inside of jail 
every decade".73 This is a further indication of the extent 
to which questions of identity, association and 
discrimination were taken out of the hands of the population 
and vested in the state. The extent to which lives 
(especially African lives) were formally policed under 
apartheid laws has led some authorities to note that 
'informal' oppression was less necessary than in other 
systems where a high consciousness of ethnicity and practice 
of discrimination co-existed with formal concern for 
democratic norms. M.G. Smith writes, for instance; 
While South African whites did not need a Ku 
Klux Klan since state police actively 
enforced the rules of apartheid, in the 
Southern united States, given juridical 
restraints on their personal conduct, police 
and other state employees could not openly 
undertake such violent illegal activities as 
burning appropriate buildings or lynching 
suitable scapegoats that were regarded as 
essential to 'keep the negroes in order,.74 
Sachs makes essentially the same point, "It is the 
pervasiveness of the court system that helps explain why 
lynching has been virtually unknown in South Africa", 
stressing the extent to which the law and the courts made 
self-help unnecessary for whites. 75 
The all-embracing nature of apartheid legislation, and the 
pervasiveness of the court system also help to explain the 
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apparent paradox that although South Africa exhibited a very 
high degree of social control, "the country ranked low on 
indices of police manpower per head of population; 
.•• in 1984 the regular force comprised only 
44 696 officers. Despite the authoritarian 
nature of the South African state, this 
represented only 1.4 policemen and women per 
thousand of population, comparing favourably 
with liberal democratic countries. The South 
African ratio has oscillated around this 
proportion since the inception of the SAP.76 
Frankel dismisses this apparent contradiction by pointing to 
the fact that, " .• formal police manpower is supplemented by 
the resources of other functionally compatible government 
agencies and by the embedding of police activity in a dense, 
informal and quasi-informal social network".77 Police 
manpower is also supplemented by the resources of municipal 
township police, the Reserve Police Force (a white citizen 
unit, founded in 1961) and the Police Reserve (1972), 
composed of ex-policemen and national servicemen. Although 
since 1961, the ratio of white to black policemen has 
oscillated around 1:1.07,78 the authority structure has been 
overwhelmingly white-dominated. Uniform, pay, and service 
differentials between black and white, and inequalities in 
access to commissioned rank, were enormous until the late 
1970s, and although many of the conditions have been 
equalised, the hierarchy is overwhelmingly white. It has 
also been, and remained, overwhelmingly Afrikaans-speaking. 
Sachs estimated that ninety per cent of entrants to the 
force in the mid-seventies gave Afrikaans as their first 
language, with the obvious inference that their political 
allegiances lay with the National Party.79 
Uninterrupted Nationalist control of the legislature and 
executive after 1948 meant that the regime was able to call 
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into being a very wide range of powerful security 
legislation to give authority to the pattern of partisan 
policing outlined above. Beginning with the banning and 
suppression of political organisations in the 1950s and 
continuing with the refinement and extension of detention 
without trial in the 1960s and the dramatic ramification of 
categories of offence like terrorism and sabotage in the 
1970s, the apparatus of political offences, trials and 
imprisonment was developed to meet each challenge to the 
state. 80 The judiciary which applied and interpreted this 
legislation was exclusively white, but although this (and 
the oppressive and discriminatory nature of the laws 
themselves) has led black people in recent years to, " •• the 
inevitable conclusion that blacks must expect little or no 
justice from the courts",81 even authors critical of, or 
even hostile to the government's, security legislation are 
reluctant to describe the judiciary as clearly partisan. 82 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
The states and political systems fashioned by Ulster 
Unionists and Afrikaner Nationalists in response to the 
predicament of finding themselves among an alien and (in 
their perceptions) hostile majority had as common features, 
legitimacy crisis, discrimination, de facto one partyism, 
and a marked reliance on repression. Despite this, there 
were important differences of emphasis which, as the two 
grappled with renewed and altered political crisis and the 
demands of transition, ensured that each had its unique 
trajectory of change. 
Contested legitimacy has been the characteristic feature of 
both Northern Ireland under the Unionists, and South Africa 
under Nationalist rule. The metaphor of siege has 
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frequently, indeed routinely, been used of both. The 
consequences of contested legitimacy have included the high 
premium on unity among Ulster Protestants and Afrikaner 
Nationalists, and the branding of opposition as \disloyal', 
subversive or downright treasonable. This in turn has been 
used to justify narrow limits on political expression and 
permanent recourse to repressive measures more usually 
associated with emergencies. 
Although a permanent legitimacy crisis had the effect of 
fusing internal and external elements of the situation in 
both cases, and shaped their political dynamics both in 
periods of stasis and (as we shall see) rapid change, there 
were important differences. While the legitimacy of 
Nationalist rule was contested exclusively in terms of human 
rights, racial justice and the right of self-determination, 
Northern Ireland's legitimacy crisis was widely understood 
in terms of irredentism. 83 The human rights aspect of the 
claims and complaints of Northern Ireland's Catholic 
minority was relatively muted until the 1960s, by comparison 
with demands which focus on the indivisibility of the Irish 
national territory and the Irish people. This was one of the 
factors effectively insulating the stormont regime from 
external attention and pressure in the first four decades of 
its existence. Indeed a change of emphasis favouring human 
rights rather than re-unification on the part of the 
Catholic opposition in Northern Ireland and the government 
of the Irish Republic, was the key element in the new crisis 
which Unionists faced from the mid-sixties onwards. Since 
this time, questions of international legitimacy have played 
a role in the Northern Ireland conflict,84 but with nothing 
like the same intensity and pervasiveness of concern as 
displayed by the anti-apartheid struggle. 
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The most obvious difference in the two systems of 
discrimination was of sheer extent. The full-blown apparatus 
of differential statuses imposed by force which marked South 
Africa, simply did not exist in Northern Ireland, and the 
political, social and economic inequalities were nothing 
like as gross there. Two other differences, less obvious 
perhaps, but arguably just as important (in the context of 
this study at least), are worth considering. 
The first is the fact that the apparatus of discrimination 
in South Africa was not only more extensive and elaborate 
but much more formal. It was more formal in three ways; 
discrimination had the official backing of the law of the 
land; the state and the public sector of the economy were 
used with great purpose and vigour to favour not only whites 
in general but Afrikaners in particular; discrimination 
against blacks was justified by a very elaborate ideological 
construct of racial ideas and assumptions. 
By contrast, in Northern Ireland, Protestants could not rely 
to anything like the extent of Afrikaners on law and the 
state for the reproduction of their privileges. To an 
important extent, discrimination at the work-place was 
something which had to be maintained by their own efforts 
and vigilance, in which the traditions of Orangeism were 
invaluable. This vigilance had to be maintained politically 
too; the traditions of ultra-sectarianism and labourism did 
not by any means die out after the foundation of the 
Northern Ireland state and the unity of Ulster Unionism was 
more fragile than that of Afrikaner Nationalism. The 
relative informality of discrimination is suggested by the 
fact that discriminatory practices were unevenly spread 
throughout Northern Ireland, with local authority 
discrimination being noticeably greater in areas bordering 
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on the Irish Republic, where protesta~ts had only a narrow 
demographic superiority, or none at all. 
Catholic sensitivities were shaped by the 
more blatant discriminatory practices 
stretching back to the foundation of the 
state and beyond, that Protestants deemed 
necessary to protect at local level their 
vulnerable majorities and even more 
frequently their vulnerable minorities".85 
This contrasts sharply with the structured, elaborated and 
universal system of discrimination which the Nationalists 
developed. 
Until quite recently, white supremacist ideologies gave 
elaborate reasons for discrimination against blacks in South 
Africa, but in Northern Ireland there was only one reason to 
favour Protestants, the issue of 'loyalty'. For all these 
reasons, and because the period of Nationalist rule between 
1948 and the mid-1970s was one of sustained economic growth, 
Afrikaners had much more security in their privilege. 
Protestants had a margin of security over Catholics, but 
this was in an overall atmosphere of insecurity and economic 
decline. 86 Latent tensions between the components of the 
Unionist alliance were more of a feature than in Afrikaner 
Nationalism, and the possibilities of independent action 
more marked. 
The second main difference lay in the purposes to which 
discrimination was put. When the Nationalists came to power 
in 1948 they conformed to Trapido's characterisation: 
Afrikaners have always occupied a limited 
number of roles in the economy; and this has 
made comparatively easy the political 
leaders' task of creating homogeneity within 
the language group. The roles themselves, 
however, have tended to necessitate the 
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holding of political power for their 
protection and advancement. The English 
language group with its far greater diversity 
of economic roles could in the thirties and 
fifties, lose political power and still 
prosper. Presumably it might continue to 
prosper if that power was transferred to non-
White groups. Not so for the Afrikaner. 87 
The transformatory nature of Afrikaner Nationalism's project 
ensured that one of the effects of Nationalist rule was 
social differentiation among Afrikaners, altering the 
imperatives and priorities emphasised by Trapido, and 
throwing up a strong impetus for change from within the 
movement. In Ulster Unionism, these forces were weak or 
absent altogether. 
Although both Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism 
operated de facto one-party states while paying lip-service 
to multi-party democracy, here again there were significant 
differences. These amounted in summary to both party and 
state being stronger and more highly developed in the case 
of South Africa. The dominance of the National Party in the 
wider context of Afrikaner Nationalism was forged in the 
years of opposition from the birth of the party as the 
Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party in 1933, to its assumption of 
power in 1948. Vigorous organisational and ideological work 
was required to achieve this and to defeat the challenge of 
the semi-fascist rivals, the mass-based, populist Ossewa 
Brandwag, and the New Order. 88 
By contrast with the National Party, the Ulster Unionist 
Party looks a more rUdimentary organisation, less 
impressively geared to ongoing political education and 
mobilisation, more concerned with the limited and episodic 
function of purely electoral mObilisation. Once again, the 
difference is usefully illustrated by the contrasting 
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relationships between the National Party and the 
Broederbond,89 and the Unionist Party and the Orange 
Order. 90 
The Broederbond fulfilled several roles within Afrikaner 
Nationalism. It was a party 'think-tank', and a sounding-
board through which the rank and file's reaction to policy 
changes could be tested. It was a way of ensuring Afrikaner 
advancement and dominance in society by selective placement 
in elite (especially public sector) jobs. It was (and 
remains) a secret, indeed cabalistic, organisation. 
Membership is restricted and self-selected, not made public 
except by unauthorised leakage. Its functions have been to 
ensure elite domination within the party, party domination 
within Afrikaner Nationalism and Afrikaner domination in 
society. 
The Orange Order is secretive (a symptom of masonic 
influence91 ) but not secret. Indeed public displays of 
ritual solidarity are one of its most characteristic 
functions. Like the Broederbond it is a self-help 
organisation in job placement and political advancement. It 
is not however an elite organisation but a mass one. 92 Its 
existence gives a fraternal facade to Unionism which has 
been crucial in reproducing its unity and reconciling 
working class Unionists to the divisions of a class society. 
Another .function of the Order has been to contain and 
discipline the militancy of Protestant extremists -- a 
perennial theme in the politics of Ulster Unionism -- but 
the relationship works both ways, in reminding the party of 
the potency of rank and file sentiment. 
In short, where the Broederbond acted as an instrument of 
elite manipulation and party dominance, the Orange Order 
reminded the Ulster Unionist Party that it did not enjoy a 
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comparable dominance, and that the definition of what 
constituted 'loyalism' did not ultimately rest in its hands. 
The dominance of the National Party in Afrikaner Nationalism 
reflected an increasingly bureaucratic flavour to the 
movement, diluting, as time went on, the popular element. 
For Slabbert, this process was symbolised by Malan's 
premiership after the Nationalists won the 1948 election; 
••. for the first time in the history of the 
Afrikaners, a fully fledged 'organisation 
man' was prime minister. He had been at 
various times a minister of religion, 
newspaper editor, and a party political 
leader. The 'age of the ~enerals' was past 
and Malan, in a sense, was the symbol of a 
collective ethos that had been 
bureaucratised. 93 
Slabbert further illustrates this trend with reference to 
the multiple bureaucratic roles of Verwoerd, M.C. Botha and 
A.P. Treurnicht, concluding that " •• the list includes many 
of the best known figures in Afrikaner public life". 94 The 
trend was confirmed by the increasing role played by 
professional organisers who had known no other occupation, 
in running the party. The career of P.W. Botha whose route 
through the party and state organs took him to the office of 
state president, is appropriately symbolic of a much wider 
tendency. 
By contrast, the Ulster Unionist Party did not display this 
dense cross-referencing of roles although it did benefit 
from overlapping support from churches, the Orange Order and 
newspapers. The party's leaders after the creation of the 
state were Sir James Craig, a whiskey magnate and landowner, 
J.M. Andrews, a company director, and Sir Basil Brooke and 
Captain Terence O'Neill who were both landowners. It is true 
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that two key party bureaucrats, Sir Richard Dawson Bates and 
Sir wilson Hungerford95 both became MPs and achieved 
government office, the former as minister of home affairs 
(1921-43) and the latter in a variety of parliamentary 
private secretary posts (1941-46). Between them they held 
the office of secretary to the Ulster Unionist council from 
1905 to 1941, Hungerford taking over in 1921. These were 
isolated cases however, and did not reflect the same 
principle as typified the functioning of the National Party. 
This bureaucratic character was greatly heightened by the 
enormous growth and ramification of the state and its organs 
which took place under Nationalist rUle96 • This had several 
effects. By partially Afrikanerising the state and using it 
as an instrument of ethnic social and economic advance, the 
Nationalists developed a powerful fusion of material 
interest and national sentiment which was an important 
source of party unity, enabling it to prevent and contain 
splits. 97 Given that Afrikaners constituted such a small 
minority in the South African population, however, and the 
need to broaden the base of support first to include all 
whites, and later the 'coloured' and Indian minorities, the 
state could not be wholly Afrikanerised. An opposite trend 
set in; as the Nationalists Afrikanerised the state, the 
state secularised nationalism. The state came to represent 
not only an enormous source of patronage, but a repository 
of secular loyalties into which other population groups 
could be incorporated. It increasingly came to eclipse the 
party as the source of authority of those in power, 
especially after the late seventies and the contradictions 
of being both a 'state' party and a 'YQlk' party were 
influential sources of discord from this point onwards. 
~y contrast, the state in Northern Ireland was not wholly 
independent and in its apparatus and functions served as a 
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transmission belt for legislation of the British parliament, 
rather than as a positive instrument for reshaping society 
in the hands of those who controlled it. Popular 
(Protestant) loyalties were diffused among the British 
monarchy, the Protestant religion, the Orange Order and a 
vague sense of regional identity, rather than focused 
directly on the state itself. Like the Unionist Party, the 
state in Northern Ireland was weaker and more fragile than 
its South African counterpart. 
It is in the pattern of partisan policing and the use of 
emergency, repressive powers as the norm, that some have 
seen an essential similarity between Northern Ireland under 
the Unionists and South Africa under Nationalist rule. 
Whyte's even-handed survey of the Northern Ireland security 
system (while deploring the lack of hard evidence) 
implicitly suggests in its overall assessment that this 
rhetorical device is unjustified; 
The fairest summary of police behaviour in 
Northern Ireland appears to be as follows. 
The police force could not be seen as 
consistently impartial, applying the law 
evenly to everyone, Unionist and non-Unionist 
alike. On the other hand, it could not be 
seen as purely partisan, designed to 
perpetuate Unionist ascendancy and batter 
into the ground all political opponents. 98 
Mathews' brief comparison of the two security regimes is 
intended to put the South African provisions in 
perspective. 99 His conclusions are unfavourable to them, 
firstly because security laws should not be justified on the 
grounds of worst-case repression elsewhere, secondly that 
the Northern Ireland situation more nearly resembled an 
ongoing emergency than the South African, and thirdly that 
at least some legal restrictions and modifications attended 
the working of the Special Powers Act. 
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Valuable as such comparisons are, it is in the pattern of 
policing, rather than the framework of repressive laws that 
the most interesting points of contrast lie. Although the 
RUC and the SAP both represent paramilitary, political 
policing and have notable points of similarity, the 
phenomenon of the 'B' specials under the Stormont regime 
gives something unique to that security system. This does 
not mean that the South African security forces have been 
without a part-time reserve component. On the contrary, 
Commando and citizen Force units have been an essential part 
of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and police 
reservists complement the regular force. But the SADF, 
despite the Afrikanerisation of its permanent component, has 
been less determinedly sectarian than the police, an 
instrument of the state rather than an ethnic force. In any 
case, the army's deployment on internal security duties came 
rather late. As for the police, reservists have been very 
much ancillary rather than central to internal security 
functions. 
By contrast, the 'B' Specials were regarded by many 
Protestants as the essential front-line force in defence of 
the state against Catholic nationalist subversion and IRA 
terrorism, as will be seen when the furore over their 
disbandment in 1969 is discussed. While the RUC aimed to 
have a one-third complement of Catholics, the Specials were 
an exclusively Protestant militia. This armed vigilante 
force, it should be recalled, was set up as much as the 
result of local initiatives as by the directive of central 
government. Its origins, composition and functions were 
graphic reminders of the popular and revolutionary origins 
of the Northern Ireland state. It stood for the capacity of 
~rotestants to take the initiative in their own defence and 
in determining for themselves their own political future, 
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independent of any legitimately constituted authority. The 
principal account of the Northern Ireland state under 
Unionist rule emphasises the importance of the 'B' specials 
and their 'populist character': 
This amounted to a propensity to 
sectarianism, to a kind of democracy in which 
unpopular officers were forced out of the 
force, and to a voracious appetite for public 
funds. The primacy accorded to the objective 
of having such a force therefore required as 
a strategic imperative the retention of a 
special relationship between the Unionist 
leadership and the Protestant masses. H2t 
only were the Specials to occupy a 
significant position within the state 
apparatuses. but the latter as a whole were 
to acgyire a deci~sglY populist character" 
(emphasis added). 
Conclusion 
The state which was created to accommodate the Unionist 
coalition's refusal to be part of a united, independent 
Ireland lasted nearly fifty years before the whole range of 
relationships which defined its nature and meaning was 
called into question; the relationships within the Unionist 
power bloc which sustained it; the relationship with Britain 
which defined it; the relationships with Irish Nationalists 
north and south of the border, which supplied its raison 
d'etre. Similarly, the state which the Nationalists in South 
Africa inherited in 1948, harnessed, elaborated and bent to 
their will, entered a long period of crisis from the late 
1970s in which changing relationships within Afrikaner 
Nationalism, and between Nationalists and the 'groups' which 
they defined as 'other', forced the remodelling and 
sometimes reversal of the state-building processes which had 
occupied the previous thirty years of their rule. 
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Both states rested on movements of ethnic unity; both were 
pseudo-democracies which required partition and exclusionary 
practices to reproduce support; and both were partisan, 
making no pretence to be impartial arbiters of conflict. But 
as the relationships in both cases were questioned, and 
under this stress the unity of both coalitions began to 
decay, the differences were highlighted too. Northern 
Ireland's lack of independence and its relatively 
rudimentary state forms and resources were important. But 
central to the issue of the decay of unity were the 
contrasting natures of the two states; Northern Ireland with 
its populist, vigilante aspects, and South Africa with its 
extensive, complex web of state bureaucracies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CRISES OF ULSTER UNIONISM AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 
Elements of Regime Strength and the Defeat of Direct Armed 
Challenge 
In both Northern Ireland and .South Africa a number of 
factors combined to enable the states and regimes, which 
were charged with protecting and advancing the identities 
and material interests of Protestants and Afrikaners, to 
survive their lack of legitimacy. 
Firstly, Arikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism were both 
movements which could mobilise diverse economic and social 
groups in the name of unity. Democracy, populism, a narrow 
but well-disseminated and strongly-rooted sense of identity 
and attention to material well-being through discrimination, 
were sources of this mobilising power. It has already been 
argued that none of these resources was unproblematic. 
Democracy and populism had limits well short of the 
rhetorical status accorded to them. Identities were not 
monolithic. According to circumstances, the experience of 
being a Protestant, a Unionist or a loyalist, a white 
person, a Nationalist or an Afrikaner, had different shades, 
intensities and dimensions of meaning. The role of 
discrimination was important in reproducing the alliances, 
but inevitably a subversive factor in the long-term problem 
of legitimacy. Nevertheless, these sources of unity were 
invaluable to Unionists and Nationalists in the tasks of 
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state building and defeating direct challenges to their 
dominance. 
Secondly, both regimes were able to equip themselves with 
coercive laws and security forces sufficient to deal with 
these challenges. Once again, the security regimes were 
functional in the short run, but subversive of the longer-
term goal of stability. 
A third factor relates to the shortcomings of opposition 
forces. Among these were the difficulties of underground and 
exile conditions which had been forced on them and the 
dilemmas of the relationship . between armed and peaceful 
political struggle. In both cases, opposition forces were 
unable to penetrate the regime's support base in order to 
exploit divisions on the basis of class. Neither could they 
persuasively sUbstitute an inclusive nationhood for a narrow 
identity. The latter goal featured in the ideologies of the 
ANC and Irish Republicans, but in the face of Unionist and 
Nationalist cohesion, it was in neither case more than a 
rhetorical flourish. 
Fourthly, both Unionists and Nationalists were able to 
maintain a favourable external environment -- or at least to 
minimise and cope with external threats. There were two ways 
in which Unionists enjoyed the best of both worlds in their 
external relationships until the early sixties. Firstly, in 
its relationship with Britain, Northern Ireland enjoyed 
access to the political and economic resources which made it 
viable as a separate entity. At the same time Unionist 
governments were granted a de facto autonomy from 
parliamentary scrutiny, which allowed derogations from 
British standards of democracy, administration and justice 
to be built into the working of the state. This confusion of 
dependence and autonomy was essential to the nature of 
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Unionist rule. Secondly, the rhetorical irredentism of the 
Irish Free State (and after 1949, the Republic) was a 
powerful incentive to Unionist unity, but the tacit 
admission of Irish governments that little could be done to 
make a united Ireland a practical reality meant that the 
security implications of the irredentist claims were not 
immediately pressing ones. Indeed Irish governments' 
willingness to use emergency powers1 against the IRA when it 
used physical force to make good these very claims, meant 
that in the short term Unionism's unity and security needs 
were both serviced from this unlikely source. 
In the case of South Africa, . Britain's failure to intervene 
to frustrate Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in 1965 symbolised the limits of Western 
involvement (self-imposed or otherwise) in Southern Africa. 
Political and military withdrawal of imperial power left 
South Africa the dominant power in a region composed of 
black-ruled successor states, a diehard settler regime in 
Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and 
Angola. Political and military withdrawal did not mean 
economic withdrawal however, and South Africa was able to 
enjoy, at least until the mid-1980s, the benefits of full 
Western investment and trading links without any serious 
infringement of its autonomy at home or in the region. 
It was these resources which enabled Unionist and 
Nationalist governments to defeat armed campaigns, 
respectively by the IRA (1956-62)2 and by the ANC and PAC 
from the early to the mid-1960s. In the short term at least 
both victories were politically and militarily quite 
conclusive, and the dissident movements were condemned to 
exile and marginalisation. 3 It was not only the superior 
.political and military resources of the ruling regimes that 
were decisive, but the armed campaigns in each instance were 
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divorced from mass political mobilisation, and were without 
strong enough roots in the communities they aspired to 
liberate. 
In Northern Ireland, Catholic opposition politics were 
contained and confined by the demography of partition, the 
near total identification of Protestants with Unionism, and 
the exigencies of the westminster electoral and 
parliamentary system. These conditions may have condemned 
Catholics to perpetual exclusion from political power, but 
they were not so onerous as to make armed struggle an 
immediately attractive proposition to any but a few zealots. 
The historical division between traditions of physical force 
and constitutional opposition also played a part in dividing 
anti-unionist forces. The Nationalist Party in Northern 
Ireland, the lineal descendent of parliamentary opposition, 
was paralysed by the contradictions of constitutional 
opposition in a state it considered illegitimate. The 
outlook for armed struggle was not propitious. By the 1960s, 
a tlbelated modernisation of outlooks both north and south of 
the six-county bordertl4 suggested that support for violence 
on both sides of the community had greatly waned. The IRA's 
own lack of political sophistication and failure to 
appreciate the importance of mass support were central to 
the failure of the 1956-62 campaign to tire-open the Irish 
questiontl • 
The question could not be opened 
constitutionally because of the Ireland Act 
of 1949; since no movement existed to 
organise a campaign of civil disobedience and 
passive resistance in the North, the only 
other means was force. 5 
Townshend's scathing analysis of this reasoning lays bare 
the political bankruptcy which produced the 1956-62 campaign 
(which was labelled 'Operation Harvester'). 
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This characteristically obtuse reasoning 
amounted to saying that since the IRA either 
could not be bothered or was not competent to 
create a mass movement, or since there was no 
prospect of mass support, Republicans could 
justifiably turn to violence. 6 
In South Africa, the conditions were very different, 
although the end result, the divorce of armed action from 
the mass support and political action which might have 
sustained it, was the same. In fact a mass movement had been 
created in opposition to apartheid between 1950 and 1960, in 
advance of the resort to armed action. civil disobedience, 
protests, strikes and boycotts were all used by African 
political organisations in their struggle. It was only after 
the suppression of these peaceful forms of protest and the 
banning of the ANC and PAC in March 1960 that armed struggle 
was adopted by both.? The ANC's Umkhonto We Sizwe was 
oriented towards sabotage, while the PAC's Poqo was 
insurrectionist in character. Aside from the state's 
formidable strengths, Umkhonto We Sizwe's campaign was 
defeated by the inadequacies of its own security procedures, 
and its failure to situate its activities in a context of 
popular support and participation. On this latter point 
Lodge cites the organisational self-criticism of two 
participants, Joe Slovo and Ben Turok, adding his own 
assessment; 
Whereas it is rather doubtful that an 
insurgent movement under South African 
conditions could afford to be anything other 
than elitist, it is quite true that outside 
the membership of the SACP no systematic 
provision was made for popular mobilisation 
in a support role. 8 
-Poqo had a wider membership than Umkhonto (making it even 
more susceptible to state penetration), but its millenarian 
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and insurrectionist tendencies, and its main support base 
among the most underprivileged migrants in the African 
population of the Western Cape meant that it was not capable 
of a sustained, controlled, well-organised campaign and it 
was broken up as an effective force by mid-1963. 
The formidable political and coercive strengths of the 
Ulster Unionist and Afrikaner Nationalist regimes were 
displayed in the ways in which opposition to them was forced 
onto the unpromising and unprofitable terrain of armed 
struggle divorced from mass support and involvement. In both 
cases the speed with which opposition forces regrouped to 
pose a more serious threat would be surprising, were it not 
for both regimes' basic lack of legitimacy and the 
vulnerability to social, economic and political change of 
the Unionists' and Nationalists' principal political assets. 
Change and the Development of Political Crisis 
The elements of regime strength which enabled Unionist and 
Nationalist governments to defeat insurgency were themselves 
subject to erosion by political, economic and social change. 
The effect of this erosion was to cause renewed and re-
stated political crises which led in both Northern Ireland 
and South Africa to the break up of ruling coalitions. 
The first source of erosion was the conflict between 
economic imperatives and discriminatory structures and 
practices. For Unionists the underlying imperative was to 
halt decline and for Nationalists it was to sustain growth. 
The policy changes needed to achieve these objectives were 
unlikely to leave intact the relationships which excluded 
subordinate groups and ensured unity in the ruling 
coalitions. 
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Secondly, new forms of resistance on . the part of these 
subordinate groups enabled blacks and Catholics to restate 
the basic legitimacy crises of the regimes in very pressing 
terms. In both cases, the resistance led to violence, 
although in neither case were the movements intrinsically 
violent. In both cases the main beneficiaries of renewed 
resistance were the bearers of armed struggle. Both the IRA 
and the ANC were rescued from the consequences of their 
earlier defeat and marginalisation by the violence which 
followed peaceful protest. 
Thirdly, both governments faced a deteriorating external 
environment, which amounted to increased pressure from 
outside, effectively ruling out coercion without reform. It 
is true, however, that in this, as in the other dimensions 
of crisis, there were important differences of emphasis. The 
Northern Ireland government's autonomy was conditional, and 
its dependence very marked. Although it was fully 
independent, the South African government faced a much more 
determined and broadly based assault on its legitimacy in 
the international community, and needed a reform programme 
to ward off damaging sanctions. 
In each case, these three factors ensured that the 
governments were forced to occupy rapidly diminishing 
political space between their own supporters and the 
previously excluded groups who had to be incorporated or 
appeased, and where necessary, repressed. Broadening the 
base of legitimacy had as its objective for both, the 
preservation, not the transformation of the system. The 
preservation respectively of white rule and the union with 
Great Britain were the imperatives of reform Nationalism and 
reform Unionism. This inevitably left little room for 
manoeuvre either to left or right. The need not to surrender 
severely limited what could be offered. In the other 
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direction, the need not to be overwhelmed by reaction, again 
curtailed freedom of action. Within their own restricted 
contexts, both governments were answerable to electorates, 
which meant that they had to reform, extend democracy and 
still reproduce their support bases. Bew et al (discussing 
the 1969 reforms in Northern Ireland) catch the dilemma 
neatly and in terms strongly suggesting both parallels and 
contrasts with the situation of Nationalist governments from 
the late seventies onwards. 
The introduction of the reforms inevitably 
divided the Unionist party at all levels, yet 
it was this party, or at least the 'moderate' 
section of it which was .also charged with 
ruling the north. Whilst a modernising and 
reforming Unionist party bereft of state 
power was a possibility, a Unionist regime 
with the double responsibility of reforming 
and reproducing mass support was not. 9 
To make matters worse, by the time reform programmes were 
under way, this lack of political space was cruelly 
emphasised for both governments by the accompanying presence 
of revitalised armed struggle. 
These elements produced a configuration of choice in both 
Northern Ireland and South Africa between sectarian or 
racist 'democracy' on the one hand, and on the other, the 
politics of modernisation and secularisation brought about 
by managerial reform from above. Central to the ideas of 
reform Nationalism and reform Unionism then, was a tendency 
to play down the politics of identity and mythology. Yet 
these could not be abandoned altogether without fatally 
undermining the essential natures of the states in question. 
In any case, both were aimed at preservation rather than 
transformation, and argued that identity and self-
determination would actually be protected and guaranteed by 
concession and adaptation. 
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Rather than abandoning these things altogether, reformers 
argued instead that the communities which embodied them were 
no longer self-sufficient, that the claims to justice of 
others had to be taken into account and that a combination 
of sociological and demographic odds with outside pressures 
made accommodation the way of self-interest. For both, 
secularisation meant increasingly introducing experts and 
bureaucrats into policy-making, and their language into 
political discourse. 10 It also meant more personal policy-
making. 
THE CRISIS OF ULSTER UNIONISM 
The cr1S1S of Ulster Unionism was precipitated by the 
campaign of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in 
1968-69, and the reaction to it of the Northern Ireland 
government and Protestant extremists. The three-way conflict 
erupted into serious communal violence in August 1969, which 
forced British political and military intervention. Between 
1969 and 1972, three Unionist prime ministers, Terence 
O'Neill (1963-69), James Chichester-Clarke (May 1969-March 
1971), and Brian Faulkner (March 1971-March 1972), tried to 
carry out British-sponsored programmes of reform while still 
reproducing the conditions of Unionist rule, the latter two 
in the context of a determined and extensive armed campaign 
by the IRA. The consequent fragmentation of Unionism into 
several political parties and paramilitary and workers' 
groups accelerated after the imposition of direct rule from 
London in March 1972. When Faulkner led a reforming rump of 
Unionists in the attempt to operate a power-sharing scheme 
of government which had been agreed between the British and 
Irish governments and the principal Unionist and Nationalist 
,political parties in Northern Ireland, direct action by 
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loyalist workers and paramilitaries in the Ulster Workers' 
Council strike (May 1974) brought his government down. 
Since 1974, Protestant political aspirations have continued 
to take several forms, expressing class-based resentments, 
paramilitary resistance, militant sectarianism and religious 
fundamentalism. 'British' and 'Ulster' identities continue 
to find adherents, offering a rough and ready way of 
distinguishing Unionists from loyalists. Some of the former 
favour full integration into the United Kingdom, others, 
devolved institutions on the pattern of 1920-72. Among the 
latter, are proponents of full independence. Despite their 
divisions, the various unionist successor groups have 
generally been able to prevent far-reaching political change 
which they regard as unfavourable to them (the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985 is a notable exception). They have been 
unable, however, to negotiate or impose a settlement on 
terms favourable to themselves. An important feature of the 
crisis of Unionism has been the impact on the wider 
political crisis of direct action by popular, extra-
parliamentary Protestant forces. In cases of the attacks on 
Catholic areas of Belfast by Protestants in August 1969 and 
the OWC strike in 1974 such actions proved to be significant 
turning-points. The threat or reality of such action has 
been a permanent structural feature of the Northern Ireland 
conflict at all other times. 
The Origins of the crisis (1) Economic Factors 
There is substantial agreement on the nature of the economic 
conditions which helped create the context of Unionism's 
crisis, although the principal accounts interpret their 
political effects and the dynamics of change in different 
ways.11 There is also consensus on the timing. Although 
Northern Ireland's economic problems were manifest from the 
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beginning of Unionist rule in 1921, it was not until the 
mid-1950s that they became the subject of the sustained 
government attention and action which, along with other 
factors, was to have profound political effects. 
Northern Ireland was (and remains) a peripheral and 
vulnerable economy, a region of the wider British economy. 
An essential aspect of this condition was that the local 
policy-makers who held office between 1920 and 1972) had no 
substantial powers of initiative. Northern Ireland has 
consistently been the poorest region in the United Kingdom, 
with higher rates of unemployment than even the other 
depressed regions. In the inter-war period, social 
deprivation in Northern Ireland was particularly sharp: 
•• A survey of the Belfast working class in 
1938-9 revealed that thirty-six per cent of 
those investigated were unable to afford 
sufficient food, clothing or fuel to maintain 
health or working capacity.12 
Although the application of Britain's post-1945 welfare 
legislation to Northern Ireland closed the gap somewhat, on 
all important indices economic and social conditions in the 
region lagged behind those in the rest of Britain. 
Northern Ireland's economy under Unionist rule had a 
sUbstantial agricultural sector. In the 1950s, one worker in 
six was employed in agriculture, and 25% of males. 
Manufacturing industry was concentrated in textiles and in 
shipbuilding and engineering. Textiles and shipbuilding were 
two of the most vulnerable industries to the long-term 
decline of the British economy in general and foreign 
competition in particular. As a result, redundancies and 
closures forced up the unemployment figures in Northern 
Ireland from the late fifties onwards. Economic decline 
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prompted intervention from the Northern Ireland and British 
governments to assist industry and create employment. The 
two key aspects of this were an increased reliance on 
centralised economic planning and the encouragement of 
foreign investment leading to .... the arrival of companies 
which owed no particular allegiance to the Unionist Party or 
to Protestantism ... 13 According to Probert, these policies 
helped undermine the hegemony of local capital (the 'Ulster 
bourgeoisie'), which had already been eroded by economic 
decline, and with it, .... an important part of the Unionist 
system of distributing patronage in the shape of jobs".14 At 
the same time, the arrival of multinationals created; 
•• a new middle class sector whose incomes and 
status were not related to the old Unionist 
oligarchy. Managers and technicians were 
hired by the huge parent companies, who had 
little concern for the peculiarities of 
Northern Ireland's political system, but 
rather placed great value on rationalisation 
and efficiency in the allocation of resources 
within the province. 15 
According to Probert, the principal political effect of the 
priority given to tackling Northern Ireland's economic 
problems through planning and the importation of capital was 
that: 
At the central government level, at least, 
the traditional preoccupation with loyalist 
unity and the constitutional issue seemed to 
have been superseded by an active concern 
with setting up 'development' programmes ... 16 
Bew et al interpret the response to Northern Ireland's 
economic problems rather differently, and emphasise other 
political priorities and results. Far from the problem of 
.unity being superseded, for these authors it was the main 
incentive for the pursuit of modernising economic policies. 
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The key issue was the loss of working class Protestant 
support to the NILP in the 1958 and 1962 stormont elections. 
In 1958, four Unionist-held seats in Belfast went to Labour 
and while in 1962 no further seats were lost, Labour 
increased its percentage vote significantly. 
Bew et al argue that the decline of the 'traditional 
bourgeoisie' and the influence of the 'new bourgeoisie' 
based respectively on established Ulster business interests, 
and on incoming multinationals, should not be exaggerated. 
Long-standing ties between textile interests and the 
Unionist Party continued to be important, and the new 
erns were not notably energetic in combating the 
s t ructures of discrimination in employment. In this account, 
the state is the 'mouthpiece' neither of the traditional nor 
of the modernising 'fraction' of capital. It retains a wide 
measure of autonomy in pursuing its central task, that of 
reconstructing dominance over the Protestant working class. 
This is the relationship which above all is crucial for the 
survival of the state. O'Neill's economic policies achieved 
this goal,17 but at the expense of antagonising sections of 
the Unionist Party. Local business interests resented the 
promotion of incoming capital. Unionists in the west of the 
province (like their Catholic counterparts) resented the 
concentration of new infrastructural projects in the east, 
the Protestant heartland where competition from the NILP was 
strongest. To make matters worse, there was widespread 
unhappiness at, " •• the centralisation of initiative at 
stormont within a relatively small group of ministers and 
civil servants. This led to charges of ministerial and 
bureaucratic dictatorship from local Unionists".18 
All accounts agree then, that economic decline and policies 
of modernisation provided the context for the crisis of 
Unionism, interacting with other factors to force divisions 
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within Unionism beyond the point at ~hich they could (as in 
the past) be contained. All are agreed that the balance of 
social and economic forces which enabled the Unionist 
alliance to reproduce itself and to maintain its domination 
over the Catholic minority was threatened by the contraction 
of staple industries, rising unemployment among Protestant 
workers, the arrival of foreign capital in the shape of 
multinationals, and the combination of rational bureaucratic 
planning with dependence on increased sUbsidies from the 
British government. It is worth re-emphasising, however, the 
differences of nuance in interpretations of cause and 
effect, and in the relationships between economics and 
politics. The most important ~ifferences revolve around the 
question of specifying the relative importance of social 
forces in the crisis. Where Probert and to a lesser degree, 
Farrell, emphasise the role of the multinationals and the 
'new' middle-class, both Catholic and Protestant. Bew et al 
insist that, "The determinant social force in the crisis was 
the working class, in particular that section of the Belfast 
Protestant working class which voted NILP".19 The state, in 
its role as co-ordinator of the Unionist alliance, was the 
other crucial actor. These differences of emphasis will 
assume importance when the question of the break up of the 
alliance is confronted directly, and the crisis compared 
with that of Nationalism in South Africa. 
The Origins of the Crisis (2l The Reconstitution of Catholic 
Opposition 
Up to the mid-1960s, Catholic opposition to Unionist rule in 
Northern Ireland was for the most part, " •• the preserve 
either of gunmen on the one hand, or of the pubocracy and 
the shopocracy topped up by the clergy, drawn broadly from 
the same background on the other".20 As far as 'the gunmen' 
were concerned, the border campaign of 1956-62 made plain 
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the IRA's political confusion and decline into "autolectic 
violence",21 and internment both north and south of the 
border seemed to show how far removed armed struggle was 
from the realities of contemporary Ireland. As a result, the 
leadership came to believe that the IRA and the broader 
Republican movement should equip themselves for involvement 
in popular struggles on social and economic issues. 22 Armed 
action was de-emphasised, and the theory (in particular) and 
practice of Republicanism began to echo 'progressive' and 
even Marxist categories of analysis. Although these shifts 
were in tune with the modernising temper of the times, and 
there was even a tradition of 'social republicanism' to 
legitimise them, as Patterson , points out; 
•• the core ideas of republican re-thinking 
were deeply dependent on the pre-given 
categories of nationalist thought. The most 
striking characteristic of the thinking of 
the period is its capacity to deny the 
significance of certain massive realities 
which a 'Marxism' less influenced by 
nationalism would have paused to reflect 
on. 23 
In any case, such recruits as came to the IRA even after the 
failure of the border campaign were attracted by the 
prospects of military training and action, so the movement 
continued to carry a heavy traditional freight. This divided 
personality meant that the IRA was poised to play a role 
both in the modernised and apparently secularised conflicts 
which developed around the civil rights movement, and the 
relapse into atavistic militarism which followed the 
communal conflicts sparked by the civil rights campaign. 
The terms 'pubocracy' and 'shopocracy' succinctly describe 
the main constituency of the Nationalist Party in Northern 
Ireland. 24 Typically for a community excluded from political 
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power and 'the establishment', the Catholic middle class in 
both its entrepreneurial and professional manifestations, 
was a service class to its own community. It was from these 
narrow ranks that the leadership of the Nationalist Party 
came. Early in the century, close connections with the 
clergy and the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), a Catholic 
organisation bearing a close resemblance to the Orange 
Order, tainted the Nationalists with Catholic sectarianism. 
While the worst of such influence had long been dispelled, 
strong clerical and AOH influence remained right down to the 
1960s. 25 Socially conservative26 largely rural,27 paralysed 
by the contradictions of constitutional opposition in a 
state whose legitimacy they rejected and doomed to 
ineffectiveness by demography, the Nationalists faced two 
key challenges as the pace of politics quickened in the 
1960s. 28 
The first involved how to respond to O'Neill's 'bridge-
building' gestures, which without conceding anything 
sUbstantial (in the way of Catholic appointments to 
statutory boards for instance), seemed to signal a 
willingness to recognise Catholics as something more than 
'second-class citizens'. The second challenge was posed by 
the appearance of activist groups in the Catholic community, 
disillusioned with the Nationalists' lack of policy, 
organisation and intra-party democracy. The focus for their 
activism was social and economic reform rather than a 
rehearsal of the grievance of partition. In trying to meet 
these .challenges, the Nationalist Party accepted the role of 
official opposition in the Stormont Parliament in 1965, held 
its first annual conference in 1966 (an eloquent enough fact 
on its own) and in general tried to acquire policy positions 
on a wide range of issues. Despite these efforts, the 
b~sically anachronistic nature of the party placed it beyond 
the reach of piecemeal reform, and from 1970, it was 
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superseded by the Social Democratic and Labour Party which 
united the various strains of Catholic constitutional 
politics from nationalism and civil rights through to 
labourism. 
The Emergence of the Civil Rights Moyement 
The contradictions and failures of traditional Catholic 
politics, leading to reconstructions of physical force 
republicanism and constitutional nationalism which were 
only partially successful, form the background for the 
emergence of the civil rights movement, the truly novel 
element and principal catalyst in Northern Ireland's crisis 
of modernisation and the Unionist coalition's dissolution. 
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed in 
Or -7 . The aims of this umbrella organisation were to 
highlight, resist, and redress cases of discrimination, 
especially in housing and employment. 29 It contained 
elements whose purpose was reform within the context of 
maintaining the union with Britain. 30 Others wished to use 
specific grievances for the purposes of traditional 
republicanism,31 and some aspired to transcend the national 
question by attracting the Protestant working class into 
broadly-based class politics. 32 
The view that the civil rights movement represented 
something new in Northern Ireland's politics rests on three 
grounds. The first is that it emerged from a growing 
Catholic middle class, fostered by the extension of 
Britain's post-1945 welfare provisions to Northern Ireland, 
especially in secondary and tertiary education. The influx 
of n~w industry to the province also encouraged this group 
to have higher expectations of upward mobility in 
employment. The second is that the campaign altered the 
ground of opposition by focussing on social and economic 
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reform rather than sectarian politics. and the national 
question. The third is that the twin futilities of armed 
struggle and parliamentary opposition in a demographically 
loaded assembly, were rejected for tactics of peaceful 
demonstration and civil disobedience borrowed from the 
experience of the American South. 
The thesis that the civil rights movement represented the 
emergence of a new Catholic middle class was put forward by 
the report of the Cameron Commission33 and repeated by later 
accounts. 34 It has since been challenged35 and defended. 36 
The debate is a useful one, because fundamental to the 
analysis of any political movement is investigation of its 
social base. But class categories are not always sensitively 
used. For instance, the People's Democracy leaders are often 
described as 'middle class' and the label used, directly or 
indirectly to explain some or other aspect of the movement's 
ideology or strategy.37 In fact as students, these people 
enjoyed financial independence through a small state-funded 
allowance, complete freedom from the discipline of 
productive work and the prospect of a secure occupational 
and financial future. These were often combined with a 
working class background. To label this cocktail of social 
attributes 'middle class' is not particularly helpful. 
In fact, the central emphasis should be, not how 'middle 
class', but how 'new' and how 'Catholic' were the forces 
gathered up and released by the civil rights movement. These 
questions can be addressed by considering the claim that the 
grounds of opposition were shifted to social and economic 
issues. Hewitt's assertion38 that the civil rights campaign 
was merely the restatement of nationalist objectives by 
other means has been damaged by charges that he 
underestimates the extent of discrimination under the 
Stormont regime, and hence the nature and extent of 
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Catholics' grievances. Patterson's conclusions on the 
influence of traditional nationalism have been noted above39 
but his account suggests less a conspiracy of camouflage, 
than genuine ideological confusion. Austin curry40 claims 
from a participant's perspective that: 
The thousands who marched for 'one man, one 
vote' and a fair allocation of houses and an 
end to discrimination in jobs actually did so 
for those reasons and in the great majority 
of cases the feeling of injustice arose from 
personal or family experience. 
But he adds: .... Many were sufficiently politically aware to 
realise that the slogan 'If we are British citizens we 
demand the same rights as other British citizens' was not 
quite as simple as it sounds". Eamonn McCann, in his 
activist's memoir of the civil rights period in Derry, 
exemplifies the aspiration to secular class conflict and a 
rejection of traditional nationalism. 41 But the same author, 
writing in 1969, frankly acknowledges the contradictions in 
the civil rights movement. 
It is perfectly obvious that people still do 
see themselves as Catholics and Protestants, 
and the cry 'get the Protestants' is still 
very much on the lips of the Catholic working 
class. Everyone applauds loudly when one says 
in a speech that we are not sectarian, we are 
fighting for the rights of all Irish workers, 
but really that's because they see this as 
the new way of getting at the Protestants. 42 
What Currie signals obliquely and McCann states more 
directly is that there were strains and tensions within the 
civil rights movement. Tendencies which favoured pan-
Catholic unity (in a broadened and more radical form of the 
Nationalist Party's constituency), or secularised class 
politics, or piecemeal reform within the continuing context 
of British rule, jostled with each other over the movement's 
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tactics and direction. And as Patterson points out, the 
republican movement, only incompletely weaned from armed 
struggle and partially reoriented from irredentist to 
progressive priorities, also took part. 
As a result, although both in the social composition of its 
support and in the nature of its demands, the civil rights 
movement represented significant change from the Catholic 
politics of the past, it is by no means clear that within 
its own ranks, or in the anxious eyes of Unionists, it 
represented a decisive break with the past. The tensions 
between old and new were further highlighted by the 
movement's choice of tactical ,weapon, the protest march. 
This tactic was intended to inspire solidarity and activism 
and to capture the sympathy of the outside world, imitating 
the American civil rights movement in an increasingly 
telegenic age. This characteristically modern inspiration 
could not be transferred to Northern Ireland without side-
effects however. As Bew et al put it; 
I n Ulster demonstrations had distinctly non-
secular implications. Marches in particular 
meant, and still mean, the assertion of 
territorial sectarian claims. To march in or 
through an area is to lay claim to it. When 
so many districts are invested with 
confessional significance by one bloc or 
another, undertaking a 'secular' march 
creates the conditions for territorial 
transgressions and counter-transgressions. 43 
The wider political crisis which developed around the 
campaign of the civil ~ights movement was largely played out 
through the issue of marches. There were three principal 
dimensions to this issue. The first was the question of the 
authorities' response, which included banning individual 
marches, the passing of fresh public order legislation and, 
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crucially, the conduct of the police force. The second 
involved struggle within the civil rights movement between 
those who favoured limited, peaceful protest and an early 
end (or at least moratorium) to . marches when reformist gains 
had been made and those who were determined on confrontation 
to expose the contradictions in the system and to bring it 
down altogether. The third dimension was the development of 
extremist Protestant resistance to the civil rights 
movement, inspired and led by the Rev. Ian Paisley, which 
concentrated on organising counter-demonstrations, pre-
emptively occupying public space, and directly attacking 
marchers. 
These three dimensions were of course closely integrated in 
a chain reaction of escalating conflict. Protestant 
extremists put pressure on the government to deal 
repressively with the civil rights movement. By their 
obvious connections with the police and 'B' Specials they 
made plain the sectarian nature of the regime. Their hostile 
reaction completely contradicted the secular rhetoric of the 
civil rights movement, encouraging those on both sides of 
the community divide who preferred to see it as a vehicle 
for Catholic and nationalist aspirations. 
All three of these effects were evident in the case of the 
People's Democracy march to Derry in January 1969. The 
attack on this march by Protestant extremists (many of whom 
were members of the 'B' Specials) with the connivance of the 
police who were supposed to protect the marchers, was a 
significant turning-point in exposing the deep sectarian 
divisions behind the modernised facade of the civil rights 
campaiqn. 44 
It is ironic, then, that the most 'modern' and secular 
aspect of the civil rights movement should also be the most 
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atavistic and the one most likely to .incite sectarian 
passions. The tactic of the protest march in a situation 
where it had strong atavistic associations is indicative of 
the limits of modernisation in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. 
The reconstitution of Catholic opposition which took place 
under the aegis of the civil rights movement involved a re-
vitalised constitutional nationalism, a partly transformed 
physical-force republicanism and an admixture of left-wing 
radicalism in tune with the student activism of the late 
sixties. It reflected an accessible form of participatory 
opposition untainted by the s~erility of electoral minority 
opposition in a divided society, or the futility of armed 
struggle divorced from popular support. Its subversive 
challenge to the regime was based not on action directly 
aimed at its overthrow, but on an invitation for it to live 
up to the logic of its own ('British') standards. Any 
attempt to do this, as the more perceptive of the civil 
rights leaders knew well, would be likely seriously to 
destabilise the Unionists' own constituency. The 
characteristic of the civil rights campaign that caused 
crisis and division in the ranks of the Unionists was its 
composition of modernised, partly-transformed and 
unreconstructed elements. The nature of the movement itself 
and the circumstances in which it operated, were such that a 
reformist response from the Unionists was inevitable. But 
equally inevitable was a powerful backlash to reformism 
The Origins of the Crisis (3) The Deterioration of the 
Unionists' External Environment 
Given the ambiguities of Northern Ireland's political 
status, it is scarcely surprising that external factors loom 
large in the Northern Ireland conflict. The ability of 
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Unionists to reproduce a bloc of support cohesive enough to 
maintain the state depended partly on enjoying enough 
autonomy from British 'interference' to allow the 
continuance of its populist and discriminatory features. 
Anything which threatened this autonomy threatened the 
foundations of the Unionist coalition. 
Between 1922 and 1972, Northern Ireland's constitutional 
status was, at least in theory, unambiguous. Article -75 of 
the Government of Ireland Act45 clearly established the 
superior jurisdiction of the westminster parliament and the 
conditional nature of the Northern IreIand government's 
powers. But in practice, the convention that Northern 
Ireland matters were not discussed at Westminster (despite 
the fact that Northern Ireland constituencies sent twelve 
members there) clouded the issue. So too did matters of 
status, like the attendance of Northern Ireland delegations 
at Imperial and Commonwealth conferences. 46 Even Northern 
Ireland's economic relationship with Britain was less like 
that of a depressed region in a national economy, than of a 
distant neo-colonial dependency to its metropole. Buckland 
notes that; 
•• imperial and local perspectives were often 
at variance with the regional perspective, 
and thus severely restricted the Northern 
Ireland government's will and capacity for 
developing satisfactory regional policies. 47 
Indeed, writing of Northern Ireland's first prime minister, 
he concludes, "Craig at times acted less as Northern 
Ireland's prime minister than its ambassador to Britain".48 
This providential ambiguity and de facto autonomy rested on 
wider considerations than the direct relationships between 
the Unionist Party and British governments. Undoubtedly, the 
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Unionists' freedom of action derived .in part from its 
embattled status. As long as Northern Ireland was the focus 
of irredentist rhetoric from Irish governments and the 
Catholic opposition in Northern Ireland, and as long as 
armed struggle continued to pose a threat to order and 
stability in the province, it could hardly be treated as 
nothing more than another region of the British Isles. As 
argued above, the failure of the IRA's insurgent campaign 
and the rise of the civil rights movement drastically 
altered the configuration of Catholic opposition. One of the 
effects of this was to make more feasible the airing of 
Catholic grievances in the context of British party 
politics. A bridgehead of sorts already existed for this 
purpose in the 'Friends of Ireland' group of Labour MPs 
which was founded during the Labour administration of 1945-
50. 49 This support base was expanded in 1965 with the 
founding of the 'Campaign for Democracy in Ulster', whose 
inaugural meeting was attended by sixty Labour MPs. The 
return of the Labour Party to office in 1964 gave confidence 
to the civil rights movement and threatened to alter the 
traditional quiescence of British government policy.50 This 
threat provided ammunition both for reform Unionists and 
their reactionary counterparts. 
In some respects the key to the changing nature of the 
Unionists' external environment lay with the Irish Republic, 
where a process of modernisation parallel to that associated 
with O'Neill in Northern Ireland was under way. Indeed the 
breadth and the depth of this process were considerably more 
extensive in the south than in the north of Ireland, largely 
because the former had a considerably greater way to go in 
that direction. Modernisation is generally accepted to have 
been inaugurated as a conscious and consistent policy with 
the replacement of De Valera as Taioseach (prime minister) 
and leader of the ruling Fianna Fail Party in 1959, although 
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as with all historical movements, its. roots are more varied 
and stretch further back. 51 The adoption of Keynesianism, 
economic planning by bureaucrats and experts an~ the 
attraction of foreign investment, were the key economic 
instruments of modernisation. The Republic moved towards 
free trade with Britain in 1960 and 1965. The pieties of 
traditional republicanism could no longer be sustained as 
official policy in the light of this demarche, and the Irish 
government's attitude to Northern Ireland became more and 
more explicitly that re-unification could only come about 
through consent. 
Leaving behind the persona, associated with De Valera, of a 
pious, autarchic and Gaelic republic, sundered and martyred 
by British imperialism, Irish policy-makers began skillfully 
to purvey the image of a go-ahead, modern state, its economy 
open to the world and eager to compete in it. This re-
launched version would be fit to take its place in the 
context of European integration and on a wider world stage, 
forsaking the pedantic and narrow neutrality which kept it 
out of the Second World War, for something more active, 
along the lines of Third World non-alignment. 
Modernisation had its limits of course, and as Foster points 
out, the Republic's political structure, "remained closely 
connected to the cultural and social norms of Irish rural 
society".52 But at the same time as Lemass could argue53 
that Protestants would be happy to take their place in the 
Irish nation if the Republic could sustain enough economic 
growth to equalise material conditions with Northern 
Ireland, O'Neill could proclaim that if Roman Catholics had 
decent jobs and homes, they would be as loyal as 
Protestants. 54 Even more disturbing to Unionists than these 
optimistic (and contradictory) materialist projections, was 
the possibility that Northern Ireland might become an 
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archaic inconvenience to businesslike relations between 
Ireland and Britain as both moved towards entry into the 
European Community. The decline of Northern Ireland's basic 
industries and the failure of the Republic to establish an 
independent national economy reflected in each case an 
inability to survive in the face of foreign competition. 
Both parts of Ireland were thrown back on their links with 
Britain. Northern Ireland became more dependent on state 
intervention and direct subsidies, the Republic abandoned 
protectionism and was reintegrated into the British market. 
As Probert puts it; 
The foundations of partition in the historic 
development of two different modes of 
production in Ireland were being steadily 
undermined, together with the basis of ruling 
class sectarianism in Ulster. 55 
In several ways, then, the favourable external circumstances 
which sustained Ulster Unionism were subject to erosion in 
the 1960s. At a time when Northern Ireland's dependence on 
subsidies from the British exchequer increased, the British 
government and parliament could be expected to take a more 
critical view of the Unionist regime. The civil rights 
movement represented in many influential British eyes the 
kind of reformist, modernising force which could propel 
Northern Ireland in the direction of British standards of 
administration. The Dublin government's firm hand in dealing 
with the IRA between 1956 and 1962 and Lemass's programme of 
modernisation, seemed to remove the external threat on which 
uncritical British support was partly premised. These 
altered circumstances were influential in the development of 
reform Unionism and the reaction to it, which constituted 
the crisis of Unionism in the late sixties. 
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THE CRISIS OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 
The notion of crisis is virtually omnipresent in the 
literature on contemporary South African politics. 56 This 
ubiquity, and the flexibility with which the concept has 
been used, leave it open to a measure of interpretative 
discussion and critique. For instance, there is the problem 
of chronology and the identification of a 'crisis': is there 
a threshold beyond which a series of interrelated 
dysfunctional trends becomes a crisis? How do we 
conceptualise a situation in which dysfunctional 
contradictions are endemic both in periods of unrest and 
stability?57 
There is also the question of the relationship between 
economic and political dimensions of crisis. How closely can 
manifestations of political crisis (electoral volatility, 
party splits, states of emergency, political violence) be 
related to structural change in society and the economy? How 
simple and direct are the causal links between the two? Do 
we risk, in using the idea of 'crisis,' imposing a spurious 
order on situations fraught with the irrational and 
contingent? 
Clarity is also desirable on the exact locus of whatever 
crisis we are talking about. In the context of South Africa 
from the mid-1970s, for instance, the formulae, 'crisis of 
the state', 'crisis of white supremacy', 'crisis of 
Afrikaner Nationalism' are all intelligible and offer useful 
perspectives on basically the same terrain. But they are not 
the same and different perceptions of crisis have seemed to 
present different and sometimes contradictory imperatives. 
For instance, measures intended to alleviate or resolve a 
general crisis of white supremacy have tended to sharpen and 
deepen the crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
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It will be useful to bear these points in mind while 
discussing the crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism and its 
bearing on the dissolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
alliance. 
Passages of stress frequently attended Nationalist rule 
between 1948 and the mid-1960s. These included the struggle 
over the amendment of the constitution removing coloured 
voters from the common roll, the gathering of black 
resistance to the imposition of apartheid, culminating in 
the Defiance Campaign, Sharpevil l e, and the banning of the 
ANC and PAC. The inexorable b~ild-up of international 
concern was a reaction to these events and an additional 
source of stress in itself. These stressful periods 
encompassed secular trends which would accelerate from the 
1970s, like international action against apartheid, and 
-~ nts which, like black resistance, would go underground 
. -emerge in altered and more potent forms from 1973 
onwards. 
There was an important difference however between the 
stressful conditions of the period 1948-1965, and the full-
blown crisis which made its presence felt in Afrikaner 
Nationalism from the mid-1970s onwards. Before then, the 
conflictual elements were external to the Nationalist 
coalition and the conflicts were functional, perhaps 
essential, to its ethnic mobilisation and unity. The sources 
of stress did not combine and react with internal fault 
lines to threaten the integrity of the alliance, as they 
later did. This does not mean that Afrikaner Nationalism was 
a monolith. Differences of emphasis and principle were 
there, but the different tendencies were kept together by 
various factors. These included the perceived hostility to 
Afrikaner Nationalism of outside forces, including English 
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imperialism, African nationalism and international opinion; 
the interlocking web of organisations which assiduously 
cultivated ideology, promoted careers, and censored thought 
and action beyond 'acceptable' limits; the force of 
Verwoerd's personality and to some extent the legacy of his 
authority even after his death; the identification of the 
party with movement, action, change, large tasks and 
ambitious blueprints. 
These characteristics enabled the National Party to shrug 
off the departure of disaffected right-wing members to found 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) in 1969. This prologue 
to the deeper divisions which .would emerge later, was 
prompted by minor alterations in direction by the Vorster 
government, especially in establishing diplomatic relations 
with newly-independent African states, and allowing Maori 
players to tour with the New Zealand All Blacks. Personality 
clashes and cultural issues also played a part, but Stadler 
points to a structural issue of longer term importance. This 
was a 'new populism' generated among lower-class Afrikaners, 
disgruntled and threatened by the rise of an affluent elite 
propelled upwards by the Nationalists' use of the state as 
the vehicle of ethnic advance. 58 
It was to be over a decade before there was a more serious 
split, the breakaway of Dr. Treurnicht and 18 Nationalist 
MPs to form the Conservative Party in 1982. It was a decade 
in which the structural economic problems and reconstituted 
black resistance, which made themselves felt from 1973 
onwards, prompted a strategic response from the Nationalist 
government which combined both reform and intensified 
repression. The central elements of this strategy were; the 
centralising of policy-making in the executive with greatly 
increased roles for the bureaucracy and the military, at the 
expense of parliament and the party; broadening the basis of 
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support for the state by cultivating English-speaking whites 
and big business, co-opting Indians and coloureds through 
the tricameral constitutional system, and attempting to 
create a black middle class through the homelands, the black 
local authorities systems, and easing controls on black 
economic advance: downplaying the cultural and ideological 
pieties of Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, and replacing them 
with an all-embracing ideology ('total onslaught/total 
strategy') which purported to be completely neutral in 
ethnic terms. 
This strategy was based on internally contradictory 
premises. The party leadership accepted that the partition 
of the country into spurious nation states could not provide 
the legitimacy and stability on which white interests 
depended, but refused to contemplate a future in which 
racial categories would not determine political rights and 
the composition of political structures. The second premise 
was that some discriminatory structures which were essential 
to white interests would have to remain, and those that were 
not could be abolished. This committed the government to 
large scale repression in defence of discrimination. 
Government policies caused alienation and disaffection among 
the activist, populist and culturally militant sections of 
the Nationalist alliance. The relative decline of these 
elements in the National Party helped keep this disaffection 
in check. The contradictory premises on which reform was 
based also helped keep the party together. Policies were 
made and implemented in an elaborate shuffling ritual, 
forwards, sideways and backwards. Much of the time too, they 
were explicated in clouds of ambiguous rhetoric which 
obscured their immediate effects and ultimate purposes from 
white voters, and in all likelihood from the policy-makers 
themselves. These obfuscations meant that not only could the 
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disaffection of the Afrikaner right w~ng be contained within 
the party until the split of 1982, but even after that, the 
revolt could be kept very largely within constitutional 
limits, so that for ten years (1982-1992) the crisis of 
Afrikaner Nationalism was played out in a competition for 
the allegiance of the white (and especially Afrikaans-
speaking) electorate. This electoral struggle was 
complemented by competition for control of the social, 
religious and cultural organisations which provided 
Afrikaner Nationalism's infrastructural network. During the 
eighties, however, the fragmentation of the Nationalist 
alliance was emphasised by the growth of numerous 
paramilitary bodies (notably the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging, the AWB) , and political groupings whose 
standpoint reflected radical partition and a much smaller 
white homeland, rather than the Conservative Party's claim 
to the whole territory of current 'white' South Africa. 
President de Klerk's unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and the 
South African Communist Party in February 1990, presented 
the Afrikaner right with a moment of truth. The choice was 
whether to continue to oppose the government primarily by 
constitutional means, or to resort primarily to extra-
parliamentary direct action in political, industrial and 
paramilitary forms. The former option was the one which 
prevailed, and even after the crushing defeat for the right 
in the whites-only referendum of March 1992, no popular, 
mass direct action has taken place. Instead, a third theatre 
of operations appears to have been activated, a core of 
resistance from within state organs, especially the security 
forces. Given the enormous importance of the state as the 
instrument of Afrikaner advance, it would not be surprising 
if its organs, rather than streets, factories or farms, 
provided the terrain on which the last crisis of Afrikaner 
Nationalism was played out. 
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In summary, then, the crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism has 
had four phases; an abortive prelude in the HNP's breakaway, 
which nonetheless revealed fault lines in the Nationalist 
coalition; the struggle within the National Party over the 
permissible limits of reform; the attempt by the 
Conservative Party to recreate the ideological and social 
basis of the Nationalist alliance; the struggle from within 
the organs of state to hinder or even destroy the pattern of 
negotiation politics liberated by the unbannings of February 
1990. 
structural. Economic and Social Change and the Crisis of 
Afrikaner Nationalism (1) Demographic Change 
For a political system whose basis was the classification of 
people into 'population groups' and assigning status and 
rights on this basis, demographic change was an important 
matter. According to Giliomee; 
Perhaps the most important political fact in 
South African history is that from 1700 to 
the 1950s the proportion of whites to the 
overall population of South Africa was always 
sufficient to man all the strategic positions 
in the political, economic and administrative 
system of the country.59 
From 1910 to 1950, the white population maintained itself at 
over 20% of the total population, but between 1950 and 1985, 
the percentage dropped from 20.9% to 15%. This relative 
demographic decline has not been arrested, and it is 
projected that by 2010 whites will account for only 11% of 
the population. This decline has coincided with two other 
tendencies; extensive economic development and growth in all 
aspects of the state's responsibilities. The coincidence of 
these three trends forced the apartheid system up against 
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its own administrative and economic limits. In both private 
and public sectors, there were too few whites to staff the 
bureaucracies which administered apartheid, or alone to 
sustain the economic growth on which white prosperity and 
security was based. 
The changing demographic profile of the South African 
population contributed to a general crisis of white 
supremacy in several ways. Firstly, it undermined the belief 
that whites could continue to rule on their own terms. 
, Secondly, it forced open the way for bl'ack entry into 
skilled and administrative jobs in both private and public 
sector. This altered the clas~ composition of black 
communities and created new opportunities for leadership and 
organisation which were taken up by trade unions, the Black 
Consciousness Movement and latterly by the United Democratic 
Front and the ANC. The impressive expansion of black 
education which the demographic shift and the shortage of 
white manpower made necessary, raised black expectations and 
opened up what was to be the most important theatre of 
struggle in the seventies and eighties. Thirdly, the need to 
address black aspirations had repercussions within the 
Afrikaner Nationalist alliance, exacerbating the class 
tensions and populist discontents which contributed to the 
formation of the HNP. 
(2) The Changing Structure of South African Industry 
The rapid economic growth which South Africa achieved in the 
1950s and especially the 1960s reflected not only increases 
in production but also alterations in the distribution of 
economic activity. The key development was the increase in 
manufacturing industry's share of production relative to 
mining and agriculture. By 1965, the contribution of 
manufacturing to South Africa's GOP was greater than that of 
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agriculture and mining and in the 1960s, employment in 
manufacturing increased by 70%; by 1970, this sector 
employed more people than any other. 60 While the South 
African economy as a whole grew at impressive rates of 
between 4% and 5.5% during the 1950s and 1960s, 
manufacturing grew even more quickly, at rates of over 7% 
between 1957 and 1969, and over 6% between 1969 and 1974. 61 
It is in the growth of manufacturing industry that the 
structural problems of the political economy of apartheid 
have been most apparent. Price62 summarises the socio-
political effects of the rise of manufacturing in the 
following terms; blacks were ~ncreasingly drawn to the 
cities by the attraction of employment opportunities and the 
increasingly impoverished state of the homelands; 
manufacturing industries needed technically capable, 
literate and trained workers unlike agriculture and mining63 
where the priority had been ultra-cheap and unskilled 
labour; when the white market for manufactured goods began 
to be saturated in the 1970s, the need for growth ran up 
against the near-subsistence level of black incomes. 
These effects directly confronted some of the central 
foundations of apartheid, namely that blacks should be 
considered as no more than temporary 'sojourners' in 'white' 
areas for the sole purpose of selling their labour; that 
blacks should be educated only for unskilled and menial 
employment; that categories of occupation should be reserved 
for whites, irrespective of market requirements for labour; 
and that black wages should be kept down in the interests of 
employers in mining and agriculture. 64 These structural 
constraints to the further growth of manufacturing industry 
helped create a lobby for reform within business circles. As 
Greenberg has pointed out,65 throughout the apartheid 
period, secondary industry and commerce have been uneasy 
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about the rigid framework of racial labour controls, 
especially selected aspects of them like job discrimination. 
But expressions of disaffection and even challenge have been 
a minor theme in a generalised accommodation to the needs of 
primary industry and National Party ideology: 
Only during periods of serious political 
disorder and economic dislocation have 
businessmen renewed their search for other 
ways of organising a labour force. And even 
then, they have quickly abandoned the issue 
when order was restored or when the 
government seemed strong enough to resist the 
pressures for reform. 66 
The basis of this accommodation was increasingly questioned 
from the late 1970s onwards however. Recognition of the 
structural limits on economic growth and growing black 
resistance stimulated criticism of the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the homelands system and efforts to keep 
blacks out of cities. By comparison with the past, this 
criticism was more serious, more sustained, and came from 
Afrikaner businessmen as well as their English-speaking 
counterparts. 67 This last feature highlights another 
important structural development, the changing social 
composition of the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance. 
(3) The Changing Social Composition of Afrikaner Nationalism 
The social differentiation of Afrikaners as a consequence of 
economic growth and the use made by nationalist governments 
of the state as an instrument of ethnic economic advance, 
have been recognised for over twenty years. 68 More recently, 
these phenomena and their implications for the alignment of 
political forces both within Afrikaner Nationalism and in 
the wider polity, have been documented and discussed at 
length. 69 
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The contours of the Afrikaner economic advance can be 
outlined in four developments. Firstly, there has been 
considerable movement between occupational categories. In 
1936, 41.2% of Afrikaners followed 'agricultural 
occupations', declining to 8.1% in 1977. 'Blue collar and 
other manual' occupations rose to a high of 40.7% in 1946 
and declined to 26.7% in 1977, while 'white collar' 
categories accounted for 65.2% of Afrikaners in 1977, up 
from 27.5 in 1936. 70 Substantial numbers of those in white 
collar categories were in professional and managerial 
categories, thanks to enormously increased provision for 
higher education in Afrikaans-medium universities and 
technical colleges. 
Secondly, ownership and control by Afrikaners of assets in 
the private sector of the South African economy grew from 
9.6% in 1948 to 20.8% in 1975. 71 Thirdly, there was a 
substantial movement of Afrikaners from country to town. 
Fourthly, Afrikaners became heavily dependent on the state 
for employment: 
By 1968 there were twice as many Afrikaners 
in government jobs than before the election 
of 1948. In 1976, some 60 percent of the 
white labour force in the public and semi-
public service were Afrikaners •••• Sadie 
estimates that in 1977 some 30 percent of the 
whites employed are in the public and semi-
public sector. Some 35 percent of all 
economically active Afrikaners are in this 
sector against only 25 percent English-
speaking whites who occupy less than ten 
percent of the top positions. 72 
In their turn, the political effects of these social changes 
can be summarised as follows. Occupational mobility and the 
emergence of a substantial class of Afrikaans-speaking 
capitalists sharpened class tensions within Afrikaner 
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Nationalism and eroded the resources which previously had 
contained them. At the same time, black resistance and 
faltering economic growth dramatically raised the costs and 
narrowed the margins of policy choices in maintaining the 
apartheid system. Afrikaner businessmen became increasingly 
influential in the Nationalist alliance, and at the same 
time came to recognise interests in common with their 
English-speaking counterparts and to look for class allies 
rather than exclusively ethnic ones. Afrikaners who occupied 
advanced positions in the economy began to feel that their 
security would be better served by the advancement of blacks 
than their exclusion from the economy, and that they could 
feel more secure in the face ~f this development by virtue 
of their skills, than through ethnic solidarity. 
occupational mobility, economic security, urbanisation and 
social differentiation, also encouraged a more cosmopolitan 
world view in which blatant racism had no place. These 
trends also favoured secularisation at the expense of ethnic 
mythology, a revisionist approach to ideology, a more 
impersonal style of administration and a technocratic and 
managerial, rather than a YQlk-orientated rationale for the 
state. 
The Reviyal of Black Militancy and the Crisis of Afrikaner 
Nationalism 
The South African government's campaign of arrests, 
prosecutions and prohibitions aimed at outlawing and 
dispersing organised resistance to apartheid, was successful 
in creating a period of coerced acquiescence and repressive 
stability which lasted from the mid-1960s to the early 
1970s. Although the Nationalist government was briefly 
shaken into uncertainty by the liberation movements' 
campaigns in 1960, the leadership soon recovered and 
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demonstrated that hopes of a spontaneous revolutionary 
uprising by the black masses were altogether unrealistic. 
Two major lessons were learned: firstly, the 
mass of black people were not prepared to 
risk their security and meagre privileges in 
any active political engagement of the 
authorities, and secondly, the South African 
state was easily able to control and repress 
the most determined public dissidence from 
the radical wings of black society.73 
The government's victory over the now-exiled liberation 
movements gave it the political space to carry out the 
social engineering dimension of apartheid, especially forced 
removals, preparing the homelands for independence, and 
imposing Bantu Education on blacks. Conversely, the social 
and economic needs of so-called 'urban Africans' were 
neglected in this period. Not only did these apartheid 
measures fail to gain for the system the legitimacy that its 
most zealous proponents anticipated however, they were 
instrumental in re-shaping black resistance in novel and 
potentially threatening forms. The re-emergence of this 
altered and re-vitalised militancy74 was perhaps the central 
element in the various crises of white rule which 
crystallised in the 1970s and of which the crisis of 
Afrikaner Nationalism was one. 
Black opposition to apartheid was of course shaped by the 
exploitation and repression of blacks and the basic 
illegitimacy of the regime in their eyes. But the specific 
forms opposition took in the 1970s were affected by two 
organisational and ideological currents which were reflected 
respectively in the growth of the independent black trade 
union movement and the Black Consciousness Movement. 
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Black Trade Unions 
Black workers were excluded from independent participation 
in the state-controlled system of industrial relations in 
which bargaining between employers and white unions took 
place. Insofar as questions of black employment were 
addressed, it was as a rigidly controlled adjunct to this 
bureaucratic system. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, 
changes in the South African economy undermined this 
carefully stratified system. The long post-war boom which 
saw rapid growth in the manufacturing sector brought great 
increases in the number of Africans employed in secondary 
industry, as whites moved on .and up into non-manual clerical 
and supervisory categories, and as the absolute demand for 
semi-skilled operatives grew. As Lambert and Webster put it, 
"Through the concentration of large numbers of workers in 
production, the material conditions for a strengthened shop 
floor-based trade unionism had been created by the early 
1970s".75 
Despite these altered circumstances, the existing system of 
industrial relations could be sustained as long as African 
workers' material conditions did not deteriorate, but this 
is what happened in the early 1970s. One study claims that 
the price of essential commodities for African families 
increased 40% between 1971 and 1973. 76 The new possibilities 
of worker militancy were dramatically illustrated in the 
Durban strikes of 1973 which ignited a wave of industrial 
unrest elsewhere in the country, to the extent that over 200 
000 black workers came out on strike between January 1973 
and mid-1976. 77 
The Durban strikes, which were very largely spontaneous 
~vents, generating their own imitative momentum and ad hoc 
organisational forms, demonstrated to the workers themselves 
217 
and to employers and the government, .the possibilities of 
mass working-class action. From this point onward, it was 
clear that black trade unions would emerge and that there 
would be a struggle to define the terms under which they 
would develop. The two principal issues that would determine 
the processes involved were what degree of independence 
would the new black unions enjoy and whether they would 
evolve into narrowly industrial bodies, concerned only with 
'production' struggles, or as 'political' unions, concerned 
with the wider context which shaped the social and political 
context of workers' lives. A third and a fourth issue were 
linked to these; to what extent would unions become 
affiliated in one or more federation or congress? What 
relationship (if any) would develop between the emerging 
unions and the banned and exiled liberation movements? 
These issues have been addressed in some twenty years of 
struggles between unions, employers and the state. The 
context of these struggles has been of both reform and 
repression and their resolution has tended towards the 
emergence of independent unions grouped in two large 
federations, embracing both industrial and political 
dimensions, and having strong links to the liberation 
movements. The importance of the emergence of black trade 
unions in the 1970s lies in the fact that they represented a 
form of opposition that the state could not simply repress. 
The structural impediments to growth in the South African 
economy could not be adequately addressed unless the 
increasingly numerous and strategically important African 
working class could be brought within a stable system of 
industrial relations which recognised workers as bearers of 
rights and not merely disposable units of labour. This 
admission, embodied in the 1979 report of the Wiehahn 
Commission which paved the way for official recognition of 
black trade unions in the Industrial Conciliation Act of the 
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same year, had profound implications .for the wider political 
system. Among these implications was the fact that the 
privileged position of the white worker in the state-backed 
system of industrial relations and in the Afrikaner 
Nationalist alliance was definitively ended. 
The Black Consciousness Movement 
The second strand of renewed black resistance was provided 
by the Black Consciousness Movement which developed from the 
late 1960s, enjoyed an open and influential existence in the 
early 1970s and was stifled in the repressive measures which 
followed the Soweto uprising. The movement reflected an 
appreciation of the shortcomings of previous oppositional 
tendencies and of the difficulties of finding effective 
means of confronting the repressive power of the apartheid 
state. In the first instance, Black Consciousness reflected 
an explicit, radical and uncompromising rejection of white 
liberalism as a counterfeit and enervating influence on 
blacks. Less explicit, but in keeping with the movement's 
ideology, was a rejection of the ANC's espousal of a non-
racial alliance against apartheid. In another point of 
difference with the ANC, Black Consciousness was non-
violent, and did not call for direct action to overthrow the 
apartheid regime. In keeping with these orientations, Black 
Consciousness stressed the essential unity of black people's 
experience and sought to raise their self-esteem, 
substituting a positive psychological disposition to the 
experience of being black for the negative images of 
colonialism and the cultural imperialism which were 
allegedly characteristic of 'friends' like the liberals as 
well as enemies. 
In order to do these things, the followers of Black 
Consciousness created community projects, workshops and 
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cooperatives (mainly in the fields of health and education) 
which would demonstrate the viability, vitality, and even 
superiority of black-run enterprises to the segregated and 
inferior provision of the state. The principal 
organisational impetus for mobilising Black Consciousness 
came first from the South African Students' organisation 
(SASO) -- whose creation as a breakaway from the white-
dominated National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) 
marked the decisive break with liberal multiracialism -- and 
then from the Black People's Convention (BPC), a federation 
of community groups aimed at disseminating the movement's 
influence which had hitherto largely been confined to the 
campuses of universities, theological seminaries and 
schools. 
The place of Black Consciousness in the renewal of 
resistance to apartheid is a disputed one. Its critics dwell 
on the movement's lack of clearly articulated long-term 
strategy to give political direction to its cultural and 
psychological dimensions. Its narrowly middle-class 
membership and inability to engage the black working class 
is another criticism, as is the lack of a coherent 
relationship with the exiled liberation movements. Debate 
over the movement's significance emerges especially in the 
context of rival explanations for the Soweto uprising in 
1976. Tom Lodge assesses these interpretations and 
arbitrates between them, coming to the conclusion that even 
if the formal organisational structures of the Black 
Consciousness Movement were not directly involved in 
planning the protests which led to the Soweto uprising: 
Given the fact that Black Consciousness seems 
to have been especially pervasive among 
university students, school teachers and 
churchmen it would surely have been a little 
surprising if sentiments inspired from it 
were not found in schoolchildren for whom 
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such people were an important reference 
group. 78 
The Black Consciousness Movement was effectively suppressed 
in the months following the Soweto uprising, in a wave of 
individual detentions and harassment (the most notorious of 
them being the murder of steve Biko in police custody in 
September 1977) and the banning of its principal 
organisations and publications (October 1977). Although the 
ideology of Black Consciousness was carried on in other 
organisational forms (notably the Azanian People's 
Organisation, AZAPO) the movement's influence was probably 
more important in a more diffuse and pervasive way. One 
essential (and crucial) difference between black resistance 
to apartheid as it developed into the 1980s, and the 
opposition movements of the 1950s and 1960s, is that the 
former was widely diffused through hundreds of community-
based structures. While it was easy for the regime 
temporarily to cripple opposition in the 1960s by banning 
the principal organisations, by the 1980s resistance could 
not be neutralised because it had such deep and broad roots 
in communities. 79 It is likely that this has been one of 
Black Consciousness's most enduring legacies. Another has 
been the provision, not only of recruits, but of leadership 
for the ANC and UOF. 
Probably the most important and politically 
sophisticated leaders in the UOF graduated 
from the ranks of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in the early and mid-1970s. 80 
The revival of black resistance to apartheid was the most 
conspicuous and dynamic element of the gathering crisis 
which faced the system of white rule in all its 
manifestations from the mid 1970s onwards. Where the frontal 
assault of the Defiance Campaign and the armed struggle had 
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been contained, the flanking attacks .of black trade unionism 
and Black Consciousness exposed vulnerabilities in the 
system. Both the emerging black unions and the Black 
Consciousness Movement were subject to repression and 
harassment, but in important ways they went with, rather 
than against influential economic and political currents in 
the white minority. 
The emergence of black unions was not only compatible with 
the modernising demands of South African industry, it was a 
condition of satisfying them. As industrialists and even the 
government came to realise, it was not a question of simply 
repressing the unions (although this was an option to be 
exercised when the political dimension of union activities 
threatened wider imperatives of maintaining white rule) but 
also of accommodating them. The strategy of accommodation 
had its own problems however. Firstly, it helped deepen 
divisions in white politics between reformers and 
reactionaries and secondly, given the wider exclusions and 
repressions that black political aspirations were subject 
to, it proved impossible to confine black unions to a purely 
industrial role. 
The case is more difficult to make for Black Consciousness 
whose moment of direct influence was shorter, and whose 
organisational structures were more thoroughly and finally 
repressed. Yet even here it is possible to see how the 
oblique and innovative forms of opposition to white rule 
which Black Consciousness represented helped to shape the 
crisis of white rule. To begin with white liberals 
(disapprovingly) and supporters of apartheid (with 
satisfaction) believed that Black Consciousness was 
It •• entrenching the idea of racial exclusivity and therefore 
doing the government's work lt • 81 As the government-supporting 
Die Burger put it; 
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The people with whom this new thinking has 
taken root reject the condescension with 
which they have often been regarded by whites 
who represented themselves as their only 
friends. And they do not want to be objects 
of white politics any longer, but desire to 
determine their future themselves as people 
in their own right •• In South Africa we can 
be thankful that certain opportunities have 
been created in advance for the realisation 
of the new ideas. It has been done among 
other things by the development of the Bantu 
homelands •• The new spirit thus fits in well 
with the objectives of our relations 
policy.82 
These misconceived sentiments may well have reflected a 
stiff dose of wishful thinking, but Black Consciousness's 
espousal of non-violence, rejection of white liberals and 
willingness to use segregated educational institutions as 
its main theatre of operations, offered the superficial hope 
that here was a movement which was going to oppose apartheid 
on its own terms. This misconception lasted long enough to 
give Black Consciousness valuable political space to carry 
out its work of consciousness raising and community 
organisation. When SASO provoked the authorities with 
militant shows of support for the victories of liberation 
movements in Angola and Mozambique, repression of Black 
Consciousness began in earnest, yet it was not until over a 
year after the Soweto uprising that the movement felt the 
full weight of the state. By this time the extent of Black 
Consciousness's radical (if inchoate) rejection of apartheid 
was clear, and even the most wilfully self-deluded supporter 
of that policy could not believe that the movement somehow 
reflected its vindication. It is likely that this 
realisation was particularly influential in convincing 
reform nationalists of the bankruptcy of Verwoerdian 
apartheid. After all, Black Consciousness was pre-eminently 
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the movement of the emerging black service bourgeoisie 
(teachers, students, journalists, writers and artists, 
clergy, doctors and other medical personnel) who had 
benefited from the expansion of black education and ought 
(in the eyes of apartheid apologists) to have been the show-
piece products of segregation. If this influential 
intellectual elite so bitterly denounced the system which 
produced them, there was little hope for its eventual 
legitimacy. 
In their different ways, then, black trade unions and Black 
Consciousness altered the political terrain and the agenda 
of resistance and opposition •. Each in its own way showed 
that there were possibilities which belonged neither to the 
armed struggle (against which all whites could unite), nor 
in acquiescence to apartheid (whose political and economic 
constraints and contradictions were beginning to exercise 
some whites). In this way they helped to shape the crisis of 
white rule as a crisis which divided, rather than united the 
ruling group. 
The Deterioration of South Africa's External Enyironment and 
the Crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism 
The survival of apartheid and nationalist rule depended on 
South Africa's domestic political and international 
environments remaining stable. Serious domestic instability 
would frighten foreign investors, vindicate those who 
claimed apartheid was a threat to international peace and 
security, call into question the motives of those opposed to 
international ostracism and other punitive measures, and 
enhance the credibility and raise the morale of exiled 
liberation movements. 
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In their turn, unfavourable international developments would 
open possibilities for domestic opposition, raising the 
morale of resisters and making the costs of resistance seem 
more acceptable. A marked feature of the crisis of the 1970s 
was the way in which domestic and international events had 
these multiplier effects on each other. The key events in 
this relationship were the withdrawal of Portugal from its 
African colonies83 and the Soweto uprising. 
The security of white rule in South Africa depended on; the 
inability or unwillingness of a great power to intervene 
militarily in the region; the continuation of white rule in 
the larger three of South Afr.ica's neighbours, Rhodesia, 
Angola and Mozambique; and the ability of South African 
governments to convince Western states that for a variety of 
reasons (principally strategic and economic) their active 
participation in destabilising white rule would work against 
their own global interests. This combination of domestic, 
regional and global imperatives was (as is always the case 
in international relations) vulnerable to changes outside 
the control of the South African government. These included 
shifts in the balance of power between the superpowers, 
changes of government in the major Western powers, the 
fortunes of anti-colonial wars elsewhere in the region and 
the vagaries of the international economy, to which South 
Africa as an exporter of primary products and importer of 
technology and capital goods84 was particularly prone. 
During the 1970s, all of these elements were subject to 
change, ensuring that the crisis of continued white rule had 
a pronounced external dimension. The debilitating effects of 
the vietnam war on American foreign policy not only 
highlighted material constraints on American ability to 
engage Soviet-backed revolutionary wars of liberation in the 
Third World, but helped bring to power an administration in 
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1976 whose perceptions of such conflicts differed from those 
of its predecessors. It could not be said that American 
foreign policy under President Carter reflected a decisive 
commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle, but the tilt 
towards white ruled states embodied in NSC Memorandum 39, 
which underlay Kissinger's policy in the region, was 
discredited. The coming to power of a Labour government in 
Britain in 1974, again did not reflect a swing to decisive 
activism. But the British abandonment of the Simonstown 
Agreement -- the most emphatic symbol of South Africa's 
self-evaluated strategic importance to the west -- was an 
indication of a more generally unfavourable alteration in 
circumstances. 
Linked to altered western perceptions of capability, self-
interest and South Africa's status as a global asset, of 
course, was the USSR's forward policy in the Third World. 
Taking advantage of American confusions, self-doubts and 
hesitations, able to deploy a long-range strategic re-supply 
capability for the first time and to take advantage of an 
increasingly favourable climate among Third World non-
aligned states, the USSR embarked on a policy of active 
support for the new states and liberation movements of the 
Southern African region. The effect of this on south African 
policy-makers was greatly heightened by Cuba's semi-
independent pursuit of the same policy by the more drastic 
means of direct military involvement. 
The point around which these developments coalesced was the 
withdrawal of Portugal from its African colonies. 
Independence for Angola and Mozambique under the 
revolutionary movements which had fought anti-colonial wars, 
exposed the flanks of white rule in Rhodesia and South West 
Africa, provided the exiled liberation movements with bases 
on South Africa's borders, opened up the region to Soviet 
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and Cuban influence, and embroiled South Africa in military 
operations far outside its borders. The liberation of 
Portugal's colonies gave an immediate boost to the morale of 
the already burgeoning internal black resistance movements. 
Pro-Frelimo rallies provoked the first major crack-down by 
the government on the Black Consciousness Movement which 
culminated in a seventeen month trial (July 1975-December 
1976) of nine SASO and BPC members which, " •• instead of 
contributing to the suppression of Black Consciousness 
ideology •. by giving the accused a continuous public 
platform through the press, merely disseminated the ideology 
even more widely, and held up to youth once again a model of 
'rebel' courage". 85 
The Soweto uprising was the essential domestic complement to 
South Africa's deteriorating external environment, the 
catalyst which ensured that the deterioration would continue 
and intensify.86 The killing of unarmed and youthful 
demonstrators, the sheer number of casualties and the 
ferocity of the repression which touched every manifestation 
of black opposition, threw every aspect of the apartheid 
system into sharp relief for an international audience and 
emphasised that for black people the only changes since the 
killing of unarmed demonstrators at Sharpeville 16 years 
before had been for the worse. As with so many other things, 
1976 was a decisive turning point in the deterioration of 
South Africa's internal relations. 
The symbiotic effect of increased domestic resistance and 
deteriorating international conditions was to ensure that 
apartheid would move up the agenda of international concern, 
causing a groundswell of governmental, non-governmental and 
inter-governmental concern which though fluctuating in 
intensity, could not be rolled back. 
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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISES OF AFRIKANER 
NATIONALISM AND ULSTER UNIONISM 
The crises which beset Ulster Unionism from the early 1960s 
and Afrikaner Nationalism from the mid 1970s were crises of 
governing in the face of opposition which threatened not 
merely the tenure of a government but the existence of the 
state. opposition movements in both cases arose in contexts, 
took organisational forms, and followed strategies which 
indicated to at least some members of the ruling regimes 
that repression would not be a sufficient response to them 
and that their respective states would have to broaden the 
basis of their legitimacy. 
They were also crises of economic management. In Northern 
Ireland, the problem of long-term economic decline called 
into question the unionist government's ability to reproduce 
its own support base in the face of discontent among 
Protestant workers. Paradoxically, the strategies it adopted 
proved a greater threat to unity than the material 
grievances of its supporters. In South Africa the problem 
was stalled growth, and its focus was not the Nationalists' 
own supporters. The material costs of slowed growth could at 
first be forced on blacks. Apartheid however was a very 
costly system which needed high rates of economic growth to 
survive. Wasteful duplication, social engineering in the 
form of forced removals or the consolidation of 'homelands', 
the rising costs of security in the face of black opposition 
and a deteriorating regional environment, were all extremely 
expensive items. In any case, as the Durban strikes showed, 
the discontent of a now-numerous and economically strategic 
black proletariat at declining living standards, could 
threaten political destabilisation in the future. 
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They were also crises of autonomy in . which questions were 
posed about the respective states' and regimes' abilities to 
withstand external pressures. Both could not avoid being 
judged by the standards of larger polities and communities, 
especially those with which they claimed affinity and 
membership. Northern Ireland could not escape from the 
'British standards' of administration and social justice 
invoked by the Civil Rights Movement, and after considerable 
prompting by events, the British government. For South 
Africa, no amount of realist or legalistic advocacy could 
equip it to evade or ignore the post-Nuremberg and post-
colonial environment of discourse on human rights, and the 
notion of 'Western values' whose invocation it invited by 
claiming a Western persona for itself. In both cases, there 
were those in the ruling groups who would recognise the 
reality that their states were not morally, politically or 
economically self-sufficient, and those who would not. 
These common features might suggest that the crises had some 
common root, or at least some essential quality in which 
they might be characterised. In the literature which 
discusses the recent history of Afrikaner Nationalism and 
Ulster Unionism, the word 'modernisation' is frequently 
invoked. Can these stressful and catalytic periods be 
characterised as crises of modernisation? 
To do so would in some sense be to risk misunderstanding and 
miscasting the movements. There was much in their respective 
cycles of growth and maturity that was 'modernised' and very 
little that could be accurately labelled 'pre-modern'. Both 
were from the first, the creations of mass suffrage and the 
modern political party. Both depended on education, mass 
literacy and the mass media. Ulster Unionism's most 
effective mobilising device in the Home Rule Crisis was the 
Ulster Volunteer Force, the very model of a modern citizen 
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army with its functional divisions (transport, 
communications, supply, medical corps, womens' auxiliary, 
motorised detachment) and its reliance on the latest 
technology, all celebrated by an impressive public relations 
machine. 87 Afrikaner Nationalism's development of an 
elaborate ideology and use of the state as an instrument of 
social engineering could hardly have been more 
characteristically modern. 
To characterise them as anachronistic movements belatedly 
trying to get to grips with changing circumstances in a 
'crisis of modernisation' would, as a result, be misleading. 
The truth is, both were flexible and durable hybrids of 
modernisation and atavism. The elaboration of a sacred 
mythology out of elements like the Trek and the Covenant in 
Afrikaner Nationalism was the correlate of the Nationalists' 
determination to capture state power and modernise 
themselves by entering and ultimately controlling an 
industrial economy. The preoccupation of Ulster Unionists 
with the religious and monarchical wars of the seventeenth 
century in a perpetually re-lived historical present, went 
hand-in-hand with the claim to represent the interests of 
modernised, industrial classes against the threat of rule by 
backward peasants and an obscurantist church. For both, 
atavistic forms of identity co-existed with advanced forms 
of social and political organisation in a potent mobilising 
combination. As Mason puts it: 
The existence and utilisation of symbols of 
unity emphasising past communal achievements 
and experiences should not be taken 
uncritically as evidence that the exponents 
of such unity are simply mourning a lost 
past. It cannot be assumed that the movements 
and actions justified partly by reference to 
such symbols are merely representative of an 
unreconstructed 'traditionalism' or new 
expressions of a primordial form of social 
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cohesion and identity ••••• nationalism as a 
doctrine, appeals both to 'modernist' and 
'traditional' symbols. It thus acts as a 
bridge enabling a 'modern' political movement 
to offer the salvation and reunification of a 
'traditional' community, whilst at the same 
time deriving its strength from the 
mobilising capacity that communally rooted 
symbols of identity may offer. 88 
The crises of Afrikaner Nationalism and of Ulster Unionism 
threatened to disturb the coexistence of these elements, 
indeed served notice that such coexistence was no longer 
possible in movements which ruled heterogeneous and divided 
societies. It was in this sense that they were crises of 
modernisation, and more specifically they focussed on two 
modernising principles. The first was that economic 
rationality and bureaucratic planning should take precedence 
over communal favouritism in policy-making and 
administration. The second was that the principle of equal 
citizenship is the surest guarantee of legitimacy. The 
following chapter will make it plain that these principles 
(especially in South Africa) were not conceded fully, nor 
were they pursued with decisiveness, alacrity and 
generosity. Nevertheless, they were the sUbversive 
concessions to modernisation in which the crises of 
economic, social, and political pressures, internal and 
external, presented themselves to the ruling regimes in both 
states. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the similar 
contours of the crises as they developed in Northern Ireland 
and South Africa, but there were also some essential and 
influential differences. The most important of these centred 
on the question of social change within the ruling 
coalitions, and the relative fragility of the state 
structures. 
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It has already been pointed out89 how the class composition 
of Afrikaner nationalism changed with the years of National 
Party rule from a predominantly agricultural and blue collar 
profile to one with a high loading of white collar workers 
in state and parastatal employment. The same degree of 
mobility was not evident in the ranks of Ulster Unionism. 
The 1971 census for Northern Ireland revealed the following 
percentages of economically active Protestants (men and 
women) in certain occupational categories: 












The percentage in unambiguously working-class occupations is 
59%. When only men are considered, the percentage rises to 
67%: 











The difference may be accounted for by the relatively high 
number of women in low-paid non-manual service occupations. 
These figures show the continuing predominance91 of working 
class occupations among Ulster Protestants and are in clear 
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contrast to those quoted by Adam and .Giliomee for the 
changing occupational structure of Afrikaners, which reveal 
that by 1977, only 26.7% of them were in 'blue collar or 
other manual' jobs. In any case, it should be recalled that 
many of these individuals occupied posts that were 
essentially supervisory (of African labour) in nature, and 
whose working class status has been challenged in several 
interpretations. Fifty years of 'defensive ascendancy,92 did 
little to alter the class structure of Protestant Ulster, 
but in South Africa, thirty years of assiduous social 
engineering under nationalist rule ensured that its crisis 
of authority and unity was partly caused by the social 
differentiation of its own constituency, and the other 
elements of the crisis (black opposition, external pressure) 
acted on this greatly altered social formation. 
The contrasting class structures of Afrikaner Nationalism 
from the mid-1970s, and Ulster Unionism from the 1960s 
suggest interpretative keys to how the two movements 
experienced their similarly structured crises. It could be 
argued for instance that working class predominance in 
Unionism's support base means that a greater proportion of 
Ulster Protestants could be described as insecure, or even 
marginal in their material circumstances than Afrikaner 
Nationalists. An indication of this insecurity is offered by 
the incidence of unemployment. In 1971, 6.6% of male 
Protestants were out of work (the figure for men and women 
was 5.6%),93 rising dramatically during the 1970s to 12.4% 
by 1981. 94 At all times, the rate for Catholics has been 
very significantly worse, and it has risen at a higher rate. 
Indeed unemployment is widely seen as the greatest 
difference in material circumstances between Catholics and 
Protestants and as a result considerable debate has taken 
place around rival explanations for the gap.95 What is not 
at issue is the fact that Protestants have been vulnerable 
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to r1s1ng unemployment in a declining economy, at a rate 
consistently above the average for the united Kingdom. 96 
This is in marked contrast to the position of Afrikaners. 
Figures for unemployment by language group are not 
available, but the position regarding Afrikaners can be 
roughly gauged from the fact that in 1970, a mere 4 767 
whites (male and female) were unemployed out of an 
economically active white population of 1 508 901. This 
means that of 0.3% of whites were unemployed in that year. 97 
Housing provides another example of the condition of working 
class Protestants. The 1961 census revealed that 19.3% of 
houses in Northern Ireland had no piped water and 22.6% had 
no flush toilets. 98 The situation had not improved by 1974 
when another survey indicated that 19.4% of all dwellings in 
the province were unfit for habitation and over half the 
houses required remedial action of some kind. 99 That sub-
standard housing was not the exclusive lot of Catholics is 
demonstrated by this report of the Belfast Medical Officer 
of Health on housing in the loyalist Shankill Road area in 
1973, which found 95% of the houses to be below acceptable 
standards: 
The dwelling houses in this area were built 
between 1852 and 1887. There was a state of 
general decay, disrepair, general dampness 
and instability. Many houses had no secondary 
means of access necessitating the delivery of 
fuel and the removal of house refuse through 
the dwelling. Amenities for personal hygiene 
were almost non-existent and very few houses 
have internal WCs. There was inadequate 
provision for cooking of foods and, in many 
cases, improvised sculleries had enclosed the 
drains and obstructed lighting and 
ventilation ••• 100 
Another indication of the poor housing endured by 
Protestants (and evidence that it was a rural as well as 
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urban problem) is the fact that an attack on poor housing 
conditions of Protestants and Catholics was the centrepiece 
of the Rev. Ian Paisley's successful populist appeal to the 
voters of the Bannside constituency in 1969, his first 
breakthrough into electoral politics. 
Being a member of a dominant class alliance clearly meant 
much less in the way of absolute standards of living and 
material security for working class Protestants in Northern 
Ireland, than it did for even the declining portion of 
Afrikaners who could be classified as blue collar workers. 
This opens the possibility that the relative insecurity of 
Ulster Protestants would predispose them to react in a more 
volatile and directly confrontational way to the prospect of 
status and material loss than Afrikaners would under similar 
circumstances of crisis. There is also the possibility that 
for them, the threshold of perception of such loss might be 
lower. 
Two other attributes of the Ulster Protestants' condition 
are relevant here. The traditions of sectarian and labourist 
militancy and independent action which were described in an 
earlier chapter comprise the first of them. The second 
concerns the social geography of employment and segregated 
residence in Northern Ireland, and especially Belfast. 
Throughout Northern Ireland, Protestants live face to face 
with Catholics in ways that the spatial dimension of 
apartheid largely preclude in South Africa. This phenomenon 
is especially marked in working class areas of Belfast where 
the communities face each other across urban 'shatter 
zones', many of which have histories of endemic rioting 
going back over a century. These areas of hostile proximity 
encourage feelings of profound insecurity on both sides of 
the religious and political divide, and are ideal for swift 
mobilisation for defence or attack in a situation of 
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communal unrest. This high density residential pattern, 
often in the shadow of factories, is also conducive to 
mobilisation for political strikes, 'no-go' areas, and 
paramilitary recruitment, and allows the possibility of 
intimidation on which the success of these and other direct 
action strategies often depends. 
By contrast, supporters of Afrikaner Nationalism lived at 
considerably lower levels of density, at higher material 
standards and at greater distances from black residential 
areas. In addition, they did not work in large industrial 
enterprises where they constituted the overwhelmingly 
dominant element in the work .force, as Protestants did in 
the shipyards and engineering factories of Belfast. 
The presence of such a large, relatively insecure, 
potentially volatile component in Ulster Unionism's support 
base suggests that Ulster Protestants would, under stressful 
conditions, be less likely to trust and follow their 
leaders, more likely to adopt extremist postures and direct 
action strategies, and more likely to come into direct 
conflict with the excluded community and the opposition 
forces which represented it, than Afrikaner Nationalists 
under similar situations of crisis. 
At the same time, the Afrikaners' rapid, extensive, state-
sponsored social mobility ought to have produced an 
increasingly numerous class of people for whom cultural 
militance, sectarian mythology and ethnic solidarity had a 
decreasing appeal. For such a group, command of the state 
apparatus, from whom so many received their livelihood and 
most their information, would be more important in securing 
allegiance than the mobilising devices of the past. The 
extent, depth, flexibility and resilience of the state 
structures themselves was one of the principal resources of 
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the government in its competition with the forces of the 
right wing which followed Afrikaner Nationalism's crisis of 
unity. Ulster Unionist governments had no such resources, 
and no depth of constituency willing to follow a path of 
reform, comparable to that which has remained loyal to the 
Nationalist government. 
The crises which have been described in this chapter were 
followed by conflicts between reform and reaction and the 
dispersal of the previous dominant coalitions. These 
conflicts will be analysed and discussed in the remaining 
chapters, when comparative observations of class structure 
and the state which have comprised the concluding portion of 
this one will be recalled. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CRISIS AND REFORM IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND SOUTH AFRICA 
It is a commonplace of political discourse that under 
certain circumstances, reform can be a hazardous business 
for the reformer. As de Tocqueville puts it; 
Generally speaking, the most perilous moment 
for a bad government occurs when it seeks to 
mend its ways. Only consummate statecraft can 
enable a king to save his throne when after a 
long spell of oppressive rule he sets out to 
improve the lot of his subjects.! 
In any situation where rulers try to strengthen their 
position by making concessions to pressure from below, or by 
anticipatory restructuring, there is a danger that 
revolutionary forces will find fresh confidence and new 
opportunities in the altered circumstances presented by 
specific reforms, or a general atmosphere of change and 
movement. On the other hand reforms which threaten to 
appease or co-opt disaffected or excluded groups in society, 
present a danger to these revolutionary forces, prompting 
them to adopt more extreme and often violent and 
destabilising strategies. Reformers undercut revolutionaries 
and revolutionaries outflank reformers in a risky dialectic 
of bidding and counter-bidding. 
In political systems where hegemony is closely related to 
ethnicity, these circumstances are compounded by other 
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contradictions. In a sympathetic assessment of capt. Terence 
O'Neill's predicament in the 1960s, Joseph Lee points out 
that; 
•• he had embarked on one of the most perilous 
enterprises in statesmanship, to persuade a 
triumphalist ascendancy to begin treating its 
hereditary inferiors as its contemporary 
equals. O'Neill's policy of integrating 
catholics, however gradually into the 
stormont state, required not only a change in 
political behaviour. but the virtual 
assumption ~f a new political personality. by 
unionists. (emphasis added). 
The parallels with South Africa are striking. There too, the 
success of reforms meant not only the acceptance of 
piecemeal acts of policy by the government's supporters, but 
also an invitation (expressed in various degrees of opacity) 
to review their sense of political self and revise their 
understanding of what is alien to that self. In order to 
carry out the (at first selective and very limited) 
integration of subordinate communities into hitherto 
partisan state structures, governments in South Africa and 
Northern Ireland tried to take advantage of certain secular 
trends among their supporters. 
In Northern Ireland the welfare state and the spread of 
metropolitan popular culture, through television 
particularly, and in South Africa the affluence and 
occupational mobility of new classes of Afrikaners, helped 
persuade governments that shifts in political identity could 
be encouraged. The popular coalitions which sustained 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism were mobilised 
around cultural ethnicity and material advantage, and it was 
unthinkable that these things could be dispensed with 
altogether. But they could be adapted to fit changing 
conditions and political demands. The economic and social 
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conditions which were already eroding them naturally could 
be encouraged and a degree of further erosion could be 
risked. The key objective in both cases was economic growth. 
If this could be achieved, conditions of rising prosperity 
for all sections of the community, could help to drain 
cultural ethnicity of its direct political significance. 
While ethnicity might increasingly become a colourful 
sideshow, material advantage would either cease to matter so 
much in the general affluence, or, more likely, be sustained 
at a higher level. 
Despite the essential simplicity of these strategies, 
implementing them was a very tall order. Four principal 
obstacles lay in the way. Firstly, social change had not 
brought natural decay in the populist base of the class 
alliances all that far, certainly not far enough for bold 
and radical moves to create new political alliances outside 
them. Secondly, although cultural identity and material 
advantage through discrimination might be subject to 
erosion, the force which linked them and in the end provided 
them with political force was self-determination, which was 
likely to prove more durable. At quite an early point in 
both cases, reforms aimed at broadening legitimacy seemed to 
threaten loss of political control and the end of self-
determination. This fear put a decisive curb on what 
reformers would offer, and what their followers would 
accept. 
Thirdly, in both movements, mythology provided exemplary 
interpretations of past crises, whose functions, from the 
beginning, had not been limited to celebrating past 
victories and remembering past hardships. Their key function 
had always been to provide ready-made moral frameworks in 
which to interpret current dilemmas, and identify current 
enemies and traitors with their historical counterparts. 
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Habits and predispositions to think in these terms which had 
served both movements well in the past, could not easily be 
discarded. Fourthly, in both cases reform strategies were 
chosen in the context of security threats, greatly 
complicating their justification and implementation. One 
further point gave urgency to all the other four. Reforms 
had to be endorsed in periodic elections and popular support 
for them had to be cultivated and mobilised. Acquiescence 
was not enough, and within the dominant groups, opposition 
had ample political space to find expression. 
These difficulties were influential in shaping the nature of 
reform in the two societies, and in defining the different 
directions in which reformers and reactionaries wished to 
take Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism, leading to 
the decay and breakup of the two coalitions. They also help 
to define the framework in which these developments will be 
discussed in this chapter. In each case, the sources, 
directions and limitations of reform will be discussed, as 
well as the agents and audiences of change. Each focus will 
raise questions about the nature of the political processes 
involved, and offer media for comparison between the two. 
Some common themes offer guidance. 
Crisis-driven Reform 
As argued in the last chapter, the polarisation between 
reform and reaction in Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner 
Nationalism was widely perceived in terms of crises 
precipitated respectively by the civil rights campaign in 
Northern Ireland and the Soweto uprising in south Africa. 
Although the terminology of crisis was accepted widely 
enough, the understanding of it differed greatly between 
reformers and reactionaries. Reformers saw the crisis as a 
crisis of opposition, grounded in a prior condition of 
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illegitimacy, to which reform was a rational, ex post facto 
response. Reactionaries saw a crisis of authority, to which 
reform was a prior, contributory factor. The former saw 
reform as part of the solution, a condition of a return to 
stability. Reactionaries saw reform as part of the problem, 
a destabilising departure from firm government and well-
tried principles of solidarity. In both Northern Ireland and 
South Africa then, reform was indelibly associated, whether 
positively or negatively, with extraordinary circumstances. 
Reform in the context of Armed Struggle 
The association of reform with extraordinary circumstances 
was heightened by the successful revival of armed struggle 
by the IRA and the ANC. The demands of structural reform had 
to be balanced with those not only of public order, but also 
of counter-insurgency. One of the reasons why Ulster 
Unionist and Afrikaner Nationalist regimes were illegitimate 
was their repressive security laws and partisan security 
forces, but these were areas in which reform was 
particularly problematic. A further complicating factor was 
that in each case public order came to be threatened not 
only by anti-regime guerrillas, but also by paramilitary 
organisations of 'ultras,3 among the regimes' erstwhile 
supporters. Arguments about the causal relationships between 
reform, disorder and tough security policies constituted one 
of the principal areas of contest between reformers and 
reactionaries. 
Reform as Modernisation 
The central importance of economic growth to reform projects 
in Northern Ireland and South Africa helped situate them 
squarely in a discourse of modernisation. In both, the 
popular elements of coalition-building were downplayed. 
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Growth itself became an ideological preoccupation, at the 
expense of openly sectarian, racist, or atavistic rallying 
cries. Parliament and party were downgraded. Their roles in 
policy-making and especially their function as legitimising 
agents, which set limits to the governments' freedom of 
action, were attenuated. Increasingly, constituencies of the 
excluded began to be considered. Some formula which 
satisfied, yet set strict limits to their aspirations had to 
be calculated. Increasingly, a 'technicist' discourse of 
bureaucratic and academic contribution to policy-making was 
canvassed and employed, at the expense of partisan 
considerations. 
Reform from Aboye 
By increasingly shifting public policy choices to the realm 
of the expert, reform-as-modernisation necessarily acquired 
the character of reform-from-above. Reformers in both cases 
aspired to policy-making that was more concentrated and 
streamlined. Reformers also tried to articulate a conception 
of interests which contributed to this top-down quality of 
their policies and strategies. They argued that a general 
interest subsumed the interests both of the dominant and 
subordinate groups, that the pursuit of sectional interests 
either by the privileged or by the excluded would spell 
disaster for all. In both cases they positioned themselves 
as forces of the moderate centre, standing above parochial 
concerns and needing to be free of the parochial restraints 
which the elements of populist democracy in the governing 
coalitions imposed. They were unable to accommodate their 
opponents' rival conceptions of democracy4 very far, because 
they had to reproduce as much of their existing support base 
as possible and in any case they were afraid of letting the 
p~ocess get out of hand. At the same time they were diluting 
their own followers' conception of democracy. So without 
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gaining much credit for extending democracy to the excluded, 
reforming governments could now be accused of being 
undemocratic and elitist by disaffected populists among 
their own supporters. 
The Multiple Audiences of Reform 
The reform processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa 
did not represent single axes of conflict between ancien 
regime and progress. The peculiar nature of their political 
systems meant that in each there were multiple audiences for 
reform. The key features in this context were, the confusion 
of political opposition with ·the illegitimacy of the state, 
the question of violence, the ineffectiveness of 
constitutional opposition, de facto one-party rule and the 
nature of the ruling coalitions. In each case then, there 
was an open, constitutional and peaceful opposition, and an 
underground, violent one. constitutional and extra-
constitutional opposition to reform also came from ultras on 
the government side. External forces including other 
governments were interested parties. These audiences were 
also not merely spectators of course, but also actors. For 
the most part however, they had no direct purchase on each 
other. They could make their presence felt only through 
actions directed at those in power, that is the South 
African and Northern Ireland governments. As a result, 
reforming governments found themselves at a nexus of complex 
and contradictory pressures, from below and from a distance, 
from inside and outside the formal political system. 
REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA5 
The idea of reform occupies disputed ground in the theory 
and practice of politics, somewhere between revolution and 
the status quo. From this vantage point, reformers can 
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invoke the imperatives of transformation or preservation 
when expedient, appealing to the respective claims of 
justice or necessity according to circumstance. Kenneth 
Minogue captures the ambiguity of reform when he writes; 
Nineteenth-century Britain passed three 
Reform Bills and did not experience a 
revolution. Yet British politics ~ 
'revolutionised' in the nineteenth century, 
for the extension of the franchise changed 
the constitution from oligarchy to democracy, 
and brought in its train a host of consequent 
adjustments .•••• Along these lines, then, we 
may say that the reform of the franchise was 
a revolution in British politics. We derive, 
indeed, the superficial paradox that British 
politics did, and did not, have a revolution 
in the nineteenth century.6 (emphasis in the 
original). 
Such paradoxical considerations were clearly evident in 
South Africa between 1979 and 1989 when the need for a 
reform programme which would broaden the basis of white rule 
without undermining it altogether dominated the agenda of 
P.W. Botha's government. The reforms of this period included 
the extension of industrial rights to Africans by the labour 
reforms of 1979, the granting of freehold title to Africans 
resident in urban areas and the abolition of influx control 
for those resident outside the independent homelands. The 
extension of political rights to Africans was, however, 
limited to the creation of Black Local Authorities in 
'white' South Africa, while Indians and coloureds were 
included in the New constitution of 1983, with chambers of 
their own in a tricameral parliament. 
The process which produced these reforms had four main 
characteristics. In the first place, it was crisis-driven 
and justified in terms of the dire consequences of simply 
standing on the status quo. Secondly, the imperative of 
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change was matched by that of preservation, in a 
determination not to relinquish white control. Thirdly, 
reform was seen both by its agents and critics as a 
substitute for negotiations with representatives of the 
black majority. Lastly, the government displayed a ruthless 
determination to close down, by brute force if necessary, 
political space in which its conception of reform might be 
challenged and resisted, or in which the reforms might be 
exploited to subvert white control. with these features 
setting limits to its scope and momentum, reform under 
Bothai 
.. was a pragmatic and uncoordinated process 
guided by the need to contain the unfolding 
contradictions of apartheid, and did not 
seriously address its (sic) root causes. 7 
By the end of the 1980s, then, three sets of structural 
constraints had apparently checkmated reform. These were the 
reformers' own conception of reform (or, more properly, 
their lack of one), the vigour of black resistance, and, 
after the Afrikaner nationalist coalition began to fragment 
with the creation of the Conservative Party in 1982, the 
danger of defections by government supporters to the right. 
The stalemate was broken by Botha's successor as president 
and leader of the National Party, F.W. de Klerk. De Klerk's 
dramatic initiatives of February 1990 and beyond transformed 
reform from a substitute for negotiation to its embodiment. 
Although unbanning liberation movements, dismantling 
apartheid's foundations and embracing the politics of 
negotiation were particularly radical departures, this 
second phase of reform did not represent a complete break 
with the past. If the National Party under de Klerk was 
prepared to countenance an end to the formal apparatus of 
white minority rule, the continued security and prosperity 
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of whites as a group were still the primary goals of reform. 
These were sought at first in an explicitly group context, 
and when this failed, in the context of power-sharing among 
political parties and the protection of individual 
liberties. 
Given the contradictions and ambiguities which seem 
inevitably to attach themselves to projects of reform, it is 
never easy to reach conclusive verdicts on their meaning and 
significance. Reform in South Africa is no exception. The 
process can be criticised within its own terms of reference 
because it could not secure legitimacy without sacrificing 
white control. From an alternative perspective, reform and 
reformers can be criticised precisely for setting these 
terms of reference, rather than opting much earlier for more 
boldly inclusive initiatives. 
These are valid criticisms but other considerations have to 
be taken into account in any balanced interpretation, 
especially a comparative one. In some ways what is most 
impressive about reform in South Africa is the way in which 
from 1979 onwards how much change did take place -- in the 
nature of the National Party and what it claimed to 
represent, in the assumptions and blueprints which had 
dictated policy up to that point, in the machinery of 
government -- without the political process being 
overwhelmed either by revolution or reaction. That the 
National Party managed to maintain itself in power with 
regular mandates from the white electorate, and make the 
transition from being the centrepiece of a popular ethnic 
coalition to a more inclusive party with much more secular 
and managerial claims to authority can be explained only 
partly by the self-imposed limits it set to reform. Of 
central importance to the maintenance of reform as a 
plausible popular position were a powerful range of human, 
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material and ideological resources that could be deployed to 
that end. This discussion of reform in South Africa now 
turns to these resources. 
The Phenomenon of 'Verligtheid' 
The importance of yerligtheid and the yerligtes who 
professed it are widely acknowledged in discussions of 
reform in South Africa. 8 Verligtes represent a number of 
characteristics which deeply mark Afrikaner Nationalism and 
assert its singularity in wider western political discourse. 
Firstly, Afrikaner Nationalists have been unusually 
predisposed to ground their movement and the policies it 
professes in firm moral principles. It has been an essential 
part of the Nationalists' self-image that they are part of 
Western political traditions, but the ethnic exclusivism on 
which the movement was mobilised, and the assumptions of 
white supremacy gave little purchase for this claim. For 
this reason, at least since the 1950s, a feature of 
Afrikaner Nationalism has been the search for some bridge of 
principle to give meaning to Afrikaner identity beyond the 
parochial and selfish, and, for less exalted purposes, to 
defuse international criticism and claim membership of 'the 
West'. In any case, Afrikaners display a high degree of 
adherence to formal religious belief and practice, in 
Christian denominations notable for rigorous and 
comprehensive moral codes. It would be surprising if this 
salient characteristic did not make itself felt in their 
corporate public discourse. These dispositions represented 
both a source of yerligtheid and a resource for yerligtes. 
Secondly, apartheid was a radical political doctrine of 
m,ovement and change, of uprooting and re-deploying, of 
tearing down and building up. Its proponents claimed unusual 
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far-sightedness and clarity of thought in analysing social 
and political problems and devising radical, activist 
policies to forestall them. They created an atmosphere of 
change and movement and set easily-verifiable standards of 
success or failure, of which the extent of black 
urbanisation is a good example. In these respects apartheid 
invited modification, revision and even wholesale re-making 
of the kind with which the yerligtes were associated. 
Apartheid was a comprehensive and interlocking (though 
admittedly ramshackle) system of theories embracing 
anthropology, sociology, politics, theology and philosophy. 
As a result, logical and practical flaws in one major 
component threatened the whole edifice.' Improbabilities in 
the theory and practice of creating 'homelands' for 
coloureds and Indians exemplifies this point. 
Thirdly, the yerligtes emphasised the importance of fully-
allegiant opposition within the National Party. Where 
conditions of political association are less deterministic 
and more flexible than in white South Africa, dissatisfied 
elements like the yerligtes might switch their party 
allegiance or withdraw from politics altogether. Neither was 
seen as an option by the vast majority of dissatisfied 
Nationalists. Whether prompted by moral doubts, changing 
class allegiances or intellectual perception of the failures 
of past policies, they remained convinced that the group 
basis of allegiances and rights was inviolable, and that 
unless Afrikaners retained control, they in particular and 
everyone else in general would be engulfed in chaos. The 
question of 'survival', central as it is to Afrikaner 
political identity, is usually understood in wider than 
purely parochial terms. It is commonplace for Afrikaner 
politicians to claim that they not only have a right to 
maintain control of their own destiny, but a duty to manage 
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and control the forces of change in the interest of other 
'groups' too. 
The first two of these factors ensured that questioning, 
doubt, pragmatism and revisionist ideas would have 
significant purchase within Afrikaner Nationalism. The third 
would ensure that these things would be kept within very 
strict limits. Verligtes did not constitute a movement, nor 
did they have a comprehensive programme of reform which 
would fundamentally alter the basis and distribution of 
rights in South Africa, at no time did they dominate the 
National Party. Verligtes included industrialists who knew 
that economic growth could not be sustained without better 
utilisation of a trained black work force, generals who were 
converted to reform by modern theories of counter-
insurgency, churchmen for whom apartheid violated universal 
religious truths,9 diplomats who had first-hand knowledge of 
the dangers of isolation, export farmers concerned at the 
effects of sanctions and social scientists who could not 
ignore the evidence of apartheid's failure. Slabbert 
summarises this diverse constituency in the judgement, " •• An 
Afrikaner verligte is an individual who experiences conflict 
between the parochial demands of the particular organisation 
within which he finds himself and the more universal demands 
of his occupation".lO Two things united the various strands. 
The first was a rejection of the incoherence and drift which 
overtook both party and government in the late 1970s under 
the laissez-faire management of Vorster and the desire to 
recapture the sense of purpose, energy and direction which 
animated the movement under Verwoerd, but on a more 
defensible and viable set of principles and policies. The 
second was a refusal to abandon a belief in the group basis 
of politics, and the conviction that Afrikaners must retain 
leadership and even control. These 'non-negotiables' 
signalled the belief that the National Party was the only 
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viable instrument of reform, and even those verligtes who 
wanted the party purged of its reactionary and populist 
elements could not contemplate wholesale re-constitution or 
dissolution of the nationalist alliance. 
Verligtes performed a number of political roles in the 
context of reform. They headed off any substantial potential 
defection of disillusioned Afrikaner intellectuals to the 
Progressive Reform Party; they gave sympathetic western 
audiences some justification for resisting economic 
sanctions and they helped broaden the base of support for 
the government by attracting English-speaking voters. 
Overall, Yerligtes helped create an atmosphere of 
questioning and an expectation of change which they did not 
fill with a well-articulated alternative vision. The 
resulting vacuum of policy and ideology was filled to some 
extent by another important group with whom the verligtes 
overlapped to some extent. 
The Adyance of the Technocrats 
One of the most striking aspects of Afrikaner social advance 
under Nationalist rule was the expansion of higher 
education. This sUbstantial investment yielded a return in a 
generation of technocrats well-trained in disciplines of all 
kinds. They had been brought up to regard the state and the 
public service as the natural preserve of their ethnic group 
and their technicist expertise could be put to resolving the 
contradictions of achieving reform and retaining control. 
They also relished the prospect of material advancement, 
status and influence which co-option into the state 
apparatus represented. This was a generation coming of age 
in the same way as the generation which accompanied 
Gorbachev to power was the It •• first entirely Soviet 
generation of formally educated men •• ready to take 
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control".11 As bureaucrats and planners, both civilian and 
military, this self-confident generation could re-model 
constitutions, relocate industries, redefine the status of 
urban Africans, and upgrade township services while 
projecting a sophisticated counter-insurgency campaign into 
them. 
The Language of Reform 
The availability of these educated and trained cadres 
greatly facilitated another dimension of the reform process. 
This was the development of a language of reform in which 
policies were co-ordinated, a·rticulated and legitimised. 
According to Posel this new "language of legitimation" had 
three principal elements, "technocratic rationality", "total 
strategy" and "free enterprise".12 Free enterprise was 
promoted in pragmatic terms as the best means of creating a 
black middle-class to be a bulwark against 'communism'. 
Total strategy put security at the heart of all government 
policy and fused its military and civil dimensions. 
Technocratic rationality sought to redefine the parameters 
of politics, and to place as wide a range as possible of 
government activity within the realm of 'technical' choice 
dictated by incontestable facts, such as 'economic 
realities'. This applied particularly to problems engendered 
by apartheid policies. 
Properly problems of political control, they 
are presented as if merely technical ones, 
the solutions to which can and should be non-
'ideological' and therefore non-contestable. 
Such solutions depend on the findings of 
economic, academic or military 'experts', 
rather than as the outcome of partisan and 
inexpert 'political' debate. 13 (emphases in 
the original). 
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In this way, opponents (right or left) of govern~ent reforms 
could be branded as ideologically purblind and the 
government could pass itself off as the medium through which 
the impersonal forces of modernisation worked. This 
assiduously cUltivated language came to dominate the (white) 
political agenda from the late 1970s onwards, despite the 
efforts of liberals to expose it. However, it was of course 
the servant and not the master of the interests of those in 
power. Giliomee's acute observation of an earlier phase in 
Nationalist policy14 is equally telling in this context: 
"The terminology of the 'progressive' or 'liberal' 
Nationalists had conquered the National Party, or rather the 
party had conquered the terminology".15 
The language of reform was more like a smokescreen than an 
inspirational standard, borne by the party to lead it and 
the country forward. Behind this smokescreen, the disparate 
reformist forces could be kept together, opponents and 
allies alike could be kept in the dark about the future 
directions of reform and above all, the fact that the reform 
process lacked a rationale of essential values grounded in 
beliefs about human rights and individual freedoms could be 
concealed. As such, it was an invaluable asset in ensuring 
the durability and flexibility of reform, but at the same 
time helped rob it of direction and purpose. 
The Sources of Reform 
The verligtes and technocrats demonstrated that there were 
sUbstantial resources within the National Party's support 
base committed to at least a partial vision of reform. The 
actual sources from which the reformers' ideas were taken, 
however, revealed how fragmentary, confused and limited this 
vision was. To some extent reformers picked up ideas from 
the repertoire of liberal criticism. Stadler notes in 
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particular the influence of the study Project on 
Christianity in an Apartheid Society (SPROCAS) whose reports 
were published in the early 1970s. 16 In their assumption of 
continuing white control, but with increasing black pressure 
dissipated in 'organised and regulated bargaining' between 
black and white, the SPROCAS reports and studies talked a 
language which could be assimilated and adapted to the 
reformers' agenda. According to Stadler: 
•• the ideas running through the commission 
have subsequently, in a curious and quite 
typically South African way, been diluted 
into the orthodoxy of the reform movement 
which overtook government thinking during the 
late 1970s. 17 
It is not unusual for reformers to adopt opponents' ideas 
and policies in this way. Less common, but a striking 
feature of reform in south Africa is the appeal to the 
authority of academics, especially foreign ones. Among those 
whose ideas are credited with influencing reform policies in 
South Africa are Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, 
American political scientist Samuel Huntington, and French 
strategic theorist Andre Beaufre. Whether or not these (and 
other) western scholars actually intended the use made of 
their writings by South African reformers would be difficult 
to establish conclusively and in any case is probably 
something of a side issue. What is important to establish is 
the degree of opportunistic attribution which marked the 
South African government's efforts at reform. The extent to 
which these efforts called forth attempts to give them 
intellectual respectability is quite remarkable, especially 
the need to validate the government's policy choices as 
scientifically necessary. 
To the extent that there has been an attempt 
to give some kind of intellectual 
respectability to the Government's 
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constitutional guidelines, it has been to 
fall back on the logic and theory of 
consociational democracy. The underlying 
philosophy of the President's Council's 
recommendations, as well as the Government's 
constitutional guidelines represents the 
crudest bastardisation imaginable of the 
logic of consociational democracy. It is 
academicall~ too embarrassing to take 
seriously. 1 
Despite such scathing appraisals as Slabbert's, the search 
for scholarly pedigree was a persistent and pervasive aspect 
of reform policies in south Africa. 
~'~orm as Co-option 
If the sources of reform reflected the confusions and 
uncertainties of the process, at least some consistency of 
purpose was bestowed ' by the aspiration to attract support 
from other constituencies. The aim was not only to cUltivate 
but even in some instances to create them. The challenge was 
to convince others to participate in a system which would 
continue to be controlled by Afrikaner Nationalists. This 
limited campaign to broaden the legitimacy of the state had 
four principal fronts; the English-speaking business 
community; English-speaking voters; coloured and Indian 
communities and urban blacks. 
Although by the late 1970s, there was a substantial 
Afrikaner entrepreneurial and corporate class, much of South 
Africa's business still lay under the control of English-
speaking managers and shareholders. The relationship between 
English business and Afrikaner Nationalist governments was 
never cordial, sometimes critical, but on the whole 
accommodative. As in the aftermath of Soweto, the government 
increasingly cast about for allies and ideologies to help 
resolve its legitimation and accumulation crises, corporate 
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South Africa (which was independently becoming involved in 
the crisis through such media as the Urban Foundation) 
seemed a likely candidate for partnership. If economic 
growth and anti-communism were to be priorities, then free 
enterprise would be at the heart of the government's 
modernising message. 
The influence of monetarism, following conservative 
victories in British, American and German elections around 
the turn of the decade, began to make itself felt in South 
Africa and to push in the same direction. In addition, a 
crucial aspect of the government's reform programme was to 
de-racialise the central state. The idea was to devolve as 
many as possible of its interventionist functions outward 
and downward to local and private agencies, diffusing power 
and giving greater play to market forces. 19 
This two-pronged reconstruction, if 
successful, removes the national state as a 
primary site of struggle, creates a complex 
of institutions through which political 
demands are mediated, and reduces the 
reliance on coercive methods. 20 
It was against this kind of background, that high profile 
meetings took place between P.W.Botha and South Africa's 
most prominent business leaders at the Carlton Hotel 
(November 1979) and the Good Hope Centre (November 1981). 
Their aims apart from judicious symbolic grand-standing were 
to discuss how government and business could jointly sponsor 
economic growth. The tangible results of the meetings 
(another took place in Pretoria in November 1986) were 
meagre however. It soon became clear that while business was 
being offered a consultative role, if its suggestions for 
political reform went beyond the very narrow limits of what 
the government deemed acceptable to its primary 
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constituencies, they would not be acted on. As Slabbert put 
it: 
The two parties seem to be talking past one 
another. When the government talks about free 
enterprise, it talks about it as operating 
within present political structures. When the 
private sector talks about it, it talks about 
it as operating in a situation where the 
present structures have been reformed. 21 
Another bone of contention was the government's failure to 
trim the numbers employed in the public service and in 
general to curb the prerogatives and power of what 
businessmen saw as a grotesquely over-inflated bureaucracy. 
As resistance and repression increased in the years of the 
states of emergency, businessmen (at least some of them) 
sought ways of distancing themselves from government, rather 
than coming closer. 
The second source of co-opted support for government reforms 
was the votes of English-speakers. The (white) general 
election of 1981 saw the first serious erosion of Afrikaner 
support for the National Party. From that point, the 
government faced the stark choice of abandoning reform 
altogether or compensating for the losses by attracting 
English votes. Success in the referendum on the proposals 
for the tricameral constitution in 1983 vindicated the 
latter strategy, and English-speakers became an increasingly 
important component of National Party support thereafter. 
The relationship between reform and the English vote was not 
absolutely simple however. Another strategy was to denigrate 
the Progressive Federal Party's pOlicies as representing a 
security risk. In general to play up the security issue was 
highlighted as much as reform, if not more, in white 
~lectoral contests. In this way, the security fears of the 
267 
English-speakers as well as their hopes of reform were 
influential in co-opting them to the government side. 
The extension of political rights to Indian and coloured 
people offered another potential opportunity for co-option. 
Two imperatives were at work here. Firstly, one of 
apartheid's most serious illogicalities was to extend the 
idea of territorial self-determination to Indians and 
coloureds. By the late 1970s (and especially after the 
report of the Theron Commission on the political future of 
the coloured people) only the most diehard yerkramptes were 
prepared to defend this idea. The second imperative was the 
government's need for allies and legitimacy. 
The 1983 constitution purported to extend political rights 
to Indians and coloureds in a form of power-sharing, but it 
had the following shortcomings. It was not negotiated 
between representative leaders and the \ groups , which were 
to be enfranchised were not consulted. The apartheid 
classifications were built into the system and the balance 
of institutional power between the three chambers was firmly 
in favour of whites. The electoral procedures for choosing 
the state president, his extensive powers to define \own' 
and \general' affairs and his powers to nominate members of 
the deadlock-breaking President's Council confirmed that the 
constitution would preside over the elaboration, not the 
abolition of apartheid. Rather than power-sharing in any 
legitimate sense of the word, the tricameral system was 
intended to shift the administration of apartheid on to 
coloured and Indian leaders, offering them only the 
distribution of patronage in their own communities and a 
spurious, symbolic, equality with white legislators as a 
base for their legitimacy. 
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The tricameral constitution triggered .off a new wave of 
resistance, exemplified above all by the creation of the 
united Democratic front (UDF). Despite this and the derisory 
polls in siege-like conditions which characterised 
tricameral elections, the government managed to find enough 
parties and people to run the tricameral institutions. Even 
this partial success has however been undermined by cynical 
floor-crossing and office-brokering (especially in the 
Indian chamber, the House of Delegates), by outright 
corruption, and the transparent inability of Indian and 
coloured politicians to be an effective, loyal opposition. 
Efforts to co-opt black support were even less successful. 
Two principal strategies of reform were attempted here. The 
f i r st was to extend economic and social rights to black 
~ r esidents. The granting of trade union rights came 
i nt o this category, as did more secure residential status 
and property rights to those who already had the right to 
live in urban areas. Another arm of policy was to encourage 
the growth of the informal sector of the economy through 
deregulation. Together, these changes were intended to 
create a black middle class, which at worst would divide and 
diffuse black opposition to apartheid, and at best would 
encourage outright support for the system among blacks. To 
create a politically rightless, black middle class would 
have been a self-defeating objective however, and the 
strategy included a political element as well. The omission 
of blacks from the tricameral system showed just how little 
was on offer though, and potential black allies of the 
government had to be content with the homelands or the Black 
Local Authorities (BLAs) which purported to address the 
problem of political rights for urban blacks. Like the 
tricameral system i~self, this \reform' sparked off greatly 
intensified resistance. In fact, more than any other measure 
the BLAs offered an exposed flank of the government's reform 
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programme in the black townships, where various strands of 
resistance (the UDF the most important) could take the 
initiative from the government. The vulnerability of all co-
opted blacks was made cruelly plain in this campaign of 
intensified resistance. 
The dilemmas of co-option were made plain also in the 
relationship between the government's reformers and Chief 
Buthelezi. In Buthelezi and Inkatha, the government had a 
potential partner who was vehemently anti-radical and was 
willing to operate, up to a point, within the framework of 
grand apartheid, if only for the purposes of transcending 
it. Buthelezi and his advisors were energetic and 
resourceful in devising strategies and schemes of 
constitutional reform which would protect white minority 
interests, but also be able to attract (they calculated), 
substantial black support and international backing. Even 
the elaborate consociational formulae and restrictive 
constitutional safeguards which they produced went far 
further than the government calculated its supporters would 
tolerate. The narrow and conservative parameters of reform 
which ensured the rejection of Buthelezi's proposals left 
him without the political space needed to make a moderate 
anti-apartheid alternative to the ANC credible on a national 
basis. 
The Agencies of Reform 
It is perhaps in the agencies of reform that the South 
African experience makes its clearest impression and reveals 
its essential characteristics. The agencies of reform were 
the institutions and strategies used by the government to 
promote and where necessary to enforce its conception of 
political change on all other parties. Under the conditions 
of " ideological confusion and struggle which characterised 
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the South African state and the Afrikaner Nationalist 
alliance during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, 
neither the underlying values (if any) nor the goals and 
directions, nor even at times the limits, of reform were 
well defined. Even the designations 'reformer' or 
'reformist' became quite unclear, especially with regard to 
the government. 
P.W. Botha's administration (1978-89) quite quickly lost the 
character of a reforming administration in any strong sense 
-- in the sense of seizing the initiative with a 
comprehensive and well-integrated programme of reform which 
would alter the terrain and agenda of politics, and the 
configuration of competing alliances. Ceasing to be 
'reformist' in this autonomous, self-generating sense, it 
became not much more than the meeting point of reformist and 
conservative pressures -- from below, from within, from 
outside -- claiming to occupy the ground of the former, 
while more or less permanently conceding territory to the 
latter. In this situation of contradiction and confusion, 
the government came to rely a good deal on semantic and 
conceptual manipulation, and on changing the forms and 
structures of its rule while remaining opaque or 
inarticulate on the true range and trajectory of reform. 
In this situation of deception and confusion, the meaning of 
reform has to be read from the agencies used to implement it 
in the absence of a coherent and articulate philosophy of 
change. In a sense, the medium became the message. The 
principal medium of change was the restructuring and 
elaboration of the framework of decision-making and 
administration by which the country was governed. 22 The 
political space to do this was guaranteed by the long-
established accretion of authoritarian powers and practices 
by which apartheid was imposed and black opposition 
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repressed, and which could be turned to other purposes. It 
was enhanced by the availability of the wide range of state 
and parastatal institutions at the government's disposal. It 
was further underwritten by the marked tendency of many 
whites to be loyal to the government, even when they 
disagreed with it, a phenomenon strengthened by the 
transformation of the Nationalists's support base into a 
predominantly bourgeois and petty-bourgeois one, with far 
less appetite for activism and militance. 
The effect of this restructuring was to insulate the 
government on two fronts. Firstly, by streamlining and 
centralising the decision-making process, the government 
insulated the most important aspects of its working from 
electoral pressures and public scrutiny. These effects were 
achieved by reducing, regrouping and greatly extending the 
role of departmental committees, in whose ranks a 'new 
ruling class' of high-ranking military officers and 
bureaucrats became prominent. The co-ordinating role of the 
state Security Council and of P.W. Botha's personal rule 
were also part of this process. Essential adjuncts to this 
kind of restructuring were the language of modernisation and 
rational/technical imperatives which allegedly superseded 
the 'outmoded' agenda of racial categories and ethnic 
particularism, and the militarisation of white society 
around the security model provided for in the total 
onslaught/total strategy ideology. In these various ways, 
but particularly by redefining all important areas of policy 
in terms of security, the government sought to insulate 
itself from the kind of widespread discontent among whites 
which would threaten not only decomposition, but complete 
fragmentation of its support base. 
Secondly, the state's coercive powers were used to insulate 
the government and the reform programme from being 
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overwhelmed by the black resistance which showed rapidly, 
indeed exponentially, increasing powers of recuperation 
after the post-Soweto repression. When reform in the shape 
of industrial rights, more flexible influx control, the new 
constitution and BLAs failed to secure broader-based 
legitimacy for the state, a second front was opened. This 
involved a bottom-up approach to black political rights and 
material advancement in which central government functions 
were decentralised to second and third tier institutions. At 
this level they were to be depoliticised, translated into 
the neutral and technical administration of needs, rather 
than conflict and bargaining over interests and aspirations. 
Cobbett et al saw the purpose· of this spatial devolution as: 
.• to prevent national democratic forces from 
mobilising against the central state and, 
should they come to control that state •• to 
prevent them from effectively using it to 
bring about radical social and economic 
changes. 23 
This combination of force and restructuring ensured that the 
government was never in any danger of losing control, but it 
could not completely insulate its efforts to gain 
legitimacy. Black resistance and the growth of the white 
right in the 1980s set such contradictory limits to its 
freedom of action that in the stalemate towards the end of 
the decade, it became clear that a clear-cut choice would 
have to be made between the risks of a bold initiative and 
those of continued piecemeal and incoherent attempts 
manoeuvre within these limits. Aided considerably by the 
changes in world politics which removed the Soviet Union as 
a factor in the balance of forces between the government and 
the ANC, President de Klerk opted for the former in his 
dramatic reforms of February 1990. 
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REFORM UNIONISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
Nothing like the considerable resources which Afrikaner 
Nationalist reformers were able to draw upon were available 
to their Ulster Unionist counterparts. Indeed, to an extent 
that is highly significant for any understanding of Northern 
Ireland's recent history, the policy of reform in response 
to Unionism's various crises is associated with one man, 
Captain Terence O'Neill. 24 The period of civil rights 
agitation, reform and Protestant backlash has, ever since, 
been associated with his name. 'O'Neillism' came to stand, 
according to political persuasion, either for the tragically 
unfulfilled promise of moderation, or for the hypocrisy of 
gestural reform without substance, or the treacherous 
appeasement of implacable enemies. Not surprisingly, views 
of O'Neill's personal qualities vary too. In one account he 
was .... a colourless figure who was largely a mouthpiece for 
the technocrats in the civil service".25 In another, he was, 
"courageous", and "bold",26 while a third describes him as 
.... an Olympian, a man of destiny who found the company of 
world leaders more convivial than those (sic) of his 
colleagues". 27 
The questions raised by O'Neill's personal qualities and the 
nature of his political style are important in explaining 
the nature of reform and the decay of the Unionist alliance, 
and these issues will be explored below. But in a sense the 
emphasis on the individual and the personal is in this case 
faute de mieux. Resort to this kind of explanation 
highlights the weakness of reform as a movement, and points 
to the absence of any SUbstantial political force or 
alliance of forces which could propel a determined political 
leader forward, and sustain him. This does not mean to say 
that there was no support for reform in the community. But 
the substantial support which O'Neill enjoyed was diffuse 
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and disjointed. Most importantly, it was largely outside the 
Unionist Party, and he could not mould that party into an 
instrument of reform, however defined. The nature of the 
support for reform, the nature of the Unionist Party, and 
O'Neill's relationship with that party, were particularly 
influential in determining the nature and fate of reform in 
Northern Ireland in the years of crisis between 1963 and 
1969, and those of collapse between 1969 and 1972. 
Most accounts of 'O'Neillism' agree that the reforms were of 
two kinds. The first consisted of an emphasis on economic 
growth to be achieved by Keynesian interventions in the 
economy. The second concerned· an altered disposition towards 
the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Republic, expressed mainly in symbolic meetings and 
gestures, and a rhetoric of inclusive citizenship. 
The elements of O'Neill's economic reforms included planning 
by experts, infrastructural development and generous 
incentives aimed at encouraging corporations to set up 
production in Northern Ireland. These things required an 
overhaul of government structures, including the setting up 
of a new Ministry of Development, which took 
responsibilities away from lower tiers of government. 
Another aspect was a tacit leaning towards corporatism, 
symbolised by the government's recognition of the Northern 
Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trades Unions 
(ICTU), after which " •• the way was open for the 
establishment of an employer-labour-government economic 
council".28 O'Neill's revisionist attitudes to community 
relations and the Irish Republic were much less tangible, 
but on a popUlation in which sensitivity to political 
symbolism is raised to an art form, the impact of his visits 
to Catholic schools, meetings with clergy and especially his 
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meetings with the prime minister of the republic, Sean 
Lemass, should not be underestimated. 
Although the principal versions of the O'Neill years all 
cite the two-dimensional quality of his reforms, they do 
not, for the most part, explore the connections between 
them. For the most part they are content to imply that both 
were complementary parts of a programme of modernisation, 
whose aims were to arrest Northern Ireland's economic 
decline and to normalise political life there in patterns of 
cleavage and integration common to the rest of western 
Europe. One exception to this is the account given by Bew ~ 
Ai which begins by effectively denying that there was a 
connection between the two -- "O'Neill's economic policies 
bore no relation to intercommunal relations. Their raison 
d'etre lay only in political conflicts within the Protestant 
bloc ... 29 In this account, the Unionists faced two distinct 
problems; the defection of Protestant working-class voters 
in Belfast to the NILP as a result of increasing 
unemployment and, .... developing a policy to meet what was 
perceived as a transformation, or potential transformation, 
of traditional London-Belfast relations" This development 
was threatened by the return of a Labour government at 
Westminster in 1964. 30 The basis of this interpretation 
rests firstly on chronology. The economic reforms preceded 
O'Neill's gestures of goodwill towards the Catholic 
community and their relative success emboldened him to 
undertake them. Secondly, the weakness of the gestures and 
their contextual ambiguity are explained by their purpose as 
sops to the British government. They were unaccompanied by 
any expressed intention of secularising the state machine 
and alternated with statements of bedrock Unionist belief. 
This interpretation is not entirely convincing. The authors 
note themselves that the Keynesian policies espoused by 
276 
O'Neill to win back Protestant workers from the NILP 
increased Northern Ireland's dependence on the British 
exchequer. This suggests linkage between the two problems 
which Bew et al initially wish to keep apart, since 
increased dependence meant increased vulnerability to the 
unsympathetic administration which Wilson's was thought to 
be. Perhaps sensing this, the authors later modify their 
position; 
O'Neill's position was not, of course, wholly 
determined by the Wilson problem. The 
strategy of reformist gestures accorded with 
his earlier outflanking of the NILP, and was 
accompanied by an ideology of 
modernisation. 31 
On the other hand, the strength of this version is that it 
satisfactorily explains why O'Neill saw fit to embark on 
reforms at a time when Catholic parliamentary opposition was 
in an advanced state of decay, when peaceful extra-
parliamentary opposition had not mobilised, and when the 
paramilitary opposition was undergoing a painfully 
protracted metamorphosis. O'Neill offered nothing of any 
political substance to Catholics because they were not among 
his principal concerns. These were to re-organise the 
Protestant class alliance, and to defend the Unionists' 
autonomy from Britain by making minimal gestural concessions 
towards the minority. What was principally on offer to 
Catholics was a share in economic growth and the 
patronisingly confident prediction that materialism would 
re-orient their political aspirations from Irish 
nationalism, and dissipate the undesirable consequences (in 
O'Neill's insulting view) of their religion's social 
teachings. It did not escape Catholics' notice that 
O'Neill's reforms did not confront their grievances 
directly. Instead, his gestures produced a heady mixture of 
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emboldening and embittering effects which were influential 
in igniting the Civil Rights Movement. 
The first phase of reform began with O'Neill's succession as 
prime minister and leader of the Unionist Party in 1963, and 
ended as the confrontation between the civil Rights 
Movement, the government and Protestant ultras intensified 
after October 1968. The dominant features of this period 
were the intra-Unionist dynamics of reform, and the concern 
with an external audience, the British government. 
The second phase began with the government's banning and the 
RUC's violent dispersal of a civil Rights Association march 
in Derry on October 5, 1968. It ended with the resignation 
of O'Neill in April 1969. The principal features of this 
phase were revealed in the rapid erosion of the Northern 
Ireland government's autonomy from British scrutiny and 
direction, and the weakness of forces committed to reform, 
especially within the Unionist Party. 
The police violence at the march in Derry was televised and 
widely reported, calling forth public and parliamentary 
concern in Britain on an unprecedented scale. Further 
marches were met by Protestant counter-demonstrations. 
Against this background, O'Neill persuaded the Unionist 
parliamentary party to accept a five-point reform plan, this 
time directly addressing some (though by no means all) of 
Catholics' grievances. The proposals included the 
appointment of an ombudsman, the replacement of the 
gerrymandered Londonderry council, and reform of the 
allocation of local authority housing. 32 O'Neill frankly 
admitted that pressure from Britain made reform imperative, 
sparking off a serious public clash with his minister of 
home affairs, William Craig, over rival interpretations of 
Westminster's powers under the Government of Ireland Act. 
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This resulted in craig's dismissal on 11 December. 33 
Resignations from O'Neill's government, backbench unrest and 
continuing turmoil in the streets forced O'Neill to call an 
election (24 February) which was effectively a vote of 
confidence on his conception of Northern Ireland's 
relationship with Britain, and on his reform policies. 
The later O'Neill period showed that there was strong 
resistance to reform in the Unionist Party and no coherent 
internal constituency to sustain it. Indeed one important 
feature of the period was that O'Neill appeared better 
supported outside his party than in it. He attracted into 
politics numbers of people who were 'unionist' in the sense 
that they supported the link with Britain, but who wanted no 
part of the sectarianism populism, the links with the Orange 
Order and all the atavistic baggage of traditional militant 
Unionism. Like the more moderate civil rights supporters, 
they wanted to see Northern Ireland become more British, in 
the sense of doing away with overt discrimination and 
repressive security laws. These newcomers were, for the most 
part, not assimilated into the Unionist party.34 They were 
concentrated initially in the New Ulster Movement (NUM). 
This largely middle-class body was formed on 6 February 
1969, immediately after O'Neill called the general election. 
The movement's immediate purpose was to support pro-O'Neill 
candidates, and sponsor them -- as 'unofficial' Unionists -
where none were standing. Within a short time, the movement 
had 2 500 members. 35 
The result of the election was a disappointment to 
supporters of O'Neill, and especially after his resignation 
on 28 April 1969, it seemed clear that there could be no 
future for a left wing in the Unionist Party. Having failed 
to become a base for the transformation of the Unionist 
Party, the NUM became the point of departure for the 
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avowedly non-sectarian Alliance Party which was founded in 
April 1970. The subsequent career of the NOM as a 
pamphleteering pressure group and think tank reveals the 
limitations as a political force of the reform movement 
inspired by O'Neill. The NOM was an early advocate of power-
sharing36 and of creating a just society in Northern Ireland 
to diminish the appeal of Irish nationalism. Many Catholics, 
in the collective view of the NOM, wanted a united Ireland 
as the most practical means of getting justice for \the 
minority' ; 
If this justice could be obtained by other 
means -- by a restructuring of institutions 
in the North so as to gu'arantee a sharing of 
power -- would this not alter the case for a 
united Ireland?37 
Although power-sharing was a radical idea in the Northern 
Ireland context, the NOM's other positions38 were decidedly 
conservative. The movement's expressed concerns were to ward 
off radical change threatened by Irish republicanism or 
socialism, as much, if not more than to pursue justice in 
society for its own sake. This message became clearer as the 
_ •. i ct deepened and the isolation of the NOM -- and of all 
self-styled moderates -- became more marked. By 1975, just 
before its dissolution, the NOM was warning that although 
the Provisional IRA seemed the greater contemporary danger, 
"Marxist republicans" posed a long term threat unless 
economic prosperity was promoted and popular discontent 
defused. Referring to these Marxist republicans, the NOM 
warned; 
It is known that contacts exist between them 
and groups on the \Protestant side' who are 
expressing disillusionment with their 
political representatives. The possibility of 
the growth of \non-sectarian politics' in a 
revolutionary form is one which cannot be 
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ignored ••• The community movement needs to 
be encouraged and guided in channels of 
constructive cooperation with state agencies, 
and a politically directed.ove:all plan Of. 
social development. Otherw1se 1t could eas1ly 
become the organisational basis of 
destructive revolution. 39 
Notwithstanding the implausibility of the middle-class 
nightmare which it expresses, this passage confirms the 
impression of the NUM's conservatism and isolation. It 
illustrates how the NUM's ideology set itself against every 
single popular position -- sectarian populism, Irish 
nationalism, socialism -- in Northern Ireland's politics, 
thus revealing the narrow base and range of the forces 
called into politics by O'Neill's reforms. The NUM was 
transformed from a support group for reform within the 
Unionist Party, to the prototype for reforming Unionism 
outside the party. The nature of the Alliance Party, .... a 
province-wide organisation of moderate people which is firm 
on the constitution .. 40 reveals how inhospitable the Unionist 
Party, with its sectarian populist base was to any 
conception of ginger group tactics, of being led to the left 
from above by reformers, no matter how conservative and 
.... firm on the constitution" they might be. 
The February 1969 stormont election also revealed the nature 
and limits of the reform forces. On 9 December 1968, O'Neill 
broadcast to the people of Northern Ireland on the theme 
"Ulster at the crossroads".41 He appealed for support for 
reform initiatives and for an end to civil unrest, stressing 
that both government and opposition at Westminster had made 
it clear that pressure would be applied to keep up the 
momentum. The response to the broadcast suggested that 
O'Neill enjoyed substantial support. 150 000 people sent 
l .etters or telegrams of support, and in the following week, 
120 000 returned coupons printed in a Belfast newspaper 
281 
expressing support for him.42 Less than two months later, 
after a challenge to his leadership by 12 backbench 
Unionists, O'Neill called the election. 
The period between dissolution and polling day was marked by 
competition in several constituencies over nomination 
contests between pro-and anti-O'Neill candidates. The 
conflicts were deepened by the fact that the Unionist Party 
did not exercise central control over constituency 
associations, and there was no central vetting of 
candidates. In the event, only one sitting anti-O'Neill 
member was ousted from the nomination,43 and on other 
Unionist side the election was fought with a confusing list 
of candidates. There were 'official' and 'unofficial' pro-
O'Neill candidates, and 'official' and 'unofficial' anti-
O'Neill candidates. 
Overall, the Unionist Party won 39 seats. in the 52 seat 
parliament, an increase of two over the previous 
parliament. 44 The most interesting contests however were 
intra-Unionist. Flackes computes O'Neill's support as 27 (24 
official and three unofficial), while anti-O'Neill members 
were ten in number, with two unclear in their attitude to 
the prime minister (both official). O'Neill himself saw his 
majority in the immediate aftermath of the election as being 
"perhaps eleven".45 In all, 17 unofficial Unionist 
candidates contested seats, 16 pro-and one anti-O'Neill,46 
while the Rev. Ian Paisley's Protestant unionist Party 
contested five seats. In this way, there were 22 contests 
between official and other sorts of Unionist. In only three 
of these did an unofficial candidate win, all of them pro-
O'Neill. 
It is not easy to generalise about the social bases of pro-
and anti-O'Neill voting patterns in the 1969 election. Bew 
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et al discuss the significance of the election in these 
terms, noting that since anti-O'Neill tallies were most 
substantial along the border and in working-class Belfast; 
It has been argued in explanation that since 
these regions contained a concentration of 
deprived Protestants, and since the 
opposition to O'Neill was frequently classist 
in rhetoric, class antagonism underlay 
popular preference for O'Neill's opponents. 47 
The authors go on to criticise this account, pointing out 
that these are interface districts with large Catholic 
concentrations. They argue that it was in these areas where 
autonomy from Westminster ("central bourgeois control" as 
they put it) was most crucial, in order to allow the 
practices which kept Unionists in power locally. These areas 
were "bastions of populism" and "most sensitive to its 
erosion". Bew et al prefer this interpretation to one based 
on class, claiming it is simpler and better. Perhaps 
simplest of all would be to acknowledge that the two were 
inevitably interlinked. It would not be surprising if 
Protestants who felt vulnerable in the face of Catholic 
self-assertiveness, who were convinced that the Civil Rights 
campaign was merely a contemporary variation on the 
traditional republican assault on the state and who saw 
every gesture of conciliation to Catholics as evidence of 
betrayal of Protestant solidarity on which alone the 
foundations of the state rested, expressed their fears and 
frustrations in opposition to those whose education, social 
position, and comparative wealth allowed them to accommodate 
or even ignore Catholic advance. 
Despite this interpretation, O'Neillite Unionists did quite 
well in both working-class and rural seats. 48 All ten of the 
anti-O'Neill dissidents were opposed by supporters of the 
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prime minister. The aggregate vote for the ten was 65 187, 
and their reformist opponents grossed 53 190. Despite this 
strong showing, and although three were held to majorities 
of less than a thousand, only one of them was unseated by an 
O'Neillite. 49 
The pro-O'Neill candidates did best in straight fights 
against anti-O'Neill antagonists, or in three-cornered 
contests with either a liberal or an NILP candidate. They 
did worst in two kinds of constituency; where there was a 
large block of Catholic voters, and candidates of 
identifiably republican or left-civil rights sympathies 
stood,50 or in border counties where, even if there was no 
block of Catholic voters strong enough to threaten a 
Unionist seat in the constituency itself, the demographic 
situation in the county as a whole tended to parity,51 or 
there was an outright Catholic majority.52 
These generalisations notwithstanding, the results of the 
election and what Bew et al describe as " •• the collapse of 
O'Neillism as a popular position"53 do not lend themselves 
to ready-made explanation. The contrasting fortunes of 
reformist candidates in two neighbouring Belfast 
constituencies illustrate the difficulties of 
interpretation. Shankill and Woodvale are predominantly 
Protestant constituencies in North Belfast. If anything, 
Shankill could have been expected to be more hard-line. It 
is the site of the essential Protestant community of 
populist rhetoric and mythology, and, given that the 
Shankill road borders the Catholic Falls road area along its 
length, it is one of the urban 'shatter-zones' of cyclical 
popular disorder. Despite the contiguity of the two 
constituencies, Woodvale contains more middle-class voters. 
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Both Woodvale and Shankill had as official Unionist 
candidates, charismatic, hard-line, anti-O'Neill figures. 
Yet despite these similarities, the pro-O'Neill unofficial 
Unionists fared quite differently in these seats. In 
Shankill, the pro-O'Neill vote was 71% of the anti-O'Neill 
tally, while in Woodvale the unofficial Unionist could 
gather only 44.3% of the total gained by his rival for 
Protestant votes. 54 
As a pointer to the future, perhaps the most significant 
result was in the rural Co. Antrim seat of Bannside. Here, 
O'Neill was forced to defend his seat for the first time in 
his political career. He was opposed by the Rev. Ian Paisley 
who ran him a close second, taking 39% of the vote against 
O'Neill's 44%. This was a significantly higher percentage 
than his five Protestant unionist colleagues who managed an 
average of 28% in the constituencies they contested. 55 
In some respects, the 1969 election gave the Unionists the 
worst of all worlds. The reformists did well enough to 
suggest that it would be difficult to reconstitute 
Unionism's traditional base, yet they did not do well enough 
to suggest that theirs was the way of the future. If there 
was a popular mandate for reform among Unionist voters it 
was a slim one and anyone who pressed on with a vigorous and 
far-reaching programme of reform (especially if identifiably 
under pressure from the British to do so), would run the 
risk of his opponents resorting to direct action if they 
felt that their constitutionally expressed wishes were being 
flouted. Paisley's success at Bannside made it clear that 
there was a dynamic focus for discontented Protestants 
outside the Unionist Party, one which could mobilise class 
resentments as well as traditional loyalist sentiments. The 
divisions in Unionism had been well and truly advertised for 
the benefit of the Civil Rights Movement, republicans and 
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traditional nationalists, all of whom could be relied on to 
push harder in taking advantage of an increasingly fragile 
ruling coalition. The British too, would draw their own 
conclusions from these divisions. 
Although O'Neill had a mandate of sorts, in that he had a 
majority in the parliamentary party, his was a position from 
which he could only lose, not gain strength. On 28 February 
the parliamentary party confirmed him in the leadership, 
voting twenty-three for him, one against, with one 
abstention. 56 But this was more probably a reflection of the 
unreadiness of any rival than a reflection of strong belief 
in O'Neill. A truer reflection was given by the Unionist 
Standing Committee's confirmation of O'Neill's leadership by 
only 183 votes to 116 (7 March) ,57 and the Unionist 
Council's vote of confidence in him by 338 votes to 263, a 
margin of only 75 (31 March).58 
On the previous day, there had been an even more ominous 
sign, an explosion which destroyed an electricity sub-
station in a suburb of Belfast. This, the first serious act 
of sabotage in recent years, was followed by several more 
explosions towards the end of April. The target for the 
later blasts was Belfast's water supply, and by 25 April, 
the major pipelines had been destroyed and the city was 
experiencing severe shortages. It was generally believed at 
the time that the IRA was responsible and many blamed the 
government for the deteriorating security situation. 59 On 
Wednesday 23 April, the Unionist Parliamentary Party voted 
on the introduction of universal adult suffrage in local 
elections. The majority in favour, 28 to 22,60 was an 
indication of the fragility of the majority for reform in 
the party. A further blow to O'Neill was the resignation on 
this issue of the minister of agriculture (and O'Neill's 
cousin) Major James Chichester-Clark, who said he was not 
286 
against the reform of the franchise, "in principle", but was 
against, "its timing". 
O'Neill's authority had been damaged by the inconclusive 
election result, the opposition to him at all levels in his 
own party, and by the street demonstrations of Protestant 
ultras. The civil rights campaign continued, the occasion of 
repeated confrontations between police, activists, and 
Protestant counter-demonstrators. The explosions, followed 
by the vote on the suffrage and Clark's resignation, gave 
him the final push, and he resigned on 2 April. 
O'Neillism had five principal. elements. Firstly, the O'Neill 
years saw the creation of an atmosphere of modernisation in 
Northern Ireland. Planning and the role of experts were 
stressed in the pursuit of secular issues like attracting 
new investment. O'Neill accepted that there were new 
challenges to Unionism -- first the NILP and then the civil 
Rights Movement -- which called for new responses, and he 
also accepted that there were new opportunities, like those 
presented by the outward policy of the new Irish premier 
Sean Lemass. That O'Neill and Lemass appeared to be 
complementary figures did not escape the hostile notice of 
Irish republicans and Protestant ultras. O'Neill himself 
protested that these secular economic and social issues did 
not detract from the importance of the constitutional 
question, the defence of which, he claimed, had been " •• the 
motivation of my political life .... ,61 but that only by 
dealing with them could the constitution be effectively 
defended. This meant (especially after the civil rights 
campaign gathered momentum) making the state more legitimate 
in the eyes of Ulster Catholics and the British government, 
which in turn meant incorporating Catholics more effectively 
into an expanding economy. 
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The second element in O'Neillism was the centralising of 
decision-making in the prime minister's hands, and those of 
the bureaucrats close to him. When O'Neill met Lemass early 
in 1965, he told only craig of his cabinet colleagues, and 
that only the night before. To make a unilateral decision on 
such an emotive issue violated the Unionists' conception of 
intra-party democracy, and many of them never trusted him 
again. 
Thirdly, O'Neill violated the myth of Unionist solidarity by 
being willing to condemn enemies within, as well as without. 
Some of his sharpest denunciations were reserved for 
Paisley, a favourite theme being to brand him as a fascist. 
To those of us who remember the thirties, the 
pattern is horribly familiar. The contempt 
for established authority, the crude and 
unthinking intolerance; the emphasis on 
monster processions and rallies; the appeal 
to perverted forms of patriotism: each and 
every one of these things has its parallel in 
the rise of the Nazis to power. 62 
Craig too came in for stinging rebukes; 
There are, I know, today some so-called 
loyalists who talk of independence from 
Britain -- who seem to want a kind of 
Protestant Sinn Fein •• they are lunatics who 
would set a course along a road which could 
lead only at the end to an all-Ireland 
republic. They are not loyalists, but 
disloyalists; disloyal to Britain, disloyal 
to the constitution, disloyal to the Crown, 
disloyal -- if they are in public life -- to 
the solemn oaths they have sworn to Her 
Majesty the Queen63 
It is important to note that O'Neill simply could not grasp 
t~at the 'disloyalty' to which he was referring was the very 
foundation of the state, a badge of honour which many of his 
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opponents were only too willing to claim. Of course, O'Neill 
was only attacking those, particularly Paisley, who 
themselves so bitterly denounced him. But he gave the 
unmistakable impression that while he was willing to consort 
with priests and the leader of a hostile foreign state, 
while he was prepared to appease enemies within Northern 
Ireland and their supporters outside (including the British 
government), he reacted with venom and scorn to the true 
loyalists who protested at his departures from the 
traditional pieties of Unionism. Paisley was especially 
adept at portraying himself as a much harried and even 
persecuted figure, a potent reversal of the truth which 
redoubled in its effects when he was imprisoned in 1966 and 
1969. The impression that O'Neill cared little for Unionist 
solidarity was heightened by his strategy of appealing over 
the heads of the party and the Orange Order in 
'presidential' broadcasts to the whole population. 
Fourthly, O'Neill's character imparted a strong flavour to 
the reform Unionism which bore his name. He was aloof and 
aristocratic of bearing without appreciating the need for 
bonhomie, for the backslapping and arm-twisting which are 
useful for a party leader in a democracy, especially one at 
the head of a movement with strong populist overtones. He 
did not conceal his contempt for the wilder fringes of 
unionism and although he was a member of the Orange order, 
his appearances at its rituals reflected (if photographs are 
anything to go by64) an ambiguous forbearance quite without 
enthusiasm. He was equally unconcealed about what he saw as 
the low standard of most Unionist parliamentarians. Of his 
predecessor, Lord Brookeborough, a backwoods Fermanagh 
squire who had come to personify all that was unyielding 
about traditional Unionism, O'Neill said; 
He was good company and a good raconteur and 
those who met him imagined that he was 
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relaxing away from his desk. What they didn't 
realise was that there was no desk. 65 
But the unreconstructed Brookeborough had been present at 
the creation of the Northern Ireland state, and was 
particularly influential in the setting up of the \B' 
Specials. What the modernising O'Neill didn't realise was 
how important such things remained in his new world of ring 
roads, investment incentives and local government 
restructuring. One thing O'Neill did have in common with 
Brookeborough was that he was a landowner in a party 
dominated by business interests. When, shortly after taking 
power as premier, O'Neill imposed a code of conduct for 
ministers covering clashes between their official duties and 
business interests, he was the only member of the cabinet 
with no such interests at all. This did not endear him to 
his colleagues, and when he used the code to dismiss one of 
his most persistent political critics, Harry West, the 
minister of agriculture, the incident seemed to combine 
ruthless intrigue with snobbish high-mindedness. 
In the end there was something proconsular about O'Neill, 
something alien to the instincts and tastes of Ulstermen. 
This deficiency might not have been fatal if he had been a 
dynamic and charismatic character who could have strenuously 
worked to create a new constituency composed of moderate 
Protestants and Catholics, who would have to be persuaded 
that they had full future in a reformed Northern Ireland, 
and could safely abandon Irish nationalism. But O'Neill was 
patronising to the point of insult about Catholic 
aspirations. Even if he had been more vigorous and 
determined in trying to create a new support base, the 
problems of the constitution and Irish nationalism lay 
squarely across the road ahead. 
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Lastly, O'Neill's conception of Unionism was a peculiarly 
British one. It had very strong metropolitan reference 
points which can be clearly seen in the extract from the 
'Ulster at the Crossroads' speech, quoted above. It was to 
the Crown, to the British constitution and to British 
citizenship which he appealed, not the frontier notion of 
loyalism, by which the whole Protestant community stood in 
solidarity and in a narrow contractual relationship to 
Britain. Modernising and metropolitan imperatives meant that 
Unionism would have to be recast if the essential goal of 
resisting absorption into a united Ireland were to be 
maintained. 
These features of reform Unionism violated basic traditional 
premises. Above all, reform violated the mythic status of 
Unionism as a movement embodying a whole community in which 
there were no enemies and which practised fraternity and 
democracy, at least in the sense that all had their place 
and all had their say, irrespective of rank and social 
position. In another sense, O'Neillism subverted this notion 
of community by offering to open up Unionism to anyone who 
subscribed to the allegiances and values of British 
citizenship. Although O'Neill was not personally associated 
with the idea of allowing Catholics to join the Unionist 
Party, followers of his were. The implication of his general 
approach was that you did not need to be an Orangeman, or 
even a Protestant, to be a loyal British subject and 
depended on not to harbour a desire for a united Ireland. 
Since Unionism had never been exclusively about the 
connection with Britain but involved also the ethnic 
identity of Ulster Protestants, opening up Unionism seemed 
ethnic betrayal as well as misguided policy. 
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THE BREAK UP OF THE AFRIKANER NATIONALIST COALITION 
From 1978 onwards, the National Party and the government 
drawn from its ranks were able to use the resources which 
control of the South African state since 1948 had bequeathed 
to them, to mark out, occupy and defend a popular political 
position under the rubric of ,'reform'. Nothing about this 
position was very well defined. As a result, the durability 
of the government's position, its resilience in reproducing 
(and transmuting) reform as a mobilising and legitimising 
agent, cannot to be seen in terms of the politics of 
conviction. It is rather in the government's ability to 
manipulate and control its considerable assets that the 
continuing viability of what became a self-consciously 
centrist position should be seen. More specifically, the 
National Party and the government could successfully 
practise defence-in-depth and damage limitation against 
right-wing challenge and its own crumbling support base, 
because it had superior resources and could claim that its 
own strategies for ensuring Afrikaner survival and 
prosperity were more likely to prevail than those of its 
right-wing rivals. It was these things, rather than any very 
profound difference in principle and conviction, that 
characterised the dissolution of Afrikaner unity. 
Despite the assets and resources Which could be deployed 
behind reform, it was not possible to reproduce in the name 
of change the same coalition of interests and conviction 
which had sustained Afrikaner Nationalism since 1948. Loss 
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of privilege, class resentment, anger at the betrayal of 
ethnic identity, fear for the future and deep racial 
prejudices were all provoked by the changing orientations 
and strategies of the National party.1 These reactions made 
themselves felt across the full range of political, 
economic, social and religious organisations whose 
interlocking functions and membership gave overt expression 
to the Afrikaner nationalist coalition. This discussion will 
focus on three concentrations of discontent, the 
Conservative Party, white trade unions, and paramilitary 
groups. 2 
THE WHITE RIGHT FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTy 
TO THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1989 
The Conservative Party 
The origins of the Conservative Party (CP) lay in a schism 
within the parliamentary caucus of the National Party. From 
the moment of its creation, the CP never lost this 
schismatic quality, and the principal focus of its concern 
lay in the aspiration to capture power in the white 
parliament. It remained schismatic in the sense that its 
understanding of the issues and conflicts in contemporary 
South African politics focussed purely on the reconversion 
or defeat of heretics who had betrayed the Verwoerdian 
faith. Refusing to acknowledge the force of economic and 
social change (or simply ignorant of it), the CP was fixated 
on the narrow, enclosed world of white parliamentary 
politics. Insofar as it interested itself in anything 
outside this concern, the fraternal struggle (broedertwis) 
for control of the vanguard organisations of Afrikaner 
Nationalism represented the boundary of its horizons. 
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From the mid-1970s, the National Party operated in two 
dimensions; containing and responding to black aspirations 
in their newly and forcefully restated forms of mobilisation 
and resistance, and competing with white forces on the left 
and right for the mandate to represent white interests. By 
contrast, the CP admitted only the importance of competing 
for power in the white parliament, denying the need for any 
policy other than that of forcing blacks back into the 
Verwoerdian mould of grand apartheid. 
The occasion for the split which led to the founding of the 
CP was provided by the issue of power-sharing between white, 
coloured and Indian 'groups', which was developed in the 
National Party's constitutional proposals between 1977 an~ 
1982. A group of National Party MPs objected to the idea of 
power-sharing in general and in particular the proposition 
that whites, coloureds and Indians would each have a 
separate chamber in a single parliament, rather than three 
separate parliaments as previously suggested. 3 Twenty-two of 
them, headed by the Transvaal leader of the National Party 
Dr. Andries Treurnicht, voted against a motion of confidence 
in P.W. Botha, the prime minister, in the parliamentary 
caucus on 23 February 1982. On 27 February, a confrontation 
took place in the controlling body of the Transvaal National 
Party, the upshot of which was the confirmation of Botha's 
hold on the party and the departure of Treurnicht and his 
supporters to form the Conservative party.4 
Two factors place these events in broader context. The first 
is the substantial gains made by the right-wing HNP in the 
white general election of 1981. Although it did not win a 
seat, the HNP increased its share of the vote from 3% to 14% 
overall. More important than the HNP's total vote were its 
much larger percentages in several rural and industrial 
seats in the Transvaal5 which pointed to noticeable 
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defections of Afrikaner voters to the right. 6 The HNP's 
success suggested that there was a growing constituency of 
white voters dissatisfied with the idea of reform, and with 
their declining living standards. 7 
Secondly, the struggle for power which installed P.W. Botha 
as leader of the National Party and prime minister had 
marked regional overtones. Botha's chief rival was Transvaal 
leader of the party, Connie Mulder, who was also minister of 
information. Under Mulder, the Department of Information 
conducted its own covert foreign policy in the atmosphere of 
departmental intrigue and empire-building encouraged by the 
laissez-faire leadership of B·.J. Vorster. Departmental, 
regional and ideological rivalries fed on the revelations of 
corruption and abuse of power in the Department of 
Information (which collectively became known as 
'Muldergate') and turned the struggle for Vorster's 
succession into a particularly bitter one. Botha's triumph 
was not only a victory for reform (at least in the sense of 
pragmatism) but also for the Cape over the Transvaal. Of the 
MPs who formed the CP with Treurnicht, only one was not from 
the Transvaal: 
Provincial loyalties -- as expressed through 
provincial congresses -- have always been 
significant within the NP and the shift of 
power and influence at the time probably 
contributed to the break-away of a number of 
the seventeen parliamentarians and to the 
growing dissatisfaction among many party 
members. 8 
The Conservative Party was the principal institutional 
expression of the crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism and the 
more general one of white supremacy. It was in this 
narrowly-defined role that it sought the support of the 
white electorate. A profile and summary of the support that 
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it in fact obtained, suggests that although the CP's goal 
was to take power in the white parliament, a secondary 
effect, that of altering the balance and the dynamics of 
reform and reaction within the National Party was more 
important. 
Although by-elections9 played an important part in 
establishing the CP as an important force in white politics, 
keeping ·it more or less continuously in the public (and 
international) eye between 1982 and de Klerk's reforms of 
1990, the party faced only two sUbstantial tests of its 
support in these years, the white general elections of 1987 
and 1989. 
I n the general election of May 1987,10 the CP won 22 seats 
u_ of 166, all of them in the Transvaal. Its 26% share of 
the vote translated into only 13% of the seats, although 
this was enough to make it the official opposition thanks to 
the ground lost by the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). 
Although this was an auspicious enough performance for a 
first general election appearance, the CP would have done 
even better had it not been opposed in 75 of the 126 seats 
it contested by the HNP, which nevertheless failed to win a 
seat. This split in the right-wing vote allowed the NP to 
capture eight seats (six in the Transvaal and two in the 
Orange Free State) in which the combined vote for right-wing 
parties exceeded its own. The combined share of the vote for 
the right wing was 30%, against 52% for the NP which won 123 
(or 74%) of the seats. 
Support for the CP was concentrated in the rural regions of 
the Transvaal where 16 of its 22 seats were situated. Of the 
other six, four were urban and two mixed. Its support was 
also concentrated among the 2.8 million Afrikaners who make 
up 60% of the white population. 11 Although no seats were won 
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either by the HNP or the CP in the Orange Free state, the 
combined right-wing vote in that province was 42% (NP, 56%). 
In the Transvaal, the right-wing share was 38% and that of 
the NP , 48%. An analysis of 'possible wins' ,12 which added 
constituencies where the right-wing vote was over 40% to the 
eight where the combined vote already exceeded the NP's, 
came to a total of 40, 23 in the Transvaal (including 16 
urban seats) and 12 in the Orange Free state. 
In the white general election of September 1989, the CP 
increased its total of seats to 39 by winning 17 
constituencies from the NP. Nine of the new acquisitions 
were in the Transvaal, six in· the orange Free State, and two 
in the Cape. Although this represented a modest breakout 
from the Transvaal heartland, the Cape and Free State seats 
involved very narrow margins of victory. The CP's advance 
reflected a serious underachievement for the party which had 
hoped for something like the 60 or so seats which Bekker and 
Grobbelaar designated as possible wins in the aftermath of 
the 1987 election. Although the CP's percentage of the vote 
rose to 31.2%, this was scarcely more than the total for the 
combined right in 1987, a very poor performance considering 
that the HNP polled only 0.2% in 1989. Indeed if the virtual 
collapse of the HNP is discounted, the CP made scarcely any 
ground at all. Once again the CP's support was 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the Afrikaner population: 
only 7% of English speakers voted for it. 
Municipal elections in white areas (October 1988) provided a 
further test of CP support, but commentators found the 
results difficult to interpret. 13 The CP consolidated its 
position in urban areas in the Transvaal without either 
making serious inroads into the Orange Free state, or 
breaking out into the Cape and Natal. In addition, its 
successes brought with them the difficult task of putting 
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its policies of racial segregation into practice against 
resistance from blacks and business interests. Like many 
extremist parties, it became vulnerable to the compromises 
of actually wielding power. 
The 1989 general election demonstrated that after seven 
years of existence the phenomenon of a right wing 
parliamentary opposition, based largely on a restated 
Afrikaner Nationalism, had established itself as a permanent 
and significant force in white politics. 14 The election also 
demonstrated that the Conservative Party was now the sole 
institutional expression of this parliamentary opposition, 
and that support for it had stabilised at a point well short 
of any threat to unseat the government or completely derail 
its halting progress towards reform and negotiation. This 
meant that the CP could count on the allegiance of three out 
of ten white voters, with this support concentrated heavily 
in the northern provinces of the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State. 
The social composition of the CP's support remained 
consistently concentrated among three principal groups.1S 
The first source was blue collar workers, who were 
particularly vulnerable to recession, black advancement and 
the ending of statutory protection for whites in employment. 
Secondly, the vulnerability of certain agricultural 
interests helps explain the CP's domination of the 
Transvaal's rural areas, especially in the north. Security 
problems on the borders of black-ruled states and 
'homelands' (ranging from stock theft to guerrilla 
incursions) often left a declining population of white 
farmers at odds with government policies. A combination of 
drought (to which the northern provinces were particularly 
susceptible) and the fiscal crisis of the South African 
state left farmers perpetually dissatisfied with the level 
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of government aid in the 1980s. Another source of 
agricultural disaffection was concentrated among smaller 
farmers and those producing for the domestic maize market 
(again, concentrated in the Transvaal and the Free state) 
who believed that government policies favoured the larger, 
export-producing farmers of the Cape (fruit) and Natal 
(sugar). A third occupational group attracted to the CP 
could be found among lower-level bureaucrats, especially 
those in apartheid bureaucracies16 and in the security 
forces. 
To some extent these social groups gave a solid base to the 
CP, to which could be added ideological zealots of white 
supremacy, or Afrikaner Nationalism (or both), irrespective 
of social background. Although this guaranteed a well-nigh 
irreducible minimum of support -- reflected in the results 
of the 1987 and 1989 elections -- certain features of the 
CP's social base made advance beyond this minimum difficult 
to achieve. 
Firstly, the classes which were attracted to the CP did not 
constitute a coherent set of social interests out of which a 
new ruling coalition and ideological hegemony might be 
constructed. It might be objected that the Afrikaner 
Nationalist coalition which narrowly scraped into office in 
1948 was constructed out of similarly (in some respects 
identically) unpromising material. Indeed some commentators 
have seen parallels between the old United Party's decline 
into incoherence before 1948 and the NP's groping' to find 
new directions and identities in a time of social change and 
upheaval. Clearly, leading Conservatives hoped that just as 
conviction politics, intensive grassroots organisation and a 
base-line of ethnic identity could mobilise diverse social 
interests behind the National Party, and be moulded by it 
into a relatively compact ruling alliance which rescued 
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white interests from the united Party's incoherence and 
drift, so the Conservative Party, forty years later, could 
put the same forces to work and save whites from a governing 
party which had apparently abandoned all conviction and 
distinct identity. 
In 1948 however, Afrikaner farmers and workers constituted a 
numerous bloc in a white social formation and polity whose 
dominance was scarcely challenged. By the 1980s, not only 
were these groups in steep numerical decline, but white 
dominance was increasingly under threat, and white interests 
were increasingly dependent on an accommodation with blacks. 
From being the vanguard of an · upwardly mobile ethnic 
coalition in an autonomous white polity between the 1940s 
and the 1970s, the Afrikaner workers and farmers who 
supported the Conservative Party in the 1980s moved to the 
political margins, as social and political change 
increasingly emphasised the fusion of black and white 
politics, and shifted the centre of white interests in an 
accommodationist direction. The bureaucrats who composed the 
third principal occupational segment of the CP's support did 
not fit into this pattern. Far from declining in numbers, 
public servants became ever more numerous, but despite the 
fears and insecurities that the prospect of accommodation 
with blacks forced on them, the inroads that the CP could 
make on public service loyalties were limited by the direct 
possibilities of patronage which the government could deploy 
on this source of its support. 
The Conservative Party never came to terms with the fact 
that the interests of its constituency had become exposed as 
sectional interests, that its conception of a generalised 
white interest (perhaps ~ conception of a generalised 
white interest) was no longer comprehensible. Although it 
was seen by some analysts as the expression of class forces, 
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a number of formidable prohibitions prevented the 
Conservative Party from choosing a fully articulated class 
identity. Firstly, the CP's philosophy of politics regards 
nations as the organic and eternal building blocks of social 
life, the elemental axes of conflict and cooperation. This 
world view is simply incompatible with any developed sense 
of class conflict or identity. Any wholehearted assumption 
of either of these would in any case only divide the white 
polity and hasten the final demise of its claims to 
autonomy. 
Secondly, even those conflicts within Afrikaner Nationalism 
which are susceptible to explanation in terms of class are 
cut across and confused in expression by questions of 
regional identity. Thirdly, there is no strong tradition in 
Afrikaner Nationalism of independent working-class identity 
and action, given the early and thorough incorporation of 
working-class elements into 'national' structures like the 
Christian National trade union movement. Fourthly, at a 
strictly pragmatic level, the HNP seemed to provide CP 
strategists with an exemplary lesson on the fate of any 
party which tried to give Afrikaner Nationalism a 
specifically and emphatically working-class dimension. 
The HNP also provided other salutary lessons. The first was 
that although Afrikaner Nationalism retained its mobilising 
force, too exclusive and rigid a conceptualisation of its 
meaning would be counter-productive in an increasingly 
secular society in which the question of a wider white 
identity had electoral resonance. For instance, Conservative 
Party strategists rejected the HNP's insistence on primacy, 
if not supremacy, for the Afrikaans language, as archaic and 
unworkable, an electoral millstone. The second was that the 
terminology and rhetoric of bigotry and crude racial 
supremacy would be likely to repel as many voters as it 
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attracted. The sectarian interests of whites and Afrikaners 
should as a result be articulated in a discourse of 
internationally respected values, like nationhood and self-
determination, even if these were no more than ideological 
code words for the racism favoured by many on the white 
right. 
As a result of these precautions, the CP had to position 
itself somewhere between the equivocations of the National 
Party, and the class rhetoric, the crude racism and ethnic 
exclusivism of the HNP. Although it did successfully portray 
itself as a clear alternative to the National Party, the 
party's image was not without· its own ambiguities. There 
could be no mistaking the clear note of reactionary populist 
resentment which emerged from the CP's supporters, the 
disaffected voice of declining, marginal social groups, 
prompted by their declining living standards, diminishing 
privileges, and vanished access to the policy-making 
process. The outrage and sense of betrayal that they 
expressed was not only at the advance of blacks, but also at 
the disappearance of Afrikaner Nationalism as a fraternal 
system in Which, although power was unevenly distributed and 
authority bestowed in a hierarchical way, all cultural and 
occupational groups had an effective say. 
Despite this, the CP could not merely be the party of the 
disaffected since its principal aim was to gain an electoral 
majority in the white population as a whole. Similarly, 
although its most powerful appeal was to Afrikaners who felt 
betrayed at the NP's dilution of the ethnic content of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, and the redefinition of Afrikaners as 
a 'group', rather than a nation or Y2lk, the CP's ambition 
of ruling through the white parliament could no longer be 
achieved by Afrikaners alone, and it could not afford the 
complete alienation of English speakers. 
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For these reasons, although the Conservative Party was the 
party of class resentment and Afrikaner Nationalism, it 
could not allow these personae to define and dominate it. 
Some sort of solution was achieved by becoming the party of 
apartheid in its full Verwoerdian orthodoxy. 
If the Conservative party's social base was to some extent 
out of harmony with its parliamentary ambitions, these same 
constitutional methods and expectations were sometimes 
difficult to keep in step with broader political 
developments. The CP's breakaway from the parliamentary 
National Party was only one aspect of the fragmentation of 
the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition. The paramilitary, 
religious, cultural and industrial bodies which made up the 
extra-parliamentary Afrikaner right posed problems of co-
existence and leadership in the wider revolt against the 
transformation of the National Party. 
Even within the narrow parliamentary domain, the question of 
the Conservative Party's relationship with the HNP had to be 
settled. Despite its discouraging record in actually winning 
parliamentary seats, the HNP proved demanding in the 
question of allocating seats between the parties of the 
right in the 1987 election, on the grounds that it deserved 
preferential treatment for its prescience in leaving the 
National Party earlier and conducting the struggle for 
apartheid orthodoxy alone for so long. Sensing that the 
HNP's sectional and sectarian appeal would be a liability in 
the long run, and would not survive determined competition 
from the Conservative Party, the latter's leadership decided 
to sacrifice a number of seats to intra-right competition in 
the 1987 election on the assumption (correctly, as the 1989 
results proved) that the HNP's support would gravitate to 
its larger rival. 
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The groupings of the wider right posed different problems. 
The small, but intellectually influential cultural bodies 
which favoured radical partition and a much smaller 
Afrikaner homeland than the 'white South Africa' which was 
the basis for the CP's claim to self-determination, 
threatened to undermine the whole logic of the 
Conservatives' policies, although they were not in direct 
electoral competition with them. The paramilitaries 
(especially the AWB) , on the other hand, were extremely 
useful mobilising vehicles for the cause of the right 
generally, but their penchant for direct, militant action, 
especially when it involved violence, clashed with the 
claims to respectability and propriety which were important 
to the Conservatives' electoral ambitions. 
White Trade Unions 
Exclusive trade unions, in the sense of bodies confined to 
white membership and defining industrial and wider political 
goals in racial terms, have been an important part of the 
Afrikaner nationalist alliance. The principal relationship 
of exclusive unionism however was originally, and remained, 
with the state rather than a particular political movement: 
The particular conditions of exploitation on 
the mines made possible the emergence of an 
exclusive racist trade unionism recruited 
from mainly supervisory staff in conditions 
of rapid deskilling and dilution. These white 
mining unions became increasingly dependent 
upon state intervention to enforce colour 
bars and guarantee the jobs and conditions of 
their members. This strategy was later 
adopted by other groups of unskilled white 
workers, particularly in the state sector: on 
the railways and in the steel industry. 
Lacking political autonomy whilst they 
depended on the goodwill of the state and 
antagonistic to black workers, these ~nions 
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played only a limited role in the wider trade 
union movement17 
As Yudelman makes plain, the incorporation of white workers 
into a highly structured system of labour relations 
underwritten by the state took place early in South Africa's 
post-union history. The development helped satisfy the 
state's legitimation imperative; white workers would 
henceforth defend their interests as citizen-voters rather 
than (as the miners did in 1922) as worker-militants. The 
Broederbond's and the National Party's campaign for 
Christian National trade unionism as part of the wider 
movement of Afrikaner Nationa~ism took the incorporation one 
stage further by using trade unions to mobilise Afrikaner 
workers by fusing material interests with ethnic and racial 
identities. In this way, long term allegiances could be 
secured from the competitive vagaries of electoral contests 
fought solely on material issues. Despite some authorities' 
scepticism as to the degree of penetration specifically 
Christian National ideas achieved in the white working 
class, there is no doubt about the exclusive unions' 
enthusiasm for apartheid ideology: 
For the exclusive industrial unions, the 
apartheid framework was the key to their 
trade-union practice and the survival of the 
white working class. In the absence of 
genuine job control, only the state, not 
industrial councils or apprenticeships, could 
bar the way to African economic advancement. 
Job reservations provided some protections, 
as did the suppression of African trade union 
organisation and political leaders, but only 
separate development promised ultimately to 
relieve the pressure on the bounded working 
class. to limit Atfiican proletarianisation. 
(emphasis added) 
This judgement illustrates the central weakness of the white 
trade unions. They could fight -- as the white Mine Workers' 
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Union (MWU) did in the mid 1960s19 -- against attempts by 
employers and the government to dilute specific aspects of 
job reservation, but if apartheid failed, the specific 
privileges of the white workers could not be sustained, no 
matter how militant their opposition to their removal. The 
struggle over the colour bar in the mines in 1964-5 is an 
instructive case, because it provides the only significant 
example of white worker militancy in the period of 
Nationalist rule since 1948. 
In August 1964, the mining employers, concerned as always 
with the margin between gold's fixed price and labour costs 
which constituted such a high· proportion of total costs, 
introduced 'experimental' dilutions of the colour bar in 
several mines. They did so with the cooperation of the 
government and the MWU which at the time was complacent, co-
opted, bureaucratic and protected. 20 Even before the 
experiment began, an action committee of dissatisfied 
members was in conflict with the union, and these rebels 
formed the nucleus of opposition to the changes. The 
struggle took place through wildcat strikes, court cases, 
threats to start a (white) workers' party to oppose the 
Nationalists, and in particular, intra-union struggles for 
control. Eventually, a government-appointed commission of 
enquiry, " •• found some substance in the rebels' claims and 
in the name of 'industrial peace', the government decided 
that the experiment would endanger the colour bar and 
therefore should be terminated".21 Although the action 
committee took over the union and galvanised it into tougher 
negotiating positions, it reverted to 'bread and butter' 
issues, losing for the most part its wider political 
militancy. 
This example of partly22 successful rank and file white 
worker action, took place at a time when the government's 
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confidence in the success of apartheid had not been dented, 
when the economy was booming, and when black resistance had 
been effectively crushed. Its target was an issue specific 
and internal to the gold industry, affecting the day to day 
conditions of white miners. By the late 1970s, when the 
government appeared ready, in the name of reform, to make a 
determined assault on job reservation, the circumstances had 
changed considerably. Confidence in apartheid was fast 
ebbing away, black resistance was on the agenda again, and 
the economy was in trouble. The question of black 
advancement was not solely an issue of mineowners' costs, 
but of the development of militant black trade unionism23 
and the state's legitimacy problems. In these changed 
conditions, white mineworkers went on strike in 1979, just 
before the publication of the first Wiehahn Report. 24 The 
issue was the appointment of three coloured men to vacant 
'white' posts at the Okiep copper mine. Despite a great deal 
of militant rhetoric, during the strike, " .. the African 
labour force kept the mines working, the Chamber maintained 
an intransigent position and the state merely looked on from 
a distance as the white miners trickled back to work".25 
The wider difficulties of the exclusive unions are 
illustrated by the experience of the South African 
Confederation of Labour (SACLA)26 in the wake of the Wiehahn 
reforms. SAC LA was founded in 1957 to act as a coordinating 
body of right wing unions, mainly representing non-salaried 
employees in government, quasi-government enterprises and on 
the mines. A powerful force in SACLA was the Coordinating 
Council of South African Trade Unions, founded in 1948 and 
with its roots in Christian National Trade Unionism; 
From 1948 to the early 1970s, relations 
between the Coordinating Council and SACLA on 
the one hand, and the National Party and the 
Department of Labour on the other, were 
~. i· 
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extremely cordial. The Confederation's views 
were widely canvassed by state and NP 
officials. There were numerous instances of 
state intervention to secure concessions over 
wages, jobs, colour bars, etc. 27 
When the government's reform programme began to phase out 
such corporatist arrangements, SACLA, as might be expected, 
became the focus of a rearguard of protest action. But its 
opposition was hampered by internal divisions, into those 
unions (mainly in the public service proper) which feared 
the total loss of their relationship with the government, 
and favoured a stance of 'loyal opposition' and those (like 
the MWU) which recognised no ~uch restraints. Both moderates 
and militants disaffiliated as a result of these divisions 
(the MWU leaving and re-joining) diminishing SACLA's 
membership from 22 unions (representing 179 000 members) in 
1980, to 14 unions (100 000 members) in 1982. The rapid 
growth of black trade union membership soon put these 
figures in perspective. By 1987, there were 109 racially 
mixed trade unions, 46 restricted to whites, 17 restricted 
to coloureds and Indians and 23 for blacks only. Altogether, 
487 002 whites, 333 829 coloureds and Indians, and 823 620 
blacks belonged to trade unions by 1987. 28 
Throughout the 1980s, as white opposition to reform and 
support for the CP grew, the potential of white worker 
disaffection as a serious force on the right was noted. 29 As 
early as 1980, one authority predicted that as their special 
access to policy-making was withdrawn, white trade unions 
would .... be forced by a feeling of powerlessness and 
frustration to enter the political arena directly". Unions 
would be compelled to act in four ways, .... pressurise 
ministers; use their voting strength at the polls; start 
their own party; in a crisis, resort to legal and illegal 
strikes ... 30 In fact, the white unions were not ruthlessly 
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and immediately cut out of the policy-making process. 
Although the government made it increasingly clear that the 
days of a special dispensation for white workers were over, 
the last vestiges of job reservation, especially in the 
mining industry, were only gradually and gingerly 
withdrawn. 31 The prolongation of privileged access is 
underlined by the exclusion of the (black) National Union of 
Mineworkers (HUM) from the talks between the MWU and the 
Chamber of Mines on the removal of job reservation, which 
began in 1984: 
The Chamber justified this on the grounds 
that the HUM had not existed at the time the 
white paper was issued and could not 
therefore be regarded as a party to the 
negotiations. The Chamber did, however, 
undertake to consult with (the) HUM on the 
issues. This was not to come about for 
several years. 32 
The limits of such negotiations were clear however. The 
white unions could not prevent change, merely press for some 
form of job security assurances from the employers. 
The response of white trade unions to the dissolution of 
their privileges was muted. Despite evidence, both social 
scientific33 and anecdotal34 of discontent, there was little 
sign of successful organisation to resist reform by direct 
industrial action and organisation. Despite rhetorical calls 
by both unionists and right-wing politicians for white 
worker unity, the separate identities of individual unions 
remained strong. From 1981 the MWU began recruiting workers 
outside the mines,35 and by 1985 had established a presence 
in the nationalised steel corporation (ISCOR) and in the 
power stations of the state electricity monopoly (ESCOM). 
Despite denials by the MWU's leader that there had been, 
.... any specific attempt to organise strategic industries",36 
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the spectre of a right-wing political strike appeared to 
some to be on the march; 
If the majority of the white electorate could 
be persuaded to accept the dismantling of 
Apartheid and the establishment of some form 
of democracy, what good would that do if 
every pit and workshop and turbine were 
controlled by white workers loyal to the AWB, 
prepared to resist change with force and 
backed by at least the lower ranks of the 
police and the armed forces?37 
But although these apocalyptic visions gained wide 
currency38 and there were indications of overlap between the 
AWB and the white unions,39 there was little sign of 
planning for militant direct action to halt the erosion of 
the white workers' position. The probable reasons for this 
can be summarised as follows. Firstly the number of workers 
in white unions and the number of unions themselves were 
dwarfed by the numbers of black unions and their members in 
the 1980s. Not only were white workers outnumbered in the 
country as a whole, but even in plants and factories where 
whites were concentrated in significant numbers and 
strategic positions, they were usually outnumbered by 
increasingly organised black workers. Secondly, South 
African heavy industry, although concentrated to some extent 
in the northern and north-eastern provinces of the country, 
is still very widely dispersed, and white workers could not 
aspire to the critical mass of concentration which would 
make a political strike feasible. 
Thirdly, as the disaffiliations from SACLA make clear, even 
right-wing white workers are sufficiently disunited between 
avowed die-hard racists and more pragmatic supporters of the 
government's reforms to make direct action difficult on any 
large scale. Fourthly, despite the deterioration of the 
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political and economic status of the white worker, prior to 
de Klerk's reforms of 1990 neither the security nor the 
political position of whites in general seemed immediately 
threatened. Finally, as Greenberg puts it, the changing 
nature of the white labour force weakened the unions; 
.... with the upward advance of European labour -- the 
emergence of managers, technicians and, indeed, 'aristocrats 
of labor' -- exclusive industrial unionism mattered a great 
deal less than it had done in earlier periods ... 40 
Paramilitary Organisations 
The Voortrekkers' conflicts with powerful black tribes or 
nations and the long struggle of the Boers against British 
imperialism have provided the mythology of Afrikaner 
Nationalism with potent themes celebrating paramilitary 
organisation. The commandos of the Anglo-Boer War 
appropriately symbolise the right and duty of citizens to 
bear arms in defence of the Y2lk, an idea which has been 
extensively incorporated into the military establishment of 
the South African state. There are aspects of this legacy 
which have been exploited by paramilitary organisations in 
the break up of the Afrikaner nationalist coalition,41 but 
there are also some qualifying and mitigating factors which 
should be noted. 
Firstly, the failure of the 191442 Rebellion to attract more 
than scattered and localised support suggests that the 
notion of romantic nationalist paramilitarism had limited 
purchase once South Africa was governed by unmistakably 
Afrikaner figures, no matter how apparently collusive with 
imperial interests. Secondly, although the Ossewa Brandwag43 
aChieved an impressive degree of paramilitary mobilisation 
along proto-fascist lines, a power struggle between it and 
the National Party was resolved in the latter's favour. The 
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outcome cast the Afrikaner nationalist alliance in an 
unmistakably civilian, constitutional, and electoral mould, 
rather than one emphasising revolutionary and paramilitary 
forms of organisation. These lines of development continued 
under nationalist rule. The military establishment developed 
by the Nationalists did indeed make extensive use of citizen 
force and commando participation and the permanent force was 
always small relative to the whole force potentially 
available for mobilisation. But it was a highly professional 
force whose control over the citizen components was very 
firm, and whose ethos became one reflecting loyalties to the 
state rather than the YQlk. This does not mean that the 
military was simply one of subordination to civilian control 
as was officially claimed. 44 Especially from the mid-1970s, 
as the sense of crisis deepened, accelerating with the 
: . ·~tion of defence minister P.W. Botha to prime minister 
in 1979, the relationship became one of integration with 
other arms of state in a system of joint military-civilian 
rule. 45 
In a sense then, the history of civil-military, and 
political-paramilitary relations within Afrikaner 
Nationalism reflects a mixed legacy. The celebration of 
resistance to illegitimate political authority and 
ancestrally hostile racial and national 'groups' is strong. 
But so too is the idea that all military action is the 
province of state, government and military establishments 
whose identities have blurred into a single authority 
complex. In this way, it can be argued that the extensive 
Afrikanerisation of the armed forces after 194846 may have 
fed on the Y2lk's paramilitary traditions, but by 
formalising and bureaucratising them in an exclusively state 
context, the long-term effect was to rob them of much of its 
potentially dissident value. 
318 
Similarly, the extensive conscription and related measures, 
usually summarised as 'militarisation', which were so much 
part of state policy from the mid-1970s, may have encouraged 
some Afrikaner dissidents to think in paramilitary terms, 
especially through the propaganda-induced paranoia about 
'total onslaught'. But by making such a conspicuous effort 
at military mobilisation itself, the state denied much 
ground to potentially rival paramilitary groups.47 In fact, 
the state's military strategies in the domestic environment 
-- especially of course the use of covert units in an 
underground war against anti-apartheid forces -- create 
difficult analytical problems in distinguishing 'military' 
from 'paramilitary', and acts ·of violence by white 
dissidents from those of state functionaries, whether 
authorised or unauthorised. 48 These analytical problems were 
to emerge more forcefully after the unbanning of the ANC in 
1990. 
This mixed legacy has to be borne in mind in any assessment 
of the role of paramilitary groups in the dissolution of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist coalition. 
The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging49 
The principal focus of paramilitary dissidence in the 
dissolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition has been 
the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWS). The response of this 
body to the crisis of Afrikaner Nationalism, and the efforts 
of the National Party to reconstitute itself on a less 
exclusive basis than ethnic solidarity has been twofold. Its 
first self-assigned function has been to demonstrate a 
capacity to mobilise for violent direct action against 
political reform and its second to mobilise for the defence 
of white, and more specifically Afrikaner, interests in case 
the process of political change should degenerate into chaos 
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and violence. In doing so it has vehemently re-stated 
certain elements of traditional Afrikaner Nationalism, 
notably the coalition's populist dimension and certain 
aspects of its civil religion, the principal casualties of 
the NP's metamorphosis. 
But in certain other aspects, it has departed from the 
mainstream of Afrikaner Nationalist ideas and apartheid 
ideology. Important in this context have been the degree of 
explicit racism with which it customarily expresses itself, 
the degree of exclusivity with which it defines who is an 
Afrikaner (or in its own preferred terms, a 'Boer'), and 
above all its conception of the basis for partition of South 
Africa into black and white-ruled states. In these altered 
perspectives and in its preferred modes of mobilisation and 
action the AWB has constituted an element of radical 
dissidence in the break up of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
coalition. 
The AWB was founded in 1973 in Heidelberg (Transvaal) by 
seven individuals, of whom two, Eugene Terre'Blanche and Jan 
Groenewald were particularly influential. 50 The group's 
motivation sprang from the same discontents which propelled 
dissidents from the National Party to form the HNP; 
Vorster's modest concessions to international opinion on 
sporting policy, the mild dilution of ethnic pieties in the 
NP's discourse, the emergence of class divisions among 
Afrikaners. Both Terre'Blanche and Groenewald had been full 
time employees of the HNP, and Terre'Blanche had been a 
candidate for parliament and the Transvaal Provincial 
Council in the HNP's interest. Their disillusion with the 
party's inability to make an impact within the 
constitutional framework of political competition led 
directly to their role in the founding of the AWB. As a 
result, the rejection of constitutional politics has 
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remained one of the movement's key characteristics. Shortly 
after founding the AWB, Terre'Blanche was expelled from the 
HNP. 
The AWB remained largely inactive until the late 1970s when 
the turmoil of Muldergate and the change of leadership in 
the NP brought the party's transformation into focus. In 
March 1979, the AWB received wide public attention for the 
first time when a small group of its members tarred and 
feathered an Afrikaner professor of history as he addressed 
a conference in Pretoria. By calling into question the 
historical provenance of the Covenant myth -- one of the 
central elements in the Afrikaner civil religion --
Professor Floors van Jaarsveld made himself, in the AWB's 
eyes, an appropriate symbol of the changes taking place in 
Afrikaner Nationalism. 51 In its attack on Professor van 
Jaarsveld, the AWB set the tone of romantic and theatrical 
fundamentalism which was to characterise it thereafter. To 
this was added a cult of paramilitary display and direct 
action, with a converse rejection of rationality and 
negotiation. All these things were expressed best in the 
ornamental rhetoric of Eugene Terre'Blanche, who had emerged 
as the movement's leader by the late 1970s. Following a 
well-trodden path of extreme right-wing political rhetoric52 
he offered up his own experiential version of nationalist 
pieties and fundamentals for the benefit of those who felt 
betrayed and abandoned by the changes in the National 
Party's ethos. 
After the founding of the Conservative Party gave a definite 
focus to the divisions in Afrikanerdom,53 the AWB took on 
several specific functions within the growing and 
proliferating ranks of the white right. The first of these 
was paramilitary mobilisation, which in turn took two forms. 
The more overt was organisation for vigilante purposes.54 
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Neighbourhood groups were formed with growing frequency from 
about 1985, whose functions included patrolling white areas 
to deter and expel 'criminals' and 'trespassers'. In effect 
this meant reserving the right to intimidate any blacks 
found on the streets after dark. Another function of these 
groups was to police violations of the Group Areas Act and 
other apartheid legislation, either forcing the authorities 
to act if they had been slow, or simply evicting blacks 
themselves. 55 The second paramilitary function was the 
formation and arming of terrorist cells which could carry 
out operations against anti-apartheid activists, or simply 
random black targets, in deterrence or reprisal for military 
acts of anti-government insurgents. 56 
A third paramilitary function had a more direct political 
purpose in that it was aimed at affecting the outcome of 
white elections. This was to take over and/or force the 
cancellation of National Party election meetings (usually 
during by-election campaigns) by physical intimidation. 57 A 
political function which had nothing to do with physical 
force was to act as a mediator and link, a catalyst of 
unity, between the competing political parties on the right 
and in the white right generally. Before the 1987 whites-
only general election, the AWB invested considerable effort 
in trying to overcome the hostile competition between the 
HNP and the Conservative Party, aware that this situation 
made a gift of several parliamentary seats to the 
Nationalists. A combination of personal rancour, the HNP's 
stubborn insistence on equal treatment with the much larger 
Conservative Party and the latter's calculation that it 
would take only one general election to kill off the HNP 
completely, prevented these efforts from bearing fruit.58 
Aside from paramilitarism and electoral activities, the AWB 
tried throughout the 1980s to cultivate a social role, 
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principally through feeding and other support schemes for 
white families who were affected by rising unemployment in 
the recessionary conditions of the mid-eighties. S9 
Assistance was also made available to farmers, often 
combined with paramilitary patrolling of boundaries to 
counter stock theft and so on. One of the AWB's principal 
areas of concern, however, remained the guardianship of 
fundamental Afrikaner Nationalism. A typical expression of 
this was through gatherings at shrines on the sacred days of 
the nationalist calendar. By attracting bigger crowds than 
the Nationalists and in making sure that traditional 
verities were rhetorically expressed, in contrast to the 
often convoluted speeches of government ministers whose 
efforts to justify reform in terms of Afrikaner mythology 
were never plausible, the white right, with the AWB in the 
vanguard, occupied the physical and ideological space ceded 
in default by the Nationalists. 60 
As the AWB took on these political and paramilitary roles 
throughout the 1980s, so also did its ideological and policy 
dimensions develop and emerge. A central element in the 
movement's ethos was the rejection of parliamentary 
politics. In Terre'Blanche's accounts of the AWB's origins, 
alienation from the "British Westminster system" takes pride 
of place, and the divisions of parliamentary democracy are 
viewed in his speeches and the AWB's literature as devices 
to weaken the YQlk. As the right emerged as a credible 
electoral force in the 1980s, Terre'Blanche's views appeared 
to gain substance in the discrepancy between votes for the 
right and the number of seats won by them, the difference 
attributable to the proportional vagaries of the Westminster 
system. 61 This rejection of parliamentary politics was also 
strengthened by Terre'Blanche's exasperation with the 
failure of the HNP and the Conservative Party to agree on an 
electoral pact. In fact, the AWB was itself an element in 
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that disagreement. 
The Conservative Party allowed its members to belong to the 
AWB, but the HNP -- which despite the extremity of its 
policies was a model of constitutional propriety and did not 
officially condone paramilitarism -- did not. The AWB's 
vision of the future was of a one party state ruled by 
technocrats in which ethnic homogeneity would preclude 
political competition. For pragmatic reasons in the near 
term however, the AWB made two concessions to parliamentary 
politics. The first was to register a political party, the 
Blanke volkstaatsparty, in order to gain certain useful 
operating privileges. 62 The party has been no more than a 
shell however and does not contest elections. The second 
concession is to support the Conservative Party in 
elections. After the 1987 election, the AWB claimed that 
four successful Conservative candidates were AWB members. 63 
Along with this anti-political world view, certain other 
extreme right-wing staples are prominent in the AWB's 
ideology. Distrust of concentrations of wealth and economic 
power are expressed in ethnic and racial terms, as in 
rejection of "Anglo-Jewish money power". Such slogans are 
also resonant with the old nationalist rallying cries of 
populism and anti-imperialism. Valuing the land and 
agriculture higher than the city and industry falls into the 
same ideological category, as do vague notions of 
nationalisation and wealth as the property of the YQlk. As 
the movement developed in the 1980s, some effort was made to 
tone down crude racism, stressing that while it existed to 
assert and defend white interests, it did not propagate 
hatred of blacks, who would enjoy complete self-
determination in their majority-rule state. 64 Nonetheless a 
strong underlying ethos of white superiority remained. 
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In fact there was much that was vague, confused and self-
contradictory about the AWB's ideology and policies. A 
spectre of impracticality attended such concrete proposals 
as could be discerned. Three things, however, gave the AWB 
purchase in the dissolving world of Afrikaner unity. The 
first was the fundamentalist restatement of Afrikaner 
Nationalism, which (like religious fundamentalism) espoused 
the literal truth of the Afrikaner civil religion and was 
expressed literally in ceremonies of re-dedication. This was 
shared in large measure with all other right-wing movements 
and parties in South Africa. The second attribute was a 
version of Afrikaner self-determination which claimed the 
territory of the old Boer Republics in the Orange Free 
State, Transvaal and Northern Natal. 65 Despite the 
impracticalities of this scheme it can be argued that it was 
no more incredible than those of its competitors. The 
National Party's conception of white self-determination 
through group rights in a power-sharing system, the 
Conservative Party's initial claim to the 80% of South 
Africa which Verwoerdian apartheid sets aside for whites and 
the tiny kibbutz-like growth points of settlement envisaged 
by the radical partitionist groups on the right, were all 
inherently implausible. 
The third thing to give the AWB purchase was its ability to 
express the frustration and sense of betrayal which the 
National Party's change of identity engendered in many 
Afrikaners. Again, this emotional theme was part of all 
South African right-wing movements, but the AWB with the 
romance and theatricality of its uniforms and rituals, the 
power of Terre'Blanche's oratory and its direct promise of 
violence, probably expressed it best. 
The AWB's secretiveness about membership figures has made it 
difficult to estimate its support. Zille summarises the 
conventional wisdom of the late 1980s on the subject: 
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Estimates by specialist observers are that 
the AWB ••• has between 5 000 and 9 000 signed-
up members, 150 000 supporters who attend the 
organisation's meetings, and about 500 000 
tacit sympathisers. 66 
since just over 600 000 people voted for the CP and HNP in 
the 1987 general election, these estimates would suggest 
that something like five out of six right wing voters are at 
least 'tacit' sympathisers of the AWB. Even allowing for the 
fact that this designation is rather a 'soft' category, 
without much analytical substance, the estimate seems over-
generous, suggesting a greate~ unity of sentiment on the 
right than is warranted by the evidence of its fragmented 
institutional state. 
THE WHITE RIGHT SINCE 1990 
The Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party was already in a state of some 
disarray before President de Klerk's reforms of February 
1990. The 33 seats which it won in the general election of 
September 1989 had been a disappointment to the party, 
falling well below the 60-66 which it had claimed was the 
,likely tally. Such archaic policies as a 'coloured homeland' 
cast serious doubts on the Conservatives' claim to 
relevance, and even their successes were not easy to 
exploit. The difficulties of re-imposing strict racial 
segregation in the municipalities which they had controlled 
since the local elections of october 1988 highlighted their 
problems in coming to terms with the changing terrain of 
South African politics. This became especially clear after 
the Supreme Court ruled illegal the attempted reversion to 
hard-line apartheid in Carletonville and Boksburg. 
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Dissidents who favoured a greatly reduced white homeland 
over the claim to rule the whole of South Africa had already 
made their appearance at the party's Transvaal congress in 
october 1989, signalling the stressful effects of these 
developments on party unity.67 
The Conservatives' immediate reaction to the unbanning of 
the ANC and its allies, was to threaten a stayaway of whites 
'in everything from the SAA to hospitals, police, fire 
brigades, businesses and schools.,68 This threat was made in 
the context of a campaign which included a drive to gather 
one million signatures rejecting de Klerk's policies, mass 
marches, and a rally on 26 May, the anniversary of the 
Nationalists taking power in 1948. 69 The 26 May meeting was 
widely predicted to be part of a campaign which would 
include widespread strikes and a possible boycott of 
Parliament and municipal councils. 70 In the event, the crowd 
which attended the rally fell well short of the over 100 000 
expected71 and the proposals for action made by Dr. 
Treurnicht were considerably less radical than predicted. 72 
In order to succeed in reversing de Klerk's reforms, the 
four-month campaign would have had to impress the government 
with the threat of extra-parliamentary mobilisation so 
extensive as to threaten chaos and social breakdown. This it 
signally failed to do and over the next 18 months the 
Conservative Party, while not entirely relinquishing its 
new-found rhetoric of militancy, relapsed into a familiar 
parliamentary strategy of forcing another test of white 
opinion in a general election, on the grounds that de Klerk 
had no mandate for the extent of his reforms. The chosen 
medium was by-election contests. This predominantly 
electoral and parliamentary strategy was more congenial to 
the CP than one of radical, direct action. The party had no 
substantial core of the disaffected and excluded, 
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substantially motivated by class resentment as well as 
ethnic betrayal. More important, there was no substantial 
extra-parliamentary force to take such an initiative and 
force the CP into action in its wake. Other factors 
influencing the grip of parliamentarianism on the party 
were; a residual belief in democracy (albeit confined to 
whites); Dr. Treurnicht, a leader to whom the values of 
procedural civility were very important; an ethnic world-
view in which the objects of resistance -- the government 
and National Party -- were still Afrikaners, no matter how 
seriously misled. 
As it happened, the by-election strategy yielded results 
which apparently vindicated the Cpts strategic choice. In 
1990 and 1991, the CP contested five by-elections. 73 The 
highest swing recorded in the Cpts favour was 23.61% 
(Umlazi, Durban, June 1990) and the lowest, 7.4% (Ladybrand, 
Cape, May 1991).74 Despite the encouragement of this 
sustained improvement, the results seemed to indicate that 
support for the white right was too sUbstantial for its 
demand for a full-scale test of white opinion to be ignored, 
but would probably fall short of winning that test. 
Unfortunately for the CP moreover, the government could 
choose one of two tests, a general election for which the CP 
would need a swing of 12% to win, or a referendum in which 
victory would require a swing of 19%.75 Apart from the 
obvious attraction of a referendum (given these figures) for 
the government, a whites-only general election would be 
virtually impossible to hold in the likely face of stormy 
black opposition. 76 In fact, the logic of the Cpts strategy 
of shunning negotiations and sticking rigidly to the narrow 
terrain of white politics was to bring about a contest in 
which victory for the right represented a decidedly uphill 
task. 
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Such factors presumably played a part in President de 
Klerk's calculations when the Conservative Party won the 
Potchefstroom by-election in February 1992. De Klerk had 
chosen the occasion of his party's defeat in the Virginia 
by-election, three months previously, to announce that 
Potchefstroom would be a 'better test' of (white) public 
opinion. Despite this hostage to fortune, the Nationalists 
fought what was generally agreed to be a half-hearted 
campaign featuring a lack-lustre candidate and compounding 
their own problems by announcing politically damaging 
policies from cabinet level two days before polling. The NP 
strategy seemed to be so inept that there was widespread 
speculation (after the event) ·that the Potchefstroom defeat 
was an elaborate ambush for the Conservatives, as well as a 
means of bringing home to the ANC the danger of the white 
right and of 'selling' the idea of a whites-only referendum 
to them.77 Whether or not such a degree of Machiavellian 
calculation went into the decision, de Klerk did call a 
referendum, asking for approval of his reform policies thus 
far and a mandate for continuing the negotiation process. 
The underlying weaknesses of the CP's position which had 
been concealed by a smokescreen of by-election successes 
could no longer be concealed. Firstly, as the referendum 
question itself made clear, the future of the country could 
no longer be decided exclusively by a contest for the 
allegiance of white voters. Secondly, in any case, the 
ethnic and class interests behind the CP now accounted for 
only a minority of the white electorate. These weaknesses 
were heavily underscored when the CP could not at first make 
up its mind whether or not to contest the referendum, 
suggesting that the leadership was not unaware of them. 
Although the Conservatives now probably outscored the NP in 
support from Afrikaners, burgeoning support from English 
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speakers kept the NP ahead in white votes. 78 TWo structural 
factors continued to inhibit further growth in CP support, 
as they had done throughout the 1980s. Firstly, its 
principal appeal was to declining social groups in 
agriculture, industry and the lower-ranks in the 
bureaucracy, occupational categories which accounted for 
smaller percentages of the white population every year. And 
secondly, despite efforts to attract English-speaking 
voters, the party's main raison d'etre was as the vehicle of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, which deterred all but a very small 
minority of English-speakers from anything but a fleeting 
and opportunistic identification with the Cp.79 
TWo further problems contributed . a degree of incoherence to 
the CPo The first was a lack of clear cut policy. This 
reflected differences among the party's supporters (notably 
in the parliamentary caucus itself) between those who were 
prepared to accept a smaller white 'homeland' and those who 
demanded the present extent of 'white' South Africa as the 
extent of white territory, at least for bargaining 
purposes. 80 The degree to which rigid apartheid laws would 
be re-introduced in a CP-ruled South Africa (of whatever 
territorial extent) was also the occasion of flatly 
contradictory pronouncements by leading party spokesmen. 81 
The long-running uncertainties of CP relationships with the 
further right and especially the paramilitary AWB was a 
second source of confusion, despite the declaration of a 
common front to fight for a 'no' vote. 
All these formidable obstacles to the growth of the CP and 
the successful prosecution of a 'no' campaign were inherent 
in the party's own nature. External factors were also 
forbidding. In promoting a 'yes' vote, President de Klerk 
had the support of the liberal white opposition, virtually 
all of organised business and commerce, all important 
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newspapers, the ANC and the international community. In 
addition, the National Party did not scruple to use the 
resources of the state-run media and the bureaucracy (in 
speedily processing citizenship applications for instance) 
in the 'yes' campaign. 
The CP's defeat in the referendum halted in its tracks the 
impression of momentum which the by-election victories had 
created. It greatly sharpened the internal conflict between 
those who were prepared to accept a smaller white homeland, 
and others who insisted on the territorial status quo.82 Of 
the other differences between the camps, the most important 
was over the question of whether to participate in the 
negotiations. Although the referendum result effectively 
ended any possibility of coming to power through the white 
polity, there were those in the CP who still refused to 
negotiate with anyone other than the leaders of yolks 
(nations), a category which excludes the ANC. The 
yolkstaters (those who argue for a smaller white homeland) 
represented the negotiating wing of the party. Between 2 
February 1990 and the referendum two years later, these 
divisions were contained with grave difficulty.83 After the 
referendum the CP could not hold together. 84 Although the 
'volkstaters' or 'new right' would have preferred to convert 
the CP to its policies, when a breakaway came, the fact that 
only five members of the parliamentary caucus left to form 
the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) and pursue policies of 
negotiation for Afrikaner self-determination indicates the 
balance of power in the party.8S 
In the last months of 1992, shaken by the disappearance of 
the exclusively white polity, embarrassed by the breakaway 
of the AVU, emboldened perhaps by the possibilities of 
c~operation with conservative homelands interests86 and 
informed by a public opinion poll that 70% of their 
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supporters favoured talks,87 the CP reassessed its position 
on negotiations. Although it was clear that internal 
divisions on the issue remained, the party announced in mid-
January 1993 that it was willing to join multi-party 
negotiations when they resumed. The decision also marked the 
CP's conversion to a negotiated territorial settlement 
reflecting the aspiration to Afrikaner self-determination. 
Indeed it was repeatedly made clear that this was the only 
issue the CP would countenance at the talks. 88 The CP duly 
put its proposals for an Afrikaner state to the negotiation 
forum in June. Despite containing extensive constitutional 
detail, the plans specified neither boundaries nor 
unambiguous qualifications for citizenship. Negotiators 
would not elaborate on these issues. 89 It is likely that the 
death of CP leader Andries Treurnicht (22 April 1993) less 
than a month after the Conservative Party had joined the 
multi-party talks allowed divisions over the negotiations to 
re-emerge more bitterly than before. Certainly his 
successor, Ferdi Hartzenberg was known to be a hardliner, 
vehemently opposed to the negotiation process as it had been 
structured by the government and the ANC.90 The realisation 
that its proposals for an Afrikaner state could hardly be 
expected to win the approval of the main negotiators and the 
emergence of the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)91 which promised 
to unite the disparate forces of the white right were 
further influences in persuading the CP to join Chief 
Minister Buthelezi in withdrawing from the multi-lateral 
talks early in July. Since that point, the CP's role has 
been increasingly to act as part of the AVF and COSAG 
(renamed the Freedom Alliance in early October) rather than 
individually. 
The Paramilitary Right and the White Trade Unions since 1990 
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Like the Conservative Party, the paramilitary right has 
experienced mixed fortunes since 1990. De Klerk's reforms 
encouraged a revival of interest in paramilitarism, and by 
late 1990, one estimate put the number of paramilitary 
groups at 20, with a total membership of perhaps 18 000. 92 
This undoubted growth was characterised more by 
theatricality and shadow-play than substantive action, a 
perennial problem in assessing the status of right wing 
paramilitaries. 93 These qualities were exemplified by the 
career of Piet "Skiet" (shoot) Rudolph, who skillfully 
manipulated the media into projecting him as a pimpernel 
figure while on the run after carrying out a raid on an Air 
Force arms depot. At the same · time, the message from 
paramilitary spokesmen echoed that of political readers on 
the right -- the time had come to prepare for armed action, 
but not to unleash it. Typical of this consensus is the 
statement of Boerestaat Party leader Robert van Tonder: 
The Boer army will begin shooting on the day 
when the Y2lk loses the right of self-
determination (beSluitnemingsre~) over 
itself. (author's translation). 4 
One area in which substantive action was taken however, 
setting a pattern for right-wing activities, was vigilante 
protection of white privileges in residential areas, 
workplace and municipal facilities. serious clashes took 
places in the Orange Free state mining town of Welkom, where 
a campaign of action against racism in the workplace by the 
black National Union of Mineworkers (NOM), beginning in 
1989, sparked off counter-accusations of assaults against 
white miners underground. 95 The ensuing conflict was clearly 
exacerbated by the reactions of both white and black miners 
to the ANC's unbanning and spread from the workplace to 
involve vigilante actions in white neighbourhoods, a 
consumer boycott by black organisations and police shootings 
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of black demonstrators. 96 In later developments (May-June), 
an incident arising out of the wearing of ANC colours by 
miners underground at President steyn mine saw demonstrating 
black miners shot at, and two white miners murdered. 
Explosions, including one at HUM headquarters in Welkom led 
to AWB leaders in the area being detained. 97 
Events in Welkom in the first half of 1990 showed how well 
the paramilitary right could exploit a situation of 
structural tension involving workplace and territorial 
issues. Not least of the right-wing gains was a propaganda 
coup scored when Eugene Terre'Blanche met law and order 
minister Adrian Vlok. 98 On the other hand, the Welkom 
conflicts were isolated, and remote from the country's 
political, administrative and industrial heartlands. The 
effectiveness of the blacks' counter weapon of consumer 
boycott and the arrest of right-wing activists contained and 
curtailed the right's ability to exploit the situation. 
In the second half of 1990, security police carried out 
numerous raids, detaining suspects and recovering stolen 
arms. 99 Preventive measures were also evident including, for 
instance, the withdrawal of arms from part-time commando 
units, whose loyalties might lie with the right. By 
September 1990, the paramilitary right was reported to be in 
serious disarray, subject to repeated infiltration from the 
security police and "unexpectedly harsh action".100 Police 
measures also extended to the right's attempts at vigilante 
and mass action. On 11 May 1991, police engaged a group of 
right-wing farmers who were attempting to evict a black 
community from the Goedgevonden farm near Ventersdorp in the 
Western Transvaal. The community, which had been forcibly 
removed from the land in 1978, reclaimed it in April 1991. 
~o farmers were wounded in the skirmish when police moved 
in to protect the residents from attack. 101 On 9 August, 
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three people were killed and 53 wounded when right wingers 
tried to prevent President de Klerk from speaking at a 
National Party meeting in Ventersdorp. About 2 000 AWB 
supporters engaged a similar number of police, with firearms 
used by both sides. l02 
The issue of state action against right-wing paramilitaries 
is a contentious one. Some sources argue that the state 
shows undue tolerance towards the right, allowing 
paramilitary training and insurrectionary rhetoric to a 
degree forbidden to anti-apartheid activists. l03 Others take 
a diametrically opposed view: 
An extraordinary feature of right wing 
attacks has been the diligence with which the 
state has investigated them, and the 
extremely high rate of success it has had in 
making arrests and obtaining convictions. 
Just what the reasons are for this 
outstanding display of political will is not 
clear, but what is clear is that the capacity 
and ability exists for the ·solution of crimes 
of political violence. l04 
Several points can be made in confronting these apparently 
irreconcilable assertions, suggesting that in fact, in their 
own ways, both could be correct. Firstly, particularly in 
the intimate conditions of rural and small town South 
Africa, remote from central control, police, state legal 
functionaries (where they are not the police themselves) and 
right-wing civilians may have close links. l05 The tolerance 
and even cooperation bred in these situations could easily 
co-exist with infiltration, investigation and prosecution of 
right-wing groups by the security forces at higher 
structural levels, closer to central control. Secondly, the 
security forces are not monolithic; they are subject to 
divisions between reformers and reactionaries like the rest 
of white South Africa and in their own case to the 
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conflicting tensions between partisanship and 
professionalism. As a result, it should not be surprising if 
a mixed response to the white right is evident. Thirdly, it 
is likely that the government and security forces believe 
that the repression of the grass roots mobilisation of 
right-wing paramilitaries would be difficult and possibly 
counter-productive in both political and security terms. At 
the same time the energetic pursuit of right-wing terrorists 
is politically essential. 
Whether through security force vigilance, their own 
infrastructural shortcomings, or strategic choice, right-
wing paramilitary organisations have played only a minor 
role in the political violence which has consumed South 
Africa since 1990. Certainly this conclusion holds true if 
numbers of incidents and deaths attributable to right-wing 
actions are taken as yardsticks. For instance, the Human 
Rights Commission's two year survey106 (July 1990 - June 
1992) records a total of 207 'right-wing attacks' causing 44 
deaths and 347 injuries. In the same period, an overall 
total of 5 700 incidents were recorded and a total of 6 229 
deaths. 'right-wing attacks' caused 0.7% of these deaths. 
Not only is the overall percentage very low, but a very low 
percentage of deaths per incident is evident (21%).107 
Two features of the paramilitary right (and by extension, 
the right-wing phenomenon in general) may help explain the 
level and character of right-wing violence. The first is the 
right's apparent inability to achieve a concentration of 
forces. The difficulties of aligning the largely law-abiding 
electoral support of the Conservative Party with mass direct 
action, never mind violence, have already been noted. The 
failure of the CP campaign to reverse the de Klerk reforms 
between February and May 1990 underlines the point. Equally, 
there is no sign yet of the kind of alliance between white 
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workers and paramilitaries which could destabilise the 
country to the right's disadvantage. There is plenty of 
rhetoric108 and it is a central article of faith on the 
right that "a three day stayaway by white workers could shut 
down the whole economy".109 This threat remains a staple of 
Eugene Terre'Blanche's repertoire: 
If the right wing finds each other, then they 
have the power to bring South Africa to a 
complete stop. With their strength in the 
labour field, they can bring every train to a 
halt ••• They can destroy communications 
totally ••• if the boys of ESKOM switch of 
the lights then it will be darkest 
Africa".110 
Despite reported gains for militant white unions over more 
moderate ones since early 1990111 there have been no 
experimental or demonstrative exercises to flex the alleged 
muscle and give any SUbstance to the threat. 112 
Allied to the right's inability to concentrate its forces is 
a second characteristic, the strategic policy of reserving 
the threat of far-reaching direct action for after the 
assumption of power by a black government. Another central 
theme of the right's rhetoric is to stress the preparatory 
nature of all its present activities. By this choice, and by 
refusing until early 1993 to become involved in negotiations 
with black political groups, the right-wing parties and 
organisations have retained (whether deliberately or not) 
the character of pressure groups on the National Party 
government, rather than actors in their own right. In fact, 
although the Nationalist coalition has long ago lost its 
organisational basis and ideological coherence, the right-
wing groups have neither sought, nor even exercised by 
default, the autonomy Which shoulq have been the inevitable 
by-product of the coalitions's decay. The main aim of the 
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Conservative Party (and even largely the AWB) has been to 
'bring the government to its senses' rather than to take new 
initiatives in altered conditions for revised configurations 
of social forces. 113 Apparently only after the end of white 
rule will they do so. 
The Reyolt of the Farmers and the Formation of the Afrikaner 
yolksfront CAYF) 
Early in 1993, moves to consolidate right-wing forces in a 
unified front suggested that these limitations could be 
transcended. Several factors contributed to this 
development. The whites-only r~ferendum of March 1992 
effectively spelled the end to the white polity as a 
separate entity, and the right's ambitions to come to power 
through white elections. But something like one third of 
white voters associated themselves with the right's 
rejection of de Klerk's reforms and many (perhaps most) of 
those who did vote for reform did so out of a profound 
desire for a peaceful and stable new dispensation in which a 
future black government would be effectively contained by 
constitutional constraints. By early 1993, negotiations had 
been bogged down for over six months, political and criminal 
violence were running at high levels and the government's 
ability to force a settlement favourable to whites on the 
ANC appeared to be in doubt. Most serious of all was the 
armed campaign against whites undertaken by the Azanian 
People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing of the 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), late in 1992 and continuing 
into 1993. These developments made themselves felt in 
widely-reported disillusion with the National Party and 
further decay of its grass roots infrastructure. 
Coincidentally, the National Party re-launched itself as a 
specifically non-racial, non-ethnic party, with strong 
emphasis on attracting the support of coloured voters in the 
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Cape. This caused further discontent among Nationalist 
supporters in the Transvaal and the Orange Free state. 
These factors were enough to crystallise and multiply white 
fears and disillusion, but what translated them into 
significant action on the right was the simultaneous 
emergence of farmers as a corporate social force capable of 
forming the core of right wing unity, and a group of 
recently-retired military officers to provide leadership. 
Historically, the agricultural sector has been of central 
importance in the white South African polity and the South 
African economy; " •• in 1910, more than 50 per cent of the 
MPs in the South African Parliament were farmers with an 
electoral system biased towards agricultural interest and 
the vote loaded in favour of rural areas".114 
At present however, white farmers have declined to 60 000, 
while agriculture contributes less than 6% to South Africa's 
GOP, employing 12.5% of the economically active population. 
The influence of agricultural lobbies has declined 
correspondingly, leaving a sense of grievance which helped 
ensure that in the 1980s the National Party lost most of its 
rural seats in the Transvaal and Orange Free State to the 
Conservative Party, while the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State Agricultural Unions became strongholds of the right. 
An increasingly unfavourable political climate for white 
farmers has developed at the same time as prolonged drought 
conditions (the worst for over 60 years) have extended from 
the 1980s into the 1990s. This coincidence has meant 
cumulative blows to the farmers' morale and position of 
privilege which include; exposure to more market-related 
interest rates and producer prices; the repeal of the Land 
Acts of 1913 and 1936 which reserved most of the country's 
agricultural land for white ownership; the extension to the 
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agricultural sector of labour legislation embodying basic 
workers' rightsl15 ; the exposure of farmers to claims for 
recompense and redistribution from land-hungry blacks, and 
to physical attack from criminals and radical black 
groups. 116 
Noting an alleged neglect of the rural environment by 
researchers in South Africa, one authority (writing in 1988) 
argued: 
•. there is little doubt that, over the next 
few years the attitudes and behaviour of 
white farmers at the periphery of the South 
African state, as well as their black 
workers, will playa crucial part in the 
future of the country.117 
The emergence of farmers as a body which can combine 
corporate material concerns with a degree of ethnic 
solidarity and the expression of national political fears 
and dissatisfactions, tends to support this prediction. 
Since 1990, farmers have added direct action to the 
traditional lobbying for influence. In January 1991 they 
blocked Pretoria's main streets with agricultural 
vehicles,118 and in May 1991 2 000 of them attempted to 
evict 'squatters' from government-owned land at Goedgevonden 
in the western Transvaal. 119 The farmers' lobbying bodies 
were the theatre of struggle between the government and the 
right. 120 In early 1993, a number of developments quickened 
the longer term concerns of the farmers and prompted them to 
action; the condition of the country in the immediate 
aftermath of Chris Hani's assassination seemed to suggest 
that the initiative had passed conclusively to the ANC, that 
perhaps the government could no longer be regarded as the 
sovereign power; the death of Conservative Party leader, 
Andries Treurnicht opened the possibility of re-alignment on 
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the right; agreement on the joint control of security forces 
by the government and the ANC seemed imminent; the maize 
price was fixed for the coming year at a level considered by 
farmers to be unacceptably low; the imposition of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act seemed imminent. The urgency of 
these developments gave impetus to efforts (which had been 
going on for about nine months) aimed at consolidating 
Afrikaner political groups to the right of the government. 
These efforts centred on a steering body, the 
Yolkseenheidskomittee (Vekom), in which former military 
commanders were prominent. 121 
A week of intense right-wing m9bilisation, which was given a 
popular dimension by a mass meeting of farmers in 
Potchefstroom on 7 May, culminated in the formation of a 
Volksfront whose purpose is to unite the disparate 
political, occupational, ideological and paramilitary forces 
on the right, behind the idea of 'Afrikaner self-
determination'. 
The initiative for the Yolksfront lay in the hands of four 
retired army and police generals who had only recently 
become active in politics. 122 The prestige of these men 
(especially former head of the army Constand Viljoen) gave 
impetus to the unity moves, but what gave them their 
principal impact was a protest meeting of farmers in 
Potchefstroom on Friday 6 May, the day before the Front's 
formation. It is Afrikaner dominance of the agricultural 
sector which ensures that occupational grievances are fused 
with ethnic and nationalist fears and discontents to form a 
potentially solid foundation for right-wing dissent. 
The volksfront123 set up a 17-man steering committee to draw 
up plans of action before the Front's next meeting on 19 
May, but anticipating this, farmers outlined certain 
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specific positions at the 6 May meeting. These included both 
political and economic demands: negotiations should be 
suspended until the 'private armies' of the black political 
movements are brought under control: farmers will not 
'serve' under an ANC government: farmers will not operate 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act: security forces, of 
which practically all farmers are part-time members, should 
refuse to serve an ANC government. Actions threatened in 
furtherance of these positions included immobilising large 
cities by blocking roads with agricultural machinery, 
ceasing to pay debts, and a 'producer strike' to 'empty 
shelves of food,.124 
Any assessment of these moves on the right has to take the 
following points into account in a situation which remains 
fluid at the time of writing. All the main figures involved 
have avoided inflammatory rhetoric and have expressed 
themselves with firmness but caution. For instance, Genl. 
Viljoen (easily the most impressive of the new leaders) was 
careful to stress that negotiations should not be abandoned, 
but only suspended until violence is brought under control. 
Despite the commitment to unity, substantial forces on the 
right have yet to be incorporated. For instance, the 
paramilitary AWB was virtually excluded from the 
Potchefstroom meeting, and it is obvious that the racism, 
emotional rhetoric and violence which give the AWB its neo-
fascist character are not welcome in the new grouping. It is 
equally clear that if the AWB is to play a part, it will be 
very much on the new leadership's terms. 
Although there was an impressive turnout at Potchefstroom 
(estimates varied from 6-12 000 with the majority in the 6-8 
000 range), the farmers' numbers are very small in a country 
o.f over 30 million. And by the very nature of their 
occupation, farmers are geographically dispersed, locally as 
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well as nationally, diffusing and diluting their political 
strength. While the combination of occupational grievances 
and wider political discontent makes a formidable mobilising 
combination in the short term, it is vulnerable to piecemeal 
concessions (heavier security protection in the rural 
areas125 , debt alleviation schemes, upward adjustment of the 
maize price), and it will be difficult to carry the initial 
impetus through to force an overall political settlement 
through on terms favourable to the right. 
Perhaps most problematic of all is the fact that conceptions 
of 'Afrikaner self-determination' vary very widely in 
theory, and in projected institutional expression. Some 
Afrikaner groups are very anxious to include Afrikaans 
speakers of all races -- especially coloured people -- while 
others are equivocal, or openly define 'Afrikaner' in racial 
terms. The status of an Afrikaner 'homeland' -- whether a 
sovereign independent state or an autonomous region in a 
greater South Africa -- is in dispute, as is the likely 
geographic location. 126 
Viewed in this light, the farmers' movement and mobilisation 
on the right are not likely to derail the negotiation 
process or lead to the creation of an Afrikaner state. But 
they have nudged the question of Afrikaner self-
determination closer to the top of the negotiating agenda, 
and should help clarify that concept into a more politically 
viable form than any which has previously emerged. 127 
The recent demonstrations of right-wing unity and strength 
appear at the time of writing to presage a return to 
effective political mobilisation by whites which will be 
influential in pressure group politics in the short to 
medium terms. The combination of sectoral economic and 
national political grievances which animated the farmers' 
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protest is unlikely, however, to be sustained into a 
movement durable enough to affect the outcome of 
negotiations in a decisive way. 
CONCLUSION 
The central fact in the break up of the Afrikaner 
Nationalist coalition has been that the National Party was 
able between 1981 and 1992 to enlist a substantial block of 
Afrikaners behind 'reform' as a popular political position. 
The number of Afrikaner votes that the NP could attract 
declined throughout the 1980s, but the haemorrhage 
stabilised between 1987 and 1989, and the limits of 
Conservative Party growth seemed to be confirmed by the 
whites-only referendum in March 1992. By maintaining its 
popular position and retaining possession of the state, the 
NP could define itself as the vehicle of the Afrikaner 
mainstream and the right as the radical breakaways who 
disrupted unity. Although by no means incontestable, this 
claim carried enough political weight to force the CP into 
the unpromising role of outsiders striving to reconvert the 
mainstream, to reconquer the middle ground. Afrikaner unity 
has always involved a difficult balancing act between those 
for whom it has meant the realisation of something exclusive 
and an end in itself, and those for whom it has meant a 
strong base on which Afrikaners (and Afrikaner interest 
groups) could co-exist with other political and social 
forces. For those of this persuasion, partnership with 
English-speaking whites in a system of white supremacy could 
logically be extended to partnership with Indians and 
coloureds in a coalition of minorities against the black 
majority. 
Especially after this development, the legacies of 
exclusivity and pragmatism could not be kept in harmony and 
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the latter strain came to dominate the NP thereafter. It is 
a tribute to the hall of mirrors effects of reform that the 
NP could accommodate blacks as permanent fixtures in the 
economy and white South Africa, Indians and coloureds in the 
constitution, English-speakers in its electoral 
constituency, and finally negotiate the end of statutory 
apartheid with liberation movements, while still remaining a 
largely Afrikaner party presiding over a largely Afrikaner 
state. This remarkable achievement required the ruthless 
abandonment of the overt baggage of Afrikaner mythology 
while maintaining, for the time being at least the substance 
of Afrikaner control. 
It was an act which the Conservative Party could not match. 
Rejecting both the ambiguities (to say the least) of the 
NP's transformation and the conclusions drawn by the radical 
partitionist groups which were willing to settle for a much 
smaller territory to be controlled exclusively by 
Afrikaners, the CP simply refused to recognise that the 
political terrain had shifted. This recognition was 
belatedly forced on it by the referendum result which made 
it plain that there was no hope of reconstructing the 
exclusively white polity and the Afrikaner Nationalist 
coalition which had dominated it. 
That the NP was able to manage and to a degree control the 
break up of the coalition which it had hitherto led was 
attributable first of all to the resources which it 
commanded. The identification of state, party and ~ which 
had been cultivated since 1948, gave resilience and strength 
to state structures, put considerable patronage at the 
disposal of the party, along with the control of information 
and coercion. It also diluted the importance of the Y2lk and 
its primary organisations. Because the 'chosen people' 
version had never been the sole or even dominant Afrikaner 
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identity, the NP's equivocations about 'peoples', 
'population groups' and finally 'minorities' did not 
represent a complete volte face for their supporters. 
Neither did change, adaptation and innovation. Afrikaner 
Nationalism, contrary to its reputation for immobility, had 
displayed enough dynamism in the past for the idea (if not 
always the precise details) of change to have resonance for 
at least the more self-confident of Afrikaners. Not least of 
the resources available to the NP was their ability to point 
to the stark dangers of immobility. 
To the end the white right wing has continued to believe 
that 'reform' was a confidence trick brought about by 
misinformation, self-delusion and downright mendacity about 
the nature and extent of the process and the likely 
cumulative and collateral effects of reforms in acquiring a 
logic of their own which would destroy the system they were 
meant to preserve. There is much truth in this 
interpretation. As late as the 1992 referendum campaign, the 
NP was being very economical with the truth about black 
majority rule as the outcome of negotiation. 
To focus on this truth however is to miss the point. The 
very essence of a successful confidence trick is that the 
victims are willing participants in the deception. Perhaps 
the most important factor of all in the break up of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist coalition was the existence of a large 
percentage of Afrikaners who believed that there was a way 
to preserve their identity and prosperity without either the 
human and material costs of domination, or of giving up 
control completely. It was the maintenance of this core 
constituency which allowed the NP to deploy its considerable 
resources of patronage, co-option and coercion to survive 
its own transformation intact. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE BREAK UP OF THE ULSTER UNIONIST COALITION 
In 1968, the Unionist Party had been in power in Northern 
Ireland for 47 years. As long as a majoritarian Westminster 
system of government and a first-past-the post electoral 
system prevailed there, as long as political cleavages were 
organised almost exclusively along sectarian lines, as long 
as British governments allowed a sUbstantial degree of 
autonomy to devolved institutions and as long as Catholic 
opposition remained weak and divided, there was no apparent 
impediment to Unionist unity and Unionist government in 
perpetuity. 
As outlined in previous chapters, all these premises ceased 
to be valid between 1968 and 1974, and the forces which made 
up the Ulster Unionist coalition could no longer be 
contained within a single political party. Although 
Protestants have retained an effective veto over far-
reaching political change and drastic alterations to their 
identity and status, these forces have never been 
reassembled into anything more than temporary 
confederations. It has never proved possible to deliver an 
organised bloc representing all shades of Unionist interest 
and opinion for anything more taxing than a discordant and 
ragged chorus of "No!". It is true that dramatic, concerted 
action has proved possible, notably in the Ulster Workers' 
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council (UWC) strike of 1974. But even this impressive 
demonstration of political power could not provide a 
platform for a renewed closing of ranks on unity's old 
bases, or under the leadership of newly-emergent forces. 
The breakup of the Unionist coalition took two principal 
forms. The first was a struggle for the formal 
constitutional expression of Protestants' interests. To 
begin with, the site of this struggle was the Unionist Party 
itself, broadening later to a contest between it and rival 
parties. The second source of fragmentation was provided by 
extra-parliamentary groups capable of sectarian mobilisation 
either at the work-place or on a territorial basis. Their 
contribution was direct action sometimes in alliance with, 
at others in rivalry with the formal political parties. 
Politicians sometimes needed the mobilising potential of 
workers and paramilitaries, not to mention the threat of 
chaos that their industrial and violent actions could bring. 
Workers and paramilitaries in turn needed the legitimacy 
that elected office could confer (especially when they found 
it so hard to achieve themselves), along with the channels 
to the British state that the politicians could open. But 
all sides had good reason to be suspicious of each other. 
They appealed to different constituencies, and, (tactical 
exigencies apart), their views on ends and means were 
fundamentally antithetical. The striking fact is that no 
integrated mass movement emerged to gather up the energies 
and direct the frustrations and fears of Protestants. 
What the political parties and other groups had in common 
and which allowed their ad hoc cooperation, is generally 
conveyed in the portmanteau term 'loyalism'. It will be 
useful at this point to define and discuss the term, which 
can be made to cover a whole range of Protestant political 
positions. 
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The most important point to be made is that the object of 
loyalty in loyalism is not indivisible. Indeed it is so 
many-faceted that the concept can easily appear self-
contradictory.l The principal contradiction "arises over 
whether the focus of loyalty is to Britain, or to the 
loyalists themselves. 2 Loyalty to Britain involves the 
acceptance of institutions like the monarchy and parliament 
as sources of authority and objects of allegiance, and was a 
prominent part of moderate or reforming Unionism. O'Neill, 
Chichester-Clark and Faulkner all in their various ways 
stressed the importance of conforming to the Government of 
Ireland Act which clearly reserved authority to the British 
parliament. Indeed it was on the question of Westminster's 
constitutional authority that O'Neill asked for William 
Craig's resignation. 3 
This metropolitan focus is much less important however in 
what has come to be known as loyal ism. It is the loyalist 
community itself, sometimes given an ethnic cast, sometimes 
a religious emphasis, which is the focus of loyalty. 
Moderate or reforming unionism violated this notion of 
solidarity, this community of the faithful. By accepting 
British leadership, by espousing modernising and ecumenical 
rhetoric, by dismissing those who did not accept reform as 
fringe extremists and archaic backwoodsmen, the reformers 
were committing acts of betrayal. For good measure, these 
attitudes often aggravated class-based, populist grievances. 
In practice, loyalism has come to define the political 
position of those who, since the imposition of Direct Rule 
in 1972, have campaigned for the restoration of an 
autonomous parliament and government for Northern Ireland, 
which will reflect in their composition the fact that there 
~s a sUbstantial majority of Protestants in the population. 
Loyalists also vigorously reject the view which is held by 
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constitutional Nationalists, that in any Northern Ireland 
settlement there must be provision for all-Ireland 
institutions -- an 'Irish Dimension'. 
On this basis, it has been clear since at least February 
1974 that loyalists, in this sense, have constituted a 
sUbstantial majority of Northern Ireland Protestants. But 
there are other dimensions to be considered. Loyalism has 
also come to mean an aggressive disposition to use 
unconstitutional direct action, to frustrate a settlement 
which does not embody the above conditions, and to use force 
as deterrent or reprisal in response to Irish Republican 
violence. These positions and the populist rhetoric of 
resentment and betrayal which goes with some strands of 
loyalism, can under most circumstances, count on much less 
sUbstantial support than the basic loyalist position 
outlined above. 
Allowing for these important differences of emphasis, 
loyalism as defined above has been the principal force ' in 
the break-up of the Unionist coalition. It is necessary now 
to look at this process of disintegration by examining first 
its constitutional and then its extra-parliamentary 
dimensions. 
Political Parties and the Break Up of the Ulster Unionist 
Coalition4 
It is not easy to summarise the lineage of the various 
political parties and groupings of parties which have 
competed for the right to be the authentic representatives 
of Northern Ireland's Protestant majority since 1968. The 
fissiparous representation common to communities in crisis 
has been aggravated by the multiplicity of elections ~nd 
electoral systems which has marked the search for a solution 
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in the wake of the collapse of two systems of government 
stormont and the Northern Ireland Assembly. In fact, since 
1968 there have been over twenty sets of elections in 
Northern Ireland, including those to four devolved electoral 
bodies (the stormont Parliament, the 1973 Assembly, the 1975 
Convention, and the 1982 Assembly), those to Westminster, 
and those to the European parliament. 5 Throughout these 
contests, parties, splinters and temporary coalitions have 
aligned and re-aligned to compete for Protestant votes under 
a bewildering variety of names and acronyms. 
Despite this, the main movements can be reduced to three. 
Firstly, the Unionist Party lost support to right and left 
in trying to come to terms with the legacy of O'Neillism and 
reformist pressure from British governments, which 
increasingly diluted Unionist autonomy. Secondly, the Ulster 
Vanguard Movement (1972-1978), led by William Craig, failed 
in its attempt to recreate a unionist coalition which would 
embrace parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups and 
unite all shades of Protestant opinion and interest. 
Thirdly, the Reverend Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist 
Party, which was not a splinter of the Unionist party, but 
an independent alternative from its beginning, has advanced 
from fringe status to be a serious rival to the Unionist 
Party in what has been since the mid-seventies a two-party 
competition for Protestant votes. 
The Post-O'Neill Unionist Party 
The first phase in the breakup of the Unionist coalition 
involved the phenomenon of O'Neillism, reaching a high point 
with the chord this reforming position struck in the wider 
community, exemplified by O'Neill's 'Ulster at the 
Crossroads' speech and the foundation of the New Ulster 
Movement. The opposition to O'Neill embraced ministerial 
365 
resignations and dismissals, backbench revolt and the 
contest for Unionist votes between pro- and anti-O'Neill 
candidates in the February 1969 stormont general election. 
The defeat of O'Neill in the aftermath of the election's 
inconclusive result and in an atmosphere of escalating 
community strife, did not mean the end of reform, but 
neither of his two successors could be regarded as reformers 
by conviction. certainly, neither could be regarded as a 
leader who could transform Unionism into a movement capable 
of commanding legitimacy and support from all sections of 
the community. As a result, those forces which had briefly 
grouped around O'Neill moved away from the Unionist Party 
and formed the bi-confessional Alliance Party in April 1970, 
thus removing the most convinced and advanced reformers from 
the party. 
An unmistakable air of the temporary hung over the 
administration of Major James Chichester-Clark, O'Neill's 
kinsman and successor. Certainly Chichester-Clark himself 
showed neither appetite nor aptitude for the job. However, 
it is unlikely that a better-equipped leader could have done 
much more to cope with the unbroken run of disasters which 
Chichester-Clark faced. In August 1969 continuing civil 
disorder led to the confrontation between police and 
Catholic residents in Londonderry which became known as the 
siege of the Bogside. This was the spark needed to ignite 
communal conflict which had been smouldering throughout the 
spring and summer on the boundaries of Catholic and 
Protestant areas of Belfast. After serious rioting and 
attacks by Protestants on Catholic areas which left many 
houses burned, British troops were called into both cities. 
The August 1969 riots exposed the fragility of the Northern 
Ireland state in a number of ways. The inability of the 
police to restore order, or even to contain the disorder, 
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suggested that the state might, with more determined effort, 
be overthrown completely. Catholics could feel that they had 
won a great victory symbolised by the fact that their 
various ad hoc citizens' defence associations were 
negotiating directly with the British Army. Certain Catholic 
areas of Belfast and Londonderry became 'no-go areas' and 
have never to this day returned to control through 'normal 
policing' by the state. The most important legacy of August 
1969 however was in the changed relationship between the 
Northern Ireland government and the British state. The 
autonomy of the Northern Ireland government was not 
officially at an end, but its foreclosure was there for all 
to see in the joint statement (the 'Downing street 
Declaration,6) issued by the two governments on August 19, 
pledging specific reforms and principles of equal 
citizenship for all citizens of Northern Ireland. More 
important than this demonstration was the question of the 
responsibility for security. Another communique underlined 
Northern Ireland's dependent status in unmistakable terms; 
•• the GOC Northern Ireland, Lt-Gen Sir Ian 
Freeland, would 'with immediate effect assume 
overall responsibility for security 
operations'. For other than 'normal police 
duties outside the field of security', he 
gained full control of the deployment and 
tasks of the RUC; additionally, he assumed 
'full command and control of the Ulster 
Special Constabulary for all purposes,.7 
Even worse was to come with the swift ordering, completion 
and publication, of a commission of enquiry into the RUC 
(the Hunt Report8 ) in october 1969. This recommended the 
civilianising of the RUC and the disbandment of the 'B' 
Specials in favour of a part-time, locally-recruited 
regiment of the British Army, the Ulster Defence Regiment 
(UDR). The release of the report's recommendations led to 
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rioting in the Protestant Shankill Road area of Belfast, and 
the death of the first RUC member to be killed since the 
beginning of the violence. This quintessentially loyalist 
event effectively dramatises the conflicts of identity 
inherent in loyalism as a position. Confirmation that 
Protestant militancy and dissidence was not confined to 
sporadic street disorders was furnished by electoral 
victories won by the Rev. Ian Paisley and one of his 
followers. 9 If the disturbances of August 1969 had opened a 
crack between the Unionist rank and file and their 
government, and another between the Northern Ireland and 
British governments, the lever which widened these rifts was 
the renewed IRA campaign which began to gather momentum in 
1970-71, with the split into Provisional and Official wings 
of the republican movement. 
Chichester-Clark resigned in March 1971 against the 
background of a severely deteriorating security situation. 10 
His successor, Brian Faulkner was an abler individual and a 
more considerable force both inside and outside the Unionist 
Party. He had credentials as a hardliner, having resigned 
from O'Neillis cabinet, and further back, during the 1956-62 
IRA campaign, he had been minister of home affairs, 
responsible for administering the Special Powers Act, and 
specifically internment without trial. Although a wealthy 
businessman, his background was not aristocratic and 
metropolitan, but authentically grassroots Orange. His aim 
was to bring in whatever minimum of reforms would satisfy 
the British without alienating the Unionist majority. At the 
same time he would prosecute a vigorous security policy, 
gambling on the hope that this, and his reputation for 
grassroots authenticity, would stabilise the situation in 
the Unionist Party. 
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Under Faulkner, as the violence continued to increase, it 
became clear that the most important dynamic was no longer 
i nter-communal tension, but the IRA's guerrilla campaign. 
This narrowed to virtually nothing the ground on which 
political reform might be negotiated. Faulkner's modest 
proposals for Catholic participation in government were 
completely overturned by events when two Catholics were shot 
dead by the British Army in disputed circumstances in 
Londonderry. The SOLP, the mainly Catholic opposition in 
stormont and the object of Faulkner's initiative, walked 
out. 
In the absence of political progress, Faulkner turned to the 
security arm of his policy and introduced internment without 
trial under the Special Powers Act in August 1971. The 
political and security effects of internment for the 
stormont and westminster governments were severe. Violence 
rose to unprecedented heights and virtually the entire 
Catholic community was alienated because it seemed clear 
that the intelligence on which internment was applied was 
often faulty. Many men innocent of involvement with the IRA 
were picked up and severely ill-treated. What is more, at 
first no Protestant extremists were picked up, giving the 
operation a decidedly sectarian aspect. As a result, the IRA 
received a large influx of recruits and a welcome injection 
of credibility as defenders and revengers of wronged 
Catholics. The SOLP was placed under enormous pressure not 
to co- operate either with the stormont or Westminster 
governments. Above all, the violence increased; 
Between internment and the end of 1971, 146 
people were killed, including 47 members of 
the security forces, and 99 civilians, and 
there were 729 explosions and 1 437 shooting 
incidents. 1! 
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The central political point about internment is that it was 
the last chance for the stormont government, the system of 
devolved rule on which it rested, and the Unionist Party 
whose raison d'etre was to administer that system. If 
internment failed, there were no other initiatives, 
political or security, which could win breathing space for 
negotiated reform, short of direct rule from westminster. 
This was duly imposed in March 1972 after the events of 
'Bloody sunday,12 in Londonderry had graphically illu~trated 
the dangerous and intractable cul-de-sac of current 
political and security policies. 
Direct Rule was another of the central events around which 
the crisis in Northern Ireland has turned. What the communal 
violence of August 1969, internment, and Bloody Sunday were 
to Catholics, Direct Rule was to Protestants. It removed 
their political autonomy, but, by continuing to regard 
'Northern Ireland' as the essential unit for which a 
solution must be found, continued to respect the ambiguous 
phenomenon of Protestant self-determination. It brought 
forward the confusions and contradictions of loyalism's 
mixture of allegiance and dissidence. While it united 
Protestants in opposition, it also served to highlight the 
splits in Unionism, and if anything, accelerated the 
dispersal of the Unionist coalition. Up to this point, the 
crisis of Unionism had been manifest mainly in a struggle 
for control of the Ulster Unionist Party. In the atmosphere 
of unresolved ambiguity which followed Direct Rule, this 
contest was overshadowed (though not ended) by the growth of 
Protestant worker and paramilitary organisations, and the 
emergence of rival political parties as serious contenders 
for Protestants' votes. 
Although the Unionist Party had shed its most committed 
reformers long before Direct Rule, British pressure and 
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tutelage moved Faulkner, the former hardliner, into 
acceptance of reform positions far in advance of any O'Neill 
dreamt of. Faulkner's party did not appreciate this irony 
however, and he was unable to take more than a minority of 
Unionists with him. This final split took place between 
Direct Rule and the Ulster Workers' strike in 1974, a period 
dominated by Britain's efforts to widen the basis of consent 
to local state institutions so that devolved government 
would again be possible for Northern Ireland. This process 
led to the British government's White Paper of March 1973 
which proposed a 78-member Assembly elected by proportional 
representation, from which a power-sharing executive would 
be drawn. To satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the 
Catholic minority, a council of Ireland was proposed. This 
would create an All-Ireland statutory framework in which 
matters of common interest to the Republic and Northern 
Ireland could be dealt with. 
Elections held for the Assembly in June 1973 reflected the 
divided reaction of Unionists to the proposals. Unionists 
took 50 out of the 78 seats, but they were split into five 
groupings. 24 Official Unionists were returned, but of these 
only 14 sided with Faulkner in approval of the White Paper. 
This meant that with the other 26 Unionists divided between 
unofficial Unionists and three loyalist groups (Paisley's 
Democratic Unionist Party, Craig's Vanguard Unionists and 
the West Belfast Loyalist Coalition), there was a heavy 
anti-White Paper majority among Unionists. A majority for 
power-sharing was created however, by the addition of 19 
SDLP, eight Alliance and one Northern Ireland Labour Party 
member to the Faulkner Unionists. 
The spectacle of a leader of the Unionist Party reduced to 
reliance on the votes of Catholic nationalists for a 
majority was a difficult one for most Unionists to swallow, 
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and its significance was not lost on them. On 7 July, the 
"Unpledged Unionists"13 asked the secretary of state for 
Northern Ireland to regard them as a separate group, 
emphasising that Faulkner could not be regarded as their 
leader. On the same day, William craig chose an Orange walk 
in Glasgow to proclaim that the loyalists and Unpledged 
Unionists had reached agreement to wreck the Assembly. For 
his part, the Rev. Ian Paisley, speaking in a hardline 
loyalist area in Co. Derry said that " •• the sell-out by 
O'Neill, Chichester-Clark and Faulkner is over •• " and that 
loyalists were determined to save the country.14 
The early meetings of the Assembly were marked by loyalist 
disruption of procedures, and by co-operation between the 
pro-White Paper parties to defeat loyalist motions. During 
October and November agreement was reached on the 
composition of the power-sharing Executive. 15 Faulkner's 
position was increasingly beleaguered. At an Ulster Unionist 
Council meeting on 20 November, a motion calling for 
repudiation of power-sharing was defeated, but an amendment 
proposed by Faulkner himself was passed by only ten votes 
(379-369).16 Loyalist opposition to power-sharing grew even 
sharper when it became clear that anti-Executive groupings 
would not be invited to forthcoming tripartite talks between 
British, Irish and Northern Ireland representatives. These 
discussions were intended to seal the new system of 
government for Northern Ireland. There were outbreaks of 
violence in the Assembly with Faulkner's Unionists being 
abused and physically attacked and police called to remove 
loyalist members. 17 
The tripartite talks took place at Sunningdale in Berkshire 
(6-9 December 1973). The resulting agreement covered three 
main areas; the status of Northern Ireland; the 
acknowledgement of an all-Ireland dimension to politics and 
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administration by the provision of a Council of Ireland on 
which representatives from both sides of the border could 
co-operate at ministerial and assembly level; and measures 
to bring to justice those accused of crimes of violence 
wherever in Ireland they were committed. 18 
The sunningdale Agreement was rejected by the Ulster 
Unionist Council (427 votes to 364) and Faulkner resigned 
the leadership. Although he retained the support of the 
Unionist members of the Assembly who had previously voted 
for him, the vast majority of party members and voters 
remained with what came to be known (and remains called to 
this day) the Official Unionist Party (OUP). Its first 
leader was Mr. Harry West, one of the first MPs to have 
opposed O'Neill's earliest efforts to change the direction 
of the Unionist Party. 
With the failure of the Executive and Assembly at the hands 
of the Ulster Workers' Council strike in May 1974, the 
power-sharing, or reforming Unionists did not disperse, as 
the followers of O'Neill had done, but constituted 
themselves as the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI). 
This however was clearly a rump party and although it 
survived Faulkner's withdrawal from politics in 1976 and his 
death in a hunting accident in 1977, it made little 
electoral headway. Its precarious existence was wound up in 
1981. The OUP cooperated closely with the loyalists of 
Paisley's Democratic unionist Party and Craig's Vanguard 
Unionists, forming the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) 
with them to fight the Sunningdale Agreement in the February 
1974 Westminster general election. This contest, 
fortuitously for the loyalists, was called unexpectedly as a 
result of the Conservative government's conflict with the 
British coal miners. By ensuring that only one anti-
Sunningdale candidate stood in each constituency, the UUUC 
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won 11 of the 12 seats, taking 50.8% of the vote, as against 
13.1% for the pro-Assembly Unionists. After initial 
hesitation, the UUUC also co-operated with the loyalist 
workers and paramilitaries in the strike which brought down 
the Executive. 
The defeat and resignation of Faulkner might have paved the 
way for a re-constituted Unionist Party to act again as the 
centrepiece of a coalition representing all Protestant 
identities and aspirations. Despite the common front against 
Sunningdale and the Assembly however, the various Unionist 
and loyalist parties and groups kept their separate 
identities and their co-existence ever after was marked by 
competition as well as cooperation. The free rein given by 
the crises of Unionism to strains of populism and class 
resentment, religious fundamentalism, proto-nationalism and 
paramilitarism, could no longer be accommodated in a single 
party. Above all the collapse of the old Unionist system's 
autonomy and access to patronage meant the end of the 
Unionist Party as the sole vehicle for the expression of 
Protestants' political identity. 
Ul t V d d th V d U · . t . s eranguar aneanguarnlonls Progress lye Party 
Ulster Vanguard was set up in February 1972 to provide an 
umbrella for the various strands of right-wing Unionist 
resistance to reform, and the Unionists' loss of autonomy to 
British direction and control, especially in security 
policy, which culminated in the imposition of Direct Rule 
one month later. 19 The leading figure in Vanguard was 
William Craig, the most prominent dissident in the Unionist 
Party. From the beginning, vanguard had a somewhat anomalous 
nature. In some respects it was a pressure group whose 
purpose was to capture (or recapture) the Unionist Party for 
a more explicitly loyalist conception of Protestant identity 
374 
and the relationship with Britain. In other resects it was 
the medium of expression for political forces which were not 
compatible at all with Unionism as traditionally conceived. 
This dissonance was made plain in the relationships between 
Vanguard and the loyalist worker and paramilitary groups 
with whom it had close though not invariably harmonious 
relationships. 20 
Endemic to Ulster vanguard (and indeed to the phenomenon of 
loyalist mobilisation as a whole) was the aspiration of 
worker-based organisations to create a left-of-centre 
loyalist political party. This created tensions between the 
largely middle and lower-middle class right wing Unionists 
who gave Vanguard its political direction, and their working 
class partners in the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW) 
and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). These respectable 
right-wing elements were also ambivalent about the 
paramilitaries, whose mobilising power they needed, 
particularly at the launch of the movement, and subsequently 
in election campaigns, but whose violence and criminality 
brought them into disrepute. The essential contradiction 
remained that Vanguard could not mobilise effectively 
without the workers and paramilitaries, yet association with 
them made impossible the recapture of mainstream Unionism, 
and especially the Unionist Party itself. 
This was not the only source of contradiction. Running 
counter to Vanguard's function as a launching pad back into 
the Unionist mainstream was its apparent encouragement of 
resistance to British leadership and control, which might be 
taken as far as a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. 
The break between craig and O'Neill came over this very 
issue and especially in the aftermath of Direct Rule, 
Vanguard became closely associated with nationalist and 
separatist sentiments. In fact, the movement's statements on 
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the issue do not reflect a strong drive for independence at 
all,21 and they reflect a somewhat incoherent blend of 
threats and reassurances. Nevertheless, the popular 
association of Vanguard with the idea of an Ulster, rather 
than a British identity was a strong one, lending it the 
character of a new, potentially radical political force. 
To some extent these contradictions were assuaged when 
Vanguard was transformed into a fully-fledged political 
party; 
The formation of the Vanguard Unionist party 
in March 1973 was a partial admission that 
the umbrella concept was' unworkable. It also 
reflected disillusionment that the Unionist 
Party could be changed from within after that 
party had authorised Brian Faulkner to 
negotiate with Britain on her power-sharing 
proposals like negotiated independence, 
dominion status or a federal British Isles. 
The toning down of its anti-Britishness and 
its paramilitary links also made it a more 
acceptable partner for other loyalist 
parties •• 22 
Despite some successes in the NI Assembly (1973), 
westminster (1974) and NI Convention (1975) elections, the 
VUPP was never able to settle on a distinctive position 
which would locate it firmly in the competition for 
influence which followed the breakup of the Unionist Party. 
Craig himself never seemed to free himself of the aspiration 
to return in triumph to lead something like the old Unionist 
Party. He did in fact return in 1977, but it was a less than 
triumphant homecoming. During the Convention of 1975-6 he 
split the VUPP by proposing voluntary coalition with 
Catholic parties as a way out of the political impasse. 
Craig had been overcome by the same trend that finished 
Faulkner -- a hardliner moves to a more flexible position 
for pragmatic reasons and is repudiated by his followers. 
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Although Craig remained in politics into the 1980s, neither 
he nor Vanguard had any substantial influence after the 
split. 
Paisley. Paisleyism and the Democratic Unionist party23 
The nature and depth of the crisis in Ulster Unionism is 
tellingly revealed by the Rev. Ian Paisley's progress from 
the margins of religious extremism to be the most durable 
and visible (certainly the most audible) Protestant 
political leader in Northern Ireland. It is tempting to 
conclude that only in times of profound crisis can an 
individual who is so self-consciously and determinedly an 
outsider gain such significant purchase in a social and 
political milieu which in \normal' times has been heavily 
dominated by conventional, hierarchical and \ establishment' 
views of what is acceptable in a leader. 
Paisley represents the very epitome of a charismatic24 
outsider, owing nothing to social position or networks of 
class-based influence. In a society which places great 
influence on access to academic education, Paisley is a 
complete outsider -- having failed the scholarship exam for 
grammar school, he was the product of evangelical bible 
colleges and his degrees are from sources which are derided 
by the British university elite. 25 This quality of being an 
outsider might be a drawback in a time of relative 
tranquillity or security, when formal elites are considered 
to be controlling the situation and reproducing favourable 
conditions for the client groups in the coalition which they 
lead. But in a time of crisis when elites are unable to 
control the situation, and succumb to external forces, the 
outsider is untainted by association with established 
authority. His \years in the wilderness', spent denouncing 
backsliding leaders, bestow on him the mantle of prophetic 
377 
authority; he alone could foresee the dangers which the 
ruling elite either ignored, argued away, or insisted could 
only be contained by compromise. 26 
This quality of being outside formal elites is reinforced by 
the fact that, quite early in his career, Paisley managed to 
antagonise three of the four main establishment powers in 
Unionism, the Orange Order, the Presbyterian Church and the 
Unionist party.27 With what seemed an almost perversely 
disputatious talent for fission, he seemed destined to 
remain a maverick, able to appeal only to the fringes of his 
natural constituency. Not only were his views extreme, but 
he appeared unable to compromise with those in power. 
The outsider's vantage point and world view which background 
" temperament bestowed on him, meant that anti-elitism is 
-. , of Paisley's strongest characteristics. Firstly, it can 
be expressed in the popular mythology of betrayal in which 
the people themselves have to be ready to take matters into 
their own hands -- like the Apprentice Boys of Derry in 
case their leaders waver. Secondly, anti-elitism can be 
expressed in a culture of political and religious 
authenticity, in which truths are available to all, 
irrespective of education and status in the community. Where 
individuals' special qualities of leadership are recognised 
(as of course in Paisley himself), the emphasis is on God-
given extraordinary qualities, rather than those which might 
be displayed in an upward rise through the Establishment. 
Paisley's anti-elitism has also been able to feed on class-
based resentments of working-class Protestants in both rural 
and urban areas, although as we shall see, this quality 
ceased quite early to be central to Paisleyism. These 
resentments were of two kinds. Firstly, there was the 
resentment felt that the Unionist Party was the preserve of 
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the middle and upper classes, despite the fraternal nature 
of its ideology. This resentment was part of all loyalist 
discontent with the party during the breakup of the Unionist 
coalition. Secondly, there was the resentment which was the 
product of poor living conditions and unemployment among 
Protestants. Although Catholics are more likely to be 
unemployed or live in poor housing conditions than 
Protestants, because the latter are in a majority, " .• there 
are more poor Protestants than poor Catholics •• " 28 • This 
resentment has been made all the greater because of the 
tendency of the British media, especially during the civil 
Rights campaign to focus on specifically Catholic 
grievances, and to represent Protestants as a privileged 
ruling class. 
Paisley's career and the phenomenon of 'Paisleyism' 
represent the partial emergence into autonomous political 
expression of two strains of Protestant identity which, 
prior to the crisis brought on by O'Neill's reforms, were 
integrated into the Unionist coalition and subsumed under 
traditional Unionist leadership. These are religious 
fundamentalism and lower-class populism. The emergence of 
Paisleyism, however, also reveals the difficulties of co-
existence between the two, and of either reaching full, 
radical, autonomous expression. In Paisleyism, the dilemma 
between cultivating full expression for hitherto integrated 
(or even shackled) social forces, and trying to attract the 
widest range of class and religious support in defence of an 
ethnic identity, are particularly well caught. 
When in August 1968 the first civil rights march greatly 
raised the stakes in the confrontations between opposition, 
reform and reaction, the Rev. Ian Paisley was already well 
known as a preacher and protester. From the establishment of 
its first congregation in 1946, his Free Presbyterian Church 
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had grown to over twenty in 1968, mainly in rural areas of 
those counties (Antrim and DOwn) with the largest Protestant 
majorities. The extremity of his anti-catholic rhetoric made 
him an eye-catching figure, even by Ulster's standards of 
evangelical rhetoric. Although such denunciations formed a 
staple part of his preaching, when it came to politics, 
Paisley was less concerned with romanism and republicanism, 
the palpable enemies without, than with the enemies within. 
These were the ecumenical movement and all other 
manifestations of liberal protestantism, and in the Unionist 
Party, all signs of reformist or conciliatory tendencies. 
Although he was active in unionist electoral politics as 
early as 1949, Paisley soon forsook established party 
structures for agitation in extra-parliamentary groups. 
These included the National Union of Protestants (NUP) and 
Ulster Protestant Action (UPA). The concerns of these groups 
of street agitators included the alleged encroachment of 
Catholics (buying property, opening businesses) on 
\ Protestant' areas, and another manifestation of 
\territoriality', the question of the right to fly flags and 
hold processions in various areas. Both also advocated 
preferential employment policies for Protestants, a long-
standing issue in unemployment-prone Belfast. There was an 
element of preparation for self defence in the UPA , which 
was set up just at the beginning of the IRA offensive in 
late 1956. It was organised largely at the workplace, and in 
its paramilitary and worker aspects, it was a forerunner of 
the Protestant direct action groups which were to play such 
an important role from the early 1970s onwards. 
Paisley's involvement in direct action politics was taken a 
step further in the formation of the Ulster Constitution 
Defence Committee (UCDC) and the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers (UPV) in 1966. This was a year of marked 
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sectarian tension, the fiftieth anniversary respectively of 
the Easter Rising in Dublin, and the sacrifice of Carson's 
UVF at the Battle of the Somme as the 36th (Ulster) Division 
of the British army. The UCDC was a product of these 
communal tensions, its main function being to organise 
counter-demonstrations to republican celebrations of the 
Rising. The UPV provided the manpower and the province-wide 
organisation for a show of strength at any meeting or parade 
called by Paisley. These self-styled loyalist groups gave 
Paisley a ready-made base on which to build his campaign of 
counter-demonstrations when, in 1968, the civil rights 
campaign began in earnest. 
Paisley's brand of evangelical Protestantism laid great 
stress on street preaching, marches and demonstrations. 29 In 
this respect, his religious activities fused effortlessly 
with Ulster's political culture of parades and ritual 
display. These tactics were deployed wholesale in Paisley's 
campaign to intimidate the Civil Rights Movement and the 
Unionist government. The report of the Cameron Commission 
into the disturbances of 1968 concludes: 
It is our considered opinion that these 
counter-demonstrations were organised under 
the auspices of the Ulster Constitution 
Defence Committee and the Ulster Protestant 
Volunteers and that their true purpose was to 
cause the legal prohibition of the proposed 
Civil Rights or People's Democracy 
demonstrations by the threat of a counter-
demonstration, or if this move failed, to 
harass, hinder, and if possible to break up 
the demonstration. It must have been quite 
apparent to Dr. Paisley at least, that in the 
existing state of the law and having regard 
to the strength of the police, and to 
political realities in Northern Ireland, it 
would not be practicable to prevent 
congregation or concentration of \ loyalists' 
or to disperse them once gathered together on 
the route or in the vicinity of a proposed 
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civil Rights demonstration meeting or 
march. 30 
The Report goes on to say that Paisley had to bear, .... a 
heavy share of direct responsibility for the disorders •• 
and also for inflaming passions and engineering opposition 
to lawful, and what in all probability otherwise would have 
been peaceful demonstrations. 31 While these direct action 
organisations served Paisley well in both street and 
electoral confrontations, recruitment to them brought in 
lawless elements which were to embarrass Paisley. Despite 
the violence of his rhetoric and his willingness to mobilise 
followers for obstruction and intimidation, Paisley strove 
hard to maintain a public distinction between constitutional 
and violent action, a nicety not always appreciated by his 
supporters. 
It was the uncertainties and contradictions of the O'Neill 
period which turned Paisley from a fringe agitator into a 
serious political figure, and, although he has never 
forgotten the theatrical possibilities of this milieu, 
translated him from the street to parliament. His 
considerable presence has been projected into Stormont 
(1970-72) and the various short-lived assemblies which 
followed Direct Rule in 1972, into Westminster (from 1970) 
and the European Parliament (from 1979). This individual 
success has been matched by the advance of the Free 
Presbyterian Church, and the Democratic Unionist Party (OUP) 
which Paisley has led since its formation in 1971. The OUP 
has emerged as an effective challenge to the Official 
Unionist Party, and alternative focus for Protestant 
political representation and loyalties. O'Leary refers to 
the .... intense and volatile competition between the UUP and 
the DUP for hegemony within the declining Unionist bloc" and 
notes the DUP's growth at the expense of the UUP,32 a trend 
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which was checked in the early 1980s and again after DUP 
militancy failed to break the Anglo-Irish Agreement after 
1985. Nonetheless, these two parties attract the votes of 
the whole Unionist population, in a stable two party 
competition. 33 
In some respects the significance of the DUP for 
interpretations of the breakup of the Unionist coalition, 
lies not so much in what it has become, but in what it has 
not become. To illustrate this argument, it is necessary to 
describe the circumstances of its foundation. 
Paisley's first forays into electoral politics took place 
under the banner of the Protestant Unionist Party (PUP). 
Four candidates stood in the Belfast Corporation elections 
under this title in 1964, and in the 1969 stormont election, 
Paisley and five others used it. In 1970, Paisley and the 
Rev. William Beattie were successful in stormont by-
elections, while Paisley himself won the North Antrim seat 
in the Westminster election as a Protestant Unionist 
candidate. 
The PUP relied heavily on the UCDC, the UPV, and the Free 
Presbyterian Church34 and was more of a protesting sect than 
a party. It was the confluence of this organisation, with a 
disaffected Unionist backbencher, Desmond Boal, that saw the 
foundation of the Democratic Unionist Party in September 
1971. 
Boal is most usually described as 'enigmatic,.35 Certainly 
he clearly represents some of the contradictions and 
frustrations of Unionist populism, especially those which 
arise from any kind of radical position. Accounts of Boal's 
background and political career stress his allegedly 
'humble' background, his intellectual brilliance, and the 
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'self-made' quality of his education and career as a 
barrister. Despite his establishment education and career, 
he shared Paisley's distrust of elites and his 
identification with Unionism's submerged groups.36 Boal was 
MP for the stormont constituency of Shankill, the Protestant 
working-class heartland, and he is generally seen in the 
tenacious tradition of radical unionists, who, while solid 
on the questions of Protestant identity and opposition to a 
united Ireland, and dependably anti-socialist, have agitated 
against the subordination of working class interests in the 
Unionist coalition. At an early stage in his career, he was 
deprived of the party whip for criticising Brookeborough's 
policy (or lack of it) on unemployment, and demanding 
radical measures to protect the working class. He was also 
the only Unionist MP ever to vote against capital punishment 
and he proposed socialist policies like the nationalisation 
of the Lough Neagh fisheries. 
Boal foresaw in the confusion of the O'Neill and immediate 
post-O'Neill periods the loosening and imminent breakup of 
the Unionist class coalition. He wanted to take advantage of 
these developments to form a party which would remain firm 
on the constitutional issue, but would reflect the interests 
and the participation of the Protestant masses more 
faithfully. In order to do this, he co-founded the DUP with 
Paisley, hoping to capitalise on Paisley's charisma, grass-
roots organisation and anti-elitism, while grafting onto it 
a radical social programme and participatory institutional 
framework. In this way, Paisley's undoubted distrust of the 
Unionist establishment and his rudimentary concern with 
social issues, could be expanded into a full blown 
radicalism. Equally, Boal also recognised that the only way 
to reproduce mass support from Protestant workers was to be 
utterly ~reliable' on the constitutional issue, and he had 
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been one of the most ruthless critics of O'Neill's 
liberalisation. 
The initial aim in forming the DUP had been 
to create a united Unionist Party which would 
be as orthodox in its constitutional position 
as the Unionist Party of Craig and 
Brookeborough. It would be a stronger party 
because it would win popular support from all 
sections of Unionism by advocating equitable 
social and economic policies and by removing 
power from the undependable Unionist 
elites. 37 
Smyth's account of the DUP's founding differs in emphasis. 
What it represented, according to him was; 
•• a synthesis between the radicalism of 
Desmond Boal and an Ulster variant of the 
politics of religious defence which the PUP 
had been busily promoting. 38 
From any perspective, Boal's project was an odd one. 
Although there were historical precedents of a kind, none of 
them had envisaged a fully worked out alternative to 
traditional Unionism. The Northern Ireland Labour Party 
accepted the border and, in line with the traditions of 
Belfast working class organisation, saw itself as part of 
the British working class, the British trade union and 
labour movement. In a sense then, it was 'unionist' but, 
based in the trade union movement and self-consciously 
socialist, it could not properly be compared with Boal's 
project of a radical party based on Protestant exclusivism 
and the Protestant masses. 
The DUP soon attracted the only Unionist MP with impeccable 
working class credentials, ex-prize fighter, ex-soldier, ex-
docker, Johnnie McQuade. He held the Woodvale seat, 
bordering Boal's Shankill base and like him had resigned 
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from the Unionist Party in protest at the deteriorating 
security situation after the introduction of internment in 
August 1971. Despite this, no serious headway was ever made 
at turning the DUP into a left-of-centre political party 
with democratic structures which would re-unite all 
Unionists. Bruce argues that this was, " .• largely because 
conservatives recaptured the Unionist partY",39 thus 
presumably stemming the outward flow from the Unionist 
Party. 
Moloney and Pollak stress the importance of personality, 
arguing that Paisley's schismatic history, and his pre-
emptive announcement of the new party (in the ruins of 
Shankill Road pub blown up by the IRA with two dead and 
twenty injured), made it impossible for any major political 
figure among dissident Unionists to join. In addition, they 
point to Paisley's pragmatism, arguing in effect that the 
DUP was only a cover to make the evangelism of the Free 
Presbyterian Church acceptable on a broader base, and to 
Boal's arrogance and impatience with those who did not 
immediately grasp the importance of his political vision. 
Smyth points out that the socially discontented were only 
one section of Paisley's support, and they were confined to 
Belfast. Dissident Unionists in rural Ulster and politicised 
fundamentalists were probably more important, certainly as 
office-bearers, candidates and militants. The tensions 
between secular and religious aspects of loyalism (expressed 
for instance in controversy over whether "Protestant" could 
be dropped from the name of the new party) were sharp and 
intractable. 40 
None of these authorities makes the obvious point that any 
project such as Boal envisaged for the DUP is so completely 
contradictory as to be doomed to failure. It is one thing 
to articulate class resentment against the elite which leads 
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an ethno/religious particularist coalition. It is quite 
another to move from this to a radical social programme. 
such an enterprise could not help but shift from class 
rhetoric to class analysis and undermine the prevailing 
ethos of ethnic particularism. Boal himself seemed to 
recognise this because at the time he put forward the 
remarkably naive wish that the DUP would one day be able to 
attract Catholics as well as Protestants. In any case, the 
bedrock of the DUP was the Free Presbyterian Church whose 
biblical fundamentalism, could not easily be accommodated to 
materialist explanations of class inequality. In general it 
was unpromising material out of which to build a left-of-
centre movement. 
Boal left the DUP in 1974, and in the following year he was 
advocating a federal scheme for Ireland, having made the 
journey from 'hardliner' to 'moderate' which several other 
Unionists took. The Free Presbyterian element in the DUP 
continued to assert itself. In 1978, 9.5% of respondents in 
the Northern Ireland Attitude Survey who identified with the 
DUP were Free Presbyterians, compared with the 1.6% of all 
Protestants who belonged to that church. 41 Methodists and 
Church of Ireland members were under represented in this 
sample, while Baptists were over represented, and 
Presbyterians (44.8 of DUP identifiers, 46.5 of all 
Protestants) came close to the proportion for the whole 
Protestant population. More telling is the proportion of 
activists and representatives: 
In the 1973 power-sharing Assembly, and the 
1975 Constitutional Convention all but one of 
the party's team was in the church. Of the 74 
councillors elected in 1977, eighty-five per 
cent of those whose religions were 
ascertainable were, according to one reliable 
study, Free Presbyterians. In 1981 this rose 
to 89 per cent. In the 1982-86 Assembly, 18 
of the 21 DUP Assembly members were Free 
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Presbyterians and four of them were 
ministers. 42 
In terms of socio-economic composition, Moxon-Browne found 
that: " ••• there seems no doubt that Paisleyism, and more 
narrowly, support for the OUP is concentrated in the 
Protestant working class".43 In support of this he cites 
responses to the Northern Ireland Attitude Survey (NIAS) 
which shows OUP identifiers seriously under-represented in 
status groups A (0.9%, as against the 6.4% of all 
Protestants in this category) and B (8.6%, against 11.4%) 
while OUP identifiers are over represented in groups C1, C2, 
0, and E. But support for Pa~sley and the OUP is far from 
being only an urban phenomenon. In the NIAS, Belfast city 
accounted for only 25% of the OUP identifiers, while 36.2% 
were classed as 'other urban', and 38.8% ru~al. 
It is not surprising that there should be strong support for 
the OUP in rural areas, since the Free Presbyterian Church 
was in its early days a largely rural phenomenon. Paisley's 
own rural and small-town background should not be 
underestimated here in making him and shaping his appeal. It 
is no coincidence that is entire parliamentary career has 
been as representative for rural and small-town Co. Antrim. 
In any case, 'rural' and 'urban' are not as exclusive 
categories in Northern Ireland as they are in other places. 
As Hickey points out, more than two thirds of the population 
of Northern Ireland live within thirty miles of Belfast, a 
distance which reaches more than one third of the way across 
the province. Once outside Belfast, Hickey claims, we are 
quickly into a prevailing rural social influence, and a 
style of life very different from that associated with urban 
living. He stresses the pre-modern features of this: kinship 
ties and loyalty to traditions, the power of old beliefs, 
structures and attitudes, " •• the sacred and the corporate 
rather than the secular and individualistic".44 
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In such an atmosphere, the anti-modern, anti-rational, anti-
materialist overtones of both religious and political 
Paisleyism can be expected to be popular. It might also be 
expected that both Free Presbyterianism and the DUP would do 
best in the border areas, where the proximity of the Irish 
Republi9, heavy concentrations of Roman Catholics, and 
heightened IRA activity contribute to a particularly 
emphatic Protestant siege mentality, but this is not the 
case. Although Paisleyism has its adherents in all parts of 
the province, the heaviest concentrations are found in 
Antrim and Down, the north-eastern counties settled by 
Scottish Presbyterians, where Protestants are most clearly 
in the majority. Given the small size of the province 
however, and the sharpness of the all-pervading 
constitutional issue, it is probably wise not to be too 
literal about 'the border' since to a degree, all 
Protestants think of themselves as inhabiting disputed 
territory. 
Although middle-class Protestants are under-represented, and 
working class Protestants are over-represented in the DUP, 
it would be wrong to think of it as a 'working-class party'. 
A working-class identity is handy enough for expressing 
resentment against liberal or moderate leaders, but useless, 
indeed highly counter-productive in terms of the party's, 
and its members' principal preoccupations, their identity 
vis-a-vis the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland's 
Catholics. It is simply not possible to construct an 
identity, a programme and an ideology with class as the 
central element without resorting to secular and materialist 
ways of thought, which would run counter to the 
fundamentalist world view which is such an important driving 
force in Paisley himself, the Free Presbyterian Church and 
the DUP. 
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Perhaps it is not surprising then, that the source of the 
DUP's main support, the Protestant working class, is not 
reflected in the party's structure. Flackes lists thirty-one 
members of the DUP who have been elected to devolved 
parliaments or the westminster Parliament between 1971 and 
1983. Of these, the occupations of only fourteen are listed. 
Four are ministers of religion, . three are barristers and two 
professional politicians who became party functionaries on 
their graduation from university. One each of housewife, 
farmer, company director, travel agent and docker make up 
the balance. From this admittedly imperfect tally, it can be 
inferred if nothing else that there is no strong reflection 
of the social composition of the party's supporters in its 
elected representatives. Despite this, Paisley's closeness 
to the people by comparison with previous Unionist leaders 
is frequently cited as a major source of his attraction to 
Protestant voters. 
He is not just one of the leaders of the 
Protestant lower classes, he is a product and 
manifestation of a large section of them. 
Unlike Edward Carson, James Craig or Basil 
Brooke, Paisley is of the people in whose 
name he speaks, which is one reason he will 
be there at the end, whenever that is. He is 
the lower-class Ulster Protestant ••• Ian 
Paisley is the best introduction to what the 
consciousness of large sections of the 
Protestant poor is all about. 45 
What is new and significant about him is that 
he comes from the environment of urban, 
working-class Protestantism, and to that 
extent is more representative of the majority 
than the landed gentry who spoke for it in 
the past. He is Ulster Protestant Man, in all 
his ugly reality.46 
There is some truth in the position outlined by these 
quotations, although it is probably significant that the 
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first author uses the terms 'lower class', and 'Protestant 
poor', instead of 'working class'. There is little in 
Paisley's background that would necessarily give him an 
instinct for or solidarity with specifically industrial 
working-class experiences or consciousness. It is likely 
that Paisley's sometimes uneasy relations with Protestant 
paramilitary and worker organisations (in both of which 
power has tended to lie with the Belfast working class), 
stem from this point. While indeed Paisley may be more 
representative of the urban working-class Protestant than 
"the landed gentry who spoke for it in the past", this point 
should not be overstated. Apart from his ambivalence towards 
radicalism, it is in the urban working class that religious 
observance is at its lowest, and where Paisley's 
specifically religious positions are greeted with the 
greatest scepticism. 
Aside from occupational data, five university graduates were 
listed among the 31 DUP representatives, and of the 23 whose 
date of birth was listed, 15 had been born after 1940, which 
indicates that a high proportion of the DUP's parliamentary 
representatives were elected before they were forty. This 
supports Moxon-Browne's NIAS data, on the basis of which he 
makes the assertion that; 
Although both parties draw from the same 
Protestant community, the DUP has a higher 
proportion of its support in the younger age 
groups while the Official Unionists have a 
higher proportion in the older age groups.47 
since several of the fifteen were born between 1945 and 
1950, it is likely that Paisleyism has a strong appeal to 
those who acquired political consciousness after the crisis 
of 1968/69 and in the context of the renewed IRA offensive. 
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The CUP is a contradictory party which is difficult to 
classify. It is a religious-based party which attracts much 
support from people who do not formally profess the strict 
minority sect which does much to give it its identity. It is 
a party which stands for extreme social conservatism, and 
has a strong anti-elitist character. It is a party of the 
urban working class, and also of rural, farming interests, 
some of them quite substantial. It is a party which appeals 
to young voters and career activists, although it has never 
held office, nor is it likely to. It is a party with a 
strong identity, yet the social composition of those who 
identify with it does not differ markedly from its principal 
rival, the OUP. Perhaps the conclusion towards which these 
contradictions point is that while the CUP arose out of the 
breakup of the old Unionist coalition, it is itself a 
coalition, a disparate group of the threatened and 
disaffected. Bruce, describing the three westminster MPs 
elected in 1979 on the CUP ticket, points in this direction; 
••• Paisley, Robinson and McQuade between them 
represented the full spectrum of CUP support. 
Paisley was the evangelical preacher, 
embracing the religious and the political in 
his two careers and he was backed by the 
Protestant farmers. McQuade represented the 
old working-class independent unionist 
combination of militant loyalism and a 
populist critique of the ruling elite. 
Robinson was the first of a new generation of 
supporters of Paisleyism. As a teenager he 
had been attracted to Paisley because he 
shared his evangelical religion. He quickly 
became convinced of the need for political 
action and founded a branch of the Ulster 
Protestant Volunteers. Better educated, 
brighter, and more articulate than many of 
the older men who had supported Paisley since 
the 1950s, Robinson gave the party managerial 
and organisational skills it had previously 
lacked. 48 
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The Rev. Ian Paisley has been well-placed to reaffirm the 
Ulster and Protestant elements of Unionism and to make clear 
that Ulster Protestants are not British to the exclusion of 
these particularist identities. The status of being British 
must be made compatible with them, and is subordinate to 
them. In this way, Paisleyism has been an important 
political and religious force in Northern Ireland, 
galvanising, articulating, and organising the resistance of 
rank and file Protestants to liberalising and reformist 
tendencies in Unionism and the Protestant churches. with its 
reactionary, extreme sectarian and populist character, 
Paisleyism was the cutting edge of the revolt which broke up 
the old Unionist coalition. From this purely destructive 
role, it developed into a formal challenge to the Official 
Unionist Party as the leading voice in defending and 
promoting Protestant interests. 
A number of factors have contributed to this success. 
Firstly, Ulster's religious culture has enabled Paisley to 
pursue politics-in-religion, and religion-in-politics. 
Religious belief and observance play a central role in the 
lives of the overwhelming majority of the people. Religion 
is an important component, for many, ~ important component 
in ethnic and national identity. There is a strongly 
fundamentalist strain in the Protestant churches in Northern 
Ireland, even in those mainstream churches whose theological 
leaders have embraced more liberal positions. Richard Rose 
found that 72% of Protestants said that miracles, 
" •• happened just as it said in the Bible ...... 49 In this 
context, Paisley has taken one of the elements of the 
Unionist identity -- Protestantism, more specifically, Bible 
Protestantism --- and brought it to the foreground as the 
principal identifying feature of his political movement. As 
Hickey has pointed out: 
393 
It is necessary to recall .•. that the 
Northern Ireland state is regarded by the 
majority as a Protestant state set up to 
preserve the integrity of Protestantism. 50 
Paisley has used the characteristics of his religious 
thought -- especially fundamentalism, separatism, and the 
authenticity of personal experience -- to good political 
effect, and he has given theological sanction to a doctrine 
of resistance to established authority, based on the idea of 
a covenant between ruler and ruled. 51 These characteristics 
have enabled him to embody inflexible, intransigent, 
traditional Unionism. The fact that he had fought for years 
against liberalism in the Church meant that he was well-
placed to carry that fight into politics. In addition, he 
has been able to appeal to both rural and urban forces, and 
to keep in equilibrium the possibilities of constitutional 
and direct action. 
He has come to embody loyalism in the sense of ethnic and 
religious self-determination, resistance to Irish 
nationalism and outside interference, and Protestant self-
defence (in such groups as the UPV and the UCOC). He has 
added to traditional loyalism, the specific concerns of Free 
Presbyterianism, and the fundamentalist cause generally, and 
anti-establishment, anti-elitist populism. This mixture of 
loyalism, Free Presbyterianism, and populism, along with his 
own charismatic and authoritarian nature, make Paisleyism a 
formidable ideological package. 
If Paisleyism typifies the strength and power of the forces 
released by the crisis of Unionism, it also suggests their 
incoherence and limitations. Paisleyism has no social 
programme, and no means of analysis to arrive at one. It has 
no political programme other than the restoration of 
devolved institutions for Northern Ireland on the basis of 
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majority rule, which means Protestant domination, and more 
vigorous security policies. 
Partly because of the contradictions in his own beliefs, and 
positions, and partly because he is, as some authorities 
suggest, the prisoner of his followers as well as its 
leader, Paisley has been unwilling, and unable to take the 
movement which bears his name, and the party which is its 
principal political vehicle in any of the directions --
class, nationalism, or negotiated settlement -- which could 
give direction and dynamism to the forces released by the 
breakup of the Unionist coalition. Paisleyism remains a 
reactionary movement, defensive and not creative, with no 
broad goals to be realised. It is best described as a 
movement of reactionary populism. 
Protestant Workers' Groups and the Breakup of the Unionist 
Coalition 
One of the most important elements in the breakup of the 
Unionist coalition was action by worker-based organisations, 
the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW, 1969-73) and the 
Ulster Workers' Council (UWC, 1973-81). It should be made 
clear at the outset however that these were not sectarian 
trade unions. Their purposes were exclusively political, and 
they were without substantial industrial objectives and 
functions. Their origins were solely in the political crisis 
of Ulster Unionism and they had no institutional life prior 
to this. The organisational forms they took were sketchy and 
impermanent and included representatives of political and 
paramilitary groups. Workers' groups reached a peak of 
influence with the UWC strike of May 1974, and declined 
greatly after that. 
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The political organisation of Protestant workers owes much 
to the nature of the trade union movement in Northern 
Ireland. 52 Protestants and Catholics do not belong to 
different trade unions, except insofar as they happen to be 
concentrated in different industries or categories of 
worker, but sectarian issues do arise in the question of 
trade union organisation. Although the majority of union 
members in Northern Ireland belong to unions based in 
Britain these unions are affiliated to the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions (ICTU) based in Dublin. The ICTU has an 
autonomous controlling body, the Northern Committee to deal 
with politically sensitive cross-border matters. 
Of the approximately 300,000 union members in 
Northern Ireland, about 90% are in unions 
affiliated with the Northern Committee of the 
ICTU and of these, around 78% are based in 
Britain. Some 14% are locally based unions 
and only 8% are based in Dublin53 
Although the general effect of this diffusion of 
responsibility has been to make unions and union federations 
reluctant to grasp the nettle of sectarian issues, the 
Northern Committee of the ICTU has been generally associated 
with Nationalist sympathies quite out of step with the 
loyalism of many Protestant members of its northern 
affiliates. In times of stability, this may not have 
mattered too much, because as Munck points out: 
Protestant trade unionists •.• act as workers 
anywhere do, if taken by themselves: they 
agitate for better wages and conditions, and 
sometimes elect communist (even Catholic) 
shop stewards if these are seen as the most 
militant representatives of their material 
interests 54 
In times of instability however, workplace mobilisation 
becomes a vital expression of resistance by Protestant 
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workers when they find themselves at odds with Catholic 
militancy, 'their own' government and party, the British 
authorities, and the calls for peace, non-sectarianism and 
class politics from the 'official' trade union movement. 
Such was the background to the more or less spontaneous 
formation of the Loyalist Association of Workers during the 
confused period of civil rights agitation, O'Neill's 
reforms, and the Protestant backlash. 55 LAW developed out of 
an earlier, short-lived group called The Workers' Committee 
For the Defence of the Constitution. The prime mover in both 
was Billy Hull,56 a convener of Amalgamated Engineering 
Workers' Union shop stewards at Harland and Wolff's 
shipyard. Hull had resigned from the Northern Ireland Labour 
Party over Harold Wilson's support for Irish unity. The core 
of LAW was in the shipyards but it drew support from other 
industries, especially among power station workers and in 
engineering and manufacturing concerns. Many shop stewards 
were among its leadership figures. 
LAW campaigned vigorously for stronger security measures,57 
organising marches58 and work stoppages. 59 Although LAW was 
a shop floor organisation, it scarcely concerned itself with 
industrial issues,60 was open to "loyalists from all walks 
of life",61 and had strong links to political and 
paramilitary organisations. 62 Insofar as it expressed itself 
on social issues, it did so exclusively in sectarian terms. 
For instance a complaint in a LAW publication at the low 
numbers of students from working class backgrounds at 
Belfast's university is accompanied by the allegation that 
working class Catholic students are favoured. 63 The 
impression that LAW was an incoherent movement of protest 
lacking clear political goals is confirmed by its all-
pervasive distrust of established institutions, including 
not only governments, but churches,64 trade unions,65 and 
banks. 66 
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What the Loyalist Association of Workers conveyed above all 
was resentment and a sense of betrayal. 
Clearly the working class loyalists have for 
too long been used by the Unionist Party as 
votes to be collected at election time. 
witness the high proportion of middle to 
upper class MPs, a complete paradox to their 
numerical ratio in the class 
structure ••• Working class loyalists are like 
a rudderless ship, abandoned by the middle 
class and denied the right to elect spokesmen 
who will truly promote their interests •• 
Sooner or later the working class people will 
obtain their rights, the right to control 
their own destiny, to elect genuine MPs, to 
democratically govern the country for the 
benefit of the people and not the Unionist 
Party. 67 
Despite the high profile its campaign of direct action 
achieved in the last year of the Stormont administration and 
the first of Direct Rule, LAW ceased to be the 
organisational vehicle for Protestant worker disaffection 
some time in 1973. Hull's erratic leadership68 and the 
movement's ramshackle organisation led to problems of 
strategy69 and tactics70 which were reflected in severely 
strained relations with the Vanguard Movement. 71 Moreover, 
Farrell claims that prior to its collapse, LAW was "in the 
midst of rows about the embezzlement of funds" and that it 
" .• was riddled with racketeering and corruption".72 Given 
its ideological incoherence and ramshackle structure, it is 
not difficult to understand why LAW collapsed, but despite 
its inadequacies, it had demonstrated the potential of 
Protestant worker organisation. The informal worker 
militancy (especially in the shipyards) which Carson and the 
Unionist Party had exercised themselves so much to control 
between 1919 and 1922 was still an important part of the 
Protestant working class experience. Fifty years on however, 
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there was no determined leadership in the Unionist Party to 
channel and control it. LAW was the first indication that 
the Protestant workers were on their own: 
As the political situation became more 
critical, the informal chain of communication 
and command within the sections in the yard 
and in other industrial plants became 
inadequate and it became necessary to 
formalise the structures of communication. 
Thus the Loyalist Association of Workers was 
born ..... 73 
As Fisk puts it, LAW filled a vacuum of authority and 
leadership: 
Neither the private armies nor the 
politicians •• were •• able to unify the 
suspicions, the patriotism and the 
determination of loyalists who were 
helplessly watching the transfer of 
Stormont's power to London while Catholics 
began to gain the concessions they had so 
long demanded. 74 
Despite LAW's ignom1n10us end, it was clear that Protestant 
working class militancy was too durable to go without 
institutional expression. The body which replaced LAW, the 
Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) drew on the same traditions of 
protest and the same peculiarities of divided trade unionism 
as its predecessor. It articulated the same sense of 
grievance and betrayal, but organisationally it was a much 
more formidable proposition. 75 In contrast to LAW, the UWC 
did not dissipate its energies in frequent protest action 
spurred by day-to-day political and security developments. 
Instead, a leadership core, based partly on LAW veterans and 
containing a strong representation of shop stewards with 
credibility in conventional trade union activity 
concentrated on preparing Protestant workers for industrial 
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action on a wide scale. Particular attention was given to 
recruiting the strategically crucial power workers who had 
the ability to shut down other industries by withdrawing 
their labour. 
Another feature of the OWC was perhaps even more important. 
While LAW cooperated with the Ulster Defence Association and 
other paramilitary groups, the OWC brought the relationship 
between industrial and paramilitary groups much closer. This 
development clearly indicated that the initiative in 
resisting British-sponsored schemes of reform and organising 
protests against the IRA's campaign of guerrilla violence 
had passed from the politicians to grassroots organisations. 
Although like LAW, the OWC expressed antagonism to the old 
Unionist hierarchy in class terms, its distrust (and 
sometime open contempt) for politicians, went further than 
this. After all, neither Paisley nor even Craig -- the two 
main rivals for grassroots Protestant support at this time 
-- was representative of the old Unionist bourgeoisie or 
landed class. The principal source of suspicion was the 
political leaders' tendency to provoke violent direct action 
and then to distance themselves from the political fallout 
and moral revulsion which followed. As Protestants began to 
be jailed and interned for terrorist offences, this became a 
sharp division between the workers and paramilitaries on one 
hand, and the politicians on the other. 
The OWC strike which destroyed the power-sharing executive, 
the centrepiece of British (and Irish) policies of reform, 
was in some respects the central event in the 25 years which 
have elapsed since the beginning of the civil rights 
campaign. It demonstrated the very narrow limits of 
Protestant toleration of reforms which directly affected the 
Northern Ireland Constitution and threatened change, no 
matter how long-term, in the form of state. The Sunningdale 
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Agreement threatened to do both these things by providing 
for a power-sharing executive which guaranteed Catholics the 
role in government which demography and the westminster 
system denied them under stormont. It also did so by 
providing for cross-border institutions, which pointed in 
the direction of a united Ireland. The strike and the 
executive's fate laid the foundations for a stalemate which 
has lasted since 1974, by demonstrating that the minimum 
demanded by constitutional Irish nationalists is greater 
than the maximum tolerated by the majori ty of Ulster 
Protestants. 
Beyond these basic points, there is much that is open to 
interpretation in the OWC and the strike for which it takes 
credit. These issues are central to understanding the 
breakup of the Unionist coalition and can be summarised in 
two linked questions~ how broadly-based was support for the 
OWC? and what social and ideological forces did it 
represent? 
References to actual membership of the OWC are scant, and 
clearly neither the organisation nor its interpreters set 
much store by the issue. On the first day of the strike, ~ 
Guardian noted, "The OWC claim to have 58,000 members is 
widely held to be a gross exaggeration", stressing later 
that, "its considerable strength in the electricity industry 
was much more important".76 The OWC's basis of 
representation was geographical, representatives from the 
six counties and the city of Belfast making seven units on 
the Council itself. These representatives were supposed to 
be "elected from factory delegates who are themselves 
elected by their fellow workers at branch level".77 
References to such elections being held are conspicuous by 
their absence in the primary and secondary sources on the 
OWC, and in general its democratic pretensions are not taken 
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seriously.78 The representativeness of the uwe is also 
called into question by virtue of the concentration of its 
leadership in a limited number of trades in heavy industries 
and the fact that .... none of those who hold office represent 
any more than a small section of workers at any individual 
work place ... 79 
The issue of intimidation during the strike crystallised 
these questions as to the nature of the uwe's support. From 
the first day of the strike, intimidation -- mainly through 
the medium of barricades manned by paramilitary personnel --
played an important part in its success. Thirty-seven 
roadblocks were reported on 16 May (the second fuil day of 
the strike), and 172 on 20 May.80 The role of intimidation 
was obvious and impressive. As one account puts it, 
describing the tiny turn-out to a trade union-sponsored 
march urging a return to work, 
The intimidators have done their work too 
well, and only a brave few ran the gauntlet. 
Thousands more must have been deterred by the 
knowledge that even if they were at their 
workbenches, power was not available, nor was 
their gesture likely to force the strikers 
into submission. 81 
But a few days later, the same source expressed many 
observers' ambivalence about the strike; 
It is true that a handful of self-appointed 
men have taken the community by the throat. 
It is true that thugs and bully-boys have 
been at work. It is true that there has been 
intimidation on a massive scale. It is true 
that the past few days have seen activities 
that can only be described as fascist in 
character. It is equally true that the 
objectives of the strike are supported by 
thousands of people who are neither thugs nor 
bullies, much less fascists. 82 
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Others were less equivocal; "The government's carefully 
nurtured belief that 'loyalists' are staying away from work 
only because of intimidation seems to be further from 
reality every day".83 
The main grounds for believing that support for the strike 
was not based solely on intimidation are provided by the 
results of the February 1974 westminster general election. 
Called early because of the Conservative Government's 
conflict with the coal miners, the election could not have 
come at a worse time for the Sunningdale agreement and 
Northern Ireland's new constitution. Eleven of Northern 
Ireland's 12 Westminster seats were won by loyalists under 
the banner of the United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC).84 
The fact that a majority of voters, and such an obviously 
large majority of Protestants, voted against the Sunningdale 
Agreement85 gave force to the strikers' principal demand 
that there should be fresh elections for the Assembly. The 
Westminster elections underlined the fact that a majority 
for power-sharing in the Assembly itself could be 
manufactured only by aggregating the voters of reform 
Unionists and constitutional nationalists. Loyalists, as 
Hibernia perceptively observed, had now been " •• overridden 
by the new Republican-Unionist elite".86 
The answer, then, to the question "how broad-based was 
support for the OWC strike?" is that although intimidation 
was required to enforce it, a majority of voters in the 
February election, and a very high proportion of 
Protestants, shared the strikers' concerns and probably 
their aims, if not the means they chose. The strike sent a 
clear message • 
•• the lesson which the OWC sought to convey 
was that their rejection of united Ireland 
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was not as has often been alleged, a 
demagogic invention of their political class, 
but rather something welling up from the 
base. 87 
This conclusion prompts the question, exactly ~ was 
welling up from the base? What social forces were pushing 
forward and what ideological form did they take? 
The most salient features of the OWC strike are how quickly 
and completely power passed from the hands of the 
conventional politicians to the workers' and paramilitary 
groups, but how short a time the initiative remained with 
them, and how little they were able to do with it. The rank 
and file distrust of politicians extended not ' only to the 
old Unionist establishment but also to the new generation of 
loyalist politicians. The strike was presented to Paisley 
and Craig as a fait accompli. Even before it began, 
n •• political power passed effortlessly to the workers and 
the paramilitariesn • 88 This power was emphatically and 
effectively deployed during the strike, but many factors 
limited its effectiveness as a sustained and durable 
political force. 
The Sunningdale Agreement and the Executive presented 
Protestants with two crucial issues; power-sharing and 
shared institutions with the Irish Republic. Although there 
is some debate as to their relative importance in mobilising 
support for the strike,89 together they constituted a 
serious threat to Protestant conceptions of self-
determination. Once the Executive had been destroyed, 
divisions began to appear in loyalist ranks. 
The strike with its overtones of a coup d'etat, which were 
heady for some and sinister for others, appeared to have 
released forces which would keep the initiative. The 
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strike's co- ordinating committee self-consciously modelled 
itself on a provisional government,90 and with its welfare 
and advice centres created something of the atmosphere of 
liberation politics not unlike that which prevailed behind 
the barricades of the Bogside and the Catholic areas of 
Belfast between 1969 and 1971. Political meetings were held 
to explain the meaning of the strike. 
The politicians and the strikers had decided 
to educate the people politically in a way 
that the old middle class Unionist MPs at 
stormont could never have dreamed. 91 
These features appeared to give a unity of purpose and a 
dynamism to the strike, effects which were heightened by the 
label, 'Ulster Workers' Council'. In fact the strike was run 
by a co-ordinating committee which included not only 
representatives of the UWC (three members) but also of all 
the loyalist parties and extra-parliamentary groupings. 
Despite the label by which posterity knows it, the strike 
unleashed forces by no means all of which were of 
proletarian and trade union provenance. 92 As a result, the 
strike's legacy appeared to point in several directions for 
the future. 93 For some, the possibility of independence for 
Ulster was attractive. 94 For others, explicitly working 
class mobilisation was indicated. 95 Apart from these 
questions of ideology and identity, there were tactical 
differences between politicians and paramilitaries, and 
between hawks (who supported undiluted Protestant supremacy) 
and doves (who believed a gesture of conciliation towards 
the Catholic minority was necessary). To complicate matters, 
by no means all the hawks were to be found among the 
paramilitaries, and by no means all the doves were 
politicians. Within the paramilitary groups, feuding over 
territory, racketeering and warlordism overlay ideological 
differences between those who were 'pure' militarists and 
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others who wished to mobilise around radical politics as 
well. 
Under these conditions, the energies which opposition to the 
Executive gathered up, and the strike unleashed, were 
quickly dissipated,96 and the initiative passed again to the 
politicians. 97 Confirmation that significant though it was, 
the 1974 strike represented the dissolution rather than the 
metamorphosis of Unionism, is offered by the failure of a 
second loyalist strike in 1977. 
The 1977 loyalist strike was called in the name of the 
Ulster Unionist Action Council (UUAC) at midnight on 2/3 May 
1977 and was terminated on the night of 1 June. The 
strikers' demands were for an end to Direct Rule, a return 
to devolved institutions for Northern Ireland and for a 
powerful and effective offensive against the IRA. The strike 
reflected the fragmentation and demoralisation of Unionism, 
in contrast to the triumphalism of 1974. The UUAC was 
composed of two loyalist parties, the Rev. Ian Paisley's DUP 
and a smaller splinter group called the United Ulster 
Unionist Movement,98 along with some of the fraternal 
organisations and the main paramilitary groups. By now the 
UWC was moribund,99 and the proletarian flavour of the 1974 
strike's organisation was largely absent. There was a 
notably rural and small town cast to the interests 
represented on the strike's organising committee in 1977. 100 
Among its 12 members were an auctioneer, a pedigree 
livestock breeder and a farmer. Three businessmen all came 
from small towns, as did a retired regular soldier and a 
retired bank manager. The commander of the UDA was a member 
of the committee, as were the Rev. Ian Paisley and the full-
time general secretary of the DUP. This left only one trade 
unionist as representative of the forces which did so much 
to give the 1974 strike its character. 101 
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It was not only the balance of forces behind the strikes 
which differed between 1974 and 1977. In several respects 
the response of the British state differed in decisive ways. 
In 1977, the post of secretary of state for Northern Ireland 
was filled by Roy Mason102 who is generally regarded as 
having been a more robust and resilient figure than his 
predecessor in 1974, Merlyn Rees. 103 Mason's better 
relationship with the army and the army's more favourable 
assessment of the balance of forces complemented the greater 
professionalisation of the RUC104 and the personal 
determination of its new (1976) Chief Constable, Sir Kenneth 
Newman. 10S The Northern Ireland Office under Mason also 
conducted a more aggressive information campaign which led 
to broadcasters and the newspapers pronouncing the strike 
abortive when the issue was still in the balance. 106 
In addition to this firmer response from the British state 
however, the nature of the loyalists' demands allowed for 
some flexibility on the part of the government, by contrast 
with the apocalyptic atmosphere of 1974. It was not too 
difficult for Mason to publicise plans to strengthen the 
security forces in the war against the IRA, thus 
It •• conceding without argument to (sic) the first UUAC 
demand lt • 107 Other factors told against the stoppage~ The 
economic effects of the 1974 strike were keenly felt,108 
making for caution among any Protestant workers who were not 
wholeheartedly committed. The Belfast shipyard received its 
first substantial order (£70m) for several years just before 
the 1977 stoppage, prompting a mass meeting of 8,500 
shipyard workers to vote overwhelmingly against striking.109 
Current unemployment figures were the worst since 1940. 110 
Trade unions had made a vigorous effort to assert themselves 
after the debacie (for them) of 1974111 and were prominent 
in warning of potential job losses. 112 
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Lastly, the loyalist groups had grown apart, rather than 
into a cohesive force since 1974. Personal rivalries, 
distrust between paramilitaries and politicians, the failure 
of distinctive working class initiatives to gain any 
purchase, and differing long-term objectives were more 
apparent in the absence of a symbol to unite against like 
the Sunningdale Agreement and the power-sharing 
Executive. 113 
Protestant Paramilitary Groups 
Irregular military formations have been, and remain, 
essential to the politics of Protestant Ulster. At times 
these have fused with regular military or police formations, 
at others, they have co-existed with them in various degrees 
of discomfort. This has been a phenomenon of both rural and 
urban life; the defence of isolated farms and the boundaries 
of urban shatter zones where confessional areas abut on each 
other represent some of the essential characteristics of 
both Catholic and Protestant experience both before and 
after partition. In practice, the line separating the 
private violence of feud and self-defence from the 
legitimate functions of public order has never been well-
established for Ulster Protestants. The idea that violence 
is the monopoly of the state and all other coercive measures 
are outlawed, has been hard to establish in Northern 
Ireland, as it was in Ireland as a whole until after 1922. 
Partition left the business of conquest, settlement anti-
colonial struggle and competing versions of self-
determination stabilised, but unresolved. Certainly, since 
the onset of crisis in the late 1960s, enough people on both 
sides of the religious divide have felt that initiatives 
outside the state law and order function are necessary for 
territorial defence and physical safety of their 
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communities, to make paramilitary organisation a major 
factor in the situation. 
There are two essential features to this paramilitary 
tradition. Firstly, violence in Northern Ireland is best 
thought of in terms of a continuum spanning degrees of 
formality. At one end, there is more or less spontaneous 
rioting, often sparked by a provocative incident or even a 
rumour of provocation. In 'normal' times, this has a 
cyclical nature, following the calendar of sectarian 
rituals. Local champions, 'hard men', identified by 
individual prowess, occupational group or residential area, 
may play an important part, and rioting may be organised 
round them. In crisis situations, rioting may become more 
formal, involving strategies of revenge and deterrence, or 
protest at some provocative action of the state. Under such 
circumstances more formally organised bodies -- semi-secret 
societies on the model of agrarian revenge groups, or more 
open and broadly-based structures of area defence -- may 
take shape. The highest degree of paramilitary formality was 
achieved by the UVF between 1910 and 1914. 114 It mirrored 
regular military formations in every way except one: it was 
a true citizen army, reproducing with a high degree of 
accuracy the structure of the whole Protestant community. It 
was commanded by retired British officers, landowners and 
businessmen, officered by tenant farmers and professional 
men, with artisans and labourers, both rural and urban 
falling more or less into line. Although outside the formal 
structures of public order, the UVF sought to parallel them 
closely. It was outside the law, and in terms of established 
authority, it was profoundly subversive. But it was not 
lawless, and indeed its leaders claimed, and its followers 
believed, that its function was to save the community from 
~evolutionary anarchy. 
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straddling the divide (often uneasily) between public and 
private violence, are citizen reserve units of regular 
police and military formations. These range from the 
militias of previous centuries to the 'B' Specials and 
Ulster Defence Regiment in this one. It is essential in 
trying to understand the Protestant paramilitary tradition 
(and the wider phenomenon of political violence in Northern 
Ireland) that these categories run into each other with 
distressing ease; individuals may belong to one or more 
category and act in different capacities at the same 
time. 115 
The second essential point is that the relationships between 
the state and various forms of irregular, self-help 
organisations have been problematic. These relationships may 
vary between direct co-optation, arms-length toleration, 
and outright repression. Co-optation has been generally 
accompanied by the twin goals of straightforward 
mobilisation of manpower for the defence of the state, and 
disciplining unruly elements which might be embarrassing or 
downright subversive. On the other side the unruly elements 
habitually see themselves as not only defence against the 
'other' community and ~ armed defenders/aggressors, but a 
defence against appeasement or even betrayal by their own 
leaders. 
One of the principal differences among Unionists, or to put 
it another way, between Unionists and loyalists is over the 
relationship between public and private violence, and the 
circumstances which justify self-help. The intensity with 
which this issue is taken up, has come to depend on 
perceptions of the balance of power between Unionists, 
nationalists, and the British government at any given time. 
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It was with this legacy of formal and informal military 
organisation that the Ulster Unionist community entered upon 
the stressful period which led to its fragmentation. It is 
scarcely surprising, then, not only that paramilitarism has 
played an important part in that process, but also that it 
has done so from a variety of sources and in a variety of 
forms. 
Between 1968 and 1972, several developments combined to 
stimulate an upsurge of Protestant paramilitarism. The 
revival of Catholic militancy and all the ambiguity of its 
modernised and atavistic forms, threatened both familiar and 
novel forms of destabilisation to the stormont system and 
the Protestants' place in it. Instead of viewing this as a 
security threat, O'Neill advocated reform and emphasised 
Northern Ireland's dependence on metropolitan goodwill. The 
cutting edge of resistance to the Civil Rights Movement and 
to reform was Paisley's combination of a demagogic rhetoric 
of resistance and intimidating street demonstrations. 
Despite Paisley's sotto voce qualifications and nuances of 
theology and political philosophy,116 his influence clearly 
encouraged the growth of paramilitarism. Communal tensions 
however were not confined to marches and counter-marches, 
and politicians' rhetoric of reform and resistance. They 
quickly came to pervade everyday life where Catholic and 
Protestant areas adjoined each other. Conforming to a long-
established pattern, these street tensions fed into, and on, 
the larger political confrontations of the day. 
When the dynamics of this situation precipitated the state's 
loss of control and British intervention in August 1969, the 
conclusive condition for the growth of Protestant 
paramilitarism was introduced; the removal of responsibility 
for internal security from local hands. The Battle of the 
Bogside and riots in Belfast had exposed the vulnerability 
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of the RUC to overstretch. Few outside Unionist circles 
believed that the police were impartial, and the 'B' 
Specials were completely discredited. As a result, the 
British Army took primary responsibility for security, the 
'B' specials were placed under the command of the GOC 
Northern Ireland, a senior British police officer was 
brought in to command the RUC, and a commission of enquiry 
into the police was set up. The Hunt Commission reported in 
october 1969. It recommended the disbandment of the 'B' 
Specials, to be replaced with the Ulster Defence Regiment 
(UDR), a locally recruited, part-time, regiment of the 
British Army, commanded by regular officers. It also 
redefined the role of the RUC, taking away its paramilitary 
functions, disarming and redeploying it to normal policing 
duties. The publication of the report's recommendations 
resulted in severe rioting in Protestant areas of Belfast, 
and the first killing of an RUC officer since the crisis 
began. These disturbances marked a significant escalation of 
Protestant disaffection. 
The issue of control of security remained a bone of 
contention between the Unionist government and westminster 
for a little over two years, until in March 1972 Stormont 
was prorogued and Direct Rule was imposed. This was the 
final blow to Protestant self-determination. The removal of 
control of security from Unionist hands appeared in Catholic 
(and metropolitan) eyes to mean removing from Protestant 
hands the instruments of repression which ultimately denied 
full rights to Catholics. In Protestant eyes, it meant 
removing the instruments of their defence from the only 
hands -- their own -- that could be trusted to use them with 
vigour against the violent threats to their independence 
which they permanently faced. The removal of security from 
local control was paralleled exactly by the recovery of the 
IRA from its abortive attempts at re-organisation in the mid 
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1960s, and the escalation of a determined campaign of 
bombing and shooting. The lesson seemed clear to many 
Protestants; now was the time take responsibility for 
counter-measures into their own hands. 
Even before 1969, Protestant paramilitary groups were 
involved in political violence. One group took the name of 
the UVF, although in reality it was no more than a handful 
of Shankill Road 'hard men' organised into a gang of 
politically ignorant and operationally inept hoodlums. After 
committing a series of senseless and more-or-less 
spontaneous murders of innocent Catholics (and one 
Protestant) the gang was broken up and imprisoned. Despite 
this, it had created a legend which was to grow in the next 
few troubled years. Another was an underground sabotage 
group, closely associated with members of Paisley's direct-
action organisations, the UPV and the UCDC. This covert unit 
was responsible for a series of explosions which damaged 
Belfast's electricity and water supplies in early 1969. 
Initially the outrages were attributed to the IRA and their 
effect on public confidence in the government was very 
influential in precipitating O'Neill's resignation. These 
groups were joined by a third source of influence -- the 
spontaneous street defence committees which were spawned by 
communal tensions in the summer of 1969 -- in the 
development of the main Protestant paramilitary groups from 
about late 1971 onwards. 
The Ulster Defence Association (UDA)117 
As communal strife simmered at the interface of Protestant 
and Catholic areas in Belfast through the summer of 1969, 
both sides began to organise themselves for local defence. 
The classic community pattern emerges from 
the evidence: the two communities exhibiting 
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the same fears, the same sort of self-help, 
the same distrust of lawful authority. 
Catholics and Protestants were haunted by the 
same ghosts and retreated in fear to their 
respective ghettos while attributing to each 
other the responsibility and the blame. In 
the eyes of one the police were seen as the 
willing tools of Protestant dominance, in the 
eyes of the other, as a force whose 
leadership was \soft on rebels,llS 
It was out of situations and groups such as these, 
especially after the riots, burnings and expulsions of 
August 1969, that the UDA grew. The rejuvenation of the IRA, 
the sharp increase in violence, especially after the 
introduction of internment without trial in August 1971, and 
ultimately the imposition of Direct Rule in 1972 were the 
main provocations to which the UDA was a response. 
The UDA was, and remains, a hybrid organisation reflecting 
the confusions and contradictions of Protestant politics in 
the post-Unionist Party period. Its salient characteristics 
are as follows. It has a mass membership and following which 
has fluctuated greatly according to the degree of crisis 
perceived by Protestants in the balance of power between 
themselves, the British government, the Irish government and 
Northern Ireland's Catholic nationalists and republicans. At 
the same time it has underground terrorist units which carry 
out assassinations of catholicsl19 and bombings both in 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 120 The balance 
between \political' mass action and terrorism is prone to 
shift, the former prominent in the first two years of the 
UDA's existence (1972-4). After 1974, the Northern Ireland 
conflict became stabilised and institutionalised and the 
relative unlikelihood of any dramatic change its parameters, 
attenuated the UDA's incentive and capacity to resort to 
mass action. The salience of sectarian assassination and 
other acts of terror in the UDA's operations also 
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fluctuates, principally in a symbiotic relationship of 
deterrence and revenge with IRA atrocities, which has been 
deeply institutionalised over the last twenty years. 
The UDA has been prone to serious internecine feuding, 
arising from a number of sources. 121 One has been rivalry 
between 'battalions' in the main working class areas of East 
and west Belfast. The UDA's origins as an umbrella group for 
the grassroots defence committees in these areas has 
aggravated this, as have personal rivalries between what 
effectively have been 'warlords'. Other sources of discord 
have been policy and ideological disputes, notably over the 
adoption of left and proletarian stances, or the possibility 
of fruitful contact with paramilitary groups on the Catholic 
side. A perennial problem has been the fusion between 
criminal racketeering and political paramilitarism. Despite 
frequent claims that the organisation has been 'cleaned up' 
or 'purged', this remains a serious issue. 122 At times these 
various conflicts have erupted in rashes of internecine 
assassinations, and overall they have detracted greatly from 
the credibility of the UDA, even among loyalists. The 
banning of the UDA (1990), which remains in force, can be 
seen as a result not only of its terrorism, but also its 
criminality. 
Feuds with other Protestant paramilitary groups have also 
marked the UDA's career, while relationships with Protestant 
politicians have always been fraught. 123 Like the worker 
organisations, LAW and the OWC, the UDA has resented 
Protestant politicians on class and populist grounds, 
perennially expressing bitterness at 'being used' as cannon 
fodder and abandoned (unlike their Republican counterparts) 
with condemnation when their violent acts are punished.124 
This disillusion with Protestant politicians is mainly 
responsible for the UDA's attempts to evolve a political 
415 
direction different from traditional Unionism. These 
attempts have taken two main forms. The first is the 
flirtation with working-class politics which has 
characterised virtually all significant groups in the 
breakup of the Unionist coalition and which foundered in the 
UDA's case (as it did with LAW, OWC, Vanguard and the DUP) 
on the contradictions between class and ethnic identities. 
More serious were the attempts of the UDA to promote the 
idea of an independent Ulster. 125 
The UDA became seriously interested in independence for 
Ulster in the aftermath of the 1974 OWC strike, building and 
elaborating on a position temporarily held by Craig and the 
Vanguard movement. The disillusion with local politicians 
was surpassed by the loyalist paramilitaries' distrust of 
the British government in the aftermath of the Sunningdale 
Agreement. These factors, coupled with a certain post-strike 
euphoria at having taken the initiative with decisive direct 
action, the recognition that paramilitarism without 
political direction is a dead end, and the realisation that 
class politics could not be sustained in the context of 
ethnic identity, led in the direction of independence. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the UDA's independence 
blueprints has been their acknowledgment that a condition of 
their success would be the active consent -- sealed in 
effective participation -- of the Catholic minority. 
While the UDA plan did not provide for 
mandatory power-sharing in government, 
provisions in the constitution it proposed, 
including on stipulating that the election of 
the pivotal potion of Speaker needed a two-
thirds majority in the legislature, ensured 
that the system could not function without 
the co-operation of both sections of the 
community. 126 
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Another intriguing feature was the attempt to find 
alternative grounds for Ulster Protestant identity. Rather 
than religion, the 17th century Plantations and the link 
with Britain, the UDA's new justification for a separate 
identity from the rest of Ireland looked to the 'Cruthin', 
or ancient British people. 
This is an attempt to locate the origins of 
Northern Protestants before the 17th century 
plantations of Ulster, and establish distinct 
roots for the Scot-Irish culture in ancient 
Ireland •• using evidence furnished by 
Ptolemy, Adamnan (a 7th century abbot of 
Mona) and 'the genuine traditions' of the 
people that the cruthin, a pictish tribe with 
close connections in Scotland, pre-dated the 
gaels and so qualify as the 'Ancient Kindred 
of Ireland.,lZ7 
Despite these and other attempts at political creativity,128 
the UDA remains the principal vehicle of murderous 
deterrence and revenge on the Catholic community and the 
sounding board of grassroots Protestant frustration with the 
British government and Unionist politicians. It also remains 
subject to criminality and internecine feuding. In these 
ways the UDA continues to demonstrate the incoherence of 
post-Unionist Party Protestant politics. 
The Ulster volunteer Force (uyF) 
Despite claiming the name and the heritage of Carson's army, 
the contemporary UVF has virtually nothing in common with 
the disciplined battalions drawn from the whole Protestant 
community which characterised its illustrious predecessor. 
The UVF has had a continuous but unsettled existence since 
its re-establishment in the mid-1960s. It has consciously 
avoided the mass membership of the UDA, and with the 
exception of one short period, the UDA's aspiration to 
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legitimate political operations. In fact, its organisational 
form has been largely incoherent, a matter of decentralised, 
largely autonomous murder gangs in both rural and urban 
areas, operating as an instrument of revenge for IRA murders 
of both security force members and civilians. Despite a 
penchant for emphasising military discipline and disdaining 
the more sordid aspects of the UDA, in fact, many of the 
most horrific sectarian murders have been carried out in the 
UVF's name by what were virtually freelance gangs of 
psychopaths. As with the UDA, criminality and internecine 
feuding reinforce this image of incoherence and anomie. This 
lack of direction and tight organisation has made the UVF 
particularly vulnerable to infiltration and detection by the 
security forces. 
The exception to this characterisation (which is valid up to 
the present), is the period from the uwe strike in May 1974 
to the second proscription of the UVF in November 1975. 
During these months, the UVF attempted to develop a 
political movement and a left-of-centre ideology to guide 
it. The high point of this trend was the October 1974 
Westminster general election in which the UVF's political 
wing, the Volunteer Political Party (VPP) contested the West 
Belfast constituency. Nelson points to several factors 
prompting the UVF to broaden its strategy from \pure 
militarism'. Awareness of the poor social conditions and 
other grievances of working-class Protestants, which played 
a part in all aspects of the dissolution of the Unionist 
coalition, was one. Another was the internment of 
Protestants, including UVF men, after 1972. To be treated as 
subversives by \their own' government sharpened some 
volunteers' political awareness, and posed questions about 
their identity and loyalties. It also prompted at least 
limited exchange of views with republican paramilitaries 
inside Long Kesh internment camp, and even a degree of 
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cooperation with them. This development in particular 
encouraged a faction of the UVF to look for alternatives to 
violent sectarianism. Lastly, the British government lifted 
the proscription on the UVF in April 1974,129 with the 
specific intention of encouraging it to embrace politics 
rather than violence. 
Although these influences and incentives were not 
negligible, and some of them acted on endemic sub-themes of 
loyalist identity, there were formidable barriers and 
prohibitions in the directions which they encouraged. The 
attempt to transform the UVF was undertaken by a small 
class-conscious minority of the leadership. It was a top-
down exercise in crash political education within a movement 
which had neither a mass base, nor any previous independent 
political position. Its challenge to more established forms 
of Unionist politics was met by counter-attacks from 
politicians, the pulpit and the Orange Order, and by 
scepticism from the media and Catholic politicians. These 
perennial obstacles to the creation of a loyalist working 
class party helped ensure that the VPP candidate lost his 
deposit and the 'politicians' within the UVF lost their 
influence. By November 1975, the UVF had once again begun to 
commit sectarian murders, and in that month it was banned 
again. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The dominant impression left by the breakup of the Ulster 
Unionist coalition is the contrast between the durability 
and resilience of the social and political forces which have 
made Unionism (and more particularly loyalism) such a 
genuinely popular position, and the fragility of the 
~olitical movements and state structures which were unable 
to make something coherent and constructive out of such 
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strong impulses. In this respect, the institutions of 
traditional Unionism (principally the Ulster Unionist Party) 
and the mobilising agents of loyalist revolt which replaced 
them (the successor parties, the worker organisations, the 
paramilitaries) were all failures. 
The Contradictions of Traditional Unionism 
Two kinds of contradiction which permanently threatened to 
subvert traditional Unionism help to explain the fragility 
of its institutional expressions. The first was the 
contradiction between metropolitan Unionism which regarded 
notions of British identity and standards as substantive, 
and the unfocussed but powerful conceptions of Ulster 
Protestant identity which (especially in times of crisis) 
could verge on a kind of proto-nationalism and in which 
British identity was a much more ambiguous and instrumental 
notion. The contradictions between these positions could be 
held in check when Ulster Unionists were allowed a high 
degree of autonomy from British scrutiny and intervention. 
Under such circumstances, no clash of allegiance between 
metropolitan and loyalist conceptions of Unionism would be 
serious enough to break up the coalition. 
Between 1910 and 1921, Unionists enjoyed the autonomy to 
organise, drill, acquire arms and otherwise prepare to set 
up their own state, because a considerable portion of the 
British establishment was sympathetic to them and the rest 
were mindful of the costs of coercing them. Between 1921 and 
1968, autonomy was secured by the absence of popular 
discontent serious enough to embarrass British governments, 
or any other threat to the integrity of the Northern Ireland 
state beyond the capacity of Northern Ireland governments to 
cope. After 1968, neither of these conditions was valid, and 
the contradictions were exposed. 
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The second set of contradictions overlaps extensively with 
the first. Relevant here are the class resentments and 
sectarian practices which define the independent aspects of 
Protestant proletarian political culture, both rural and 
urban. Such demonstrations of independence have tended to 
occur at times when the whole Protestant community could 
feel relatively secure politically, while in times of threat 
and crisis, the classes have come together. This commonsense 
pattern of expressing and suppressing the discontents of an 
unreconstructed class order in an ethnically divided society 
depended on there being a ruling class which would not only 
lead the whole Protestant community in defiance of British 
authority, but would, by virtue of their own social and 
political status provide a link with sympathetic elements in 
the British establishment. Such leaders could expect to 
enjoy the impressive, but nonetheless conditional deference 
which characterised the complicated relationships between 
the Protestant classes. 
If the Unionist establishment could, or would not fulfil 
these functions, there was nothing to prevent a much fuller 
expression of working class initiatives than ever before. 
From 1968, this began to happen, and it was in this way that 
the owe and the paramilitaries found themselves, with a 
mixture of euphoria and dismay, face to face with the 
British establishment between 1972 and 1974. 
These contradictions could have been resolved if the 
Unionist Party had turned itself into a party of permanent 
mobilisation, establishing itself as the vanguard of a more 
formally integrated movement, with much more extensive and 
ramified links to state structures and resources. In short, 
it could have been turned into a party of ethnic 
mObilisation. Two things stood in the way. Firstly, Northern 
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Ireland simply had neither the resources nor the autonomy to 
allow Unionism to acquire a social content and provide for 
the ethnic social mobility which alone would give meaning to 
such a party. For instance, such autonomy would be needed 
for the emphatic, open and more extensive discrimination 
against Catholics this would require. Secondly, the classes 
which dominated the Ulster Unionist coalition from the 
beginning were quite unlike the aspirant classes which 
inspired such ethnic mobilisation elsewhere. The kind of 
state-sponsored social engineering which is necessary to 
bind ethnic coalitions together was completely foreign to 
Unionism's landowning, commercial and industrial interests. 
The Protestant working class .was not the only class-
conscious component of the Unionist coalition. 
With neither the autonomy, nor the resources, nor the 
inclination to transform itself, the Unionist Party was 
fated to remain not much more than an electoral convenience, 
the fragile and vulnerable centre of a coalition which was 
rife with contradictions. As a result, traditional Unionism 
could not maintain itself in power while reforming the 
system over which it presided into either a plausible 
simulacrum of British political culture and practice (as the 
British-sponsored reforms of 1968-72 were supposed to do), 
or an entirely new constitutional dispensation which frankly 
acknowledged that Northern Ireland is a divided society and 
made provision for the pathological features of such a 
society (as the power-sharing constitution of 1973-4 was 
supposed to do). 
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The Contradictions of the Loyalist Revolt 
The loyalist revolt was an impressive demonstration at the 
ballot box, in the streets and at the work place that the 
primary identifications of Ulster Protestants could still 
be put to obstructive and destructive use. Equally 
impressive however, is the conclusion that these powerful 
impulses cannot resolve themselves into a coherent bloc, 
anchored by a constructive programme under an authoritative 
leadership. Loyalism is based on a powerful demotic 
political culture reflecting incoherent expressions of 
independence and deference. For loyalism to be 
satisfactorily contained within a wider Protestant bloc, 
deference has to be secured not only by the leaders' 
abilities to lead, but also by their respect for the 
essential elements of this culture, which include the myth 
of fraternity (embodied in the Orange Order), sectarian 
practices in employment and the distribution of public 
goods, emotive cultural displays of identity and dominance, 
and the repression of assertive displays of Catholic 
opposition. 
O'Neillism, the Civil Rights Movement and British 
intervention undercut the basis of deference, but the 
loyalist revolt did not so much overthrow the existing 
Unionist power structure, as step into the vacuum as the 
centre collapsed. 
The inability of the forces released by the loyalist revolt 
to fill this vacuum gives the breakup of the Unionist 
coalition the quality of a postscript (albeit a lengthy one) 
rather than a new departure. Effectively, there were three 
possibilities, none of which bore fruit. Firstly, there were 
several false dawns of class politics based respectively on 
the early days of the DUP, the OWC, and the paramilitaries. 
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But the divisions of ethnicity and nationalism were too 
deeply embedded for class politics in any inclusive sense, 
and the difficulties of the only other possibility -- ethnic 
mobilisation in the interests of class mobility -- have 
already been discussed. 
Secondly, some form of independence such as those favoured 
by Craig and the UDA might have formed the nucleus of a new 
departure. But question marks over the viability of an 
independent Ulster in security and economic terms undermined 
the credibility of the idea. In any case, neither Craig's 
vanguard with its paramilitary associations, nor the 
paramilitaries themselves with their overtones of crime, 
warlordism and exemplary violence against Catholics could 
provide the kind of leadership with which the wider 
Protestant community could feel comfortable. 
A third possibility would be for a hardline leader (or 
leadership group) with credentials won in resistance to the 
British and the Catholics to take a reconstituted unionist 
coalition into a negotiated settlement. This has been a 
recurrent, but abortive feature of Unionist politics since 
direct rule in 1972. Many felt that Faulkner (the minister 
who had introduced internment in 1956 and again in 1971, 
O'Neill's opponent) was the man to sell a settlement to the 
Protestants, but his credential cut no ice with loyalists 
when he shared power with Catholics in 1974. William Craig's 
recommendation of voluntary coalition with Catholic parties 
signalled a precipitate decline in his influence, and the 
same fate nearly overtook Paisley when he indicated that 
changes to the constitution of the Irish Republic might 
enable Protestants to reconsider their opposition to a 
united Ireland. 
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The third possibility raises two important points about the 
loyalist revolt and the breakup of the Unionist coalition. 
The first is the extent to which loyalism is a phenomenon 
preoccupied with its own leaders and the British government, 
with almost no developed capacity to engage its Catholic 
antagonists except through the arms-length medium of 
violence and counter-violence. The second is the way in 
which loyalist political leaders have very little freedom of 
manoeuvre. Not only rank and file militancy, but also the 
power of worker and paramilitary leaders who may have 
scarcely any public profile, is capable of curbing or 
usurping the leadership prerogatives of elected 
representatives. 
The contradictions of the loyalist revolt have ensured that 
Protestant interests and identities continue to be embodied 
and represented with different shades of meaning in the 
various political and paramilitary groups. Three things keep 
these contradictions in check. The first is that virtually 
all Protestants remain united on the essential Unionist 
premise, that a united Ireland is unacceptable. The second 
is that the IRA campaign of violence continues to legitimise 
the basic Unionist position, and to a large extent to 
insulate it from the critical scrutiny it would attract, 
especially in Britain, in the absence of the terrorist war 
of attrition. The third follows from the first two. As long 
as they hold, Britain appears willing to hold the ring and 
continue to guarantee the kind of social, economic and 
political stability in which the contradictions of the 
loyalist revolt are affordable. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE BREAK UP OF THE ULSTER 
UNIONIST AND AFRIKANER NATIONALIST COALITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
From the accounts given so far of the break up of Afrikaner 
Nationalism and Ulster Unionism, it is possible to compare 
and contrast the balance of forces between reform and 
reaction in each case by focusing on the political parties 
and extra-parliamentary groups into which the re~pective 
sides grouped themselves. Such a comparison will provide the 
primary focus of this chapter. 
A second possible dimension of comparison presents itself in 
these two cases however. Both Afrikaner Nationalists and 
Ulster Unionists created and maintained partisan state 
structures -- especially in law-enforcement agencies --
during their periods of effective one-party rule. As the 
basis of unilateral rule crumbled and reforms aimed at 
incorporating the previously-excluded progressed, the 
possibility that dissident ultras might use ~tate structures 
to obstruct reforms arose. This aspect of the dissolution of 
ruling coalitions will be discussed as the chapter's second 
focus. 
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REFORM AND THE BACKLASH AT THE BALLOT BOX AND IN THE STREETS 
The breakup of the Ulster Unionist and Afrikaner Nationalist 
coalitions represent variations on the \backlash' 
phenomenon, in which formerly privileged or dominant groups 
react against the threatened loss of their advantageous 
status. Taken to extremes, this kind of reaction can mean 
that; 
As formerly powerful groups decline and lose 
their influence, they may lash out with 
enough vigour and emotion to overwhelm the 
political process. 1 " 
This is what happened in May 1974 when the Ulster Workers' 
Council strike rendered inoperable the power-sharing 
agreement between Protestant and Catholic parties which had 
been carefully brokered by the British and Irish 
governments. The delicate process of bargaining, 
negotiation, third-party mediation and interstate diplomacy, 
was overwhelmed by the direct-action initiative of workers 
and paramilitaries. To achieve this, they first outflanked 
and then incorporated those \ extremist , political figures 
who were their ostensible leaders in the rejectionist cause. 
No such dramatic central event marks the unravelling of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist coalition and the unfolding of a 
complex and at times fragile negotiation process between a 
reformed National party and the ANC (although the rider \not 
at the time of writing' should perhaps be added to this 
comparative assessment). 
This suggests that although there are similarities in the 
elements present in both situations -- the social forces, 
political actors, policies and ideologies -- there are 
important differences in the dynamics of the relationships 
between those elements, which should be highlighted • 
• 
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One essential area of contrast has been the nature of reform 
in the two contexts. 'reform Nationalism' has been a much 
more durable, resilient and flexible phenomenon than 'reform 
Unionism'. It has represented much more significant social 
forces, has commanded much greater resources and has in all 
significant ways been much better equipped to fight off 
challenges from the political right. Probably all political 
ideologies contain provision for continuity and preservation 
on the one hand and change and transformation on the other. 
But Ulster Unionism has been very largely an ideology of 
preservation while Afrikaner Nationalism has been very 
largely an ideology of transformation. 
The central myth of Unionism is a siege, that of Afrikaner 
Nationalism is a heroic journey, and this difference 
symbolises these contrasting dimensions. Ulster Unionism 
itself was an improvisation, a pragmatic response to the 
impracticality of saving all of Ireland for the Union. This 
response created a new identity that of 'Ulsterman' or, to 
change the emphasis, this identity was discovered and 
elaborated. But improvisation ~nd discovery were put to the 
service of immobility, not transformation. In contrast, the 
survival of the nation which Afrikaner Nationalism 
discovered and elaborated, depended on its transformation 
from a people of labourers and farmers to one of managers, 
administrators and professionals in both public and private 
sectors of an advanced, industrial economy. While the years 
of Nationalist power in South Africa saw impressive economic 
growth and development, the Unionists presided over an 
advanced, industrial economy in stagnation and decline. 
While the class structure of Afrikaner Nationalism underwent 
far-reaching change, by the 1970s, that of Unionism was 
little altered from the years of the coalition's formation. 
Its divisions were reproduced at a higher level of security 
441 
and subsistence by the welfare state, but they were not 
fundamentally altered by the spread of modest affluence 
which rescued the unskilled and unemployed from stark 
poverty. Certainly, there was nothing in the way of 
spectacular social mobility. 
Behind Unionism's siege walls, not much had been going on, 
but within the circle of wagons with which Afrikaner 
Nationalism habitually faced a hostile world, there was 
furious, and innovative activity. 
In these respects, when P.W. Botha began to talk in the 
early 1980s of the need to 'adapt or die', there were enough 
people in his core audience for whom change, transformation, 
and movement had some experiential resonance to make his 
slogan ideologically plausible. What is more, outside his 
core audience there was considerable potential for 
incorporating support from English speakers (on whom the 
Nationalists came to rely for electoral victories over the 
right), and from coloureds and Indians. This useful 
strategic resource was not available to O'Neill, nor his 
reluctantly reforming successors. Northern Ireland's 
divisions between Unionist and Nationalist are, 
comparatively speaking, sharp and simple, precluding much 
opportunity of one attracting support from the other. There 
is no vacant political space for a reforming government to 
move into and occupy. 
Moreover, there was an urgency to the agenda of reform in 
South Africa which was lacking in Northern Ireland. The 
abyss to which Botha could point was a deep and a 
threatening one. The compelling facts of demography and the 
palpable failure of apartheid were not grasped by all 
Afrikaners. But there were enough of them -- especially 
among the intellectual and governing elite -- to make reform 
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a viable proposition and to hold the allegiance of the 
sUbstantial numbers of their compatriots who were prepared 
to follow strong leadership whether or not they were 
convinced by policies. By contrast, although the crisis 
faced by the Unionists in the 1960s -- economic decline, the 
'new' Catholic opposition, ominously growing British 
interest, electoral defection of working class Protestants 
-- was no illusion, it did not have the apocalyptic quality 
of the Nationalists' predicament. Protestants felt 
themselves to be a legitimate majority: insofar as they 
understood that Catholics had grievances, they felt them to 
be minor: they carried no burden of injustice and failure 
comparable to the legacy of apartheid: they were not the 
focus of attention from a disapproving world. 
Reform was an ambiguous strategy in both societies. To the 
marginal and the zealous on the governments' sides -- the 
ultras -- it meant betrayal. To the opposition in both 
cases, it meant cosmetic tinkering with illegitimate 
structures. To those supporters who remained with the 
governments, it meant ill-defined hope of stability and 
social progress without noticeable loss of material or 
status privileges. 
In fact, reformers were quite explicit in both cases. 
O'Neill made it quite clear that the purpose of reform was 
the preservation and strengthening of the union with Britain 
which was, ostensibly, the focus of Protestant identity. 
From Botha onwards, Nationalist reformers made it clear that 
the survival of white security and prosperity, and of the 
Afrikaner nation, meant reform. But O'Neill's reforms 
appeared vague and tentative; their justification seemed 
weak and inappropriate to many Unionists, stemming as it did 
from the aspiration to make Northern Ireland more like 
metropolitan Britain. This was unlikely to placate Irish 
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Nationalists and certain to ruffle loyalist sensibilities. 
Both of them could be relied upon to squeeze the middle 
ground relentlessly. 
Afrikaner Nationalist reformers were better able to 
manipulate the claims of justice and self interest into a 
powerful (if not always coherent) semblance of historical 
necessity. Although justice and self-interest are rivals as 
well as partners, their tensions were held in check and all 
reactionary challenges -- at the level of electoral 
competition at least -- were held off with impressive 
consistency, from the late 1970s to the white referendum of 
1992 and beyond. There were costs however, and these were 
paid in damage to the integrity and momentum of reform as a 
position, especially in the 'middle passage' of the years of 
the states of emergency. 
The tensions were held in check, and the damage was done, in 
two principal ways. The first involved vigorous security 
policies, especially a savage counter-revolutionary 
onslaught in the latter half of the 1980s aimed at those 
deemed to be enemies of the state. The second required 
obfuscation and camouflage to be developed to a fine art in 
concealing (perhaps from the reformers themselves) the exact 
consequences of individual reforms. It was a remarkable 
achievement (in its dubious way) to hold together for so 
long a reform project which was so internally incoherent and 
ambiguous, while at the same time reproducing a conclusive 
electoral majority for its overall direction. This 
achievement reflected the autonomy and considerable 
resources available to the state machine so assiduously 
built by the Afrikaner Nationalists in the forty years of 
their rule. This autonomy and these resources were simply 
not available to Ulster Unionist reformers. Not least of the 
resources in question was the availability of educated, 
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trained and willing state cadres to do the technocratic, 
ideological, and when it came to the crunch, repressive 
donkey work necessary for the reform project. 
Where in Nationalist-ruled South Africa we see something 
very like a political ruling class at work, in Northern 
Ireland we see something more like a vacuum of power and 
leadership. Between 1885 and 1922, Ulster's resistance to 
Home Rule had been led by a potent combination of 
landowners, the Belfast industrial bourgeoisie and sections 
of the British ruling class. 2 By the 1960s, landowners had 
ceased to play a leading social role; the influence of 
metropolitan capital, economic decline and economic 
rationalisation had curbed the leadership potential of the 
local industrial bourgeoisie; and with the disappearance of 
empire, Ireland had lost virtually all interest for what 
remained of the metropolitan class which had encouraged 
Ulster's stand. 3 Similarly, the Anglo-Irish imperial 
military caste which played such a strong part in Ulster's 
primary resistance, had simply ceased to exist. 
While in South Africa, a bureaucratic state and a 
bureaucratic party provided the backbone of a political 
ruling class, in Northern Ireland, the narrow range of 
Unionism's ambitions meant that neither the resources nor 
even the need for such a thing was evident. The 
provincialism which so shocked British politicians and 
administrators when they took control in the early 1970s4 
highlight the lack of vision, stature and energy which 
characterised the Stormont administration. These 
shortcomings extended to the right-wing opposition too. On 
neither side of the Unionist divide was there a numerous and 
coherent cadre of political leadership which could take and 
retain the initiative in the interests of reform or 
reaction. With a mixture of euphoria, consternation, and 
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bitter resentment, rank and file loyalists found themselves 
completely without the leadership their fathers had taken 
for granted. They found it from among their own ranks. 
Paisley was rescued from marginalised zealotry and became a 
national (even to some extent, international) figure. 
Vigilantes and worker-populists flitted between the shadows 
and the limelight. He and they proved more durable and 
influential than the erstwhile converts to reform and the 
minor establishment figures -- like Craig and the relative 
nonentities at the head of the Official Unionist Party --
who led the 'respectable' opposition to reform. But no-one 
·had the authority or the resources to reconstitute the 
Unionist alliance, one way or. the other. 
It can be argued then, that the different trajectories of 
dissolution in Afrikaner Nationalism and Ulster Unionism can 
be explained in part by the different capacities of 
reformers to attract and retain support. Another explanatory 
possibility lies in the differing patterns of political 
violence in Northern Ireland and South Africa. Protestants 
and Afrikaners have had different experiences of political 
violence, and security issues have presented themselves to 
each in different ways. It has to be noted however that 
these gaps of experience and perception may well be closing 
as the demise of exclusive white rule becomes imminent. 
Nationalist rule in South Africa and Unionist rule in 
Northern Ireland have both been the targets of armed 
struggle, and political change in both has taken place in 
the context of complex patterns of insurgent, state, 
'backlash', communal, and criminal violence. Ulster 
Protestants and the security forces which they feel to be 
their defenders however, have been the targets of much more 
direct, sustained, and intense attack than Afrikaners. 1972 
was the key year in stiffening Protestants' resistance to 
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reform. It is scarcely surpr1s1ng, given the security 
statistics, that they felt they were threatened by a 
situation of complete lawlessness. In 1972, there were 10 
628 shooting incidents, 1 382 bomb explosions (in addition, 
471 bombs were defused) and 1 931 armed robberies; there 
were 467 deaths, 485 policemen were injured, 578 army 
personnel, and 1 838 civilians. 5 It has to be stressed that 
these statistics refer to a population of no more than one 
and a half million in total, and that the incidents took 
place overwhelmingly in the vicinities of ordinary peoples' 
homes and workplaces, in a state which in places measures 
geographically no more than 50 kilometres across. 
It is true that the 1972 figures represent a peak which 
never before or since has been reached. It is equally true 
that counter-insurgent and Protestant violence account for 
an appreciable number of these incidents and casualties. But 
Protestants overwhelmingly understood the violence in terms 
of the Provisional IRA's campaign against the security 
forces and British rule. 6 It is scarcely surprising that in 
this context militant Protestants turned to paramilitary and 
workerist organisations to carry out revenge attacks on 
Catholics, confront the British government over security 
issues and ultimately overthrow the power-sharing executive. 
The British government's security policy of 'Ulsterisation' 
(beginning in the mid-seventies), which placed as much 
responsibility as possible for security on locally recruited 
forces, meant that even when security force casualties were 
reduced, they were more directly borne by Ulster 
Protestants. The regular murder of part-time security force 
members, in border areas, at their workplaces or in their 
homes, led to the frequent sale of Protestant farms to 
Catholics, leading Protestant politicians to talk of 
'genocide,.7 
447 
Despite the militant rhetoric of armed struggle,8 the ANC 
did not mount a sustained and effective campaign of violence 
against whites in general and the security forces in 
particular, in the major population centres of South Africa. 
Casualties of political violence both before and after the 
suspension of armed struggle by the ANC in 1990 were borne 
overwhelmingly by black opponents of the government, black 
civilians, and blacks suspected by the ANC of collaborating 
in one way or another with state structures of control. It 
is true that some white farming communities were (literally) 
in the front line of the armed struggle and lived under very 
stressful conditions, but nothing resembling the continuous 
toll of 'their' security force members has marked the 
Afrikaners' experience of political violence in the way that 
has the Ulster Protestants'. 
The successful portrayal of insurgency as principally a 
phenomenon of 'border' war (fought largely in Southern 
Angola), and the army's ability to keep white casualties in 
this war to a minimum, were important factors enabling the 
Nationalist government to retain the confidence of the white 
electorate. Even when insurgency in the townships required 
large-scale counter-insurgency action, the isolation of 
these black residential areas from 'white' South Africa 
achieved not only by geographical separation but ruthless 
control of information -- and the fact that blacks bore the 
overwhelming brunt of casualties on both sides, meant that 
the direct costs of political violence to whites in general 
remained minimal. 
In some respects, Northern Ireland is a society as divided 
as South Africa, but it is much more intimate, spatially 
concentrated and (relatively speaking) open to reportage and 
investigation. Under these conditions, Protestants' share of 
civilian and security force casualties has been not only 
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relatively, but absolutely greater than their Afrikaner 
counterparts and in all likelihood, subjectively a much 
greater collective trauma. 
The differences do not end there however. Afrikaner 
Nationalism and Ulster Unionism both depended for their grip 
on power on control of state organs of repression. Indeed, 
sectarian or ethnic policing was also an indispensable part 
of their mobilising strategies. An early casualty of the 
conflict between reform, backlash and insurgency in Northern 
Ireland was the Unionists' control of security. The 
constitutional fact of westminster's assumption of 
responsibility for security was embodied in the abolition of 
the 'B' Specials and the short-lived attempt to civilianise 
the RUC, followed by a longer-term programme to 
professionalise it and render it less partial. The 
unpalatable (for loyalists) principle of army supremacy in 
security matters was complemented by the strategic fact that 
the police could not operate in most Catholic areas after 
1969 without army protection. The loss of local control was 
completed and formalised by the proroguing of Stormont in 
1972. 
Every aspect of this loss of control was felt keenly by 
loyalists, and indeed the first major Protestant riots were 
provoked by the Hunt Report on the RUC. Nothing fostered the 
growth of the Protestant paramilitaries like the coincidence 
between the escalation of the Provisional IRA's campaign, 
and the end of local control of security. No such threat 
undermined the credibility of reform Nationalism until the 
negotiations for a transitional authority reached an 
advanced stage in early 1993. Only at this late stage have 
Afrikaners been faced with the prospect of seeing control of 
the security forces pass from the exclusive hands of their 
compatriots. Although at the time of writing the precise 
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details of the emerging agreements on security force control 
(and the longer-term goals of transforming and restructuring 
them) are far from clear, the ANC's assurances on power-
sharing, and on the security of tenure of administrators and 
bureaucrats suggest that changes may not be drastic, at 
least in the first instance. Despite this, it must be noted 
that with increasing white exposure to criminal and 
political violence9 and the prospect of white control of 
security being heavily diluted, if not lost completely in 
the medium to long term, the gap between the experience of 
Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners may be closing. 
One area in which the gap has already closed is highlighted 
by the demise since 1990 of the political system through 
which whites expressed their identities and aspirations. The 
Conservative Party's central demand between the 1990 reforms 
and the whites-only referendum was for a whites-only general 
election to test the acceptability of de Klerk's reforms. 
The end of the white polity parallels Britain's foreclosure 
of the stormont system in 1972 and refusal since then to 
return to a simple majority devolved government in Northern 
Ireland. The loss of parliamentary institutions in which 
Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism found their 
fullest political expression and the basis of their claim to 
legitimacy for the states they controlled represent an 
important experience in common. But there are differences 
too. 
Alternative opportunities for political self-expression were 
offered to both Unionists and Afrikaner Nationalists, but 
the configurations of the respective tests were rather 
different. In the whites-only referendum of 1992, Afrikaners 
voted as a part (albeit a majority) of a larger white 
electorate, and clearly recorded divided allegiances, voting 
in large numbers on both sides of the sUbstantial majority 
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in favour of reform. When the various strands of Unionism 
treated the westminster general election of February 1974 as 
a referendum on the Sunningdale Agreement and the power-
sharing reforms, Protestants voted overwhelmingly against 
them. All that has been said so far to distinguish the 
strength of reform in South Africa from its weakness in 
Northern Ireland is relevant in explaining this divergence, 
but three further factors contribute to an explanation. 
The first concerns the degree of inclusiveness of the reform 
agreements. The Nationalist government in South Africa was 
able to conclude an agreement with the ANC which embodied a 
de facto end to the armed struggle, with a de jure agreement 
clearly on the cards. The APLA campaign of political 
violence against whites had not yet got under waylO, and at 
this stage black political movements to the left of the ANC 
seemed to pose little threat. In Northern Ireland however, 
the process which led to Sunningdale and power-sharing 
excluded the IRA, which adopted a violently rejectionist 
stance towards 'solutions' short of a British declaration of 
intent to withdraw. The reform process in Northern Ireland 
was accompanied by a ruthless and implacable continuation of 
the IRA's campaign, and the incentives for Protestants to 
vote for reform did not include an immediate cessation of 
violence, far less an already existing one, such as 
Afrikaners enjoyed at the time of the referendum. 
Secondly, Afrikaners, and the rest of the white electorate, 
were being asked to validate a process and not an outcome. 
De Klerk and his government were able to make assurances 
that majority rule would be diluted and contained;11 no such 
alternative was available in February 1972 to the British 
government and the rump of Unionist reformers led by 
Faulkner. In February 1974, on the other hand, the Unionists 
were invited to express their views on a fait accompli in 
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which the aspirations of the constitutional Catholic 
opposition in Northern Ireland and of the Irish government 
had clearly been prominent. 
Thirdly, in casting their votes (and indeed, subsequently in 
resorting to direct action) it is likely that many 
Protestants were mindful that the consequences of rejection 
were cushioned by the involvement of Britain. Unable to 
tolerate a vacuum of power or a chaotic stalemate, the 
British government would remain to institutionalise the 
crisis. No such safety net beckoned for South African 
whites, and this factor was played hard by the government in 
promoting a 'yes' majority in. the referendum. 
These three factors confirmed the already strong profile of 
reform among the white electorate and strengthen the 
contrast between the two movements. It makes an interesting 
comparative sidelight on the two situations to note that a 
referendum was also used in Northern Ireland. But in this 
instance, the orientation was towards the status quo rather 
than the invitation to endorse change which was offered to 
white South Africans. The electorate was invited to choose 
whether the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
should remain. 12 'Reform' or 'the reform process' were not 
directly offered for validation either before or after a 
'settlement' was produced. 
Thus far, a number of elements have been discussed which 
have been present in the dissolution of the coalitions which 
supported both Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism. 
These are, the resources available to reformers, the 
respective communities' experience of violence, the loss of 
control of security forces and the loss of political 
institutions which expressed identity in the form of self-
determination. with differing shades of nuance and degrees 
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of emphasis, these factors made themselves felt on the 
social groups which made up the support bases for Afrikaner 
Nationalism and ulster Unionism and on the conflict between 
reform and reaction which was at the heart of each 
coalition's dissolution. It will be useful now to summarise 
some essential points of difference between the movements on 
which these factors of situation and circumstance acted. 
Both were coalitions of workers, farmers and industrial and 
commercial classes, bound together by ties of ideology and 
interest which included in common, settler, ethnic and 
populist motifs. But the exact nature of these elements and 
the way they stood in relation to each other were very 
different. 
Perhaps the essential difference was that the Ulster 
Unionist coalition was looser and its elements -- especially 
the working class -- retained an independence of identity 
and action not characteristic of their Afrikaner 
counterparts. The latter were incorporated in a more 
comprehensive and highly structured way. This was because 
the South African situation was more directly and 
essentially colonial -- certainly it retained that character 
for much longer -- than Northern Ireland. The demographic 
ratio between settler and native, the social and 
developmental difference between them, the autonomy of 
settler power and distance from metropolitan influence, are 
all factors which conditioned this dimension of difference. 
Under these conditions, Afrikaner Nationalism could not 
afford the traditions of independent militance which 
characterised the populist and sectarian traditions in 
loyalism. Conveniently enough, the independence of the white 
working class had been destroyed by Smuts' government in 
1922. Thereafter the Nationalists were able to offer in its 
place a high degree of state protection through colour bars, 
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sheltered employment and extensive opportunities for state-
sponsored social mobility. The corollary to these privileges 
was a ruthless and complete imposition of formally inferior 
status on the native population. 
In the absence of such state protection, working-class 
Protestants had to affirm their identity, status, and 
material needs in the territorial displays and rituals of 
orangeism, bouts of electoral independence in ultra-
sectarian or labourist directions, the thinly-disguised 
vigilantism of the 'B' Specials and a capacity to threaten 
communal uproar in the streets or at the workplace. 
orange ism and loyalism are not the province of poets, 
professors, editors, theologians and ideologues in the way 
that Afrikaner Nationalism was and (although in much reduced 
terms) remains. Ranting oratory from the pulpit and shouted 
slogans in the street, resting on a bedrock of virtually 
mute immobilism, rather than measured abstractions, are 
their habitual forms of expression. Afrikaner Nationalists 
built monumental megaliths and gather at them in their 
thousands to pray and pay homage, before going home to 
organise and intrigue. Loyalists paint icons on their own 
houses, decorate their streets in a blaze of colour, sing, 
dance, burn effigies and hurl defiance at their ancestral 
enemies, who live only yards away.13 Immemorially, Orange 
celebrations are poised uneasily between carnival and riot, 
the dominant tone being decided by the current state of 
communal tension. The roots of solidarity are similar in the 
Afrikaner and Ulster Protestant political cultures, but 
their ultimate expressions are rather different. 
It would not do to carry this contrast too far. Loyalism and 
orangeism are not synonymous with Unionism, but without the 
crude and colourful exaggerations of these siblings it is a 
pallid and vacuous doctrine. Not all Afrikaner Nationalists 
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are intellectuals, and, especially in its rise to power and 
the early period of its rule, Afrikaner Nationalism had its 
share of raw, popular vigour which the contemporary 
Afrikaner right wing has inherited to some extent. But there 
are very strong strains of pragmatism and idealism which 
seek explanation, guidance and justification in adapting to 
changing circumstances in a characteristically intellectual 
way. This tendency, in all probability the dominant one, has 
acted as a conductor for the no doubt deeply-felt emotions 
which Afrikaner Nationalism excites in its adherents. Like 
Giliomee,14 Marks and Trapido15 cite Rude16 when they 
discuss how " •• the more \ structured' ideas of the ruling 
class and intelligentsia •• have interacted with diffuse and 
heterogeneous popular belief" in the context of Afrikaner 
Nationalism. Unlike Afrikaner Nationalism, in the case of 
Ulster Unionism, such interaction scarcely existed at all. 
Ulster Unionism has had no comparable elaborated framework 
and no class of intellectual custodians and cultural 
entrepreneurs to contain and isolate the more volatile 
elements in its support base. Loyalism and Orangeism are 
lived and possessed at a popular level -- in an absolutely 
literal sense they are acted out at street level on a 
virtually daily basis -- in a way that is simply not 
characteristic of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
The issues of difference are not merely those of political 
culture, ideology, consciousness and identity however. The 
material circumstances of Ulster Protestant working-class 
life have had practical political consequences of a very 
important nature, which set up striking contrasts with the 
situation of the Afrikaner right wing. Despite some changes 
effected by the welfare state, new investment and the re-
organisation of industry, Belfast in the 1960s and 1970s was 
still organised very much as a 19th-century industrial city. 
High density, informally segregated housing, often in the 
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shadow of factories and in close proximity to 'shatter 
zones' marking boundaries with Catholic areas, defined the 
spatial organisation of Belfast working-class life. Working-
class employment tended to be concentrated in sizable 
concerns, employing large numbers of workers. Protestants 
continued to dominate these heavy industries, especially in 
the skilled trades, notably in the shipyards. 
What the shipyards were to the economy of Northern Ireland, 
and to Ulster Unionism, the mines were to the South African 
economy and Afrikaner Nationalism. By the time of crisis and 
dissolution of these respective coalitions, neither industry 
was as central economically or politically as before, due to 
the growth of South Africa's manufacturing industry, and the 
steep decline in the competitiveness of British 
shipbuilding. But the fact that all recent attempts to 
kindle white worker solidarity in South Africa have revolved 
around the white Mine Workers' Union, and the leadership 
roles played by Protestant ship-building workers in LAW, the 
OWC and the UDA, reflect the continuing political vigour of 
these two industries. Despite the essential symmetry of 
industrial vanguardism and political mobilisation in the two 
situations, there are very important differences. The white 
miners who threatened to strike and mobilised for the AWB in 
Welkom in 1992, are a small minority, clinging tenaciously 
on to officially-sanctioned privileges in an industry 
numerically, and, increasingly politically dominated by the 
organised African workers whom they supervise. The 
'disciplining' of the African workers is the responsibility 
of the mine companies' paramilitary security departments, or 
in extremity the regular police. 
By contrast, Protestant shipyard workers predominate in the 
yards, and a traditional feature of sectarian conflict has 
been to expel Catholic workers in times of tension. In other 
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enterprises, expulsion and violence are not necessarily 
employed, but the creation of a hostile, sectarian 
atmosphere by the display of Orange and loyalist icons and 
regalia has the clear objective of disciplining such 
Catholics as do work there. 1? Self-help, then, rather than 
legal proscriptions, codes of industrial practice sanctioned 
by management, or outright state repression, have played an 
important part in maintaining identity and privilege for 
Protestant workers. 
In patterns of employment and housing, then, many 
Protestants lived in conditions which were highly conducive 
to mobilisation for direct action, through whatever 
combination of solidarity and intimidation. Whether in the 
collection of dues, the exaction of services (like patrols 
for neighbourhood defence), acquiescence in paramilitary 
violence, mobilisation for work stoppages, demonstrations, 
'no-go areas' or riots, Protestant worker and paramilitary 
organisations were able to capitalise on these conditions. 
In short, Northern Ireland exhibited to quite a high degree 
spatial features of social and economic organisation 
inherited from 19th century patterns of industrialisation 
which made central political control vulnerable to mass 
mobilisation and direct action from b~low. This 
vulnerability was accentuated by the relative weakness of 
the Northern Ireland state and, despite the clarity of its 
status in constitutional law, ambiguities in political 
practice over the nature and extent of its autonomy. This 
ambiguity persisted even after the assumption of direct rule 
by Westminster, to the extent that the British government 
continued to treat the population of Northern Ireland as an 
independently self-determining political community.1S 
It is clear that leaders on South Africa's right are alive 
to the strategic possibilities of a political strike very 
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much along the lines of the UWC stoppage. Indeed many of 
their threats and pronouncements sound like copybook 
adaptations of the UWC example. 19 Superficially, a 
comparative balance sheet between the two is fairly easy to 
draw up, and it is unfavourable to the South African right 
on numerous counts. 
Firstly, the South African economy is much larger, 
geographically much more dispersed, and functionally more 
diverse, making it much less vulnerable than the small, 
concentrated, declining and dependent economy of Northern 
Ireland. In effect, the success of the 1974 strike and the 
fate of the power-sharing executive were decided by the 
withdrawal of labour at just one power station. Similarly, 
Afrikaner workers are not concentrated geographically, 
residentially and occupationally in the way that Protestant 
workers in Northern Ireland are. No serious account of the 
1974 strike disputes that intimidation was necessary to the 
success of the strike, even if its role was exaggerated at 
first through wishful thinking and government propaganda. So 
limited are the prospects of intimidation in the South 
African context, that an Afrikaner Nationalist strike would 
have to achieve paralysing effects virtually by solidarity 
alone. A number of factors combine to make this a tall 
order: the declining purchase of white workers in the 
economy and their increasing distance from actual production 
processes: the absence of any tradition of white worker 
militancy since the 1922 strike; divisions between English 
and Afrikaner workers and divisions within Afrikaner 
Nationalism; the continuing viability of reform as a 
political position for whites, based on the prospect of 
continuing white participation in government after the first 
universal franchise election and continuing moderation on 
t~e part of the ANC leadership; the likelihood that white 
management would not passively await the political and 
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economic outcomes of any white worker strike, but would work 
vigorously to defeat it. 
Secondly, Ulster Protestant workers enjoyed a moral 
ascendancy of numbers which would be denied to the Afrikaner 
right. Protestant workers constituted a majority at most if 
not all of the major industrial concerns which were crucial 
to the success of the 1974 strike. The British government 
insisted on treating Northern Ireland as an independently 
self-determining community, and the February 1974 
westminster election seemed to demonstrate the illegitimacy 
of the power-sharing agreement. The IRA's continuing 
campaign of violence made it plain that Protestant 
concessions and reform had not bought peace, and this added 
to the strikers' self-perceptions of legitimacy. It is 
likely too that all these factors contributed to the British 
government's passivity; if the strikers had less of a case 
in these terms, perhaps the government would have moved more 
decisively against them. 
Thirdly, a strike of white workers called by the Afrikaner 
Nationalist right would carry a very high risk of a violent 
backlash from elements of black political movements, and 
more or less spontaneous communal violence, especially if 
the strike were accompanied by violence from white 
paramilitary groups. Altogether such an action would be a 
far riskier proposition than the uwe stoppage, whose leaders 
could gamble on the capacity of the British-led civil 
administration and security forces to prevent social chaos 
and a complete vacuum of power in the event of the strike's 
success. For this reason, the ultras could count on the 
acquiescence and even passive support of very large numbers 
of more moderate Protestants. No such guarantee of stability 
is available in South Africa, and many potential strikers 
could be deterred by the realisation that the prospects of 
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success are even more intimidating than those of failure in 
such drastic direct action. Frank Wright emphasises the 
importance of Britain's guarantee of stability and 
indirectly encapsulates a fundamental contrast with South 
Africa; 
Once degeneration into territorial breakdown 
has occurred, it is exceedingly difficult to 
restore any kind of peaceful co-existence 
between territorial fragments. The breakdown 
itself exposes the collapse of the original 
objectives of conflict and largely destroys 
the entity for which the contest took place 
in the beginning: the state apparatus ••••• The 
escape from all this is external powers who 
are themselves committed. to preserving peace 
and can rely on a large part of the internal 
population who want the same thing. Boring 
and unexciting as this conclusion must be, it 
is what stands between Northern Ireland and 
the fate of Cyprus and Lebanon. 20 
Nothing comparable stands between South Africa and such a 
fate. This factor is likely to weigh heavily in the minds of 
the majority of whites, on whom the small minority of 
militant ultras must rely for the success of any mass direct 
action. 
Fourthly, a key ingredient (many would argue, ~ key 
ingredient) in the success of the OWC's strike, was the 
British government's inability, or unwillingness to take 
vigorous pre-emptive and retaliatory counter-measures to 
break the strike. In fact it is likely that the cOmbination 
of the previous three factors -- the balance of demographic, 
political and industrial forces, the claims of the strikers 
to a legitimate case, and the ability of British state 
resources to guarantee stability even while remaining 
passive -- shaped this response. In any case, the situation 
in Northern Ireland was in no way crucial for the survival 
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of the British state, it was an annoying sideshow. For any 
South African government and state administration, the same 
is not true. A successful political strike by the white 
right would spell the end of the South African state and all 
the complications of communal and international co-existence 
which that eventuality would entail for the region . No 
government, whatever its complexion, could afford merely to 
hold the ring and await the outcome. The vigorous counter-
measures which it would doubtless order, would pose stark 
questions of its servants in the administration and the 
security forces. 
But more than forty years of assiduous state-building have 
ingrained loyalty to the state, and to political control in 
white political culture. It would be surprising if any 
government which embodied a recognisable degree of 
continuity with past state structures, could not count on 
sUbstantial numbers of these loyalists to defeat a strike. 
It is likely that they would be supplemented by blacks and 
pragmatic whites, for whom the uncertainties of civil war 
and a partitioned white enclave are even more threatening 
than the prospect of black rule. 
It could be argued that to compare the balance of forces in 
Northern Ireland in 1974 with South Africa at present is 
wrong and that the true historical parallels are between the 
situation of Afrikaner Nationalists now, and the Ulster 
Unionists' successful forcing of partition on Irish 
Nationalists and British governments between 1910 and 1922. 
Even if this argument is allowed, on the grounds that, like 
the Unionists in that period, the Afrikaner Nationalist 
right is prepared to abandon much of the territory its 
members control at present and settle (admittedly in greatly 
varying degrees and forms) for a much smaller state in which 
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to exercise their self-determination, the comparison is 
still unfavourable to them. 
Unlike Ulster Unionism, which between 1910 and 1922 was at 
the height of its power to mobilise virtually every Ulster 
Protestant into political and paramilitary formations, 
Afrikaner Nationalism, in the sense of a movement dedicated 
to exclusivist self-determination, can, after a decade of 
fraternal conflict, claim the allegiance of only about half 
of white Afrikaners, and even this support is fragmented 
among groups which have quite serious differences with each 
other. In addition, partition in Northern Ireland was 
underwritten by the power of the British empire against the 
half-hearted irredentism of a militarily insignificant Irish 
successor state, which was too preoccupied with its own 
civil war to regard co-existence with another state in 
Ireland as matter for anything more than rhetoric and 
gesture. Afrikaner Nationalists are unlikely to enjoy such a 
favourable context for their secessionist project. 
Establishing their own state and co-existing with a 
demographically larger and economically more powerful 
neighbour, quite possibly under hostile international 
scrutiny, will be much harder than the sheltered route to 
secession which favoured the Unionists. 
The effect of the foregoing arguments is to suggest that 
although similar elements were present in the dissolution of 
Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism, the specific 
historical forces and actors presented themselves in 
different ways. Differences in state-building, political 
culture and ideology, and in the material circumstances of 
the social groups which made up the respective coalitions, 
made the crisis which faced Ulster Unionism more hospitable 
to successful mass-based direct action of paramilitary and 
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worker organisations, than that which faced Afrikaner 
Nationalism. 
REFORM. THE BACKLASH AND STATE ORGANS 
It would be wrong to analyse and discuss the backlash 
phenomenon as if it were exclusively confined to irregular 
formations which claim mass membership and stand apart from, 
indeed in opposition to, the state. Other initiatives are 
possible when components of previously well-integrated 
coalitions take on themselves freedom of independent action 
and these possibilities exist within state organs as well as 
outside and in opposition to them. 
As a result, the range of relationships between the 
principal protagonists in conflicts between reform and 
reaction is a complex one. The main players are, reforming 
governments (and the parties supporting them), state organs 
charged with carrying out the reforms, maintaining order and 
prosecuting campaigns of counter-insurgency and factions of 
'ultras' organised into political, paramilitary and 
industrial groups. Reforming governments generally like to 
offer a simplified portrait of these relationships, in which 
they are the moderate centre, holding the ground between a 
vengeful right and an irresponsible left and ,commanding a 
loyal and professional state apparatus. In practice, a 
number of factors may make this somewhat self-interested 
designation inadequate. 
Firstly, reforming governments may be forced or may choose 
to be tolerant of ultra groups, even when their orientations 
and actions are clearly subversive. Perhaps they are 
sufficiently numerous and/or well-armed and organised to 
make their coercion a hazardous business, especially when 
the government is fighting a war of counter-insurgency with 
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anti-regime forces. Politicians and generals are usually 
acutely alive to the dangers of a two-front war. It is also 
possible that coercing ultras might upset the balance 
between convinced reformers and sceptical hard-liners who 
yet remain in the government and governing party. such 
coercion might in any case strain the loyalties of those who 
continue to support the government and party, but harbour 
sympathies for ultra groups (perhaps seeing their existence 
as an insurance policy), without endorsing all their 
methods. A far right-wing threat can, moreover, be a useful 
strategic resource for a reforming government in 
negotiations with anti-regime groups and in mobilising 
support from the centre of all parties. This threat can 
define its reform credentials more clearly, set apparent 
limits to the possibilities of reform, and illustrate the 
destabilising consequences of actions by anti-regime forces. 
Any (or any combination) of these prohi~itions and 
incentives can complicate the relationships between 
reforming governments and the backlash to them, edging them 
towards tolerance or even collusion. This is especially true 
when the backlash spans a whole continuum of actions from 
constitutional political opposition, to outright terrorism 
and groups both within and outside state organs. The most 
extreme version of a collusive relationship would be when a 
reforming government uses state organs -- on a 'deniable' 
basis -- to pursue a double agenda in which reform is 
accompanied by destabilisation of opponents. 
Secondly, state organs themselves may harbour resistance to 
reform objectives and policies. Even this designation is not 
simple, since at least two sources of motivation, corporate 
and ideological, can be suggested. Corporate motivation 
itself may be of two sorts. In the first, the material and 
status interests of the bureaucrats, soldiers and policemen 
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themselves may be put at risk by policies of reform. 
Another possibility arises, especially in the case of 
security forces prosecuting campaigns of counter-insurgency, 
when corporate professional judgment is offended by reform 
policies. Soldiers and policemen may believe that their own 
and comrades' past efforts and sacrifices are being wasted, 
or they may simply be unable to make the transition from 
'dirty war' exigencies to those of negotiation. 
Ideological motivation involves identification (for the most 
part necessarily covert) of soldiers, policemen and 
bureaucrats with the ultras' position of resistance to 
reform, on the basis of loyalty to the essential verities 
around which the original coalition was mobilised. In this 
sense they may feel their ethnic identity impinge heavily on 
the demands of corporate loyalty. 
Soldiers, bureaucrats and policemen who are impelled into 
direct action against reform policies, do not necessarily 
identify themselves with paramilitary ultra groups. Whether 
their motives are corporate or even ideological, they may be 
repelled by the irregular, ruffianly, or even downright 
psychopathic aspects of paramilitarism, viewing them at best 
as a necessary evil. On the other hand, ultra elements may 
infiltrate state organs, especially security forces, in 
order to gain access to training, equipment and a favourable 
operational base to work against reform from within. 
In the light of these suggestions -- that the relationships 
between reformers and ultras are not necessarily of simple 
opposition, that the backlash phenomenon can be found in 
state organs as well as in ultra opposition groups, and that 
resistance from within state organs can stem from a variety 
of motivations -- it is worthwhile looking again at the 
crises and dissolution of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner 
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Nationalism to assess what part, if any, state organs have 
played in harbouring ultra resistance to reform. 
state Organs. Loyalist Dissidence and the Breakup of the 
Ulster Unionist Coalition 
Some early aspects of the Northern Ireland crisis suggest 
that 'ultra' attitudes within the state itself may have 
played a part in the developing disorder. The problem 
focuses on the question of partisan policing. Certainly, the 
RUC treated the problem of political protest which 
accompanied the altered political atmosphere of O'Neillism 
as one of counter-insurgency in the context of a sectarian 
power struggle, rather than one of the neutral control of 
public order. However, O'Neill's reforms were far too 
tentative, fragile and short-lived for any serious crisis to 
have emerged between a reforming government and its 
principal coercive agency. In any case the early reversion 
of the IRA to a an atavistic and swiftly escalating armed 
struggle retrospectively obscures the issue. Nevertheless, 
the RUC's conduct during the civil rights period of the 
crisis makes it plain that its corporate interpretation of 
the situation was closer to that of William Craig, O'Neill's 
hard-line minister of home affairs, rather than O'Neill's 
own. Even more serious than these strategic shortcomings was 
the indiscipline of rank and file policemen, especially in 
Derry between October 1968 and August 1969. This allowed 
policing in that city quite rapidly to become a private war 
between Catholic residents and the RUC, culminating in the 
Battle of the Bogside. 21 
It is scarcely surprising then, that reform of the RUC was 
one of the most important elements of the reform package 
pressed on O'Neill and his successors by the British 
government. The reforms of the Hunt Report, which did so 
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much to propel forward the dissolution of the Unionist 
alliance and foster the growth of the loyalist 
paramilitaries, were aimed at civilianising the RUC and 
leaving the internal security function of the state's 
coercive forces to the regular British army and the newly-
created Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). This policy direction 
seemed to have been vindicated by the revelation of further 
shortcomings of the RUC when the intelligence provided by 
the RUC Special Branch used by the army in conducting the 
first internment sweeps (August 1971), proved woefully 
inadequate and completely partisan. 22 But civilianisation 
was overtaken by the ferocity of the IRA's offensive in 1970 
and 1971 and it became clear that the police would have to 
be rearmed and revert to internal security duties, albeit in 
a context of Westminster control and army primacy. The 
rehabilitation of the RUC which was encouraged by the 
altered security situation and the mounting toll of murdered 
and injured officers, would henceforth be achieved by 
professionalisation rather than civilianisation. 
If the changing security situation favoured the 
rehabilitation of the RUC, the changing political situation 
-- notably the imposition of direct rule -- posed serious 
questions as to the force's ultimate loyalty. The RUC had 
been the ultimate expression of Protestant hegemony and 
Unionist political control, but despite this, it appeared 
that it would acquiesce in the removal of these conditions. 
the refusal of any elements of the police 
to be drawn into Unionist opposition to 
direct rule significantly enhanced the 
reputation of the RUC at an official level 
and helped pave the way for later changes of 
policy that placed greater reliance on the 
RUC in the security field. 23 
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In reality, there was little choice. From 1910 and the 
creation of the UVF onwards, an important role of first 
irregular, and then regular coercive forces in the Ulster 
Unionist alliance was to discipline, direct and contain the 
excesses of vigilantism. Even a ruling class as cohesive and 
determined as that led by Carson and Craig found difficulty 
in doing so. By 1972 this leadership was gone. Paisley was 
an extraordinary leader in his way, but he was a creation of 
street politics, a dubious proposition for a disciplined 
force to fall in behind. Craig carried no mantle of 
authority and was reduced to courting the paramilitaries in 
Nuremberg-style rallies. For the police to throw in its lot 
with the paramilitaries would . be, at worst, to threaten a 
reversal of roles; instead of the regular forces giving 
their character to vigilantes, the vigilantes would impart 
theirs to the police. Even at best, such a choice by the 
police would compromise, perhaps fatally, the force's 
fledgling sense of corporate professionalism. In any case, 
in 1972, there were over 20 000 British troops in Northern 
Ireland. To choose the path of resistance carried grave 
risks of confrontation with vastly superior forces. 
These signs that the police would henceforth be a 
professional rather than a partisan force were not 
materially affected by the conduct of the RUC during the 
1974 Ulster Workers' Council strike. Despite inevitable 
criticism from Nationalists and Republicans, less partial 
observers have placed the alleged passivity of the police in 
the wider context of government and military failure to act 
decisively. The army had the dominant responsibility for 
security matters, and the British government showed a lack 
of clear commitment to end the strike by removing barricades 
and combating intimidation. 24 Whatever their individual 
views on the Executive and the Irish Dimension of the 
Sunningdale Agreement, there is no evidence that the police 
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acted as a body to overthrow them, or should bear 
responsibility for the failure of these reform initiatives. 
This increasing confidence in the reliability of the police 
enabled the British government to carry out significant 
changes in security policy in the altered political 
circumstances after 1974. 25 The essential nature of these 
changes was twofold; first to redefine terrorism and related 
offences in criminal rather than political terms, replacing 
emergency measures where possible with due process, or at 
least a semblance of it; second to give the police a higher 
profile in the counter-insurgency campaign against the IRA, 
and in combating Protestant terrorism. These changes, made 
public in January 1977, have set the pattern for the RUC's 
role ever since. The verdict on how it has performed that 
role is inevitably mixed, and usually reflects in some 
degree or another the observer's political perspectives. But 
although the RUC remains an overwhelmingly Protestant 
force,26 and it is disliked and distrusted by significant 
numbers of Catholics, it cannot be regarded as an 
independent source of resistance to reform and negotiated 
attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland problem, either as 
a corporate whole, or as a haven for significant numbers of 
dissident ultras. This judgement can be made while 
acknowledging several controversial aspects of the RUC's 
operations since the late 1970s. These include revelations 
of brutality during interrogation at the RUC's Castlereagh 
headquarters in Belfast,27 allegations of a 'shoot to kill' 
policy of the RUC in the mid-1980s,28 and of collusion in 
passing intelligence information to Protestant terrorists in 
1989. 29 
It can be argued that the first two of these, however 
morally dubious or tactically misconceived, should be seen 
in the narrow context of operational exigencies in a 
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counter-insurgency campaign. These corporate imperatives, 
rather than ethnically-motivated attempts to subvert wider 
political processes, in all likelihood account for these 
problematic aspects of police operations. 30 The third 
category of alleged misconduct is potentially more damaging, 
given that contacts with Protestant extremists suggest a 
reversion to sectarian policing. The verdict of the British 
government inquiry into the affair,31 however, was that 
collusion between security forces and loyalists was "neither 
widespread nor institutionalised".32 In fact, although the 
report's 83 recommendations dealt with police procedures, 
they left the impression that the problem of collusion 
centred on the Ulster Defence. Regiment, rather than the 
police, a separate issue which will be dealt with in due 
course. 33 
The absence of any significant evidence linking the RUC to 
widespread ultra dissidence makes the positive indications 
of the force's professionalism all the more impressive. 
Three examples make the point; firstly the vigour with which 
the RUC confronted the 1977 loyalist strike, by comparison 
with 1974; secondly, the impressive detection and conviction 
rate against Protestant terrorists, at least until the 
latter re-organised on tighter, less penetrable lines in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s; thirdly the conduct of the RUC 
in the highly-charged atmosphere of loyalist protest against 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1987. 
The last of these is probably the most significant. The 
implementation of the accord in the teeth of vehement 
rejection by loyalists caused what one observer called 
" •. ferocious conflicts of loyalty within the RUC and 
UDR •• ".34 Such conflicts were exacerbated by " •• hostility 
from their own community, consisting mainly of steady 
pressure on their least professional members, the part-time 
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reservists living in loyalist, working class estates".35 
This pressure included firearm and petrol bomb attacks on 
the families and homes of RUC officers while they were on 
duty, resulting in more than 30 families having to move to 
safer areas. Despite the RUC's misgivings at features of the 
Agreement, especially the right of the Irish government to 
raise security and policing issues at the standing inter-
governmental conference, loyalist politicians and 
paramilitaries were unable to capitalise on either the 
conflicts of loyalty, or the intimidation. 36 No police 
revolt was forthcoming, and despite continuing criticisms by 
Northern Ireland Nationalists and the Irish government, the 
force held firm. 37 
If the RUC is very largely free of loyalist dissidence, the 
status of the other locally-recruited branch of the security 
forces still has to be considered. The UDR has been the 
object of deep suspicion by Catholics from its founding as a 
replacement of the 'B' Specials. In fact, these suspicions 
have centred on the belief that the regiment represents too 
much continuity with the earlier part-time force for 
Catholics' comfort. 38 That there are grounds for disquiet is 
made clear by the fact that since 1970, more than 100 UDR 
members have been convicted of serious offences. 39 These 
have included the theft of arms and, as we have seen, the 
passing of intelligence to Protestant terrorists. Most 
serious of all, 17 UDR soldiers have been convicted of 
murder, though it is not clear how many of these were 
planned sectarian assassinations. 40 
These figures are serious, although it should be noted that 
they cover over 20 years in which many thousands of men and 
women have passed through the regiment (its current strength 
is over 7 000), and 240 of its members have been murdered, 
the vast majority when off-duty.41 Nevertheless, although 
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the British government has consistently refused to heed 
Catholic and Irish government calls for the regiment's 
disbanding, it has been formally integrated into the British 
army in a move suggestive of a desire for closer control 
over its part-time members. 42 
state Organs. the Extreme Right and the Break-up of the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Coalition 
In South Africa, the security forces have also been central 
to issues of reform and reaction. A similar pattern of 
partisan policing has given way, in the wake of political 
reform, to a similar programme of security force re-
organisation along more professional lines. 43 This has left 
security forces occupying uncertain ground between a 
reforming government and ultra groups, including 
paramilitaries. 
There are strong reasons for suspecting that the South 
African security forces might be a centre of opposition to 
negotiation and reform, a source of action paralleling, if 
not actually coordinated with the extreme white right. In 
the first place, the South African Police has indisputably 
been an ethnic force, the South African Defence Force only a 
little less clearly so. Both have been so ideologically 
committed to the counter-revolutionary struggle which was 
the counterpoint to the reform process as to bear no 
resemblance whatever to the ideal of a politically neutral 
force charged with even-handed maintenance of public order. 
In short, the contradictions between all that the security 
forces had represented up to February 1990 and the demands 
of negotiation and transformation were traumatically sharp. 
In addition, security force members could expect not only to 
have to deal with former enemies on an altered basis, but 
also to expect profound changes in personnel, organisation 
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and orientation to reflect affirmative action goals, new 
forms of patronage and so on. For many the fear of official 
or unofficial revenge for past misconduct must have seemed 
very real. 
The speed and scope of de Klerk's reform initiatives left no 
breathing space in which these contradictions could be 
softened, and no immediate alternative to the security 
forces as already constituted was available to keep order. 
By contrast, the RUC was afforded a breathing space of 
several years in which the British army took precedence in 
maintaining order, allowing the police to readjust to 
altered political conditions . . 
In the light of these conditions, it is not surprising that 
the security forces have been suspected of involvement in 
the political violence which has engulfed South Africa since 
February 1990. Numerous reports have been published which 
attempt to document and analyse the role of the security 
forces in this violence. 44 These are supplemented by interim 
reports of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies set up as part 
of the process of negotiation and transition,45 book-length 
accounts by investigative journalists,46 and the ongoing 
reports and investigations of newspapers. 47 For a number of 
reasons, this varied evidence is difficult to assess. 
Firstly, the degree of latitude given to the security forces 
at the height of the struggle between anti-apartheid forces 
and the state in the 1980s has meant that covert units which 
may be currently active in violent destabilisation have the 
resources to cover their tracks. This situation is 
aggravated by the lack of any well-developed culture of 
investigation and accountability in South African politics, 
(especially in civil/military relations), and the need felt 
by current government members to protect themselves from 
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exposure of past responsibility for illegal acts of 
violence. 48 Secondly, much of the more dramatic evidence 
refers to the period before the reforms of 1990, and is 
based on confessions by former operatives which are 
difficult to verify conclusively and may be tainted by 
elements of personal instability and/or self-interest. 
Thirdly, some of the reports have been compiled by 
organisations which cannot be considered objective. 49 
As a result, although there is a widespread presumption, 
supported by strong circumstantial50 evidence, that members 
of security forces (especially, though not exclusively 
covert units) have been involved in political violence since 
February 1991, there is little clarity on how this 
presumption should be interpreted even (or perhaps, 
especially) among those individuals and groups who hold it 
most strongly. Difficulties of interpretation centre on the 
following issues: confusion between acts of omission and 
commission by security forces: the difficulty of 
establishing chains of responsibility for illegal acts, 
notably whether security force members act independently 
when they commit them, or under higher political authority: 
the fact that lack of professionalism in the police has two 
dimensions, political and/or ethnic bias, and shoddy 
procedures and other incompetence: the extent of links 
between regular security forces, ultra paramilitary groups, 
and black 'vigilante' groups. An inability (or 
unwillingness) to engage these issues leads to evidence 
being used to claim that there is a single source for the 
violence, 'destabilisation', and a single culprit 'Apartheid 
Power', rather than a complex pattern of discrete motives, 
actors and strategies. 51 
A more measured account argues that the violence lacks 
'uniform motivation' at both elite and mass level: 
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•. the violence is better classified as 
conspiratorial and turmoil producing in 
nature, originating from politically active 
networks of people in several camps (the 
government, Inkatha, and the ANC~ who act 
according to their own agendas. 5 
Arguing that for the government to be responsible for the 
violence would defeat its own 'stability goals' in effecting 
a negotiated transition, this account nevertheless 
acknowledges the responsibility of "semi-independent 
intelligence operatives" who, "disagreeing with de Klerk's 
policy change, wanted to see negotiation fail and the right-
wing agenda succeed".53 
Another brief review of the available evidence54 also 
locates the 'third force,55 within the SADF's special forces 
and the Directorate of Military Intelligence which co-
ordinates their operations, although it is more equivocal on 
the compatibility of the violence with government policy. 
This version has in fact achieved wide currency, although it 
remains reliant largely on historical, circumstantial, and 
deductive evidence to corroborate leaks from defecting 
security force personnel, and it was rejected in the 
Goldstone Commission's interim report. 56 
The likely existence of elements in the security forces 
which have right wing sympathies and have tried to 
destabilise the negotiation process, has not prevented 
negotiations between the security forces themselves and the 
ANC. By late 1993, there were strong indications that 
corporate interests like security of tenure for currently 
serving senior officers were central to questions of 
transformation and allegiance. Reports of an agreement 
reflecting the ANC's acceptance of the need for continuity 
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and the SADF's acceptance of some political appointments 
suggest that the parties have reached a point at which the 
security forces are no longer regarded as a serious 
corporate threat to transition, although Commando (home 
defence) units, especially in rural areas may use their 
training and issue weapons on behalf of the right. 57 
Conclusion 
The dissolutions of the Afrikaner Nationalist and Ulster 
Unionist coalitions were historical passages in which 
balances of forces were clearly visible. Ulster Unionism had 
never achieved (had never evep striven for) that level of 
mobilisation and integration which would have created a 
movement capable of meeting new challenges and restated 
crises from within its own resources. Neither in itself nor 
as the centrepiece of a network of mobilising organisations 
nor in fusion with the state could the Ulster Unionist Party 
create forces resilient enough, confident and numerous 
enough, to combine reform and counter-insurgency while still 
reproducing its own support base. In the absence of 
substantial social forces to support reform from within 
their own ranks, Unionist leaders were forced reluctantly to 
implement reform programmes forced on them by anxious and 
disapproving British governments. The results were 
disastrous for their credibility and the cohesion of the 
Unionist bloc. 
The populist revolt which ensued was fuelled by class 
tensions, extreme religious convictions and proto-
nationalist stirrings, all of which were endemic sub-themes 
in Unionism. It was encouraged by robust traditions of 
independent action from below, a vacuum of leadership, the 
insecurities of economic decline and favourable 
configurations of social geography. The weakly developed 
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structures of the Ulster Unionist coalition and the Northern 
Ireland state simply could not withstand such a combination 
of powerful, if incoherent forces and simply collapsed. 
By contrast, the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition created 
forces powerful enough to transform themselves first 
socially and economically, then politically. Ironically, the 
very source of the strength and flexibility which insulated 
the National Party from the kind of populist revolt which 
brought down reforming Unionism -- a powerful and extensive 
state apparatus -- made it vulnerable from another quarter. 
The possibility that the state apparatus itself would be the 
site of revolt -- through a m~litary coup perhaps -- has 
conditioned and set limits first to the reform process and 
now to the ANC's plans for a post-apartheid order. A 
disposition on the part of the top ranks of the security 
forces to see their interests in secular, corporate and 
material terms, rather than taking on an ideological and 
ethnic cast provides the best continuing hope that the 
dissolution of the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition will not 
cUlminate in full-blown revolt based in the state apparatus. 
It is likely however that destabilising harassment by 'Third 
Force' elements will continue, at least up to the election 
planned for April 27 1994 and probably beyond. 
It is unlikely that the National Party reformers intended to 
take their own metamorphosis as far as it has come. It is 
probable that what was meant as an opportunistic broadening 
of legitimacy in the interests of continued ethnic 
domination has turned through contingent, unforeseen and 
collateral effects into an abandonment of ethnic 
mobilisation in favour of entrenched defence of class 
privilege partly through negotiated constitutional 
protection and partly through strategic positioning in the 
economy and administration. What began as a planned and 
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limited withdrawal became, if not a rout, then at least a 
hasty forced march to the rear, latterly with less and less 
semblance of good order. 
Nonetheless, Afrikaner Nationalism and the white minority 
rule on which it ultimately depended, had created the forces 
through which this improbable and undeniably impressive feat 
could be carried out. That it could be accomplished without 
the centre being overwhelmed either by ultra dissent from 
the rump forces of fundamental nationalism, revolt from 
within the state apparatus, or the many-sided assault of 
resurgent black resistance is a tribute to the dynamic and 
transformatory resources of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
coalition and these things encapsulate the difference~ 
between it and the Ulster Unionist coalition. 
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When the intention of a comparativist is the parallel 
demonstration of theory, the focus is usually on some 
structural determinant of the situations compared. For 
Greenberg, class relations under conditions of industrial 
development, and for Akenson the cultural imprint of a set 
of ideas drawn from the same source, provided the analytical 
keys to comparison. The focus of this study has been rather 
different, not so much on structural determinants, but on 
the institutions through which these structural factors 
worked themselves out. 
In both cases, coalitions were mobilised and personalities 
(Protestant Ulster, the Afrikaner YQlk) were articulated by 
these institutions. The coalitions brought together 
different class interests and ideological strands, creating 
popular political forces strong enough to take power and 
build states in which they could (to their own if no-one 
else'S satisfaction) represent themselves as democratic 
majorities. These states protected and promoted the 
material, identity and unity needs of the coalitions' 
various components. They showed their sectarian and 
exclusivist natures in two ways; by expressing the 
particularist symbols of Ulster Protestants and Afrikaners; 
and by granting unequal access to these dominant groups. 
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unity among these groups was essential for the maintenance 
of these states, and it depended on fostering a democratic, 
egalitarian and populist ethos which was plausible enough, 
at best to legitimise, at a minimum to obscure, the reality 
of hierarchical control and class inequality. This balancing 
act rested in each case on the state's ability to reproduce 
favourable economic conditions, enjoyment of freedom from 
outside interference and successful repression of protest 
and resistance from Catholics and blacks to their exclusion. 
In their maturity, both coalitions experienced crises which 
put these things in doubt. Central to these crises was 
reorganised and refocused resistance. The Civil Rights 
Movement in Northern Ireland .confronted the state where it 
was weakest, on the issue of 'British standards' of social 
justice and civil liberties, instead of where it was 
strongest, in defiance of Irish nationalist irredentism. But 
nationalism could not be separated from social justice in 
the eyes of the Northern Ireland state's most determined 
attackers and its most intransigent defenders. Atavistic 
baggage on both sides made reform appear to be cosmetic 
reshuffling to one side and appeasement of ancestral enemies 
on the other. 
Similarly, the workplace and township revolts which made 
themselves felt in South Africa after the Durban strikes of 
1973 and the Soweto uprising of 1976 respectively, combined 
demands for social justice with a threat to the ethnic basis 
of the state in ways which were bound to divide the dominant 
group along much the same lines as in Northern Ireland. In 
both cases, the ruling coalitions divided principally over 
strategies to cope not only with the re-stated resistance, 
but also with broader elements of crisis like the effects of 
social and economic change and encroachments on their 
freedom of action from outside their own narrowly-based 
polities. The divisions became fault lines along which the 
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coalitions fell apart, the dissolution hastened (in 
different degrees) by already-existing contradictions of 
class and ideology, and the emergence of special interests 
such as (in the case of Ulster) the religious fundamentalism 
of the Rev. Ian Paisley. 
It is not uncommon to observe ethnic mobilisation at work in 
movements aspiring to political power, or in those which 
have already achieved it and control a state apparatus. It 
is less common to observe the declining purchase of ethnic 
mobilisation and unity, resulting in the decay of coalitions 
which once gave expression to them. It is this aspect which 
gives particular interest to .a comparison of Ulster Unionism 
and Afrikaner Nationalism. More specifically, in both these 
cases, a managed transformation from above was attempted on 
a coalition which had successfully integrated all classes 
and virtually all persuasions of Protestants and Afrikaners. 
In the case of Unionism, this initiative from above was 
quickly overwhelmed by mass-based resistance from the 
regime's own supporters, while in South Africa, the National 
Party successfully created and defended the political space 
in which it could manage and even exploit the wider 
political changes which were going on around it. 
This study has discussed a number of factors which bear upon 
the contrasting fates of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner 
Nationalism in transition and they might usefully be 
recapitulated at this point. 
The Ulster Unionist coalition was constructed out of classes 
and interests which had identities of their own and vigorous 
popular traditions of direct action and self-help. The 
pattern of mobilisation and integration of these forces into 
a coalition was episodic rather than continuous, crisis-
driven and narrowly focused, rather than reflecting broad, 
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long-term goals of socio-economic transformation of the 
coalition's members. These things were emphasised in a 
mythology which helped to bind the coalition together. Its 
principal motifs were (and remain) conditional loyalty to 
leaders and the celebration of populism and popular 
initiatives of direct action. It embodies a demotic 
consciousness rather than a formally-elaborated ideology and 
as such offers little purchase for remodelling and re-
interpretation in the interests of reform from above. 
The nature of the Northern Ireland state provides another 
essential feature of the Ulster Unionist coalition. The 
state embodied Ulster Protestants' determination not to be 
part of an Ireland defined by Irish nationalism and Roman 
Catholic social values. It was their principal guarantee 
against that eventuality, but it did not offer them in 
addition, specific, formal, and wide-ranging guarantees of 
their material advancement and identity concerns. In 
questions of territory, discrimination in employment, the 
defence of 'traditional liberties' -- in which, inevitably, 
the question of marching loomed large -- and the suppression 
of Catholic self-assertion, self-help and direct action 
rather than state sponsorship were often the order of the 
day.l 
All these features meant that Ulster Unionism contained 
elements in which class-consciousness co-existed rather than 
competed with ethnic identity, and traditions of conditional 
loyalty and independent action and self-defence were strong. 
The combination was too volatile for the relatively weak and 
fragile institutions of Unionism and the Northern Ireland 
state. 
By contrast, the elements of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
coalition did not to anything like the same degree have 
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separate class identities or traditions of independent 
action which had to be propitiated on an ongoing basis, and 
which could in times of crisis threaten to overwhelm the 
coalition's authority structure. There is no doubt that 
Afrikaner Nationalism was a popular movement, but if it ever 
was, it quite early ceased to be a movement of popular 
initiative. 
Protestants could believe in a more direct and personal way 
than Afrikaners that they had created their state 
themselves. This was the meaning of their covenant, unlike 
the abstractions and historical confusions of the Trekker 
covenant. The social and political conservatism of the 
Ulster Unionist coalition and the siege metaphors of its 
mythology should not be allowed to obscure (as it has done 
immemorially in the eyes of Irish republicans and the 
British left) the popular and insurrectionist origins of the 
Northern Ireland state, and the populist undercurrents which 
had to be appeased in order to reproduce support for it. The 
anti-imperialism of Afrikaner Nationalism and its 
association with dynamic social engineering once in power, 
have given a misleading revolutionary veneer to a profoundly 
conservative movement in which constitutional continuity and 
rectitude were always more important than popular 
initiative, and whose popular elements were always tightly 
integrated and very firmly under control. 
In these senses, the Afrikaner Nationalist coalition was 
much more self-consciously created and it was far more 
comprehensively and closely integrated. Demography and 
patterns of economic growth demanded elaborate state 
intervention to secure status, corporate identity and 
material advantage for Afrikaners. To create and operate 
~uch a system, Afrikaner Nationalism had, first of all, to 
be much more structured and stratified, geared for dramatic 
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social mobility and social engineering, guided by an 
ideology that was a remarkable blend of utopia and 
pragmatism. This in turn required elaborate and powerful 
autonomous state structures. Political relations within the 
Afrikaner Nationalist coalition after 1948 were increasingly 
dominated, not so much by the idea of the Y2lk, but by the 
relation between the party and the state. Especially from 
the mid-1970s, the National Party became the party of the 
state. In response to its legitimacy crisis, it could not 
incorporate others into the Y2lk, so it slowly began to 
accommodate them in the state. At the same time it tried to 
pretend that it remained a nationalist party in the ethnic 
and exclusivist sense, but this contradiction could not be 
sustained indefinitely. Camouflaged (though not from the 
ultras who opposed them, at first from within, and then from 
a separate right wing) by the smoke and mirrors of reform 
and insulated by the power of the state, the National Party 
shed the outward trappings of ethnic nationalism and after 
1990 emerged, largely transformed into a conservative party. 
Finally, if the contrasting trajectories of Ulster Unionism 
and Afrikaner Nationalism through similar cycles of growth, 
maturity and decay are explicable in terms of the themes 
which this study has brought forward, what bearing do such 
explanations have on concepts like ethnicity and class which 
are habitually invoked in the contexts of these movements? 
The idea of political ethnicity in the sense of solidarity 
and identity based on feelings of extended kinship and 
elaborated with reference to commonalities of language, 
culture or religion, and articulated in a mythology of 
shared historical experience, is useful in interpreting the 
life-cycles of Ulster Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism. 
Perhaps the first thing that the histories of these 
movements seem to suggest about the nature of ethnicity is 
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that ethnic identities are not pure, unambiguous and 
unchanging. In fact, both coalitions represented compromises 
between versions of identity. The more pragmatic Afrikaner 
Nationalists always recognised that they could not rule 
alone. If white supremacy was essential for the survival of 
Afrikaner ethnic identity, then Afrikaner Nationalism was 
probably the best way in which white supremacy could be 
organised and legitimised. The result was a compromise in 
which strong doses of ethnic mobilisation were needed to 
give white supremacy the motive power it needed to survive, 
but ethnic exclusivity could not be allowed to predominate 
over secular considerations like economic growth and the 
need for partners, shaped by the exigencies of demography 
and the geography of settlement. In this way, ethnic 
identity was not something simply to be cultivated and 
exploited, it was a problem to be grappled with, and under 
conditions of crisis a source of conflict and fragmentation. 
The competing dimensions of identity in Ulster Unionism 
provide an even stronger example of the untidiness of 
ethnicity. The contrast between metropolitan and loyalist 
versions of Unionism demonstrates the point. The two are 
divided on whether or not the British connection represents 
a positive identification with a wider polity and culture 
than the parochial concerns of Protestant Ulster, or is 
essentially instrumental, the guarantee of the survival of a 
narrower ethnic identity. A similar pattern to that of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, in which a compromise was stretched 
to breaking point under conditions of crisis, is evident in 
the competing identities of Ulster Unionists. 
A second aspect of ethnicity raised by looking at the life-
cycles of these movements is the question of its durability 
as a mobilising agent. Perhaps it is, as its critics 
suggest, purely a temporary phenomenon, the product of 
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specific economic, social and political conditions, 
vulnerable especially to modernisation and the shifting 
balances of class forces. 2 If the break up of the Afrikaner 
Nationalist coalition appears to give support to t~is view, 
there are grounds for sounding a cautionary note. Firstly, 
opinion polls published in late 1993 suggested that a clear 
majority of white Afrikaners now support the parties of the 
right for whom territorial self-determination and ethnic 
mobilisation are centrally important. Secondly, although the 
National Party has transformed itself, it remains dominated 
by white Afrikaners,3 and is committed to appealing to 
coloured people as 'brown Afrikaners. These things suggest 
that although ethnicity may not be the organic and eternal 
things that its zealots proclaim, it is more than the 
temporary phenomenon that its critics suggest. What have 
gone are the compromises which allowed ethnicity to be 
organised in certain specific institutional forms. Afrikaner 
ethnicity has come to be defined more broadly (to include 
coloureds) and more narrowly (to include only the 
descendants of citizens of the old Boer republics), but has 
not ceased to be relevant. 
The third aspect of ethnicity raised by this study is the 
degree of difference in the intensity and range of ethnic 
mobilisation. The extent of the difference between Ulster 
Unionism and Afrikaner Nationalism on this score suggests 
that the former was a movement of ethnic mobilisation only 
in a weak and partial sense, while the latter was in a much 
more extensive and integrated sense. This again points to 
the great flexibility of ethnicity which is both its 
strength and weakness as an explanatory tool. It also brings 
forward questions of how class issues arise and how they are 
dealt with in ethnic movements. 
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Two points of contrast help to illustrate these questions. 
The first is that there was no parallel in Ulster Unionism 
to Afrikaner Nationalism's concern with the \poor white 
problem'. Ulster Unionism did not have the resources or the 
autonomy to give systematic attention to poverty on an 
ethnic basis, but in any case was not based on conceptions 
of kinship which would give meaning to a \poor Protestant 
problem'. Beyond tolerating a margin of discriminatory 
protection over Catholics against unemployment, Unionist 
leaders and Protestant employers felt no need or obligation 
for schemes of ethnic social mobility. 
The second point of contrast .is that as an Afrikaner moved 
up the educational and occupational scale he would be more 
likely to join the Afrikaner Broederbond, and even if he did 
not, he would find Afrikaner organisations appropriate to 
his altered economic and social status. An Ulster Unionist 
on the other hand would be less likely to join the Orange 
Order in a similar situation of social mobility (unless he 
had specifically political ambitions). 
For Afrikaner Nationalism, it was the way that social 
mobility and ethnicity were bound together that helped to 
give the coalition its staying power. since social mobility 
was not part of Ulster Unionism's agenda, some corporate 
identity for the Protestant working class and a clear 
indication that this identity was recognised and respected 
within the coalition was necessary. It is impossible to read 
the publications of the worker and paramilitary 
organisations of the loyalist revolt without gaining the 
impression that for many working class Protestants ethnic 
identity was constructed not in opposition to a sense of 
themselves as working class, but in part at least, through 
it. The idea that the most authentic, staunch and 
uncompromising loyalists are working class has been, in the 
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absence of the kind of ethnic mobilisation which would have 
transformed the class structure of Protestant Ulster, an 
essential myth. But it is a myth which, in the break up of 
the Ulster Unionist coalition, has led only into the various 
dead ends of reactionary populism. 
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1. Even where legislation existed, direct action was 
sometimes necessary to make sure it was applied. A good 
example is the Flags and Emblems Act (1954) which made it 
illegal to interfere with the Union Jack and empowered 
police to remove any other flag which might provoke a breach 
of the peace. The act was forced on a reluctant government 
by extremist Prtestant agitation in the first place, and its 
enforcement depended on similar agitation. In 1964, 
Belfast's worst riots for 30 years were provoked when 
Paisley threatened to march his supporters to the Catholic 
Falls Road area to remove an Irish tricolour from the 
election headquarters of the republican Sinn Fein movement. 
The police were forced to do the job lest worse befall. See 
Moloney and Pollak, Paisley pp.65-6 and 115-116. 
2. For a critique of such versions of the recent history of 
Afrikaner Nationalism, see Giliomee, H. "Broedertwis: Intra-
Afrikaner Conflicts in the: Transition from Apartheid" 
African Affairs 91 (1992) pp.339-364. 
3. A newspaper report early in 1993 offered a profile of 
President de Klerk's sources of information and advice. Out 
of over a dozen figures listed, all were white, male 
Afrikaners with members of the Gereformeerde Kerk and the 
Broederbond prominent. tlFW's men: whisky pals and experts" 
Weekly Mail 8-15 April 1993. Even when de klerk is credited 
with consulting outside his own party, the names mentioned 
tend to be of white male Afrikaners: "De Klerk is consulting 
people of stature outside government and ••• among them is 
former PFP leader Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert and former 
SA Council of Churches general secretary and member of the 
ANC's first 'talks' delegation Dr. C.F. Beyers Naude". 
Southern African Report 21.9.90. 
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